^ 


'^*?lll^:m^^i 


L^-^il 


Itheological  seminary,!    t 


Princeton,  N.  J. 

ease,  Div         ''  — 


■^ 


Shelf fSecl^n ^^ff^^...jL 

^^*^^^  Ns. .......  J.  l.u...ljt 


5'6^ 


3 


'5 


THE 

ANALOGY 

O      F 

RELIGION, 

NATURAL  AND  REVEALED, 

TO      THE 
CONSTITUTION  and  COURSE  of  NATURE. 

TO     WHICH     ARE     ADDED, 

TWO    BRIEF    DISSERTATIONS  : 
I,  On  Perfonal  Identity,     II.  On  the  Nature  of  Virtue. 

TOGETHER  WITH 

A      CHARGE, 

Delivered  to  the  Clergy  of  the  Diocefe  oi  Durham,  at  the  Primary  Vifitation, 
in  the  Year  mdccli. 

I 

By    JOSEPH     BUTLER,    LL.  D. 

LATE    LORD    BISHOP    OF    DURHAM. 

Fjus  (Analogia;)  ha:c  vis  eji,  ut  id  quod  dubium  ejl,  ad  aliquid  fimile  de  quo  non 
quariiur,  referat ;  tit  incerta  certis  frobet. 

QUINT.  INST.  ORAT.    L.I,    C.  6. 

A    NEW    EDITION,    CORRECTED, 

WITH      A    . 

PREFACE, 

Giving  fome  Account  of  the  Character  and  Writings  of  the  Authof., 

By  SAMUEL,  Lord  Bishop  of  GLOUCESTER. 


PRINTED    at    boston^ 
By    manning    and    L  O  R  I  N  G, 

For  DAVID  WEST,  Nb.  36,  Marl80Rouch-StR5ET% 

MDCCXCIII, 


TO    TftE     RSVEREND 

THOMAS    BALGUY, 

ARCHDEACON  AND  PREBENDARY  OF  WINCHESTER,  &c. 


Dear  Sir, 

1  TRUST  you  will  excufe  the  liberty  I  have 
itaken  of  prefixing  your  name  to  the  following  flieets  ; 
the  latter  part  of  which,  I  am  confident,  will  not  be 
thought  undeferving  of  your  approbation ;  and  of  the 
former  part  you  will  commend  the  intention  at  leafl, 
jf  not  the  execution,     in  vindicating  the  character  of 
Bilhop  Butler  from  the  afperfions  throvm  upon  it 
fince  his  death,  I  have  but  difcharged  a  common  duty 
of  humanity,  which  furvivors  owe  to  thofe  who  have 
deferved  well  of  mankind  by  their  lives  or  writings, 
when  they  are  pafl  the  power  of  appearing  in  their 
own  defence.     And  if  what  I  have  added,  by  way  of 
opening  the  general  defign  of  the  works  of  this  great 
Prelate,  be  of  ule  in  exciting  the  younger  clafs  of  flu- 
dents  in  our  univerfities  to  read,  and  fo  to  read  as  to 
Underftand,  the  Two  Volumes  prepared  and  publifli- 
ed  by  the  Author  himfelf ;  I  flatter  myfelf  I  fhall 
have  done  no  inconllderable  fervice  to  morality  and 
religion.     Your  time  and  ftudies  have  been  long  fuc- 
cefsfully  devoted  to  the  fupport  of  the  fame  grea(; 
caufe ;    and  in  what  you  have  lately  given  to  the 
world,  both  as  an  author  and  an  editor,  you  have 
largely  contributed  to  the  defence  of  our  common 
Chrlflianity,  and  of  what  was  efleemed  by  one,  who 
v/as  perfedly  competent  to  judge,  its  beft  eftabiifh- 
A  2  ment. 


iV 

ment,  the  Church  of  Englani^.  In  the  prereiit 
pubhcation  I  confider  myfelf  as  a  fellow-labourer  with 
you  in  the  fame  delign,  and  tracing  the  path  you 
Iiave  trod  before,  but  at  great  diilance,  and  with 
unequal  paces.  When,  by  his  Majesty's  good- 
nefs,  I  was  raifed  to  that  flation  of  eminence  in  the 
church,  to  which  you  had  been  firft  named,  and 
which,  On  account  of  the  infirmity  of  your  health, 
you  had  defired  to  decline  ;  it  was  honour  enough 
for  me  on  fuch  an  occafion  to  have  been  thought 
of  next  to  you  :  And  I  know  of  no  better  rule  by 
which  to  govern  my  conduct,  fo  as  not  to  difcredit 
the  royal  hand  which  conferred  on  me  fo  fignal 
and  unmerited  a  favour,  than  in  cafes  of  difficulty 
to  put  the  queflion  to  myfelf.  How  you  would  prob- 
ably have  afted  in  the  fame  (ituation.  You  fee,  Sir, 
I  flill  look  up  to  you,  as  I  have  been  wont,  both  a3 
my  fuperior  and  my  example.  That  I  may  long 
reap  the  benefit  of  your  advice  and  friendfhip  ;  and 
that  fuch  a  meafure  of  health  and  ftrength  may  be 
continued  to  you,  as  may  enable  you  to  pais  the 
evening  of  your  days  with  comfort,  and  enjoy  the 
blelTmgs  of  the  life  you  love,  is  the  cordial  wifh  of. 
Dear  Sir, 

Your  very  affedtionate 
and  faithful  Servant, 

S.  GLOUCESTER. 

Dartmouth-Street,  Weftminfterj 
nth  May,  1786.    ' 


PREFACE   BY    THE   EDITOR. 


"When  I  confider  how  light  a  matter  very  often  fubjcfts  the 
beft  eftabliflied  charafters  to  the  fufpicions  of  porterity, 
pofterity  often  as  malignant  to  virtue  as  the  age  that  faw  it 
was  envious  of  its  glory  ;  and  how  ready  a  remote  age  is  to 
catch  at  a  low  revived  flander.  which  the  times  that  brought 
it  forth  faw  defpifed  and  forgotten  almofl:  in  its  biith  ;  I 
cannot  but  think  it  a  matter  that  deferves  attention." — Let~ 
ter  to  the  Editor  of  the  Letters  on  the  Spirit  of  Patriotifm,  &c. 
by  Bp.  Warburton.     See  his  Works,  Vol.  VII.  p.  547. 

X  HE  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  the  Dio- 
cefe  of  Durham,  which  is  fubjoinecl  ,to  the  prefent 
volume,  was  printed  and  pubhlhed  in  the  year  1751, 
by  the  learned  Prelate,  whofe  name  it  bears ;  and, 
together  with  the  Sermons  and  Analogy  of  the 
fame  writer,  both  too  well  known  to  need  a  more 
particular  dcfcription,  completes  the  collection  of  his 
works.  It  has  long  been  confidered  as  a  matter  of 
curiofity,  on  account  of  its  fcarcenefs  ;  and  it  is  equal- 
ly curious  on  other  accounts,  its  fubjedt,  and  the  cal- 
umny to  which  it  gave  occalion,  of  reprefenting  the 
Author  as  addi£ied  to  fuperftition,  as  inclined  to  popery, 
and  as  d]Hiig  in  the  cotnmunion  of  the  church  of  Rome. 
The  improved  edition  of  the  Biographia  Britannica., 
now  publifhing  under  the  care  of  Dr.  Kippis,  having 
unavoidably  brought  this  calumny  again  into  notice  ^ 
it  may  not  be  unleafonable  to  offer  a  few  refleilions 
in  this  place,  by  way  of  obviating  any  impreffions  that 
may  hence  arife,  to  the  difadvantage  of  fo  great  a 
charadter  as  that  of  the  late  BifliLop  Butler  j  refer- 
ring thofe  who  deiire  a  more  pai:tic;ular  account  of  his 
life,  to  the  third  volume  of  the :  fame  entertaining 
work,  printed  in  1784.     Art.  Butler  fjo/eph.j 

^    I.  The 


vl  PREFACE 

I.  The  principal  defign  of  the  Bifhop,  in  his  CIiai"ge, 
is  to  exhort  his  Clergy  to  *'  do  their  part  towards  re- 
viving a  practical  fenfe  of  religion  amongft  the  people 
committed  to  their  care  ;"  and,  as  one  way  of  elFedt- 
ing  this,  to  *'  inftrud  them  in  the  importance  of  exter^ 
nal  religion^''  or  the  ufcfulnefs  of  outward  obfcr\'ances 
in  promoting'  inward  piety.     Now,  from  the  com- 
pound nature  of  man,  confiding  of  two  parts,  the 
body  and  the  mind,  together  with  the  influence  which 
thefe  are  found  to  have  on  one  another,  it  follov/s, 
that  the  religious  regards  of  fuch  a  creature  ought  to 
be  fo  framed,  as  to  be  in  fome  way  properly  accom- 
ir^odated  to  both.     A  religion  which  is  purely  fpirit-. 
ual,  dripped  of  every  thing  that  may  af!e(5t  the  fenfes, 
and  confidered  only  as  a  divine  philofophy  of  the 
mind,  if  it  do  not  mount  up  into  enthufiafm,  as  has 
frequently  been  the  cafe,  often  fmks,  after  a  few  fiiort 
fervours,  into  indifference  :   An  abftracVed  invilible 
obje6t,  like  that  which  natural  religion  offers,  ceafes 
to  move  or  intereft  the  heart ;  and  fomcthing  further 
is  wanting  to  bring  it  nearer,  and  render  it  more  pref- 
ent  to  our  viev/,than  merely  an  intellectual  contempla-. 
tion.     On  the  other  hand,  when,  in  order  to  remedy 
this  inconvenience,  recourfe  is  had  to  inftituted  forms 
and  ritual  injundions  ;  there  is  always  danger  left  men 
be  tempted  to  reft  entirely  on  thefe,  and  perfuade 
themfelves  that  a  painful  attention  to  fuch  obfervances 
will  atone  for  the  want  of  genuine  piety  and  virtue.. 
Yet  furely  there  is  a  way  of  fteering  fafely  between 
thefe  two  extremes ;  of  lb  confulting  both  the  parts 
of  our  conftitution,  that  the  body  and  the  mind  may 
concur  in  rendering  our  religious  fervices  acceptable 
to  God,  and  at  the  fame  time  ufefui  to  ourfelves. 
And  what  way  can  this  be,  but  precifely  that  which 
is  recommended  in  the  Charge  ;  fuch  a  cultivation  of 
outward  as  well  as  inward  religion,  that  from  both 
may  refult,  what  is  the  point  chiefly  to  be  laboured 

aftet. 


Y    THE    EDITOR. 


VII 


after,  and  at  all  events  to  be  fecured,  a  correfpondent 
temper  and  behaviour ;  or,  in  other  words,  fuch  an 
application  of  the  forms  of  godlinefs  as  may  be  fub- 
fervient  in  promoting  the  power  and  fpirit  of  it  ?    No 
man  who  believes  the  Scriptures  of  the  Old  and  New 
Teftament,  and  underftands  what  he  believes,  but 
mufh  know,  that  external  religion  is  as  much  enjoin- 
ed, and  conftitutes  as  real  a  part  of  revelation,  as  that 
which  is  internal.      The    many    ceremonies  in  ufe 
among  the  Jews,  in  confequence  of  a  divine  com- 
mand ;  the  baptifm  of  water,  as  an  emblem  of  moral 
purity  ;  the  eating  and  drinking  of  bread  and  wine, 
as  fymbols  and  reprefentations  of  the  body  and  blood 
of  Chrift,  required  of  Chriftians,  are  proofs  of  this. 
On  comparing  thefe  two  parts  of  religion  together, 
one,  it  is  immediately  feen,  is  of  much  greater  impor- 
tance than  the  other  ;  and,  whenever  they  happen  to 
interfere,  is  always  to  be  preferred  :  But  does  it  follow 
from  hence,  that  therefore  that  other  is  of  little  or  no 
importance,   and,  in  cafes  where  there  is  no  compe- 
tition, may  entirely  be  neglected  ?    Or  rather  is  not 
the  legitimate  conclufion  direftly  the  reverfe,  that 
nothing  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  of  little  importance, 
which  is  of  any  ufe  at  all  in  preferving  upon  our  minds 
a  fenie  of  the  Divine  Authority,  which  recals  to  our 
remembrance  the  obligations  we  are  under,  and  helps 
to  keep  us,  as  the  Scripture  expreffes  it,  in  the  fear  of 
the  Lord  all  the  day  long  ?*    If,  to  adopt  the  inftance 
mentioned  in  the  Charge,  the  fight  of  a  Church 
fhould  remind  a  man  of  fome  fentiment  of  piety  ;  if, 
from  the  view  of  a  material  building  dedicated  to  the 
fervice  of  God,  he  fhould  be  led  to  regard  himfelf,  his 
own  body,  as  a  living  temple  of  the  Holy  Ghofi,^-  and 
therefore  no  more  than  the  other  to  be  profaned  or 
defecrated  by  any  thing  that  defileth  or  is  im.pure  j 
could  it  be  truly  faid  of  fuch  a  one  that  he  was  fuper- 

ftitious, 

*  Prov.  xxiii.  17.  •)-  i  Cor.  vi.  19. 


viii  PREFACE 

ftitious,  or  miftook  the  means  of  religion  for  the  end  ? 
If,  to  ufe  another,  and  what  has  been  thought  a  more 
obnoxious  inftance,  taken  from  the  Bilhop's  prac- 
tice, a  Cross,  erefted  in  a  place  of  public  worlhip,* 
lliould  caufe  us  to  refle<5t  on  him  who  died  on  a  crofs 
for  our  falvation,  and  on  the  necefiity  of  our  oivn  dy- 
ing toftn^\  and  of  crucifying  the  fieJJi  with  its  affe^ions 
nnd  liijls  ;  \  would  any  worfe  confequences  follow  from 
fuch  fentiments  fo  excited,  than  if  the  iame  fentiments 
had  been  excited  by  the  view  of  a  pidure,  of  the  cru- 
cifixion fuppofe,  fuch  as  is  commonly  placed,  and 
with  this  very  defign,  in  foreign  churches,  and  indeed 
in  many  of  our  own  ?  Both  the  inftances  here  ad- 
duced, it  is  very  poiTible,  may  be  far  from  being  ap- 
proved, even  by  thofe  who  are  under  the  moft;  fincere 
convictions  of  the  importance  of  true  religion  ;  and  it 
is  eafy  to  conceive  how  open  to  fcorn  and  cenfure  they 
muft  be  from  others,  who  think  they  have  a  talent  for 
ridicule,  and  have  accuftomed  themfelves  to  regard  all 
pre  tendons  to  piety  as  hypocritical  or  fuperflitious. 
But  zvifdom  is  juflified  of  her  children.^  Religion  is 
what  it  is,  whether  men  zvill  hear,  or  whether  they  will, 
forbear -jW  and  whatever  in  the  fmallefl;  degree  pro- 
motes its  interefbs,  and  affifts  us  in  performing  its 
commands,  whether  that  affiftance  be  derived  from- 
the  medium  of  the  body  or  the  mind,  ought  to  be 
efteemed  of  great  weight,  and  deferving  of  our  mofl 
ferious  attention. 

However,  be  the  danger  of  fuperflition  what  it  may, 
no  one  was  more  fenfible  of  that  danger,  or  more  ear- 
neft  in  maintaining  that  external  afts  of  themfelves 
are  nothing,  and  that  moral  holinefs,  as  diftinguilhed 
from  bodily  obfervances  of  every  kind,  is  that  which 
conftitutes  the  elTence  of  religion,  than  Bilhop  But- 
ler. Not  only  the  Charge  itfelf,  the  whole  inten- 
tion 

*  See  note  [A],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 

■\  Rom.  vi.  II.  +  Gal.  v.  24. 

%  Match,  xi.  1 9.  II  Ezek.  ii.  5, 


BY    THE    EDITOR.  k 

tion  of  which  Is  plainly  nothing  more  than  to  enforce 
the  neceffity  otl  pr apical  religion,  the  reality  as  well  as 
form,  is  a  demonftration  of  this ;  but  many  paflages 
beftdes,  to  the  fame  purpofe,  feledled  from  his  other 
writings.  Take  the  two  following  as  fpecimiens.  In 
his  Analogy  he  obfer\'es  thus  :  "  Though  mankind 
have,  in  all  ages,  been  greatly  prone  to  place  their  re- 
ligion in  peculiar  pofitive  rites,  by  way  of  equivalent 
for  obedience  to  moral  precepts ;  yet,  Vv^ithout  mak- 
ing any  comparifon  at  all  between  them,  the  nature 
of  the  thing  abundantly  fhews  all  notions  of  that  kind 
to  be  utterly  fubveriive  of  true  religion  :  As  they  are, 
moreover,  contrary  to  the  whole  general  tenor  of  Scrip- 
ture ;  and  likewife  to  the  moft  exprefs  particular  dec- 
larations of  it,  that  nothing  can  render  us  accepted  of 
God,  without  moral  virtue."*  And  to  the  fame  pur- 
pofe in  his  Seyifian^  preached  before  the  Society  for  the 
Propagation  of  the  Gofpel,  in  Febraary,  1738-9. 
"  Indeed  amongft  creatures  naturally  formed  for  re- 
ligion, yet  fo  much  under  the  power  of  imagination  as 
men  are,  iuperfiiition  is  an  evil,  which  can  never  be  out 
of  light.  But  even  againft  this,  true  religion  is  a  great 
fecurity,  and  the  only  one.  True  religion  takes  up 
tiiat  place  in  the  mind,  which  fuperftition  would  ufurp, 
and  fo  leaves  little  room  for  it ;  and  likewiie  lays  iis 
under  the  ftrongeft  obligations  to  oppofe  it.  On  the 
contrar)/-,  the  danger  of  fuperftition  cannot  but  be  in- 
creafed  by  the  prevalence  of  irreligion  ;  and  by  its 
general  prevalence,  the  evil  wdll  be  unavoidable.  For 
the  common  people,  wanting  a  religion,  will  of  courfe 
take  up  with  almoft  any  fuperftition  which  is  thrown 
in  their  way  j  and,  in  procefs  of  time,  amidft  the  in- 
finite viciffitudes  of  the  political  world,  the  leaders  of 
parties  will  certainly  be  aible  to  ferve  themfelves  of  that 
fuperftition,  whatever  it  be,  which  is  getting  ground  ; 
and  v/ill  not  fail  to  carry  it  to  the  utmoft  length  their 

occafions 

*  Analorv,  Part  II.  Chan,  i. 


X  PREFACE 

occafions  require.  The  general  nature  of  the  thing 
fliews  this ;  and  hiftory  and  facl  confirm  it.  It  is 
therefore  wonderful,  thofe  people  who  feem  to  think 
there  is  but  one  evil  in  life,  that  of  fuperflition,  Ihould 
not  fee  that  atheifiu  and  profanenefs  mufl  be  the  in- 
troduftion  of  it."  * 

He  who  can  think  and  write  in  fuch  a  manner,  can 
never  be  faid  to  mifhake  the  nature  of  real  religion  : 
And  he,  who,  after  fuch  proofs  to  the  contrary,  can 
perfift  in  afTerting  of  fo  difcreet  and  learned  a  perfon, 
that  he  was  addicted  to  fuperjiition,  mud  himfelf  be 
much  a  ftranger  both  to  truth  and  charity. 

And  here  it  may  be  worth  our  while  to  obferve, 
that  the  fame  excellent  Prelate,  who  by  one  fet  of  men 
was  fufpefted  oi  fuperjUtion^  on  account  of  his  Charge^ 
has  by  another  been  reprefented  as  leaning  to  the  op- 
poiite  extreme  di  enthnjiajm^  on  account  of  his  two  dii- 
courfes  On  the  Love  of  God.  But  both  opinions  are 
equally  without  foundation.  He  was  neither  fuper- 
ftitious  nor  an  enthufiaft.  His  mind  was  much  too 
ftrong,  and  his  habits  of  thinking  and  reafoning  much 
too  ftri(51:  and  fevere,  to  fufter  him  to  defcend  to  the 
weakneffes  of  either  charafter.  His  piety  was  at  once 
fervent  and  rational.  When,  imprelfed  with  a  gener- 
ous concern  for  the  declining  caufe  of  religion,  he  la- 
boured to  revive  its  dying  interefts,  nothing  he  judged 
would  be  more  effeftual  to  that  end,  among  creatures 
{o  much  engaged  with  bodily  things,  and  fo  apt  to  be 
affefted  with  whatever  flrongiy  folicits  the  fenfes  as 
men  are,  than  a  religion  of  fuch  a  fram.e  as  fnould  in 
its  exercife  require  the  joint  exertions  of  the  body  and 
the  mind.  On  the  other  hand,  when  penetrated  wiih 
the  dignity  and  importance  of  the  firjl  and  great  com- 
mandment.'f  Love  to  God,  he  fet  himleif  to  inquire, 
what  thofe  movements  of  the  heart  are,  which  are  due 
to  him,  the  Author  and  Caufe  of  ail  things  ;  he  found, 

in 

*  Serm.  XVI.  p.  3:39,  340.     Ed.  4tb,  1749. 
f  Matth.  x.\ii.  38. 


BY     THE    EDITOR.  xi 

jn  the  cooled  way  of  confideratlon,  that  God  is  the 
natural  objeft  of  they^;;?^  aifetftions  of  gratitude,  rev- 
erence, fear,  defire  of  approbation,  triillj  and  depend- 
ence ;  the  fame  affedtions  in  kindy  though  doubtlefs  in. 
a  very  difproportionate  degree,  vj\\\c\\  any  one  would 
feel  from  contemplating  a  perfed;  character  in  a  crea-^ 
ture,  in  which  goodnefs  with  v.^fdoni  and  power  are 
fuppofed  to  be  the  predominant  qualities,  with  the 
further  circumftance  that  this  creature  was  alfo  his 
governor  and  friend.  This  fubjetft  is  manifeitly  a 
real  one ;  there  is  nothing  in  it  fanciful  or  unreafon- 
able.  Tliis  way  of  being  affecfted  towards  God  is  piety, 
in  the  flrideft  fenfe  :  This  is  religion,  conlidered  as  a 
habit  of  mind  ;  a  religion,  fuited  to  the  nature  and 
condition  of  man.* 

II.  From  fuperflition  to  popery  the  tranlition  is 
eafy.  No  wonder  then,  that,  in  the  progrefs  of  de- 
tradlion,  the  hmple  imputation  of  the  former  of  thefe, 
with  which  the  attack  on  the  charader  of  our  Author 
was  opened,  fliould  be  followed  by  the  more  aggra- 
vated imputation  of  the  latter.  Nothing,  I  think, 
can  fairly  be  gathered  in  fupport  of  fuch  a  fuggeflion 
from  the  Charge^  in  which  popery  is  barely  mentioned, 
and  cccaiionally  only,  and  in  a  fentence  or  tvvo  ;  yet 
even  there,  it  fnould  be  remarked,  the  Billiop  takes 
care  to ,  defcribe  the  peculiar  obfervances  required  by 
it,  "  fome  as  in  themlelves  wrong  and  fuperftitious, 
and  others  of  them  as  being;  made  fubfervient  to  the 
purpofes  of  fuperflition."  With  refpeft  to  his  other 
writings,  any  one  at  all  converfant  with  them  needs 
not  to  be  told,  that  the  matters  treated  of  both  in 
his  Sermons  and  his  Analogy  did,  none  of  them,  direct- 
ly lead  him  to  confider,  and  much  lefs  to  combat,  the 
opinions,  whether  relating  to  Faith  or  Worfliip,  which 
are  pecuUar  to  the  Church  of  Rom.e  :  It  might  there- 
fore have  happened,  yet  without  any  jufl  conclufion 

ariiing 

*  See  aote  [B],  at  the  eadoi  this  Preface. 


xn  PREFACE 

arillng;  from  thence,  of  beinp;  himfelf  inclined  to  favour 
thofe  opinions,  that  he  had  never  mentioned,  fo  much 
as  incidentally,  the  fubject  of  popery  at  all.  But  for- 
tunately for  the  reputation  of  the  Billiop,  and  to  the 
eternal  difgrace  of  his  calumniators,  even  this  poor 
refource  is  wanting  to  fupport  their  m.alevolence.  In 
his  Sermon  at  St,  Bride's,  before  the  Lord  Mayor,  in 
1740,  after  having  faid  that  "  our  laws  and  whole 
confbtution  go  more  upon  fuppofition  of  an  equality 
amongil  m^ankind,  than  the  conilitution  and  laws  of 
other  countries  ;"  he  goes  on  to  obferve,  that  '*  this 
plainly  requires,  that  more  particular  regard  fliould  he 
bad  to  the  education  of  the  lower  people  here,  than  in 
places  v^^here  they  are  born  flaves  of  power,  and  to  be 
w.^idt  f.aves  of  fnperftition  :'' *  Meaning  evid>:rntly  in 
this  place  by  the  general  term  fuperftition,  the  partic- 
ular errors  of  the  Romanifts.  This  is  fomething  ;  but 
we  have  a  ftill  plainer  indication  what  his  fentiments 
concerning  popery  really  were,  from  another  of  his 
Additional  Sermons,  1  mean  that  before  the  Houfe  of 
Lords,  on  June  the  nth,  1 747,  the  anniverfary  of  his 
late  Majefty's  acceilion.  The  palfage  alluded  to  is  as 
follows,  and  my  readers  will  not  be  diipleafed  that  I 
give  it  them  at  length.  "  The  value  of  our  religious 
eftablifliment  ought  to  be  very  much  heightened  in 
our  efteem,  by  confidering  what  it  is  a  fecurity  from  i 
1  mean  that  great  corruption  of  Chrifbianity,  popery, 
which  is  ever  hard  at  work  to  bring  us  again  under 
its  yoke.  Whoever  will  coniider  the  popilli  claims 
to  the  difpofal  of  the  whole  earth,  as  of  divine  right, 
to  difpenfe  \nt\\  the  moft  facred  engagements,  the 
claims  to  fupreme  abfolute  authority  in  religion  ;  in 
Ihort,  the  general  claims  which  the  Canonifts  exprefs 
by  the  words,  plenitude  of  power— v^A\OQ\'Qr,  I  fay,  will 
confider  popery  as  it  is  profelied  at  Romey  may  fee, 
that  it  i§  manifeft,  open  ufurj)ari on  of  all  human  and 

divine 

*  Serm.  XVII.  p.  36^ 


BY    THE    EDITOR.  xiii 

divine  authority.  But  even  in  thofe  Roman-catholic 
countries  where  thefe  monftrous  claims  are  not  ad- 
mitted, and  the  civil  power  does,  in  many  refpeds, 
rcftrain  the  papal ;  yet  perfecution  is  profefTed,  as  it 
is  abfolutely  enjoined  by  what  is  acknowledged  to  be 
their  higheft  authority,  a  General  Council,  To  called, 
with  the  Pope  at  the  head  of  it ;  and  is  pra^lifed  in 
all  of  them,  I  think,  without  exception,  where  it  can 
be  done  fafely.  Thus  they  go  on  to  fubfcitute""  force 
inflead  of  argument,  and  external  profeiTion  made  by 
force  inftead  of  reafonable  conviction.  And  thus 
corruptions  of  the  groffeft  fort  have  been  in  vogue^ 
for  many  generations,  in  many  parts  of  Chriflendom  ; 
and  are  lb  ftill,  even  where  popery  obtains  in,  its  leafb 
abfurd  form  :  And  their  antiquity  and  wide  extent 
are  infilled  upon  as  proofs  of  their  truth  ;  a  kind  of 
proof  which  at  beft  can  only  be  prefumptive,  but 
which' lofes  all  its  little  weight,  in  proportion  as  the 
long  and  large  prevalence  of  fuch  corruptions  have 
been  obtained  by  force."*  In  another  part  of  the, 
fame  fermon,  where  he  is  again  ipeaking  of  our  ec- 
cleliaftical  conftitutiori,  he  reminds  his  audience  that 
it  is  to  be  valued,  "  not  becaufe  it  leaves  us  at  liberty 
to  have  as  little  rehgion  as  we  pleafe,  without  being 
accountable  to  human  judicatories  ;  but  bccaule  it 
exhibits  to  our  view,  and  enforces  upon  our  con- 
fciences,  genuine  Chriftianity,  free  from  the  iupcrfti- 
tions  with  which  it  is  defiled  in  other  countries  ;'* 
which  fuperftitions,  he  obferves,  "  naturaUy  tend  to 
abate  its  force." -f  The  date  of  this  Sermon  fhould 
here  be  attended  to.  It  was  preached  in  June,  1 747  ; 
that  is,  four  years  before  the  delivery  and  publication 
of  the  Charge,  which  was  in  the  year  1751  ;  and  ex- 
_adly  five  years  before  the  Author  died,  which  was  in 
June,  1752.  We  have  then,  in  the  palTagcs  now 
.laid  before  the  reader,  a  clear  and  unequivocal  proof, 

broudit 

^■'  Serni.  XX,  p.  440 — 44^,  -j-  P.  449. 


stv  PREFACE 

brought  down  to  within  a  few  years  of  Bifhop  But^ 
ler's  death,  that  popery  was  held  by  hhn  in  the  ut- 
moft  abhorrence,  and  that  he  regarded  it  in  no  other 
h'ght  than  as  the  great  corruption  of  Chrijiianlty ,  and  a 
manifeji^  open  ujurpatlon  of  all  human  and  divine  author- 
ity. The  argument  is  deciiive  ;  nor  will  any  thing  be 
of  force  to  invalidate  it,  unlefs  from  fome  after-ki^ 
during  the  fhort  remainder  of  the  Bidiop's  life,  befides 
that  of  delivering  and  printing  his  Charge,  (which, 
after  what  I  have  faid  here,  and  in  the  Notes  added 
to  this  Preface  and  to  the  Charge,  I  mull  have  leave 
to  confider  as  affording:  no  evidence  at  all  of  his  in- 
clination  to  papiflical  doctrines  or  ceremonies)  the 
contrary  (hall  incontrovertibly  appear. 

III.  One  fuch  after-atl,  however,  has  been  alleg-* 
ed,  which  v/ould  effeftually  demolifh  all  that  we  have 
urged  in  behalf  of  our  Prelate,  were  it  tnle,  as  is  pre- 
tended, that  he  died  in  the  communion  of  the  church  of 
Rome.  Had  a  ftory  of  this  fort  been  invented  and 
propagated  by  Papifts,  the  wonder  might  have  been 
lefs  : 

Hoc  Ithacus  velit,  Sc  magno  mercentur  Atridse. 

But  to  the  reproach  of  proteftantifm,  the  fabricatloa 
of  this  calumny,  for  fuch  we  fliall  find  it,  originated 
from  among  ourfelves.  It  is  pretty  remarkable,  that 
a  circumftance  fo  extraordinary  fhould  never  have  been 
divulged  till  the  year  1767,  fifteen  years  after  the  Bifli- 
op's  deceafe.  At  that  time  DhThomasSecker  was 
Archbifhop  of  Canterbury  ;  who  of  all  others  was 
the  moft  likely  to  know  the  truth  or  falfehood  of  the 
fact  alTerted,  having  been  educated  with  our  author  in 
his  early  youth,  and  having  lived  in  a  conftant  habit 
of  intimacy  with  him  to  the  very  time  of  his  death. 
The  good  Archbilhop  was  not  filent  on  this  occafion  : 
With  a  virtuous  indignation  he  flood  forth  to  prote<3: 
the  poflhumous  character  of  his  friend  ;  and  in  a  pub- 
lic newfpaper,  under  the  fignature  of  MiJoj^feudeSy  call- 
ed 


BY    THE    EDITOR.  xv 

ed  upon  his  accufer  to  fupport  Vv'hat  he  had  advanced, 
by  whatever  proofs  he  could.     No  provof,  however,  nor 
any  thing  like  a  proof,  appeared  in  reply  ;  and  every 
nian  of  fenfe  and  candour  at  that  time  v/as  perfedly 
convinced  the  alfertion  was  entirely  groundlefs.*     As 
a  further  confirmation  of  the  rectitude  of  this  judg- 
ment, it  may  not  be  amifs  to  mention,  there  is  yet  in 
exiftence  a  ftrong  prefumptivc  argument  at  lead  in  its 
favour,  drawn  from  the  teftimony  of  thofe  v*^ho  attend- 
ed our  author  in  the  ficknefs  of  which  he  died.     The 
laft  days  of  this  excellent  Prelate  were  palTed  at  Bath  ; 
Dr.  N  A  T  H  A N  A  E  L  F  o  R  s  T  E  R ,  his  chaplain,  being  con- 
tinually with  him  ;  and  for  one  day,  and  at  the  very 
end  of  his  illnefs.  Dr.  Martin  Benson  aUo,  the  then 
Bilhop  of  Gloucester,  who  fhortened  his  own  life 
in  his  pious  hafte  to  viht  his  dying  friend.     Both  thele 
perfons  conilantly  wrote  letters  to  Dr.  Secker,  then 
Bifhop  of  Oxford,  containing  accounts  of  Biihop 
Butler's  declining  health,  and  of  the  fymptoms  and 
progrefs  of  his  diforder,  which,  as  was  conjedlured,  foon 
terminated  in  his  death.     Thefe  letters,  which  are  fcill 
preferved  in  the  Lambeth  library,-^-  I  have  read  ;  and 
not  the  flendereft  argument  can  be  collected  from 
them,  in  juftification  of  the  ridiculous  flander  we  are 
here  confiderino;.     If  at  that  awful  feafon  tlie  Bilhoo 
was  not  known  to  have  exprefied  any  opinion,  tending 
to  fhew  his  dijlike  to  popery  ;  neither  was  he  known 
to  have  faid  any  thing,  that  could  at  ail  be  conftrued 
in  approbation  of  it :   And  the  natural  prefumption  is, 
that  whatever  fentiments  he  had  formerly  entertained 
concerning  that  corrupt  fyflem  oi  religion,  he  contin- 
ued to  entertain  them  to  the  laft.     The  truth  is,  nei- 
ther the  word  nor  the  idea  of  poper}'"  feems  once  to 
have  occurred  either  to  the  Eilhop  himfelf,  or  to  thofe 
who  watched  his  parting  moments  :    Their  thoughts 
were  otherwife  engaged.     His  diforder  had  reduced 

hiui 

*  See  note  [C],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 
f  See  uwte  [p],  at  the  end  of  tliif  Pixfai;?. 


svi  PREFACE 

him  to  fuch  debility,  as  to  render  him  incapable  of 
fpeaking  much  or  long  on  any  fubjedt ;  the  few  bright 
intervals  that  occurred  were  paffed  in  a  ftate  of  the  ut- 
mofl  tranquillity  and  compofure  ;  and  in  that  compo- 
fure  he  expired.  Mark  the  perfe5i  man,  mid  behold  the 
upright ;  for  the  end  of  that  man  is  peace.* — Let  me  die 
the  death  of  the  righteous^  and  let  my  lafi  end  he  like  his  l\ 
Out  of  pure  lefpeft  for  the  virtues  of  a  man,  whom 
I  had  never  the  happinefs  of  knowing,  or  even  of  fee- 
ing, but  from  whole  writings  I  have  received  the  great- 
eft  benefit  and  illumination,  and  which  I  have  reafon 
to  be  thankful  to  Providence  for  having  early  thrown 
in  my  way ;  1  have  adventured,  in  what  I  have  now 
offered  to  the  public,  to  ftep  forth  in  his  defence,  and 
to  vindicate  his  honeft  fame  from  the  attacks  of  thofe, 
who,  Vv/ith  the  vain  hope  of  bringing  down  fuperior 
characters  to  their  own  level,  are  forever  at  work  in  de- 
trafting  from  their  juft  praife.  For  the  hterary  repu- 
tation of  Bilhop  Butler,  it  ftands  too  high  in  the 
opinion  of  the  world,  to  incur  the  danger  of  any  dimi- 
nution ;  but  this  in  truth  is  the  leafh  of  his  excellen- 
cies. He  was  more  than  a  good  writer,  he  was  a  good 
man  ;  and,  what  is  an  addition  even  to  this  eulogy,  he. 
was  a  fmcere  Chriftian.  His  whole  ftudy  was  diredied 
to  the  knowledge  and  praftice  of  found  morality  and 
true  religion  :  Thefe  he  adorned  by  his  life,  and  has 
recommended  to  future  ages  in  his  v/ritings ;  in  which, 
if  my  judgment  be  of  any  avail,  he  has  done  effential 
fervice  to  both  ;  as  much,  perhaps,  as  any  lingle  per- 
fbn,  fmce  the  extraordinary  gifts  of  the  zvord  of  wif- 
dom  and  the  word  of  knowledge']^  have  been  withdrawn. 


IN  what  follows,  I  propofe  to  give  a  Ihort  account 
of  the  Bifhop's  Moral  and  Religious  Systems, 
as  thefe  are  colleded  from  his  works. 

I.  Hi^ 

*  PL  xxxvii.  37.  f  Numb,  xxiii.  lo,  %  i  Cor.  xii.  S, 


BY    THE    EDITOR.  xvii 

I.  His  way  of  treating  the  fubjed  of  morals  is  to  be 
gathered  from  the  volume  of  his  Sermons,  and  par- 
ticularly from  the  three  firil,  and  from  the  preface  to 
that  volume. 

"  There  is,"  as  our  Author  with  fmgular  fagacity 
has  obferved,  "  a  much  more  exa6t  correfpondence  be- 
tween the  natural  and  moral  world,  than  we  are  apt  to 
take  notice  of."  *  The  inward  frame  of  man  anfwers 
to  his  outward  condition.  The  feveral  propenfities, 
pallions,  and  afFeftions,  implanted  in  our  hearts  by  the 
Author  of  nature,  are  in  a  peculiar  manner  adapted  to 
the  circumftances  of  life  in  which  he  hath  placed  us. 
This  general  obfervation,  properly  purfued,  leads  to 
feveral  important  conclulions.  The  original  internal 
conftitution  of  man,  compared  with  his  external  con- 
dition, enables  us  to  difcern  what  courfe  of  action  and 
behaviour  that  conftitution  leads  to,  what  is  our  duty 
refpeAing  that  condition,  and  furniOies  us  befides  with 
the  moft  powerful  arguments  to  the  pradlice  of  it. 

What  the  inward  frame  and  conftitution  of  man  is, 
is  a  queftion  of  fa6l,  to  be  determined,  as  other  facts 
are,  from  experience,  from  our  internal  feelings  and 
external  fenfes,  and  from  the  teftimony  of  others. 
Whether  human  nature,  and  the  circumftances  in 
which  it  is  placed,  might  not  have  been  ordered  other- 
wife,  is  foreign  to  our  inquiry,  and  none  of  our  con- 
cern :   Our  province  is,  taking  both  of  thefe  as  they 
are,  and  viewing  the  connexion  between  them,  from 
that  connexion  to  difcover,  if  we  can,  what  courfe  of 
adtion  is  fitted  to  that  nature  and  thofe  circumftances. 
From  contemplating  the  bodily  fenfes,  and  the  organs 
or  inftmments  adapted  to  them,  we  learn  that  the  eye 
was  given  to  fee  with,  the  ear  to  hear  with.     In  like 
manner,  from  confidering  our  inward  perceptions  and 
the  final  caufes  of  them,  we  collect  that  the  feeling  of 
ihame,  for  inftance,  was  given  to  prevent  the  doin^  of 
B  things 

*  Serm,  VI, 


nvm  P    R    E    j^    A    C    E 

things  fliameful  ^  compaffion,  to  carry  us  to  rel!0\'(* 
others  in  diftrefs  ;  anger,  to  refift  fudden  violence  of-' 
fered  to  ourfelves.  if,  coiitiniMng  o\h"  inquiries  in  thi'j 
way,  it  fhould  at  length  appear,  that  the  nature,  the 
whole  nature  of  man,- leads  him  to  and  is  fitted  for  that 
particular  courfe  of  behaviour,  which  we  ufually  dif-^ 
tinguifli  by  the  name  of  virtue  ;  we  are  authorized  to 
conclude,  that  virtue  is  the  law  we  are  born  under,  that 
it  was  fo  intended  by  the  Author  of  out  being ;  and 
we  are  bound  by  the  moft  intimate  of  ail  obligations,  a<- 
regard  to  our  own  highefc  intereft  and  happinefs,  tp- 
conform  to  it  in  all  fltuatic/ns  and  events. 

Human  nature  is  not  fuuple  and  uniform,  but  made 
up  of  feveral  parts  ;  and'  we  can  hate  no  jufl  idea  of  it 
as  a  fyftem  or  conftitution,  unlefs  v/e  take  into  our  view' 
the  refpedls  and  relations  which  thefe  parts  have  to  each, 
other.  As  the  body  is  not  one  member,  but  many, 
fo  our  inward  ftrufture  conhfcs  of  various  inftincls, 
appetites,  and  propenfions.  Thus  far  there  is  no  dif- 
ference between  human  creatures  and  brutes.  But 
befides  thefe  common  paffions  and  affections,  there  is 
another  principle,  peculiar  to  mankind,  that  of  con-- 
fcience,  moral  fenfe,  refleftion,  call  it  what  you  pleafe, 
by  which  they  are  enabled  to  review  their  whole  con- 
duft,  to  a.pprove  of  fome  aftions  in  themfelves,  and  t<y 
dil  approve  of  others.  That  this  principle  will  of  courfe 
have/owf  influence  on  our  behaviour,  at  leaft  at  times, 
will  hardly  be  difputed  :  But  the  particular  influence 
which  it  oug/it  to  have,  the  precife  degree  of  power  ia 
the  regulating  of  our  internal  fra,me  that  is  afhgned  it 
by  him  who  placed  it  there,  is  a  point  of  the  utmoft 
confequence  in  itfelf,  and  on  the  determination  of 
which  the  very  hinge  of  our  Author's  moral  i'yftem 
turns.  If  the  faculty  here  fpoken  of  be,  indeed,  what 
it  is  afTerted  to  be,  in  nature  and  kind  fuperior  to  every 
other  pafhon  and  affeftion  ;  if  it  be  given,  not  merel5!f 
tha;t  it  may  exert  its  force  occafionally,  or  as  our  pref- 

ent 


:bY    TPtfi    EDITOR.  xk 

ent  humour  or  fancy  may  difpofe  us,  but  that  it  may 
at  all  times  Jexercife  an  uncontrollable  authority  and 
government  over  all  the  reft  ;  it  will  then  follow,  that 
in  order  to  complete  the  idea  of  human  nature,  as  a 
fyftem,  we  muft  not  only  take  in  each  particular  bias, 
propenfion,  inftinft,  which  are  feen  to  belong  to  it,  but 
we  muft  add,,  befides  the  principle  of  confcience,  to- 
gether with  the  fubjection  that  is  due  to  it  from  all  the 
other  appetites  and  pafiions ;  juft  as  the  idea  of  a  civil 
conftitution  is  formed,  not  barely  from  enumerating 
the  feveral  menibers  and  ranks  of  which  it  is  compofed, 
but  from  thefe  confidered  as  a6ting  in  various  degrees 
of  fubordination  to  each  other,  and  all  under  the  di- 
redlion  of  the  fame  fiipreme  authority,  whether  thai: 
authority  be  vefted  in  one  perfon  or  more. 

The  view  here  given  of  the  internal  conftitution  of 
man,  and  of  the  fupremacy  of  confcience,  agreeably 
to  the  conceptions  of  Biiliop  Butler,  enables  us  to 
comprehend  the  force  of  that  expreffion,  common  to 
him  and  the  ancient  moralifts,  that  virtue  confifts  in 
foUozving  nature.  The  meaning  cannot  be,  that  it 
confifts  in  adling  agreeably  to  that  propenfity  of  our 
nature  which  happens  to  be  the  ftrongeft  ;  or  which 
propels  us  towards  certain  objefts,  without  any  regard 
to  the  methods  by  which  they  are  to  be  obtained  ;  but 
the  meaning  muft  be,  that  virtue  confifts  in  the  due 
regulation  and  fubjedion  of  all  the  other  appetites  and 
affecftions  to  the  fuperior  faculty  of  confcience  ;  from 
a  conformity  to  which  alone  our  actions  are  properly 
natural,  or  correfpondent  to  the  nature,  to  the  whole 
nature  of  fuch  an  agent  as  man.  From  hence  too  it 
appears,  that  the  Author  of  our  frame  is  by  no  means 
indifferent  to  virtue  and  vice,  or  has  left  us  at  liberty 
to  a(5t  at  random,  as  humour  or  appetite  may  prompn 
us  ;  but  that  every  man  has  the  rule  of  right  within 
him  ;  a  rule  attended  in  the  very  notion  of  it  with  au- 
thority, and  fuch  as  has  the  force  of  a  dire(ftion  and  a 
B  2  command 


XX  PREFACE 

command  from  him,  who  made  us  what  we  are,  what 
courfe  of  behaviour  is  fuited  to  olir  nature,  and  which 
he  expeds  that  we  fhould  follow.  This  moral  faculty 
implies  alfo  a  pre-fentiment  and  apprehenfion,  that  the 
iuclgment  which  it  paffes  on  our  aftions,  confidered  as 
of  good  or  ill  defert,  will  hereafter  be  confirmed  by  the 
unerring  judgment  of  God  ;  when  virtue  and  happi- 
nefs,  vice  and  mifery,  whofe  ideas  are  now  fo  clofely 
conne6led,  ihall  be  indiffolubly  united,  and  the  divine 
government  be  found  to  correspond  in  the  moft  exa(5t 
propoition  to  the  nature  he  has  given  us.  Laftly,  this 
juft  prerogative  or  fupremacy  of  confcience  it  is,  which 
Mr. Pope  has  defcribed  in  his  Univerfal  Prayer^ though 
perhaps  he  may  have  exprefled  it  rather  too  ftrongly, 
v/here  he  lays, 

"  What  confcience  diflates  to  be  done,- 

"  Or  warns  me  not  to  do, 
"  This  teach  me  more  than  Hell  to  fhun, 

"  That  more  than  Heaven  purfue." 

The  reader  will  obferve,  that  this  way  of  treating 
the  fubjecfl  of  morals  by  an  appeal  to  fa5is  does  not  at 
all  interfere  with  that  other  way,  adopted  by  Dr. 
Samuel  Clarke,  and  others,  which  begins  with  inquir- 
ing into  the  relations  2ind  filnejfes  of  things ,  but  rather 
illuftrates  and  confirms  it.  That  there  afe  eflential 
differences  in  the  qualities  of  human  actions,  eflablilh- 
ed  by  nature,  and  that  this  77<?/?^m/ difference  of  things, 
prior  to  and  independent  of  all  will,  creates  a  natural 
jitnefs  in  the  agent  to  adt  agreeably  to  it,  feems  as  little 
to  be  denied,  as  that  there  is  the  wor^/ difference  before 
explained,  from  which  we  approve  and  feel  a  pleafu're  in 
what  is  right,  and  conceive  a  diftafle  to  what  is  wrong. 
Still,  however,  when  we  are  endeavouring  to  eftablilli 
either  this  moral  or  that  natural  difference,  it  ought 
never  to  be  forgotten,  or  rather  it  will  require  to  be 
diftindlly  iliewn,  that  both  of  thefe,  when  traced  up  to 
their  fource,  fuppofe  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature 

and 


BY    THE    EDITOR.  xxi 

and  moral  Ruler  of  the  world ;  who  originally  ap- 
pointed thefe  differences,  and  by  fuch  an  appoint- 
ment has  lignified  his  will  that  we  Iliould  conform 
to  them^  as  the  only  effectual  method  of  fecuring  our 
HAPPINESS  on  the  whole  under  his  government.* 
And  of  this  confideration  our  Prelate  himfelf  was  not 
unmindful ;  as  may  be  collefted  from  many  expref- 
iions  in  different  parts  of  his  writings,  and  particularly 
from  the  following  palTages  in  his  Xlth  Sermon.     "  It 
may  be  allowed,  without  any  prejudice  to  the  caufe  of 
virtue  and  religion,  that  our  ideas  of  happinefs  and  mii- 
ery  are,  of  all  our  ideas,  the  neareft  and  moft  important 
to  us ;  that  they  will,  nay,  if  you  pleafe,that  they  ought 
to  prevail  over  thofe  of  order,  and  beauty,  and  harmo- 
ny, and  proportion,  if  there  fhould  ever  be,  as  it  is  im- 
poffible  there  ever  fliould  be,  any  inconfiftence  between 
them."     And  again,  "  Though  virtue  or  moral  retti- 
tude  does  indeed  confift  in  affedion  to  and  purfuit  of 
what  is  right  and  good,  as  fuch  ;  yet,  when  we  fit  down 
in  a  cool  hour,  we  can  neither  jufbify  to  ourfelves  this 
or  any  other  purfuit,  till  we  are  convinced  that  it  will 
be  for  our  happinefs,  or  at  lead  not  contrary  to  it."  -f 

Befides  the  general  fyftem  of  morality  opened  above, 
our  Author  in  his  Volume  of  Sermons  has  ftated  with 
accuracy  the  difference  between  felf-love  and  benevo- 
lence ;  in  oppofition  to  thofe,  who  on  the  one  hand 
make  the  whole  of  virtue  to  confifb  in  benevolence,;!* 
and  to  thofe,  who  on  the  other  affert  that  every  par- 
ticular affedion  and  action  is  refolvable  into  felf-love. 
.  In  combating  thefe  opinions,  he  has  fhewn,  I  think  un- 
anfwerably,  that  there  are  the  fame  kind  of  indications 
in  human  nature  that  we  were  made  to  promote  the 
happinefs  of  others,  as  that  we  were  made  to  promote 
our  own  :  That  it  is  no  juft  objeftion  to  this,  that  we 
have  difpofitions  to  do  m/  to  others  as  well  as  good  ; 

for 

*  See  note  [E],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface.  f  Serm.  XI.  p.  229. 

J  See  the  vd  Differtation  On  the  Nature  of  Virtue,  at  the  end  of  the  Anahgv, 


xxli  PREFACE 

for  we  have  alfo  difpofitions  to  do  evil  as  well  as  good 
to  ourfehes,  to  our  own  moft  important  interefts  even 
in  this  life,  for  the  fake  of  gratifying  a  prefent  pafTion  : 
That  the  thing  to  be  lamented  is,  not  that  men  have 
too  great  a  regard  to  their  own  real  good,  but  that 
they  have  not  enough  :  That  benevolence  is  not  more 
at  variance  with  or  unfriendly  to  felf-love,  than  any 
other  particular  afFediion  is  ;  and  that,  by  confulting 
the  happinefs  of  others,  a  man  is  fo  far  from  lejfening 
his  own,  that  the  very  endeavour  to  do  fo,  though  he 
fhould  fail  in  the  accompiiiliment,  is  a  fource  of  the 
higheft  latisfa6tion  and  peace  of  mind.*  He  has  alfo, 
in  paffing,  animadverted  on  the  philofopher  oiMalmf- 
htiry,  who  in  his  book  Of  Human  Nature  has  advanced, 
as  difcoverles  in  moral  fcience,  that  benevolence  is  on- 
ly the  love  of  power,  and  compaflion  the  fear  of  future 
calamity  to  ourfelves.  And  this  our  Author  has  done, 
not  fo  much  with  the  delign  of  expoimg  the  falfe  rea,~ 
foning  of  Mr.  Hobbes,  but  becaufe  on  fo  perverfe  an 
account  of  human  nature  he  has  raifed  a  fyftem,  fub- 
verfive  of  all  juftice  and  honeity.-j~ 

II.  The  Religious  Sj^ftem  of  Bifhop  Butler  is 
chiefly  to  be  colleded  from  the  treatife,  entitled  The 
Analogy  of  Religion^  Natural  and  Revealed^  to  the  Con- 
Jlitution  and  Courje  of  Nature. 

All  things  are  double  one  againft  another,  and  God  hath 
made  nothing  imperfeEi.\  On  this  fingie  obfervation  of 
the  Son  of  Sir  achy  the  whole  fabric  of  our  Prelate's 
defence  of  religion,  in  his  Analogjy  is  raifed.  Inftead 
of  indulging  to  idle  fpcculations,  how  the  world  might 
poffibly  have  been  better  than  it  is ;  or,  forgetful  of 
the  difference  between  hypothefis  and  faft,  attempting 
to  explain  the  divine  economy  with  reipe6t  to  intelli- 
gent creatures  frcun  pre-conceived  notions  of  his  own  ; 
he  firft  inquires  what  the  conllitution  of  nature,  as 

made 

*  See  Sermons  I.  and  XI.  and  the  Preface  to  the  Volume  of  Sermons. 
;-  See  the  Notes  to  Sermon  I.  and  V.  %  Ecclus.  xlii.  24. 


BY    THE    EDITOR.  xxiii 

jnade  known  to  us  in  the  way  of  experiment,  a6tually 
IS  ;  and  from  this,  now  feen  and  acknowledged,  he  en- 
deavours to  fonu  a  judgment  of  that  larger  conftitu- 
tion,  which  religion  difcovers  to  us.  If  the  difpenfa- 
tion  of  Providence  we  are  now  under,  confidered  as 
inhabitants  of  this  world,  and  having  a  temporal  in- 
tereft  to  fecure  in  it,  be  found,  on  examination,  to  be 
analogous  to,  and  of  a  piece  with  that  further  difpen- 
fation,  which  relates  to  us  as  deiigned  for  another 
\vorld,  in  which  we  have  an  eternal  intereft,  depend- 
ing on  our  behaviour  here  ;  if  both  may  be  traced 
up  to  the  fame  general  laws,  and  appear  to  be  carried 
on  according  to  the  fame  plan  of  adminiftration  ;  the 
fair  prefumption  is,  that  both  proceed  from  one  and 
the  lame  Author.  And  if  the  principal  parts  cbjefled 
to  in  this  latter  difpenfation  be  fimilar  to,  and  of  the 
fame  kind  with  what  we  certainly  experience  under 
the  former,  the  objeftions,  being  clearly  inconclufive 
in  one  cafe,  becaufe  contradided  by  plain  faft,  mufl, 
in  all  reafon,  be  allowed  to  be  inconclufive  alfo  in  the 
other. 

This  way  of  arguing  from  what  is  acknowledged  to 
what  is  difputed,  from  things  known  to  other  things 
that  refemble  them,  from  that  part  of  the  divine  eflab- 
iilhment  which  is  expofed  to  our  viev/,  to  that  more 
important  one  which  lies  beyond  it,  is  on  all  hands 
confeffed  to  be  juft.  By  this  method  Sir  Ifaac  New- 
ton has  unfolded  the  Syllem  of  Nature  ;  by  the  fame 
method  Bifhop  Butler  has  explained  the  Syfleni  of 
Grace,  and  thus,  to  ufe  the  words  of  a  writer,  whom  I 
quote  with  pleafure,  *'  has  formed  and  concluded  a 
happy  alliance  between  faith  and  philofophy."-^- 

And  althoudi  the  ar2;ument  from  analo2;v  be  al^ 
lowed  to  be  imperfett,  and  by  no  means  fufficient  to 
folve  all  difficulties  refpedfing  the  government  of  God, 
and  the  deligns  of  his  Providence  with  reoard  to  man- 

liind, 

*  Mr.  Mainuaring's  Differtatlon,  prefixed  to  his  Volume  of  Scri-.iOiis. 


XXIV 


PREFACE 


kind,  (a  degree  of  knowledge,  which  we  are  not  fbr- 
niflied  with  faculties  for  attaining,  at  leaft  in  the  pvef- 
ent  fbate)  yet  furely  it  is  of  importance  to  learn  from 
it,  that  the  natural  and  moral  world  are  intimately 
connetled,  and  parts  of  one  ftupendous  whole  or  fyf- 
tem  ;  and  that  the  chief  objedions,  which  are  brought 
againft  religion,  may  be  urged  with  equal  force  againft 
the  conftitution  and  courfe  of  nature,  where  they  are 
certainly  falfe  in  fadt.  And  this  information  we  may 
derive  from  the  work  before  us ;  the  proper  delign  of 
which,  it  may  be  of  ufe  to  obferve,  is  not  to  prove  the 
truth  of  religion  either  natural  or  revealed,  but  to  con- 
firm that  proof,  already  known,  by  conliderations  from 
analogy. 

After  this  account  of  the  method  of  reafoning  em- 
ployed by  our  Author,  let  us  now  advert  to  his  man- 
ner of  applying  it,  firft  to  the  fubjeO;  of  Natural  Re- 
ligion, and  fecondly  to  that  of  Revealed. 

I .  The  foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and  fears  is  a 
future  life  ;  and  with  this  the  treatife  begins.  Nei- 
ther the  reafon  of  the  thing,  nor  the  analogy  of  nature, 
according  to  Bifliop  Butler,  give  ground  for  imagin- 
ing, that  the  unknown  event,  death,  will  be  our  de- 
ftru(ftion.  The  flates  in  which  we  have  formerly  ex- 
ifted,  in  the  womb  and  in  infancy,  are  not  more  differ- 
ent from  each  other  than  from  that  of  mature  age  in 
which  we  now  exifl :  Therefore  that  we  fliall  continue 
to  exift  hereafter,  in  a  ftate  as  different  from  the  prefent 
as  the  prefent  is  from  thofe  through  which  we  have 
paffed  already,  is  a  prefumption  favoured  by  the  anal- 
ogy of  nature.  All  that  we  know  from  reafon  con- 
cerning death,  is  the  effedls  it  has  upon  animal  bodies : 
And  the  frequent  inftances  among  men  of  the  intel- 
ledtual  powers  continuing  in  high  health  and  vigour, 
at  the  very  time  when  a  mortal  difeafe  is  on  the  point 
of  putting  an  end  to  all  the  powers  of  fenfation,  in- 
duce us  to  hope  that  it  may  have  no  effed  at  all  on 

the 


BY    THE    EDITOR.  xxv 

the  human  foul,  not  even  fo  much  as  to  fufpend  the 
exercife  of  its  faculties  ;  though  if  it  have,  the  fuf- 
penfion  of  a  power  by  no  means  implies  its  extinftion, 
as  fleep  or  a  fwoon  may  convince  us.* 

The  probability  of  a  future  ftate  once  granted,  an 
important  quefliion  arifes,  How  beft  to  fecure  our  m- 
tereft  in  that  ftate.  We  find  from  what  paffes  daily 
before  us,  that  the  conftitution  of  nature  admits  of 
mifery  as  well  as  happinefs  ;  that  both  of  thefe  are 
the  confequences  of  our  own  aftions  ;  and  thefe  con- 
fequences  we  are  enabled  to  forefee.  Therefore,  that 
our  happinefs  or  mifery  in  a  future  world  may  depend 
on  our  own  actions  alfo,  and  that  rewards  or  punifli- 
ments  hereafter  may  follow  our  good  or  ill  behaviour 
here,  is  but  an  appointment  of  the  fame  fort  with 
what  we  experience  under  the  divine  government,  ac- 
cording to  the  regular  courfe  of  nature.-f- 

This  fuppofition  is  confirmed  from  another  circum- 
fiance,  that  the  natural  government  of  God,  under 
which  we  now  live,  is  alfo  moral  ;  in  which  rewards 
and  punifliments  are  the  confequences  of  aftions, 
confidered  as  virtuous  and  vicious.  Not  that  every 
man  is  rewarded  or  punillied  here  in  exa6t  proportion 
to  his  defert  ;  for  the  eifential  tendencies  of  virtue 
and  vice  to  produce  happinefs  and  the  contrary  are 
often  hindered  from  taking  eifed  from  accidental 
caufes.  However,  there  are  plainly  the  rudiments  and 
beginnings  of  a  righteous  adminiftration  to  be  dif- 
cerned  in  the  conftitution  of  nature  ;  from  whence 
we  are  led  to  expedt,  that  thefe  accidental  hindrances 
will  one  day  be  removed,  and  the  rule  of  diftributive 
juftice  obtain  completely  in  a  more  perfe6t  ftate.;}; 

The  moral  government  of  God,  thus  eftabliihed, 
implies  in  the  notion  of  it  fome  Ibrt  of  trial,  or  a 
mofal  pollibility  of  afting  wrong  as  well  as  right,  in 
thofe  who  are  the  fubjedts  of  it.     And  the  dodrine 

of 

♦  Pan  I,  Chap.  r.  f  Ch.  2.  J  Ch,  3. 


isxyl  PREFACE 

of  religion,  that  the  prefent  life  is  in  fad  a  flate  of 
probation  for  a  future  one,  is  rendered  credible,  from 
its  being  analogous  throughout  to  the  general  con- 
dud:  of  Providence  towards  us  with  refpeft  to  this 
world ;  in  which  prudence  is  neceflary  to  fecure  our 
temporal  intereft,  jull  as  we  are  taught  that  virtue  is 
jiecefi'ary  to  fecure  our  eternal  interefi: ;  and  both  are 
trufted  to  ourfelves.* 

But  the  prefent  life  is  not  merely  a  ftate  of  probation, 
implying  in  it  difficulties  and  danger  ;  it  is  alfo  a  ftate 
of  difcipline  and  improvement  ;  and  that  both  in  our 
temporal  and  religious  capacity.  Thus  childhood  is 
a  flate  of  difcipline  for  youth  ;  youth  for  manhood, 
and  that  for  old  age.  Strength  of  body,  and  matu- 
rity of  underftanding,  are  acquired  by  degrees ;  and 
neither  of  them  without  continual  exercife  and  atten- 
tion on  our  part,  not  only  in  the  beginning  of  life, 
but  through  the  whole  courfe  of  it.  So  again  with 
refpedt  to  our  rehgious  concerns,  the  prefent  world  is 
fitted  to  be,  and  to  good  men  is  in  event,  a  ftate  of 
difcipline  and  improvement  for  a  future  one.  The 
feveral  pafTions  and  propenllons,  implanted  in  our 
hearts,  incline  us,  in  a  multitude  of  inftances,  to  for- 
bidden pleafures  :  This  inward  infirmity  is  increafed 
by  various  fnares  and  temptations,  perpetually  occur^ 
ring  from  without.  Hence  ariies  the  neceffity  of  rec- 
olledion  and  felf-government,  of  withftanding  the 
calls  of  appetite,  and  forming  our  minds  to  habits  of 
piety  and  virtue  ;  habits,  of  which  we  are  capable, 
and  which  to  creatures  in  a  ftate  of  moral  imperfec- 
tion, and  fallen  from  their  original  integrity,  muft  be 
of  the  greateft  ufe,  as  an  additional  fecurity,  over  and 
above  the  principle  of  confcience,  from  the  dangers 
to  which  we  are  expofed.-f- 

Nor  is  the  credibility  here  given,  by  the  analogy  of 
nature,  to  the  general  dodrine  of  religion,  deftroyed 

or 

*  Ch.  4.  -f  Ch.  5.    . 


BY    THE    EDITOR.  xxvii 

or  weakened  by  any  notions  concerning  neceflity. 
-Of  itfelf  it  is  a  mere  word,  the  fign  of  an  abflradt 
,idea  ;  and  as  much  requires  an  agent,  that  is,  d  necef- 
fary  agent,  in  order  to  eflfed:  any  thing,  as  freedom  re- 
quires a  free  agent.  Admitting  it  to  be  fpeculativeiy 
true,  if  confidered  as  influencing  pradice,  it  is  the  fame 
as  falfe  ;  for  it  is  matter  of  experience,  that,  with  regard 
to  our  prefent  intereft,  and  as  inhabitants  of  this  world, 
we  are  treated  as  if  we  were  free ;  and  therefore  the  anal- 
ogy of  nature  leads  us  to  conclude,  that,  with  regard 
to  our  future  intereft,  and  as  defigned  for  another 
world,  we  fhall  be  treated  as  free  alfo.  Nor  does  tlie 
opinion  of  neceffity,  fuppofmg  it  poffible,  at  all  affect 
either  the  general  proof  of  religion,  or  its  external 
evidence.* 

Still  objedions  may  be  made  againft  the  wifdoni 
and  goodnefs  of  the  divine  government,  to  which 
analogy,  which  can  on.ly  fliew  the  truth  or  credibility 
of  facts,  affords  no  anfwer.  Yet  even  here  analogy  is 
of  ufe,  if  it  fuggeft  that  the  divine  government  is  a 
fcheme  or  fyftem,  and  not  a  number  of  unconnected 
acfts,  and  that  this  fyftem  is  alfo  above  our  compre- 
henfioji.  Now  the  government  of  tlie  natural  world 
appears  to  be  a  fyftem  of  this  kind  ;  with  parts,  re- 
lated to  each  other,  and  together  compofmg  a  whole  ; 
in  which  fyftem  ends  are  brought  about  by  tlie  ufe 
of  means,  many  of  which  means,  before  experience,, 
would  have  been  fiifpe<5ted  to  have  had  a  quite  con- 
trary tendency  ;  which  is  carried  on  by  general  laws, 
fimilar  caufes  uniformly  producing  fimilar  effed;s ;  the 
utility  of  which  general  laws,  and  tlie  inconveniences 
which  would  probably  arife  from  the  occafional  or 
even  fecret  fufpenHon  of  them,  we  are  in  fome  fort 
enabled  to  difcern  ;-i-  but  of  the  whole  we  are  incom- 
petent judges,  becaufe  of  the  linall  part  which  comes 

within 

*  Ch.  6. 

f  See  a  Treat: fc  on  Divine  Benev'jkn:c,  by  Dr.  Thonai  Balgujy  Tai  t  II. 


xxvlii  PREFACE 

ivithin  our  view.  Reafoning  then  from  what  we 
know,  it  is  highly  credible,  that  the  government  of 
the  moral  world  is  a  fyftem  alfo,  carried  on  by  general 
laws,  and  in  which  ends  are  accompliHied  by  the  in- 
ten^ention  of  means ;  and  that  both  conftitutions,  the 
natural  and  the  moral,  are  fo  connefted,  as  to  form  to- 
gether but  one  fcheme.  But  of  this  fcheme,  as  of 
that  of  the  natural  world  taken  alone,  we  are  not 
quahhed  to  judge,  on  account  of  the  mutual  refpect 
of  the  feveral  parts,  to  each  other  and  to  the  whole, 
and  our  own  incapacity  to  furvey  the  v/hole,  or,  with 
accuracy,  any  fingle  part.  All  objections  therefore 
to  the  wifdom  and  goodnefs  of  the  divine  government 
may  be  founded  merely  on  our  ignorance  ;*  and  to 
iiich  objections  our  ignorance  is  the  proper  and  a  fat- 
isfad:ory  anfwer.-i* 

2.  The  chief  difficulties  concerning  Natural  Re- 
ligion being  now  removed,  our  Author  proceeds,  in 
the  next  place,  to  that  which  is  Revealed  ;  and  as 
an  introdudlion  to  an  inquiry  into  the  credibility  of 
Chriftianity,  begins  with  the  confideration  of  its  im- 
portance. 

The  importance  of  Chriftianity  appears  in  two 
refpecls.  Firft,  in  its  being  a  republication  of  Nat- 
ural Religion,  in  its  native  fimplicity,  with  authority, 
and  with  circumftances  of  advantage  ;  afcertaining, 
in  many  inftances  of  moment,  what  before  was  only 
probable,  and  particularly  confirming  the  do<5trine  of 
a  future  ftate  of  rewards  and  punifliments.i  Second- 
ly, as  revealing  a  new  difpenfation  of  Providence, 
originating  from  the  pure  love  and  mercy  of  God,  and 
conduced  by  the  mediation  of  his  Son,  and  the  guid- 
ance of  his  Spirit,  for  the  recovery  and  falvation  of 
mankind,  reprefented  in  a  ftate  of  apoftacy  and  ruin. 
This  account  of  Chriftianity  being  admitted  to  be 

juftj 

*  See  note  [F],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface.    .-  '  ^  t      . 

t  Ch.  7. 

%  See  note  [G],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface.  •  .  c 


BY    THE    EDITOR.  xxlx 

jufl,  and  the  diftinft  offices  of  thefe  three  Divine  Per- 
ions  being  once  difcovered  to  us,  we  are  as  much 
obhged  in  point  of  duty  to  acknowledge  the  relations 
we  ftand  in  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Ghoft,  as  our  Me- 
diator and  San^lifier,  as  we  are  obhged  in  point  of  du- 
ty to  acknowledge  the  relation  we  ftand  in  to  God  the 
Father  ;  although  the  two  former  of  thefe  relations 
be  learnt  from  revelation  only,  and  in  the  laft  v/e  are 
inftruded  by  the  light  of  nature  ;  the  obligation  in 
either  cafe  ariling  from  the  offices  themfelves,  and  not 
at  all  depending  on  the  manner  in  wliich  they  are 
made  known  to  us.* 

The  prefumptions  againft  revelation  in  general  are, 
that  it  is  not  difcoverable  by  reafon,  that  it  is  unlike 
to  what  is  fo  difcovered,  and  that  it  was  introduced 
and  fupported  by  miracles.  But  in  a  fcheme  fo  large 
as  that  of  the  univerfe,  unbounded  in  extent,  and  ev- 
erlafting  in  duration,  there  mud  of  neceffity  be  num- 
berlefs  circumftances  which  are  beyond  the  reach  of 
our  faculties  to  difcern,  and  which  can  only  be  known 
by  divine  illumination.  And  both  in  the  natural  and 
moral  government  of  the  world,  under  which  we  Hve, 
we  find  many  things  unlike  one  to  another,  and  there- 
fore ought  not  to  wonder  if  the  fame  unlikenefs  ob- 
tain between  things  vifible  and  invilible  ;  although  it 
be  far  from  true,  that  revealed  religion  is  entirely 
unlike  the  conftitution  of  nature,  as  analogy  may 
teach  us.  Nor  is  there  any  thing  incredible  in  reve- 
lation, confidered  as  miraculous ;  whether  miracles  be 
fuppofed  to  have  been  performed  at  the  beginning  of 
the  world,  or  after  a  courle  of  nature  has  been  eftab- 
liflied.  Not  at  the  heginning  of  the  zvorkl -y  for  then 
there  was  either  no  courfe  of  nature  at  all,  or  a  power 
mull  have  been  exerted  totally  different  from  what 
that  courfe  is  at  prefent.  All  men  and  animals  cannot 
liave  been  born,  as  they  are  now  ;  but  a  pair  of  each 

fort 

*  Part  II.  Ch.  r. 


:£xx  P    R    E    t"    A    C    E 

fort  mull  have  been  produced  at  firft,  in  a  way  alto- 
gether unlike  to  that  iti  which  thfey  have  been  fmce  pro- 
duced ;  unlefs  we  affirm,  that  men  and  animals  have 
exifted  from 'eternity  in  an  endlefs  fuccelTion  :  One 
miracle  therefore  at  leafb  there  muft  have  been,  at  th^ 
bcc^innins;  of  the  world,  or  at  the  tmie  of  man's  crea- 
tion.  Not  after  the  fettlenient  of  a  cotirfe  of  nature^  on 
account  of  miracles  being  contrary  to  that  courfe,  or, 
in  other  words,  contrary  to  experience  :  For  in  or- 
der to  know  whether  miracles,  worked  in  atteftation 
of  a  divine  religion,  be  contrary  to  experience  or 
not,  we  ought  to  be  acquainted  with  other  cafes,  lim- 
ilar  or  parallel  to  thofe,  in  which  miracles  are  alleged 
to  have  been  wrought.  But  where  fhatl  we  find  fuch 
limilar  or  parallel  cafes  ?  The  world  which  we  inhabit 
affords  none.  We  know  of  no  extraordinary  revela- 
tions from  God  to  man",  but  thofe  recorded  in  the  Old 
.and  Ne\v  Teftament ;  all  of  v/hich  were  eftablilhed  by 
miracles.  It  cannot  therefore  be  faid  that  miracles  arc 
incredible,  becaufe  contrary  to  experience,  when  all 
the  experience  we  have  is  in  favour  of  miracles,  and  on 
the  fide  of  religion.*  Befides,  in  reafoning  concerning 
miracles,  they  ought  not  to  be  compared  with  com- 
mon natural  events,  but  with  uncommon  appearances, 
flich  as  comets,  magnetifm,  electricity  ;  which  to  one 
acquainted  only  with  the  ufual  phenomena  of  nature, 
and  the  common  powers  of  matter,  mufl,  before  proof 
of  their  aftual  exiftence,  be  thought  incredible. -f 

The  prefumptions  againft  revelation  in  general  be- 
ing difpatched,  objeftions  againfl  the  Chriftian  reve- 
lation in  particular,  againft  the  fcheme  of  it,  as  diftin- 
guifhed  from  objeclions  againft  its  evidence,  are  con- 
fidered  next.  Now,  fuppofing  a  revelation  to  be  re- 
ally given,  it  is  highly  probable  beforehand,  that  it 
muft  contain  many  things,  appearing  to  us  Jiable  to 

objedions. 

*  See  note  [H],  at  the  end  of  this  Trtface. 
f  Ch.  2. 


BY    TfUJi.    EDITOR.  xxxf 

?Tbje(^ions.  The  acknowledged  difpenfation  of  nature 
is  ver/  different  from  wliat  we  Ihould  have  expected  ; 
reafoning  then  from  analogy,  the  revealed  difpenfation, 
it  is  credible,  would^  be  alio  different.  Nor  are  we  in 
any  fort  judges  at  what  time,  or  in  what  degree,  or 
manner,  it  is  fit  or  expedient  for  God  to  infhru6l  us,  in 
things  confefledly  of  the  greatcft  ufe,  either  by  natural. 
reaibn,  or  by  fupernatural  information.  Thus,  argu- 
ing on  fpeculatidn  only,  and  without  experience,  it 
would  feem  very  unlikely  that  fo  important  a  remedy 
as  that  provided  by  Chrifiianity  for  the  recovery  of 
mankind  from  a  ftate  of  ruin,  fliouid  have  been  for 
fo  many  ages  withheld  ;  and,  when  at  laft  vouchfafed, 
fhould  be  imparted  to  fo  fev/ ;  and,  after  it  has  been 
imparted,  lliould  be  attended  v/ith  obfcurity  and 
doubt.  And  juft  fo  we  might  have  argued,  before 
experience,  concerning  the  remedies  provided  in  na- 
ture for  bodily  difeafes,  to  which  by  nature  we  are  ex- 
pofed  :  For  many  of  thefe  were  unknown  to  man- 
kind for  a  nitmber  of  ages ;  are  known  but  to  te-v 
now  i  fome  important  ones  probably  not  difcovered 
yet ;  2.nd  thofe  which  are,  neither  certain  in  their  ap- 
plication, nor  univerfal  in  their  ufe.  And  the  fame 
mode  of  reafoning  that  would  lead  us  to  exvedi  thev 
ihould  have  been  fo,  would  lead  us  to  expert  that  the 
neceffity  of  them  (hould  have  been  fuperfeded,  by 
there  being  no  difeafes  ;  as  the  neceffity  of  the  Chrif- 
tian  fcheme,  it  m^ay  be  thought,  might  alfo  have  beea 
fuperfeded,  by  preventing  the  fall  of  m.an,  fo  that  he 
(liould  not  have  flood  in  need  of  a  Redeemer  at  all.* 
As  to  objections  again  ft  the  wifdom  and  goodnefs 
of  Chrifiianity,  the  fame  anfwer  may  be  applied  to 
them  as  was  to  the  like  objedlions  againil  the-  conili- 
tution  of  nature.  For  here  alfo,  Chriftianlty  is  a 
fcheme  or  economy,  compofed  of  various  parts,  form- 
ing a  whole  ;  in  which  fcheirte  means  are  ufed  for  the 

accomplilhing 


sxxii  PREPACK 

accomplifliing  of  ends ;  and  which  is  condu6led  by 
general  laws  ;  of  all  of  which  we  know  as  little  as  we 
do  of  the  conftitution  of  nature.  And  the  feemlng 
want  of  wifdom  or  goodnefs  in  this  fyflem  is  to  be 
afcribed  to  the  fame  caufe,  as  the  like  appearances  of 
defefts  in  the  natural  fyflem  ;  our  inability  to  difcern 
the  whole  fcheme,  and  our  ignorance  of  the  relation 
of  thofe  parts  which  are  difcernible  to  others  beyond 
our  view. 

The  objeftions  againfl  Chriftianity  as  a  matter  of 
fadt,  and  againfl  the  wifdom  and  goodnefs  of  it,  hav- 
ing been  obviated  together,  the  chief  of  them  are  now 
to  be  confidered  diftindly.     One  of  thefe,  which  is 
levelled  againfl  the  entire  fyflem  itfelf,  is  of  this  fort  : 
The  reftoration  of  mankind,  reprefented  in  Scripture 
as  the  great  defign  of  the  Gofpel,  is  defcribed  as  re- 
quiring a  long  feries  of  means,  and  perfons,  and  dif- 
penfations,  before  it  can  be  brought  to  its  completion  ; 
■whereas  the  whole  ought  to  have  been  efTefted  at 
once.     Now  every  thing  we  fee  in  the  courfe  of  na- 
ture Iliews  the  folly  of  this  objedlion.     For  in  the  nat- 
ural courfe  of  Providence,  ends  are  brought  about  by 
means,  not  operating  immediately  and  at  once,  but 
dehberately  and  in  a  way  of  progreffion  ;  one  thing 
being  fubfervient  to  another,  this  to  fomewhat  further. 
The  change  of  feafons,   the  ripening  of  fruits,  the 
growth  of  vegetable  and  animal  bodies,  are  inftances 
of  this.     And  therefore  that   the  fame  progreflive 
method  fhould  be  followed  in  the  difpenfation  of 
Chriftianity,  as  is  obferved  in  the  common  difjpenfa- 
tion  of  Providence,  is  a  reafonable  expediation,  jufti- 
fied  by  the  analogy  of  nature.* 

Another  circumftance  objeded  to  in  the  Chriflian 
fcheme  is,  the  appointment  of  a  Mediator,  and  the 
faving  of  the  workl  through  him.  But  the  vifible  gov- 
ernment of  God  being  adually  adminiflered  in  this  way, 

or 

*  Ch.  4. 


BY    THE    EDITOR.         xxxiii 

TjY  by  the  mediation  and  inftmmentality  of  others,  there 
can  be  no  general  prefumption  againft  an  appoint- 
ment of  this  kind,  againft  his  invifible  government 
being  exercifed  in  the  fame  manner.     We  have  (een 
aheady  that,  with  regard  to  ourfelves,  this  vifible  gov- 
ernment is  carried  on  by  rewards  and  puniOiments  ; 
for  happinefs  and  mifery  are  the  confequences  of  our 
own  adtions,  confidered  as  virtuous  and  vicious,  and 
thefe  confequences  we  are  enabled  to  forefee.    It  might 
have  been  imagined,  before  confulting  experience,  that 
after  we  had  rendered  ourfelves  liable  to  mifery  by  our 
own  ill  condu6t,  forrow  for  what  was  paft,  and  behav- 
ing well  for  the  future,  would,  alone  and  of  themfelves, 
have  exempted  us  from  deferved  pimifhment,  and  re- 
ftored  us  to  the  divine  favour.     But  the  fad  is  other- 
wife  ;  and  real  reformation  is  often  found  to  be  of  no 
avail,  fo  as  to  fecure  the  criminal  from  poverty,  fick- 
nefs,  infamy,  and  death,  the  never-failing  attendants 
on  vice  and  extravagance,  exceeding  a  certain  degree. 
By  the  courfe  of  nature  then  it  appears,  God  does  not 
always  pardon  a  finner  on  his  repentance.     Yet  there 
is  provifion  made,  even  in  nature,  that  the  miferies, 
which  men  bring  on  themfelves  by  unlawful  indulgen- 
ces, may  in  many  cafes  be  mitigated,  and  in  fome  re- 
moved ;  partly  by  extraordinary  exertions  of  the  of- 
fender himfelf,  but  more  efpecially  and  frequently  by 
the  intervention  of  others,  who  voluntarily,  and  from 
motives  of  compaflion,  fubmit  to  labour  and  forrow, 
fuch  as  produce  long  and  lafting  inconveniences  to 
themfelves,  as  the  means  of  refcuing  another  from  the 
wretched  effefts  of  former  imprudences.     Vicarious 
puniihment,  therefore,  or  one  perfon's  fufferings  con- 
tributing to  the  relief  of  another,  is  a  providential  dif- 
pofition,  in  the  economy  of  nature  :  *    And  it  ought 
not  to  be  matter  of  furprife,  if  by  a  method  analogous 
to  this  we  be  redeemed  from  fm  and  mifery,  in  the 

C  economy 

*  See  note  [I],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface, 


XXX17  PREFACE 

economy  of  grace.  That  mankind  at  prefent  are  in  at 
ftate  of  degradation,  different  from  that  in  which  they 
were  originally  created,  is  the  very  ground  of  the 
Chriftian  Revelation,  as  contained  in  the  Scriptures. 
Whether  we  acquiefce  in  the  account,  that  our  being 
placed  in  fuch  a  ftate  is  owing  to  the  crime  of  our  firS 
parents,  or  choofe  to  afcribe  it  tO'  any  other  caufe,  it 
makes  no  difference  as  to  our  condition  j  the  vice  and 
iinhappinefs  of  the  world  are  flill  there,  notwithftand- 
ing  all  our  fuppofitions ;  nor  is  it  Chriflianity  that 
hath  put  us  into  this  flate.  We  learn  alio  from  the 
fame  Scriptures,  what  experience  and  the  ufe  of  ex- 
piatory facrifices  from  the  mofl  early  times  might 
have  taught  us,  that  repentance  alone  is  not  fufHcient 
to  prevent  the  fatal  confequences  of  paft  tranfgref- 
fions  J  but  that  flill  there  is  room  for  mercy,  and 
that  repentance  fhall  be  available,  though  not  of  it- 
lelf,  yet  through  tlie  mediation  of  a  Divine  Perfon, 
the  MelTiah ;  who,  from  the  fublimefl  principles  of 
compailion,  when  we  were  dead  in  trefpajfcs  andfins^^ 
fuffered  and  died,  the  innocent  for  the  guilty,  the  jiijl 
for  the  unjnji^\  that  we  might  have  redemption  through 
his  bloody  even  the  forgivenefs  of  fins.  %  In  what 
way  the  death  of  Chrift  was  of  that  efficacy  it  is  laid 
to  be,  in  procuring  the  reconciliation  of  finners,  the 
Scriptures  have  not  explained  :  It  is  enough  that  the 
doftrine  is  revealed ;:  that  it  is  not  contrary  to  any 
truths  wdiich  reafon  and  experience  teach  us  ;  and 
that  it  accords  in  perfed  harmony  with  the  ufual 
method  of  the  divine  condud:  in  the  government  of 
the  world'.  § 

Again  it  hath  been  faid,  that  if  the  Cliriflian  reve- 
lation were  true,  it  muft  have  been  univerfal,  and 
could  not  have  been  left  upon  doubtful  evidence- 
But  God,  in  his  natural  Providence,  difpenfes  his  gifts 

ii> 

♦  "Ephef.  ii.  r.  f  Pet.  iii.  iS. 

t  Coloff.  i.  I4w  %  Ch,  5, 


BY    THE    EDITOR.  xxxv 

*n  great  variety,  not  only  among  creatures  of  the  fame 
ipecies,  but  to  the  fame  individuals  alfo  at  different 
times.  Had  the  Chriftian  revelation  been  univerfali 
at  firfl,  yet  from  the  diverfity  of  men's  abilities,  botb 
of  mind  and  body,  their  various  means  of  improve- 
inent,  and  other  external  advantages,  fome  perfons 
muft  foon  have  been  in  a  fituation,  with  refped  to 
iehgious  knowledge,  much  faperior  to  that  of  others, 
as  much  perhaps  as  they  are  at  prefent  :  And  all  men 
will  be  equitably  dealt  with  at  laft ;  and  to  whom 
little  is  given,  of  him  little  will  be  required.  Thert 
as  to  the  evidence  for  religion  being  left  doubtful, 
difficulties  of  this  fort,  like  difficulties  in  practice,  af- 
ford fcope  and  opportunity  for  a  virtuous  exercife  of 
the  underftanding,  and  difpofe  the  mind  to  acquiefce 
and  reft  fatisfied  with  any  evidence  that  is  real.  la 
the  daily  commerce  of  life,  men  are  obliged  to  a6t 
upon  great  uncertainties,  with  regard  to  fuccefs  in 
their  temporal  purfuits  f  and  the  cafe  with  regard  to 
religion  is  parallel.  However,  though  religion  be  not 
intuitively  true,  the  proofs  of  it  which  we  have  are 
amply  fufficient  in  reafon  to  induce  us  to  embrace  it  ; 
and  diflatisfaftion  with  thofe  proofs  may  poffibly  be 
men's  own  fault.* 

Nothing  remains  but  to  attend  to  the  poiitive  evi- 
dence there  is  for  the  truth  of  Chriftianity.  Now, 
belides  its  direct  and  fundamental  proofs,  which  are 
miracles  and  prophecies,  there  are  many  collateral  cir- 
cumftances,  which  may  be  united  into  one  view,  and 
all  together  may  be  confidered  as  making  up  one  ar- 
gument. In  this  way  of  treating  the  fubjed,  the 
revelation,  whether  real  or  otherwife,  may  be  fuppofed 
to  be  wholly  hiftorical :  The  general  defign  of  which 
appears  to  be,  to  give  an  account  of  the  condition  of 
religion,  and  its  profeffors,  with  a  concife  narration  of 
the  political  ftate  of  things,  as  far  as  religion  is  affe£t- 
"    Ca  ed 

*  Ch.  6. 


xxxvi  PREFACE 

ed  by  it,  during  a  great  length  of  time,  near  fix  thorr- 
fand  years  of  which  are  already  pall.     More  particu- 
larly it  comprehends  an  account  of  God's  entering 
into  covenant  with  one  nation,  the  Jews,  that  he 
would  be  their  God,  and  that  they  fliould  be  his 
people  ;  of  his  often  interpofmg  in'  their  affairs  ;  giv- 
ing them  the  promife,  and  afterwards  the  poffeffion, 
of  a  flourilliing  country  j  aiTuring.them  of  the  greateft 
national  profperity,  in  cafe  of  their  obedience,  and 
threatening  the  fevcrell  national  punifhment,  in  cafe 
they  forfook  him  and  joined  in  the  idolatry  of  their 
pagan  neighbours.     It  contains  alfo  a  prediftion  of  a 
particular  perfon,  to  appear  in  the  fulnefs  of  time,  in 
whom  all  the  promifes  of  God  to-  the  Jews  were  to  be 
fulfilled  :  And  it  relates  that,  at  the  time  expefted,  a- 
perfon  did  adtually  appear,  afTuming  to  be  the  Saviour 
foretold  ;    that  he  worked  various  miracles  among 
them,  in  confirmation  of  his  divine  authority  ;  and/ 
as  was  foretold  alfo,  was  rejected  and  put  to  death"  by 
the  very  people  who  had  long  defired  and  waited  for 
his  coming  ;  but  that  li'is  rehgion,  in  fpite  of  all  op- 
pofition,  was  eftablifhed  in  the  world  by  his  difciples, 
invefled  with  fupernatural  powers  for  that  purpofe  ; 
of  the  fate  and  fortunes  of  which  religion  there  is  a 
prophetical  defcription,  carried  down  to  the  end  of 
time.     Let  any  one  now,  after  reading  the  above  hif- 
tory,  and  not  knowing  whether  the  whole  were  not  a 
fidion,  be  fuppofed  to  afk.  Whether  all  that  is  here' 
related  be  true  ?  And  inftead  of  a  diredt  anfwer,  let 
him  be  informed  of  the  feveralr  acknowledged  fafhs', 
which  are  found  to  correfpond  to  it  in  real  life  ;  and 
then  let  him  compare  the  hiftory  and  fa<5ts  together, 
and  obferve  the  aftoniihing  coincidence  of  both  : 
Such  a  joint  review  mufl  appear  to  him  of  very  great 
weight,  and  to  amount  to  evidence  fomewhat  more 
than   human.      And  unlefs  the   whole   feries,   and 
every  particular  circumftance  contained  in  it,  can. 

be 


BY    THE    EDITOR.         xxxvii 

fee  thought  to  have  arifen  from  accident,  the  truth 
«f  Chriftianity  is  proved.* 

The  view  here  given  of  the  moral  and  reHgious 
fyftems  of  Bifhop  Butler,  it  will  immediately  be 
perceived,  is  chiefly  intended  for  younger  ftudents, 
cfpecially  for  ftudents  in  divinity  ;  to  whom  it  is  hop- 
ed it  may  be  of  ufe,  fo  as  to  encourage  them  to  pe-- 
rufe,  with  proper  diligence,  the  original  works  of  the 
Author  hirafelf.  For  it  may  be  necelTary  to  obferve, 
that  neither  of  the  volumes  of  this  excellent  Prelate 
are  addreffed  to  thofe,  who  read  for  amufement,  or 
curiofity,  or  to  get  rid  of  time.  All  fubjedts  are  not 
to  be  comprehended  with  the  fame  eafe  ;  and  moral- 
ity and  religion,  when  treated  as  fciences,  each  ac- 
companied with  difficulties  of  its  own,  can  neither  of 
them  be  underftood  as  they  ought,  without  a  very  pe- 
culiar attention.  But  morality  and  religion  are  not 
merely  to  be  ftudied  as  fciences,  or  as  being  fpecula- 
tively  true  j  they  are  to  be  regarded  in  another  and 
higher  light,  as  the  rule  of  life  and  manners,  as  con- 
taining authoritative  directions  by  which  to  regulate 
our  faith  and  pra6tice.  And  in  this  view,  the  infinite 
importance  of  them  conlidered,  it  can  never  be  an 
indifferent  matter  whether  they  be  received  or  rejedl- 
ed.  For  both  claim  to  be  the  voice  of  God  ;  and 
whether  they  be  fo  or  not,  cannot  be  known,  till  their 

claims 

*  Ch.  7,  To  the  Analogy  are  fubjoined  Two  DifTertatlons,  both  originally 
inferted  in  the  body  of  the  work.  One  on  Perfonal  Identity,  in  which  are 
contained  fonae  ftri(5lures  on  Mr.  Lccke,  who  aflerts  that  confcioufnefs  mak.e:j 
or  conftitutes  perfonal  identity  ;  whereas,  as  our  Author  obferves,  confciouf- 
nefs makes  only  perfonality,  or  is  necelTary  to  the  idea  of  a  perfon,  i.  e.  a 
thinking  intelligent  being,  but  prefuppofes,  and  therefore  cannot  conftitute 
perfonal  identity  ;  jufl  as  knowledge  prefuppofes  truth,  but  does  not  confti- 
tute it.  Confcioufnefs  of  pafl  adlions  does  indeed  fliew  us  the  ider.tity  of 
ourfelves,  or  gives  us  a  certain  aflurance  that  we  are  the  fame  perfons  or  liv- 
ing agents  now,  which  we  were  at  the  time  to  which  our  remembrance  can 
look  back  ;  but  flill  we  Ihould  be  the  fame  perfons  as  we  were,  though  this 
confcioufnefs  of  what  is  pafl  were  wanting,  though  all  that  had  been  done 
by  us  formerly  were  forgotten  ;  unlefs  it  be  true,  that  no  perfon  has  exifteij 
a  fmgle  moment  beyond  what  he  can  remember.  The  other  DilTertation  ii 
On  the  Nature  of  Virtue,  which  properly  belongs  to  tiie  moral  fyftem  cf  oui' 
Author,  already  explained. 


xxxviii  EPITAPH. 

claims  be  impartially  examined.  If  they  indeed  come 
from  him,  we  are  bound  to  conform  to  them  at  our 
peril ;  nor  is  it  left  to  our  choice,  whether  we  will 
lubmit  to  the  obligations  they'  impofe  upon  us  or 
not ;  for  fubmit  to  them  we  muft  in  fuch  a  fenfe,  as 
to  incur  the  punilhments  denounced  by  both  againfi^ 
wilful  difobedience  to  their  injunctions. 


The  following  EPITAPH,  faid  to  be  written  by  Dr.  Natkanad  Fcrjkft  is 
infcribed  on  a  flat  marble  flone,  in  the  cathedral  church  of  Brifol,  placed 
over  the  fpot  where  the  remains  of  Bifliop  Butler  are  depofited  ;  and 
which,  as  it  is  now  almoil  obliterated,  it  may  be  worth  while  here  tp 
preferve. 

H.  S. 

Reverendus  admodum  in  Chrifho  Pater 
J  O  S  E  P  H  U  S    BUTLER,    LL.  D. 

Hujufce  primo  Dioecefeos 
Deinde  Dunelmenfis  Epifcopus, 

Qualis  quantufq;  Vir  erat 

Sua  libentiffime  agnovit  setas  : 

Et  fi  quid  Praifuli  aut  Scriptori  ad  famam  valent 

Mens  altiffima, 

Ingenii  perfpicacis  et  fubadi  Vis, 

Animufq;  pius,  fimplex,  candidus,  liberahs, 

Mortui  haud  facile  evanefcei  memoria. 

Obiit  Bathoni^  i6  Kalend.  Juiii, 

A.  D.  1752. 

Annos  natus  60. 


NOTES 


NOTES 

TO      THE 

PREFACE    BY    THE    EDITOR. 


D 


Page  viii,     [A]. 


'R.  Butler,  when  Blfhop  of  Brijiol^  put  up  a 
CFofs,  a  plain  piece  of  marble  inlaid,  in  the  chapel  of  his 
epifcopal  houfe.  This,  which  was  intended  by  the  blame- 
lefs  Prelate  merely  as  a  fign  or  memorial,  that  true  Chriftians 
are  to  bear  their  crofs,  and  not  to  be  afhamed  of  folloM'ing 
a  crucified  Mailer,  was  confidered  as  affording  a  prefump- 
tion  that  he  was  fecretly  inclined  to  popifh  forms  and  cere- 
monies, and  had  no  great  diflike  to  popery  itfelf.  And,  on 
account  of  the  offence  it  occafioned,  both  at  the  time  and 
fince,  it  were  tp  be  wiflied,  in  prudence,  it  had  not  beea 
done. 

Page  xi.  [B]. 
Many  of  the  fentiments,  in  thefe  two  difcourfes  of  Bifhop 
JBuTLER,  concerning  the  fovereign  good  of  man  ;  the  impof- 
fibility  of  procuring  it  in  the  prefent  life  ;  the  unfatisfa£lo- 
rinefs  of  earthly  enjoyments  •,  together  with  the  fomewhat 
beyond  and  above  them  all,  which  once  attained,  there  will 
reft  nothing  further  to  be  wifhed  or  hoped  ;  and  which  is 
then  only  to  be  expe£led,  v/hen  we  (hall  have  put  off  this 
mortal  body,  and  our  union  with  God  fhall  be  complete  j 
occur  in  Hooher's  Eccleftajlical  Polity ^  Book  I.  §  xi. 

Page  XV.  [C]. 
When  the  firfl:  edition  of  this  Preface  wag  publiflied,  I 
had  in  vain  endeavoured  to  procure  a  fight  of  the  papers,  in 
which  Bifliop  Butler  was  accufed  of  having  died  a  papift, 
and  Archbifliop  Secker's  replies  to  them  ;  though  I  well 
remembered  to  have  read  both,  when  they  firft  appeared  in 
the  public  prints.  But  a  learned  profeffor  in  the  univerfity 
of  Oxford  has  furnifhed  me  with  the  whole  controverfy  in 
its  original  form  ;  a  brief  hifi;ory  of  which  it  may  not  be 
unacceptable  to  offer  here  to  the  curious  reader. 

The 


Xl  NOTES  TO  THE  PREFACE 

The  attack  was  opened  in  the  year  1767,  In  an  anonymous 
pamphlet,  entiled  Tke  Root  of  Protejlant  Errors  examined;  in 
which  the  author  aflerted,  that  "  by  an  anecdote  lately  given 
him,  that  *  fame  Prelate,*  (who  at  the  bottom  of  the  page 
is  called  B — p  of  D — m)  is  faid  to,  have  died  in  the  com- 
munion of  a  church,  that  makes  ufe  of  faints,  faint  days, 
and  all  the  trumpery  pf  faint  worfliip."  When  this  remark- 
able fa£l:,  no\y  firft  divulged,  came  to  be  generally  known,  it 
occafioned,  as  might  be  expelled,  no  little  alarm  ;  and  intel- 
ligence of  it  was  no  fooner  conveyed  to  Archbiihop  Secker, 
than  in  a  fhort  letter,  figned  Mifopfeu;les ^  and  printed  in  the 
S/.  James's  Chronicle  of  May  9,  he  called  upon  the  writer  to 
produce  his  authority  for  publifhing  "  fo  grofs  and  fcandal- 
ous  a  falfehood."  To  this  challenge  an  immediate  anfwet 
was  returned  by  the  author  of  the  pamphlet,  who,  now  af-? 
fuming  the  name  of  Phikleuthcrosy  informed  Mifopfeudes^ 
through  the  channel  of  the  fame  paper,  that  *'  fuch  anec- 
dote had  been  given  him  ;  and  that  he  was  yet  of  opiniou 
there  is  not  any  thing  improbable  in  it,  when  it  is  confidered 
that  the  fame  Prelate  put  up  the  popifii  injignla  of  the  crop 
in  his  chapel,  when  at  Briftol ;  and  in  his  laft  epifcopal 
Charge  ^as  fquinted  very  much  towards  that  fuperltition.'^ 
Here  we  find  the  accufation  not  only  repeated,  but  fupported 
by  reafons,  fuch  as  they  are ;  of  which  it  feemed  neceiTary 
that  fome  notice  fhould  be  taken  :  Nor  did  tke  Archbifliop 
conceive  it  unbecoming  his  own  dignity  to  (land  up,  on  thiq 
occafion,  as  the  vindicator  of  innocence  againft  the  calumni- 
ator of  the  helplefs  dead.  Accordingly,  in  a  fecond  letter 
in  the  fame  newfpaper  of  May  23,  and  fubfcribed  Mifop^ 
feudesy  as  before,  after  reciting  from  Eiftiop  Butler's  Sermon 
before  the  Lords  the  very  paflage  here  printed  in  the  Pref- 
ace, and  obferving  that  "there  are,  in  the  fame  Sermon, 
declarations,  as  flrong  as  can  be  made,  againft  temporal 
punifliments  for  herefy,  fchifm,  or  even  for  idolatry,"  his 
Grace  expreffes  himfelf  thus  :  "  Now  he  (Biihop  Butx.ER) 
was  univerfaliy  cfteemed,  throughout  !iis  life,  a  man  of  ftrid^ 
piety  and  honefty,  as  well  as  uncommon  abilities.  He  gave 
all  the  proofs,  public  and  private,  which  his  ftation  led  him 
to  give,  and  they  were  decifive  and  daily,  of  his  continuinjy 
to  the  laft  a  iincere  member  of  the  church  of  England.  Nor 
had  ever  any  of  his  acquaintance,  or  moft  intimate  friends, 
nor  have  they  to  this  day,  the  ieaft  doubt  of  it."  As  to. 
putting  up  a  crofs  in  his  chapel,  the  Archbifliop  frankly  owns, 

th"at 


B  Y    T  H  E    E  D  I  T  O  R.  xU 

that  for  himfelf  he  wifiies  he  had  not ;  and  thinks  that  in  fo 
doing  the  Biftiop  did  amifs.  But  then  he  afks,  "Can  that 
be  oppofed,  as  any  proof  of  popery,  to  all  the  evidence  on 
the  other  fide  j  or  even  to  the  fingle  evidence  of  the  above-* 
snentioned  Sermon  ?  Moll  of  our  churches  have  crofles  upon 
them  :  Are  they  therefore  popifh  churches  ?  The  Lutherans 
have  more  than  crofles  in  theirs :  Are  the  Lutherans  there- 
fore papifts  ?"  And  as  to  the  Chargef  no  papift,  his  Grace 
remarks,  would  have  fpoken  as  Bifhop  Butler  there  does, 
of  <he  obfervances  peculiar  to  Roman  catholics,  fome  of 
which  he  exprefsly  cenfures  as  wrong  and  fuperftitious,  and 
others  as  made  fubfervient  to  the  purpofes  of  fuperftition, 
and,  on  thefe  accounts,  abolifiied  at  the  reformation.  After 
the  publication  of  this  letter,  Fhileleutheros  replied  in  a  fliort 
defence  of  his  own  conduft,  but  without  producing  any 
thing  new  in  confirmation  of  what  he  had  advanced.  And 
here  the  controverfy,  fo  far  as  the  two  principals  were  con- 
cerned, feems  to  have  ended. 

But  the  difpute  was  not  futFered  to  die  away  quite  fo  foon. 
For  in  the  fame  year,  and  in  the  fame  newfpaper  of  July  21, 
another  letter  appeared  ;  in  which  the  author  not  only  con- 
tended that  the  crofs  in  the  epifcopal  chapel  at  Brifloly  and 
the  Charge  to  the  clergy  oi  Durham  in  1751,  amount  to  full 
proof  of  a  ftrong  attachment  to  the  idolatrous  communion 
of  the  church  of  Rome,  but,  with  the  reader's  leave,  he 
would  fain  account  for  the  Bifhop's  "  tendency  this  way.'*" 
And'this  he  attempted  to  do,  **  from  the  natural  melancholy 
and  gloominefs  of  Dr.  Butler's  difpofition  ;  from  his  great 
fondnefs  for  the  lives  of  Romilh  faints,  and  their  books  of 
xr.yftic  piety  5  from  his  drawing  his  notions  of  teaching  men 
religion,  not  from  the  New  Teftament,  but  from  philofoph- 
jcal  and  political  opinions  of  his  own  ;  and  above  all,  from 
his  tranfition  from  a  ftri£l  diflenter  amongft  the  prefbyteri- 
ans  to  a  rigid  churchman,  and  his  fudden  and  unexpedled 
elevation  to  great  wealth  and  dignity  in  the  church."  The 
attack  thus  renewed  excited  the  Archbifhop's  attention  a 
fecond  time,  and  drew  from  him  a  frefh  anfwer,  fubfcribed 
alfo  Mifopfeudesy  in  the  St.  James's  Chronicle  of  Augult  4. 
In  this  letter  our  excellent  Metropolitan,  firft  of  all  obliquely 
hinting  at  the  unfairnefs  of  fitting  in  judgment  on  the  char- 
a6ler  of  a  man  who  had  been  dead  fifteen  years,  and  then 
reminding  his  correfpondent,  that  "  full  proof  had  been  al- 
ready publiflied,  that  Biftiop  Butler  abhorred  popery  as  a 

vile 


xKl  NQTES   TO  THE  PREFACE 

vile  corruption  of  Chriftianity,  and  that  it  snight  be  proved, 
if  needful,   that  he  held   the  Pope  to  be  Antichriit,"  (to 
which  decifive  teftimonies  of  undoubted  averfion  from  the 
Romifli  church  another  is  alfo  added  in  the  poftfcript,  his 
taking,  when  promoted  to  the  fee  of  Durham,  for  his  do- 
meftic  chaplain,  Dr.  Nath.  Forller,  who  had  publifhed,  not 
four  years  before,  a  Sermon,  entitled.  Popery  deJiruBive  of 
the  Evidence  of  Chr'ifiaJiity)  proceeds  to  obferve,  "  That  the 
natural  melancholy  of  the  Bifliop's  tern. per  would  rather  have 
fixed  him  amongft  his  firil  friends,  than  prompted  him  to 
the   change  he  made  :   That  he  read  books  of  all  forts,  as 
well  as  books  of  myftic   piety,  and  knew  how  to  pick  the 
good   that  was  in  them  out  of  the  bad  :   That  his  opinion* 
were  expofed  without  referve  in  his  Analogy  and  his  Ser- 
mons, and  if  the  doftrine  of  either  be  popifh  or  unfcriptural, 
the  learned  world  hath  millaken  ftrangely  in  admiring  both  : 
That  inftead  of  being  a  ftri61:  diil'enter,  he  never  was  a  com- 
municant in  any  diffenting  aflembly  ;  on  the  contrary,  that 
he  went  occafionally,  from  his  early  years,  to  the  eftablifhed 
worihip,  and  became  a  conftant  conformift  to  it,  when  he  was 
barely  of  age,  and  entered  himfelf,  in  1714,  of  Oriel  College  : 
That  his  elevation  to  great  dignity  in  the  church,  far  from 
being  fuddeji  and  unexpecled,  was  a  gradual  and  natural  rife, 
through  a  variety  of  preferments,  and  a  period  of  thirty  two 
years  :  That  as  Bifnop  oi  Durham  he  had  very  little  authority 
beyond  his  brethren,  and  in  ecclcfiaftical  matters  had  none 
beyond  tlaem  •,  a  larger  income  than  mod  of  them  he  had ; 
but  this  he  employed,  not,  as  was  infmuated,  in  augmenting 
the  pomp  of  worfhip  in  his  cathedral,  where  indeed  it  is  no 
greater  than  in  others,  but  for  the  purpofes  of  charity,  and 
in  the  repairing  of  his  houfes."     After  thefe  remarks,  the 
letter  clofes  with  the  following  words  :  *'  Upon  the  whole, 
few  accufations,  fo  entirely  groundlefs,  have  been  fo  perti- 
nacioufly,  I  am  unwilling  to  fay  malicioufly,  carried  on,  as 
the  prefent  ;  and  furely  it  is  high  time  for  the  authors  and 
abettors  of  it,  in  mere  common  prudence,  to  (hew  fome  re- 
gard, if  not  to  truth,  at  leaft  to  fhame." 

It  only  remains  to  be  mentioned,  thnt  the  above  letters  of 
Archbifliop  Seeker  had  fuch  an  effe6l  on  a  writer,  wJio 
iigned  himfelf  in  the  St.  Jameses  Chronkle,  of  Auguft  25, 
yl  Diffenting  Mirtifer,  that  he  declared  it  as  his  opinion, 
that  "  the  author  of  the  pamphlet,  called  The  Root  of  Protef 
taut  Errors  examinedi  and  his  friends,  were  obliged  in  can- 

dourj 


BY     THE     EDITOR.  xViii 

dour,  jn  juftice,  and  In  honour,  to  retra£l  their  charge,  un- 
lefs  they  could  eflabliili  it  on  much  better  grounds  than  had 
hitherto  appeared  :"  And  he  exprefled  his  "  hopes  that  it 
would  be  underftood  that  the  diflenters  In  general  had  no 
hand  in  the  accufation,  and  that  it  had  only  been  the  a6t  of 
two  or  three  miftaken  men."  Another  perfon  alfo,  "a. 
foreigner  by  birth,"  as  he  fays  of  himfelf,  who  had  been 
long  an  admirer  of  Bifhop  Butler,  and  had  perufed  with 
great  attention  all  that  had  been  written  on  both  fides  in 
the  prefent  controverfy,  confefles  he  had  been  "  wonder- 
fully pleafed  with  obferving,  with  what  candour  and  tern** 
per,  as  well  as  clearnefs  and  folidity,  he  was  vindicated  from 
the  afpcrfjons  laid  againft  him."  All  the  adverfaries  of  our 
Prelate,  however,  had  not  the  virtue  or  fenfe  to  be  thus 
convinced  ;  fome  of  whom  ftill  continued,  under  the  figna-? 
tures  of  OJd  Martin,  Latimer^  An  Impartial  Protejlant,  Pau- 
linusy  Mifonothos,  to  repeat  their  confuted  falfehoods  in  the 
public  prints;  as  if  the  curfe  of  calumniators  had  fallen 
upon  them,  and  their  memory,  by  being  long  a  traitor  to 
•truth,  had  taken  at  laft  a  fevere  revenge,  and  compelled 
them  to  credit  their  own  lie.  The  firft  of  thefe  gentlemen. 
Old.  Martin,  who  dates  from  N-c-Jl-e,  May  29,  from  the 
rancour  and  malignity  with  which  his  letter  abounds,  and 
from  the  particular  virulence  he  difcovers  towards  the  char- 
adlers  of  Bifliop  Butler  and  his  defender,  I  conje£lure  to 
be  no  other  than  the  very  perfon  who  had  already  figured  in 
this  difpute,  fo  early  as  the  year  1752  ;  of  whofe  work,  en- 
titled A  fsrioiis  Inquiry  into  the  life  and  Importance  of  External 
Religion,  the  reader  will  find  fome  account  in  the  notes  fub- 
joined  to  the  Blfhop's  Charge,  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 

Page  XV.  [D], 
The  letters,  with  a  fight  of  which  I  was  indulged  by  the 
favour  of  our  prefent  mo  ft  worthy  Metropolitan,  are  all,  as 
I  remember,  wrapped  together  under  one  cover  ;  on  the 
back  of  which  is  written,  in  Archbifliop  Secker's  own 
hand,  the  following  words,  or  words  to  this  effedl,  PrC" 
Jumptive  Arguments  that  BiJIjop  Butler  did  not  die  a  papijl. 

Page  xxl.     [E]. 
"Par  be  it  from  me,"  fays  the  excellent  Dr.  7*.  Balguy,* 
**  to  difpute  the  reality  of  a  7noral  principle  in  the  human 
heart.     I  feel  its  exiftence  ;  I  clearly  difcern  its  ufe  and  im- 
portance* 

*  Difcourfe  IX, 


liliv         NOTES  TO  THE  PREFACE 

portance.  But  in  no  refpedl  is  it  }}iore  important,  than  as  It 
fuggefts  the  idea  of  a  fftaral  Governor.  Let  this  idea  be  once 
effaced,  and  the  principle  of  confcience  will  foon  be  found 
weak  and  inefFeftual.  Its  influence  on  men's  conduft  has, 
indeed,  been  too  77iuch  undervalued  by  fome  philofophical  in- 
quirers. But  be  that  influence,  while  i,t  lafts,  more  or  lefs, 
it  is  not  -n  Jieady  and  permanent  principle  of  adlion.  XJn.- 
happily  v/e  alv/ays  have  it  in  our  power  to  lay  it  ajleep.—' 
Neg/eff  alone  v/ill  fapprefs  and  ftifle  it,  and  bring  it  almofl: 
into  a  ftate  of  ftupefatlion :  Nor  can  any  thing  lefs  than 
the  terrors  of  religion  awaken  our  minds  from  this  danger- 
ous and  deadly  fleep.  It  can  never  be  matter  of  indiffer- 
ence to  a  thinhing  man,  whether  he  i?  to  be  happy  or  mife?» 
rable  beyond  the  grave." 

Page  xxviii.  [F], 
^The  ignorance  of  man  is  a  favourite  doftrine  with  Biihop 
Butler.  It  occurs  in  the  fecond  Part  of  the  Analogy  ;  it 
makes  the  fubjedl  of  his  fifteenth  Sermon  ;  and  we  meet 
with  it  again  in  his  Charge.  Whether  fometimes  it  be  not 
carried  to  a  length  which  is  exceflive,  may  admit  of  doubt. 

Page  xxviii.  [G]. 
Admirable  to  this  purpofe  are  the  words  of  Dr.  7. 
Salguy,  in  the  IXth  of  his  Difcourfes,  already  referred  to. 
*'  The  dodlrine  of  a  life  to  comcy  fome  perfons  will  fay,  is  a 
do£lrine  of  natural  religion  ;  and  pan  never  therefore  be 
properly  alleged  to  (hew  the  importance  of  revelation. 
They  judge  perhaps  from  the  frame  of  the  world,  that  the 
prefent  fyflem  is  imperfeEl :  They  fee  defigns  in  it  not^yet 
completed ;  and  they  think  they  have  grounds  for  expelling 
another  ftate,  in  which  thefe  defigns  (liall  be  farther  carried 
on,  and  brought  to  a  conclufion,  worthy  of  Infinite  Wifdom. 
I  am  not  concerned  to  difpute  xhejiijlnefs  of  this  reafoning ; 
nor  do  I  wifh  to  difpute  it.  But  hovv  far  will  it  reach  ? 
Will  it  lead  us  to  the  Chrijlian  doctrine  of  a  judgment  to 
come  ?  Will  it  give  us  the  profpe£l  of  an  eternity  of  happi- 
nefs  ?  Nothing  of  all  this.  It  fhews  us  only,  that  death  is 
not  the  end  of  our  beings  ;  that  we  are  likely  to  pafs  here- 
after into  other  fyftems,  more  favourable  than  the  prefent 
to  the  great  ends  of  God's  Providence,  the  virtue  and  the 
happinefs  of  his  intelligent  creatures.  But  into  nvhat  fyf- 
tems we  are  to  be  removed  ;  what  new  fcenes  are  to  be  pre- 
fented  to  us,  either  of  pleafure  or  pain  \  what  new  parts  we 

ihall 


B  Y     T  H  E     E  D  I  T  O  R.  xU 

fnallhave  to  a£l,  and  to  what  trials  and  temptations  we  may 
yet  be  expofed  ;  on  all  thefe  fubjefts  we  know  juft  nothing. 
That  our  hzp^'intfs  forever  depends  on  our  condu£l  here,  is 
a  moft  important  propofition,  which  we  learn  only  from 
reve/ation." 

Page  XXX.  [H}. 
**  In  the  common  affairs  of  life,  common  experience  is  fuf- 
ficient  to  direcl  us.  But  will  common  experience  ferve  to 
guide  our  judgment  concerning  xht  fall  and  redemption  of 
mankind  ?  From  what  we  fee  every  day,  can  we  explaiil 
the  commencement y  or  foretel  the  difjolutmi  of  the  world  ? 
To  judge  of  events  like  thefe,  we  fhould  be  converfant  in 
the  hiftory  of  other  planets ;  fhould  be  diftrn6lly  informed 
of  God's  various  difpenfations  to  all  the  different  orders  o£ 
rational  beings.  Inftead  then  of  grounding  our  religious 
opinions  on  what  ive  call  experience,  let  us  apply  to  a  more 
certain  guide,  let  us  hearken  to  the  iefimony  of  God  himfelf. 
The  credibility  of  human  tcflimony,  and  the  conduft  of  human 
agents,  are  fubje^ls  perfe£lly  within  the  reach  of  our  natural 
faculties  ;  and  we  ought  to  defire  no  firmer  foundation  for 
our  belief  of  religion,  than  for  the  judgments  we  form  in 
the  common  affairs  of  life  j  where  we  fee  a  little  plain  tefti- 
mony  eafily  outweighs  the  moft  fpecious  conje£lures,  and. 
rot  feldom  even  ftrong  probabilities."  Dr.  Ba/gufs  4th 
Charge.  See  alfo  an  excellent  pamphlet,  entitled.  Remarks' 
on  Mr.  Hume's  E-[fay  on  the  Natural  Hifory  of  Religion^  §  v. 
And  the  6th  of  Dr.  Poivell'^  Difcourfes. 

Page  xxxiii.  [I]. 
Dr.  Arthur  Ashley  Sykes,  from  whofe  writings  fome 
good  may  be  colle£l:ed  out  of  a  multitude  of  things  of  a 
contrary  tendency,  in  what  he  is  pleafed  to  call  The  Scrip' 
ture  Do5lrif^  of  Redemption,*  oppofes  what  is  here  advanced 
by  Bilhop  Butler  J  quoting  his  words,  but  without  men- 
tioning his  name.  If  what  is  faid  above  be  not  thought  a 
fufhcient  anfwer  to  the  objections  of  this  author,  the  reader 
may  do  well  to  confult  a  Charge  On  the  life  and  Ahife  of 
Philofophy  in  the  Study  of  Religion,  by  the  late  Dr.  Powell, 
who  feems  to  me  to  have  had  the  obfervations  of  Dr.  Sykes 
in  his  view,  where  he  is  confuting  the  reafonings  of  certaia 
philofophizing  divines  againft  the  do^lrine  of  the  Atone- 
ment.    Powell's  Difcourfes,  Charge  III.  p.  342 — 348. 

*  See  the  Obfervations  on  the  texts  cited  in  his  firft  chapter,  and  a'fo  m 
chapters  the  tifth  and  fixth. 


THE 
ANALOGY 

O    F 

RELIGION, 

NATURAL    AND    REVEALED,^ 

TO      THE 

CONSTITUTION  and  COURSE  op  NATURE. 


TO    THE 
RIGHT    HONOURABLE 

CHARLES  Lord  TALBOT, 

BARON  OF   HENSOL, 

LORD   HIGH  CHANCELLOR  OF  GREAT 
BRITAIN, 

THE     FOLLOWING 

TREATISE 

IS,    WITH  ALL  RESPECT, 

3[nrcribeti, 

IN  ACKNOWLEDGMENT   OF   THE   HIGHEST 
OBLIGATIONS  TO  THE  LATE 

LORD  BISHOP  OF  DURHAM  AND 
TO  HIMSELF, 

BY  HIS  LORDSHIP'S 

MOST   DUTIFUL, 
\     MOST  DEVOTED, 
AND  MOST  HUMBLE  SERVANT, 

JOSEPH    BUTLER, 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


If  the  reader  fliould  meet  here  with  any  thing 
•which  he  had  not  before  attended  to,  it  will  not  be  in  the  ob- 
fervations  upon  the  conftitution  and  courfe  of  nature,  thefe  be- 
ing all  obvious,  but  in  the  application  of  them  ;  in  which, 
though  there  is  nothing  but  what  appears  to  me  of  fome  real 
weight,  and  therefore  of  great  importance,  yet  he  will  obferve 
fcveral  things  which  will  appear  to  him  of  very  little,  if  he  can 
think  things  to  be  of  little  importance,  which  are  of  any  real 
v.'eight  at  all  upon  fuch  a  fubjedt  as  religion.  However,  the 
proper  force  of  the  following  treatife  lies  in  the  whole  general 
analogy  confidered  together. 

It  is  come,  I  know  not  how,  to  be  taken  for  granted  by 
many  perfons,  that  Chriftianity  is  not  fo  much  as  a  fubjedt  of 
inquiry,  but  that  it  is  now  at  length  difcovered  to  be  fictitious. 
And  accordingly  they  treat  it  as  if,  in  the  prefent  age,  this 
were  an  agreed  point  among  all  people  of  difcerflment,  and 
nothing  remained  but  to  fet  it  up  as  a  principal  fubjedl  of  mirth 
and  ridicule,  as  it  were  by  way  of  reprifals  for  its  having  fo 
long  interrupted  the  pleafures  of  the  world.  On  the  contrary, 
thus  much,  at  leaft,  will  be  here  found,  not  taken  for  granted, 
but  proved,  that  any  reafonable  man,  who  will  thoroughly  con- 
fider  the  matter,  may  be  as  much  aifured  as  he  is  of  his  own 
being,  that  it  is  not,  however,  fo  clear  a  cafe  that  there  is  noth- 
ing in  it.  There  is,  I  think,  ftrong  evidence  of  its  truth  ;  but 
it  is  certain  no  one  can,  upon  principles  of  reafon,  be  fatisfied 
of  the  contrary.  And  the  pradical  confequence  to  be  drawn 
from  this  is  not  attended  to  by  every  one  who  Is  concerned 
in  it. 

Mav,  1736. 


;   :.»lj.>V  ,»K     II.U  H'lUlg-tJ., 


CONTENTS. 


Tage 


Introduction 

PART       I. 

Of  Natural    Religion. 

C  H  A  P.     I. 

0/a  Figure  Life  ->  -  -  -  67 

CHAP.     II. 

Of  the  Government  of  God  by  Rewards  and  Pun- 
i^im^nis ',  and  particularly  of  the  latter        •>  86 

CHAP.     III. 

Of  the  Mora/ Government  of  God        -         -  gT 

CHAP.     IV. 

Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  impfying  Trial,  Diffi- 
culties and  Danger         -  -  -  -  j  23 

CHAP.     V. 

Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  intended  fof  Moral 

Difcipline  and  Improvement  -  -  131 

CHAP. 


lii  CONTENTS. 

CHAP.    VI. 

Page 

Of  the  Opinion  of  NeceJJityi  confidered  as  inflU' 
encing  Pra£iice  -  -  -  -  i^6 

CHAP.    VII. 

Of  the  Government  ofGod^  confidered  as  a  Scheme 
or  Conjiitutiony  imperfeBly  comprehended      -         1 7,2 

CONCLUSION  -  -  -  184. 

P    A    R    T        II. 

Cy  Revealed   Religion. 

CHAP.     I. 

Of  the  Importance  of  Chrijiia^iity  -  191 

CHAP.     II. 

Of  the  fuppofed  Prefumption  againfl  a  Revelation, 
confidered  as  miraculous         -  -  -  209 

%  CHAP.     III. 

Of  our  Incapacity  of  judging^  what  were  to  be  ex- 
pe^ed  in  a  Revelation  i  and  the  Credibility^ 
from  Analogy,  that  it  muji  contain  Things  ap- 
pearing liable  to  Objections  -  -  216 

CHAP.     IV. 

Of  Chriflianity,  confidered  as  a  Scheme  or  Confitu- 
iion,  imperfectly  comprehended         -         -  232 

CHAP. 


CONTENTS.  liii 

CHAP.     V. 

Page 

Of  the  particular  Syjiem  of  Chrijiianity  ;  the  Ap- 
pointment of  a  Mediator,  and  the  Redemption  of 
the  World  by  him  -  -  -         -         240 

CHAP,     VI. 

Of  the  Want  of  Univerfality  in  Revelation  ;  and 
of  the  fiippofed  Deficiency  in  the  Proof  of  it  260 

CHAP.     VII. 

Of  the  particular  Evidence  for  Chrijiianity       -         280 

CHAP.     VIII. 

Of  the  ObjeBions  which  may  he  made  againji  ar- 
guing from  the  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion         318 

CONCLUSION       .        -        .        -        q^i 


DISSERTATION 

L 

Of  Perjonal  Identity         ^         -         - 

DISSERTATION 

11. 

Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue 

6^ 


si 


A  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  the  Diocefe  of  Dut- 
hamy  1751-        *         -    .     =-  ~  ~  Ci^i^^ 


INTRODUCTION. 


JrROBABLE  evidence  is  elTentlally  dif- 
tingulfhed  from  demonftrative  by  this,  that  it  admits 
of  degrees ;  and  of  all  variety  of  them,  from  the  high- 
eft  moral  certainty,  to  the  very  lowefh  prefumption. 
We  cannot  indeed  fay  a  thing  is  probably  true  upon 
one  very  flight  prefumption  for  it,  becaufe,  as  there 
may  be  probabilities  on  both  fides  of  a  queftion,  there 
may  be  fome  againft  it ;  and  though  there  be  not, 
yet  a  flight  prefumption  does  not  beget  that  degree  of 
convitftion  which  is  implied  in  faying  a  thing  is  prob- 
ably true.  But  that  the  llighteft  poffible  prefump- 
tion is  of  the  nature  of  a  probability,  appears  from 
hence,  that  fuch  low  prefumption,  often  repeated, 
will  amount  even  to  moral  eertainty.  Thus  a  man's 
having  obferved  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide  today, 
affords  fome  fort  of  prefumption,  though  the  loweft 
imaginable,  that  it  may  happen  again  tomorrow  ;  but 
the  obfervation  of  this  event  for  fo  many  days,  and 
months,  and  ages  together,  as  it  has  been  obferved  by 
mankind,  gives  us  a  full  aflurance  that  it  will.  ^ 

That  which  chiefly  conftitutes  probability  is  ex- 
prefled  in  the  word  likely,  i.  e.  like  fome  truth,*  or 
true  event  ;  like  it,  in  itfelf,  in  its  evidence,  in  fome 
more  or  fewer  of  its  circumftances.  For  when  we  de- 
termine a  thing  to  be  probably  true,  fuppofe  that  an 
event  has  or  will  come  to  pafs,  it  is  from  the  mind's 
remarking  in  it  a  likenefs  to  fome  other  event,  which 
we  have  obferved  has  come  to  pafs.  And  this  obier- 
vatlon  forms,  in  num.berlefs  daily  inflances,  a  prefump- 
tion, opinion,  or  full  convidion,  that  fuch  event  has 

or 

*  Verifimile. 


56  INTRODUCTION. 

or  will  come  to  pafs,  according  as  the  obfervation  is, 
tmt  the  like  event  has  fometimes,  moft  commonly,  or 
alwr.ys  fo  far  as  our  obfervation  reaches,  come  to  pafs 
at  like  difhances  of  time,  or  place,  or  upon  like  occa- 
fions.  Hence  arifes  the  belief  that  a  child,  if  it  lives 
twenty  years,  will  grow  up  to  the  Itature  and  ftrength 
of  a  man  ;  that  food  will  contribute  to  the  preferva- 
tion  of  its  life,  and  the  want  of  it  for  fuch  a  number 
of  days,  be  its  certain  deftruftion.  So  likewife  the 
rule  and  meafure  of  our  hopes  and  fears  concerning 
the  fuccefs  of  our  purfuits  ;  our  expectations  that 
others  will  aO:  fo  and  fo  in  fiich  circumftances ;  and 
our  judgment  that  fuch  actions  proceed  from  fuch 
principles  ;  all  thefe  rely  upon  our  having  obferved 
the  like  to  what  we  hope,  fear,  expert,  judge  ;  I  fay 
upon  our  having  obferved  the  like,  either  with  re- 
fpeit  to  others  or  ourfelves.  And  thus,  whereas  the 
prince*  who  had  always  lived  in  a  warm  climate,  nat- 
urally concluded  in  the  way  of  analogy,  that  there  was 
no  fuch  thing  as  w^atcr's  becoming  hard,  becaufe  he 
had  always  obferved  it  to  be  fluid  and  yielding, — ^we 
on  the  contrary,  from  analogy  conclude,  that  there  is 
no  prefumption  at  all  againft  this  ;  that  it  is  fuppofa^- 
ble  there  may  be  froft  in  England  any  given  day  in 
January  next  j  probable  that  there  will  on  fome  other 
I  day  of  the  month  ;  and  that  there  is  a  moral  certainr 
ty,  i.  e.  ground  for  an  expedation  without  any  doubt 
of  it,  in  fome  part  or  other  of  the  winter. 

Probable  evidence,  in  its  very  nature,  affords  but 
an  imperfect  kind  of  information,  and  is  to  be  conlid- 
ered  as  relative  only  to  beings  of  limited  capacities. 
For  nothing  which  is  the  pofTible  objedl  of  knowledge, 
whether  pail,  prefent,  or  future,  can  be  probable  to  an 
infinite  Intelligence,  fmce  it  cannot  but  be  difcerned 
abfoutely  as  it  is  in  itfelf,  certainly  true,  or  certainly 
falle.     But  to  kj,  probability  is  the  very  guide  of  life. 

Froni 

*  The  ftory  in  told  by  Mr.  Locke  in  the  Chapter  of  Probability. 


INTRODUCTION.  57 

From  thefe  things  it  follows,  that  in  queflions  of 
difficulty,  or  fuch  as  are  thought  fo,  where  more  fatis- 
fadory  evidence  cannot  be  had,  or  is  not  feen  ;  if 
the  reiult  of  examination  be,  that  there  appears  upon 
the  whole,  any  the  loweft  prefumption  on  one  fide, 
and  none  on  the  other,  or  a  greater  prefumption  on 
one  fide,  though  in  the  loweft  degree  greater  ;  this  de- 
termines the  queftion,  even  in  matters  of  fpeculation  ; 
and  in  matters  of  pradice,  will  lay  us  under  an  abfo- 
lute  and  formal  obligation,  in  point  of  prudence  and 
of  intereft,  to  adt  upon  that  prefumption  or  low  prob- 
ability, though  it  be  fo  low  as  to  leave  the  mind  in 
very  great  doubt  which  is  the  truth.     For  furely  a 
man  is  as  really  bound  in  prudence  to  do  what  upon 
the  whole  appears,  according  to  the  beft  of  his  judg- 
ment, to  be  for  his  happinefs,  as  what  he  certainly 
knows  to  be  fo.     Nay,  further,  in  queftions  of  great 
confequence,  a  reafonable  man  will  think  it  concerns 
him  to  remark  lower  probabilities  and  prefumptions 
than  thele  ;  fuch  as  amount  to  no  more  than  fliowing 
one  fide  of  a  queftion  to  be  as  fuppofeable  and  cred- 
ible as  the  other  ;  nay,  fuch  as  but  amount  to  much 
lefs  even  than  this.     For  numberlefs  inftances  might 
be  mentioned  refpefting  the  common  purfults  of  life, 
where  a  man  would  be  thought,  in  a  literal  fenfe,  dif- 
traded,  who  would  not  adl,  and  with  great  applica- 
tion too,  not  only  upon  an  even  chance,  but  upon 
much  lefs,  and  where  the  probability  or  chance  was 
greatly  againft  his  fucceeding.* 

It  is  not  my  defign  to  inquire  further  into  the  nature, 
the  foundation,  and  meaftire  of  probability  ;  or  whence 
it  proceeds  that  likenefs  llioukl  beget  that  prefump- 
tion, opinion,  and  full  convidion,  which  the  human 
mind  is  formed  to  receive  from  it,  and  which  it  does 
necelfarily  produce  in  every  one  ;  or  to  guard  againft 
ihe  errors,  to  which  reafoning  from  analogy  is  liable. 

E  This 

•i"  SeA  Ch.  vi.  Part  II. 


58  INTRO  DUCTIO]^. 

This  belongs  to  the  fubjed  of  logic  ;  and  is  a  part  of 
that  iubjeft  which  has  not  yet  been  thoroughly  confid- 
ered.  Indeed  I  fhali  not  take  upon  me  to  fay,  how 
far  the  extent,  compafs,  and  force  of  analogical  rea- 
fonirig  can  be  reduced  to  general  heads  and  rules, 
and  the  whole  be  formed  into  a  fyftem  :  But  though 
fo  little  in  this  way  has  been  attempted  by  thofe  who 
have  treated  of  our  intelledual  powers,  and  the  exer- 
cife  of  them,  this  does  not  hinder  but  that  we  may 
be,  as  we  unqueftionably  are  allured,  that  analogy  is 
of  weight,  in  various  degrees,  towards  determining 
our  judgment  and  our  praftice.  Nor  does  it  in  any 
wife  ceafe  to  be  of  weight  in  thofe  cafes,  becaufe  per- 
fons,  either  given  to  difpute,  or  who  require  things 
to  be  fbated  with  greater  exadnefs  than  our  facul- 
ties appear  to  admit  of  in  pradlical  matters,  may 
find  other  cafes  in  which  it  is  not  eafy  to  fay,  whether 
it  be  or  be  not  .of  any  weight ;  or  inftances  of  feem- 
ing  analogies,  which  are  really  of  none.  It  is  enough 
to  the  prefent  purpofe  to  obferve,  that  this  general 
way  of  arguing  is  evidently  natural,  juli,  and  conclu- 
five.  For  there  is  no  man  can  make  a  queftion  but 
that  the  fun  will  rife  tomorrow  ;  and  be  feen,  where 
it  is  feen  at  all,  in  the  figure  of  a  circle,  and  not  in 
that  of  a  fquare. 

Hence,  namely  from  analogical  reafoning,  Origen* 
has  with  fmgular  fagacity  obferved,  that  /le  who  be- 
lieves the  Scripture  to  have  proceeded  from  him  who  is 
the  Author  of  nature^  may  well  exped  to  find  the  fame 
fort  of  difficulties  in  it,  as  are  found  in  the  confiitution  of 
nature.  And  in  a  hke  way  of  refledion  it  may  be 
added,  that  he  who  denies  the  Scripture  to  have  been 
from  God  upon  account  of  thefe  difficulties,  may,  for 

the 

Apr)  jw.£i/  Tot  yi  Tov  (KTiy.^  'KOL^txoiyoi.u.ivoy  m  Trricccvro?-  tuv 
•A.o(TfJi,ov  imxi  Tavrxg  rxg  ypoc<p(x,<;  Tmruc^ai^  on  o(ra,   wspt   rnj 

XTJCTEW?   aTTOiVTX    TOJ?   (^riTii(n    TQV  TTSpi    aVTYig    AoyOUy    TSillTX     aoii 

TTtf/i  Tuv  ^^^(puv,      Philocal.  p.  23.  Ed.  Cant, 


INTRODUCTION.  59 

tlie  very  fame  reafon,  deny  the  world  to  have  been 
formed  by  him.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  be  an 
analogy  or  likencfs  between  that  fyftem  of  things  and 
<iifpenfation  of  Providence,  which  revelation  informs 
us  of,  and  that  fyftem  of  things  and  difpenfation  of 
Providence,  which  experience,  together  with  reafon, 
informs  us  of,  i.  e.  the  known  courfe  of  nature  ;  this  is 
a  prefumption,  that  they  have  both  the  fame  author 
and  caufe  ;  at  lead  fo  far  as  to  anfwer  objections  againft 
the  former's  being  from  God,  drawn  from  any  thing 
which  is  analogical  or  fimiiar  to  what  is  in  the  latter, 
which  is  acknowledged  to  be  from  him  j  for  an  Au- 
thor of  nature  is  here  fuppofed. 

Forming  our  notions  of  the  conftitution  and  gov- 
ernment of  the  world  upon  reafoning,  without  foun- 
dation for  the  principles  which  we  alTume,  whether 
from  the  attributes  of  God  or  any  thing  elfe,  is  build- 
ing a  world  upon  hypotheiis,  like  Des  Cartes.  Form- 
ing our  notions  upon  reafoning  from  principles  which 
are  certain,  but  applied  to  cafes  to  which  we  have  no 
ground  to  apply  them,  (like  thofe  who  explain  the 
ilrudure  of  the  human  body,  and  the  nature  of  dif- 
eafes  and  medicines,  from  mere  mathematics,  without 
fufficient  {lata)  is  an  error  much  a-kin  to  the  former  ; 
iince  what  is  aflumed  in  order  to  make  the  reafoning 
applicable,  is  hypothefis.  But  it  muft  be  allowed  juft, 
to  join  abftrad  reafonings  with  the  obfervation  of 
fafts,  and  argue  from  fuch  fa6ts  as  are  known,  to 
others  that  are  like  them  ^  from  that  part  of  the  divine 
government  over  intelligent  creatures  which  comes 
under  our  view,  to  that  larger  and  more  general  gov- 
ernment over  them,  which  is  beyond  it ;  and  from 
what  is  prefent,  to  colled:  what  is  likely,  credible,  or 
not  incredible,  will  be  hereafter. 

This  method  then  of  concluding  and  determining 
being  practical,  and  what,  if  we  will  adt  at  all,  we  can- 
not but  ad  {ipon  in  the  common  purfuits  of  life  ;  be- 
E  z  ing 


6o  INTRODUCTION. 

ittg  evidently  conclulive,  in  various  degrees,  propor- 
tionable to  the  degree  and  exaftnefs  of  the  whole  anal- 
ogy or  likenefs  ;  and  having  (o  great  authority  for  its 
introdudion  into  the  fubjed  of  religion,  even  reveal- 
ed religion  ;  my  delign  is  to  apply  it  to  that  fiibjeft  in 
general,  both  natural  and  revealed  ;  taking  for  proved, 
that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature,  and  nat- 
ural Governor  of  the  world.  For  as  there  is  no  pre- 
fumption  againft  this  prior  to  the  proof  of  it,  fa  it  has 
been  often  proved  with  accumulated  evidence  ;  from 
this  argument  of  analogy  and  final  caufes  ;  from  ab- 
llract  reafonings  ;  from  the  mofh  ancient  tradition 
and  teflimony,  and  from  the  general  confent  of  man- 
kind. Nor  does  it  appear,  fo  far  as  I  can  find,  to  be' 
dehied,  by  the  generality  of  thofe  who  profefs  them- 
felves  difiatisfied  with  the  evidence  of  religion. 

As  there  are  fome,  who,  inftead  of  thus  attending  to 
what  is.  in  fad:  the  conftitution  of  nature,  form  their 
notions  of  God's  government  upon  hypothefis  ;  fo 
there  are  others,  who  indulge  themfelves  in  vain  and 
idle  fpeculations,  how  the  world  might  poflibly  have 
been  framed  otherwife  than  it  is  ;  and  upon  fuppofi- 
tion  that  things  might,  in  imagining  that  they  fliould, 
have  been  difpofed  and  carried  on  after  a  better  mod- 
el than  what  appears  in  the  prelent  difpofition  and 
condud  of  them.     Suppofe  now  a  perfon  of  fuch  a 
turn  of  mind,  to  goon  with  his  reveries,  till  he  had  at 
length  fixed  upon  fome  particular  plan  of  nature,  as  ap- 
pearing to  him  the  beft  ;  One  fhall  fcarce  be  thought 
guilty  of  detradion  againft  human  undcrftanding,  if 
one  lliould  fay,  even  beforehand,  that  the  plan  which 
this  fpeculative  perfon  would  fix  upon,  though  he  were 
the  wifeft  of  the  fons  of  men,  probably  would  not  be 
the  very  beft,  even  according  to  his  own  notions  of 
l?e/i ;  whether  he  thought  that  to  be  fo,  which  afford- 
ed occalions  and  motives  for  the  exercife  of  the  great- 
eft  virtue,  or  which  was  produdive  of  the  greateft  hap- 

pineis, 


INTRODUCTION.  6i 

pinefs,  or  that  thefe  two  were  necelTarily  connedled, 
and  run  up  into  one  and  the  fame  plan.  However,  it 
may  not  be  amifs  once  for  ail  to  "fee,  what  would  be 
the  amount  of  thefe  emendations  and  imaginary  im- 
provements upon  the  fyftem  of  nature,  or  how  far  they 
would  miflead  us.  And  it  feems  there  could  be  no 
flopping,  till  we  came  to  fome  fuch  conclufions  as 
thefe  :  That  all  creatures  fhould  at  firft  be  made  as 
perfect  and  as  happy  as  they  were  capable  of  ever  be- 
ing :  That  nothing,  to  be  fure,  of  hazard  or  danger 
{hould  be  put  upon  them  to  do  ,  fome  indolent  perfons 
would  perhaps  think  nothing  at  all ;  or  certainly,  thai 
elfeftuai  care  Ihould  be  taken,  that  they  (hould,  wheth- 
er neceffarily  or  not,  yet  eventually  and  in  fad,  always 
do  what  was  right  and  moft  conducive  to  happinefs, 
which  would  be  thought  eafy  for  infinite  power  to  ef- 
fe6t ;  either  by  not  giving  them  any  principles  which 
would  endanger  their  going  wrong,  or  by  laying  the 
right  motive  of  a<5tion  in  every  inftance  before  their 
minds  continually  in  fo  ftrong  a  manner,  as  would 
never  fail  of  inducing  them  to  aft  conformably  to 
it  ;  and  that  the  whole  method  of  government  b]/ 
punifliments  fhould  be  rejeded  as  abfurd,  as  an 
awkward  round-about  method  of  carrying  things 
on  ■;  nay,  as  contrary  to  a  principal  purpofe,  for 
which  it  would  be  fuppofed  creatures  were  made, 
namely  happinefs. 

Now,  without  confidering  what  is  to  be  faid  in  par- 
ticular to  the  feveral  parts  of  this  train  of  folly  and  ex- 
travagance, what  has  been  above  intimated,  is  a  full, 
direft,  general  anfwer  to  it,  namely,  that  we  may  fee 
beforehand  that  we  have  not  faculties  for  this  kind  of 
fpeculation.  For  though  it  be  admitted,  that  from 
the  firft  principles  of  oui'  nature,  we  unavoidably  judge 
or  determine  fome  ends  to  be  abfolutely  in  themfelves 
preferable  to  others,  and  that  the  ends  now  mentioned, 
or  if  they  run  up  into  one,  that  this  one  is  abfolutely 

the 


62  INTRO  D  UCTIOK 

the  beft  ;  and  confequently  that  we  muft  conclude 
the  ultimate  end  deiigned,  in  the  conftitution  of  na- 
ture and  conduft  of  Providence,  is  the  moft  virtue  and 
happinefs  pofTible  :  Yet  we  are  far  from  being  able  ta 
judge,  what  particular  difpofition  of  things  would  be 
mofi;  friendly  and  affiltant  to  virtue  ;  or  what  means 
might  be  abfolutely  necelTary  to  produce  the  moit 
happinefs  in  a  fyftem  of  fuch  extent  as  our  own  world 
may  be,  taking  in  all  that  is  paft  and  to  come,  though 
we  fhould  fuppofe  it  detached  from  the  whole  of 
things.  Indeed  we  are  fo  far  from  being  able  to  judge 
of  this,  that  we  are  not  judges  what  may  be  the  necef- 
fary  means  of  railing  and  conducing  one  perfon  to  the 
higheft  perfection  and  happinefs  of  his  nature.  Nay, 
even  in  the  little  affairs  of  the  prefent  life,  we  find  men 
of  different  educations  and  ranks  are  not  competent 
judges  of  the  conduct  of  each  other.  Our  whole  na- 
ture leads  us  to  afcribe  all  moral  perfection  to  God, 
and  to  deny  all  imperfection  of  him.  And  this  will 
forever  be  a  practical  proof  of  his  moral  character,  to 
fuch  as  will  confider  what  a  practical  proof  is  ;  becaufe 
it  is  the  voice  of  God  fpeaking  in  us.  And  from  hence 
we  conclude,  that  virtue  muft  be  the  happinefs,  and 
vice  the  mifery  of  every  creature  ;  and  that  regularity 
and  order  and  right  cannot  but  prevail  finally  in  a  uni- 
verfe  under  his  government.  But  we  are  in  no  fort 
judges,  what  are  the  neceffary  means  of  accomplifliing 
this  end. 

Let  us  then,  inftead  of  that  idle  and  not  very  inno- 
cent employment  of  forming  imaginary  models  of  a 
world,  and  fchemes  of  governing  it,  turn  our  thoughts 
to  what  we  experience  to  be  the  conduCt  of  nature 
with  refpeCt  to  intelligent  creatures ;  which  may  be 
refolved  into  general  laws  or  rules  of  adminiflration, 
in  the  fame  way  as  many  of  the  laws  of  nature  refpeCt- 
ing  inanimate  matter  may  be  collected  from  experi- 
ments.    And  let  us  compare  the  known  conftitution 

and 


INTRODUCTION.  6^ 

and  courfe  of  things,  with  what  is  faid  to  be  the  moral 
fyftem  of  nature  ;  the  acknowledged  difiDenfations  of 
Providence,  or  that  government  which  we  find  our- 
felves  under,  with  what  religion  teaches  us  to  be* 
lieve  and  expert  ;  and  fee  whether  they  are  not 
analogous  and  of  a  piece.  And  upon  fuch  a  com- 
parifon,  it  will  I  think  be  found,  that  they  are  very 
much  fo  ;  that  both  may  be  traced  up  to  the  fame 
general  laws,  and  rcfolved  into  the  fame  principles  of 
divine  condud. 

The  analogy  here  propofed  to  be  confidered  is  of 
pretty  large  extent,  and  confifhs  of  feveral  parts  ;  in 
lome  more,  in  others  lefs  exadt.  In  fome  few  in- 
itances,  perhaps,  it  may  amount  to  a  real  practical 
proof;  in  others  not  fo.  Yet  in  thefe  it  is  a  con- 
firmation of  wliat  is  proved  other  ways.  It  will  un- 
deniably lliow,  what  too  many  want  to  have  fliown 
them,  that  the  fyftem  of  religion,  both  natural  and 
revealed,  confidered  only  as  a  fyftem,  and  prior  to  the 
proof  of  it,  is  not  a  fubje<ft  of  ridicule,  i^nlefs  that  of 
nature  be  fo  too.  And  it  will  afford  an  anfwer  to  al- 
moft  ail  objeftions  againfl  the  fyftem  both  of  natural 
and  revealed  religion  ;  though  not  perhaps  an  anfwer 
in  fo  great  a  degree,  yet  in  a  very  confiderable  degree 
an  anfwer,  to  the  objections  againft  the  evidence  of  it : 
For  objeftions  againft  a  proof,  and  objeftions  again(l 
what  is  faid  to  be  proved,  the  reader  wiU  obferve  are 
different  things. 

Now  the  divine  government  of  the  world,  implied 
in  the  notion  of  religion  in  general  and  of  Chriftianity, 
contains  in  it, — That  mankind  is  appointed  to  live  in  a 
future  ftate  ;*  that  there,  every  one  Ihall  be  rewarded  or 
punilhed  y-\-  rewarded  or  puniftied  refpeftively  for  all 
that  behaviour  here,  which  we  comprehend  under  the 
words,  virtuous  or  vicious,  morally  good  or  evil  :  J 
That  our  prefent  life  is  a  probation,  a  ftate  of  trial,  § 

and 

*  oil.  1,  -f-  Ch.  ii.  J  Ch.  iii.  §  Ch.  iv. 


64  INTRODUCTION. 

and  of  difcipline,*  for  that  future  one  ;  notwithHand- 
ing  the  objeftions,  which  men  may  fancy  they  have, 
from  notions  of  neceflity,  againft  there  being  any  fuch 
moral  plan  as  this  at  all  ^-j-  and  whatever  objedions 
may  appear  to  lie  againft  the  wifdom  and  goodnefs  of 
it,  as  it  {lands  fo  imperfedly  made  known  to  us  at 
prefent :  %  That  this  world  being  in  a  ftate  of  apof- 
tacy  and  wickednefs,  and  confequently  of  ruin,  and  the 
fenfe  both  of  their  condition  and  duty  being  greatly 
corrupted  amongft  men  ;  this  gave  occafion  for  an  ad- 
ditional difpenfation  of  Providence  ;  of  the  utmoft  im- 
portance ;§  proved  by  miracles  ;||  but  containing  in 
it  many  things  appearing  to  us  ftrange  and  not  to 
have  been  expefted  -**  a  difpenfation  of  Providence, 
which  is  a  fcheme  or  fyftem  of  things  i-f-f-  carried  on 
by  the  mediation  of  a  divine  perfon,  the  Meffiah,  in 
order  to  the  recovery  of  the  world  ;  \X  yet  not  revealed 
to  all  men,  nor  proved  with  the  ftrongeft  poflible  evi- 
dence to  all  thofe  to  whom  it  is  revealed  j  but  only  to 
fuch  a  part  of  mankind,  and  with  fuch  particular  evi- 
dence as  the  wifdom  of  God  thought  fit.§§     The  de- 
lign  then  of  the  following  Treatife  will  be  to  fhew, 
that  the  feveral  parts  principally  objeded  againft  in 
this  moral  and  Chriftian  difpenfation,  including  its 
fcheme,  its  publication,  and  the  proof  which  God  has 
afforded  us  of  its  truth  ;  that  the  particular  parts  prin- 
cipally objected  againft  in  this  whole  difpenfation,  are 
analogous  to  what  is  experienced  in  the  conftitutiqn 
and  courfe  of  nature,  or  providence ;  that  the  chief 
objedions  themfelves  which  are  alleged  againft  the 
former,  are  no  other  than  what  may  be  alleged  with 
like  juftnefs  againft  the  latter,  where  they  are  found  in 
fad  to  be  inconclufive ;  and  that  this  argument  from 
analogy  is  in  eeneral  unanfwerable,  and  undoubtedly 

/         "  '^ 

./  *  Ch.  V.  f  Cb.  yi.  %  Ch.  viJ. 

>  §  Part  ir.  Ch.  i.  |1  Ch.  ii.  **  Ch.  iii. 

ft  Ch.  jv.  XX  Ch.  V.  §§  Ch.  vi,Vii. 


INTRODUCTION,  65 

of  weight  01:1  the  fide  of  religion,*  notwithflanding  the 
objeftions  which  may  feem  to  lie  agalnfl  it,  and  the 
real  ground  which  there  may  be  for  difference  of  opin- 
ion, as  to  the  particular  degree  of  weight  which  is  to 
be  laid  upon  it.  This  is  a  general  account  of  what 
may  be  looked  for  in  the  following  Treatife ;  and  I 
Ihall  begin  it  with  that  which  is  the  foundation  of 
all  our  hopes  and  of  all  our  fears,  all  our  hopes  and 
fears  which  are  of  any  confidcration,  I  mean  a  fu- 
ture life. 

*  Chap.  viii.   * 


THE 


ANALOGY 


O     F 


RELIGION 

TO         THE 

Constitution   and  Course   of  Naturis, 


PART       I. 

Of  Natural    Religion, 

CHAP.     I. 

Of  a  Future  Life, 

OTRANGE  difficulties  have  been  raifed 
by  fome  concerning  perfonal  identity,  or  the  lamenels 
of  hving  agents,  implied  in  the  notion  of  our  exifting 
now  and  hereafter,  or  in  any  two  fucceffive  moments ; 
which,  whoever  thinks  it  worth  while,  may  fee  con- 
fidered  in  the  firll  Dillertation  at  the  end  of  this 
Treatife.  But  without  regard  to  any  of  them  here, 
let  us  confider  what  the  analogy  of  nature,  and  the 
feveral  changes  which  we  have  undergone,  and  thofe 
which  we  know  we  may  undergo  without  being  de- 
ilroyed,  fuggeft,  as  to  the  effect  which  death  may  or 

may 


63  Of  a  Future  Life, 

may  not  have  upon  iis ;  and  whether  It  be  not  from 
thence  probable,  that  we  may  furvive  this  change,  and 
exift  in  a  future  ftate  of  Hfe  and  perception. 

I.  From  our  being  born  into  the  prefent  world  in 
the  helplefs  imperfeft  ftate  of  infancy,  and  having  ar- 
rived from  thence  to  mature  aq;e,  we  find  it  to  be  a 
general  law  of  nature  in  our  own  fpecies,  that  the  fame 
creatures,  the  fame  individuals,  Ihould  exift  in  de- 
grees of  life  and  perception,  Vv^ith  capacities  of  aftion, 
of  enjoyment  and  fuffering,  in  one  period  of  their  be- 
ing, greatly  different  from  thofe  appointed  them  in 
another  period  of  it.  And  in  other  creatures  the 
fame  law  holds.  For  the  difference  of  their  capaci- 
ties and  ftates  of  life  at  their  birth  (to  go  no  higher) 
and  in  maturity  j  the  change  of  worms  into  flies,  and 
the  vaft  enlargement  of  their  locomotive  powers  by 
fuch  change  ;  and  birds  and  infecls  burfting  the  fliell, 
■their  habitation,  and  by  -this  means  entering  into  a 
new  Vk'orld,  furnillied  with  ne\y  accommodations  for 
them,  and  finding  a  new  fphere  of  aftion  afligned 
them  ;  tbeie  are  inftances  of  this  general  law  of  nature. 
Thus  all  the  various  and  wonderful  transformations  of 
animals  are  to  be  taken  into  confideration  here.  But 
the  ftates  of  life  in  which  we  ourfelves  exifted  formerly 
in  the  womb  and  in  our  infancy,  are  almoft  as  different 
from  our  prefent  in  mature  age,  as  it  is  poffible  to 
conceive  any  two  ftates  or  degrees  of  life  can  be. 
Therefore,  that  we  are  to  exift  hei^eafter  in  a  ftate  as 
different  (fuppofe)  from  our  prefent,  as  this  is  from 
our  former,  is  but  according  to  the  analogy  of  na- 
ture ;  according  to  a  natural  order  or  appointment 
of  the  very  fame  kind  with  what  we  have  already 
experienced. 

II.  We  know  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of  ac- 
tion, of  happinefs  and  mifery  j  for  we  are  confcious 
of  acting,  of  enjoying  pleafure,  and  fuffering  pain. 
Now  that  we  have  thefe  powers  and  capacities  before 

death, 


Of  a  Future  Life,  ^9 

death,  is  a  prefumption  that  we  lliall  retain  them 
through  and  after  death  ;  indeed  a  probability  of  it 
abundantly  fufficient  to  aft  upon,  unlefs  there  be  fome 
pofitive  reafon  to  think  that  death  is  the  deftruction 
of  thofe  living  powers  ;  becaufe  there  is  in  every  cafe 
a  probability,  that  all  things  will  continue  as  we  ex- 
perience they  are,  in  all  refpeds,  except  thofe  in 
which  we  have  fome  reafon  to  think,  they  will  be  al- 
tered. This  is  that  kind*  of  prefumption  or  proba- 
bility from  analogy,  exprefled  in  the  very  word  contin- 
uance^ which  feems  our  only  natural  reafon  for  believ- 
ing the  courfe  of  the  world  will  continue  tomorrow^ 
as  it  has  done  fo  far  as  our  experience  or  knowledge 
of  hiftory  can  carry  us  back.  Nay,  it  feems  our  only 
reafon  for  believing  that  any  one  fubfcance  now  ex- 
iftino;  will  continue  to  exift  a  moment  longer,  the 
felf-exiftent  fubllance  only  excepted.  Thus  if  men. 
were  aiiured  that  the  unknown  event,  death,  was  not 
the  deftruftion  of  our  faculties  of  perception  and  of 
action,  there  would  be  no  apprehenfion  that  any  other 
power  or  event  unconnefted  with  this  of  death,  would 
deftroy  thefe  faculties  juft  at  the  inftant  of  each  crea- 
ture's death,  and  therefore  no  doubt  but  that  they 
would  remain  after  it ;  which  fliows  the  high  proba- 
bility that  our  living  powers  will  continue  after  death, 
unlefs  there  be  fome  ground  to  think  that  death  is 
their  deftruftion.-j~  For,  if  it  would  be  in  a  manner 
certain  that  v/e  lliould  furvive  death,  provided  it  were 

certain 

*  I  fay  liiiJo(  prefumption  or  probability  ;  for  I  do  not  mean  to  affirm 
that  ther?  isthe  fame  degree  of  conviftion,  that  our  living  powers  will  con- 
tinue after  death,  as  there  is,  that  our  fubftances  will. 

f  Defru&ion  of  living  poiuers,  is  a  manner  of  e.xprefiion  unavoidably  ambig- 
uous ;  and  may  fignify  either  the  delirutlion  of  a  living  being,  fn  as  that  the  fame 
living  being  Jluill  he  unca-pablc  of  ever  -perceiving  or  acting  again  at  all ;  or,  the  de- 
fir  uB  ion  of  thofe  means  and  injiruments  by  vohich  it  is  capable  of  its  prejhit  l:f\',  of  its 
prefent  fate  of  perception  and  of  aflio/t.  It  is  lie  re  ufed  in  the  form.er  fenfs. 
When  it  is  ufed  in  the  latter,  the  epithet  prejent  is  added.  The  lofs  of  a 
man's  eye,  is  a  deftrucftion  of  hving  powers  in  the  latter  fenfe.  But  we  have 
no  reafon  to  think  the  deftrudlion  of  living  powers  in'the  former  fenfe,  to  be 
poffible.  We  have  bo  more  reafon  to  tliink  a  being  endued  with  living  nov/- 
ers  ever  lofes  them  duruig  its  whole  exifience,  than  to  believe  that  a  ftoae 
ever  acquires  them. 


^o  Of  a  Future  Life,  Part  L 

certain  that  death  would  not  be  our  deftruction,  ifc 
muft  be  highly  probable  we  fliall  fijrvive  it,  if  there 
be  no  ground  to  think  death  will  be  our  deflruftion. 

Now,  though  I  think  it  muft  be  acknowledged, 
tliat  prior  to  the  natural  and  moral  proofs  of  a  future 
life  commonly  inftfted  upon,  there  would  arife,  a  gen- 
eral confufed  fufpicion,  that  in  the  great  fiiock  and 
alteration  which  we  fliall  undergo  by  death,  we,  i.  e. 
our  living  powers,  might  be  wholly  deftroyed ;  yet, 
even  prior  to  thofe  proofs,  there  is  really  no  particu- 
lar diftinft  ground  or  reafon  for  this  apprehenfion  at 
all,  fo  far  as  I  can  find.  If  there  be,  it  muft  arife 
either  from  the  reafon  of  the  thing,  or  from  the  analogy 
of  nature. 

But  we  cannot  argue  from  the  reafon  of  the  thing,  that 
death  is  the  deftru6tIon  of  living  agents,  becaufe  we 
know  not  at  all  what  death  is  in  itfelf ;  but  only 
feme  of  its  effefts,  fuch  as  the  diflblution  of  flefh, 
ikin,  and  bones.  And  thefe  effects  do  in  no  wife  ap- 
pear to  imply  the  deftrudion  of  a  living  agent.  And 
befides,  as  we  are  greatly  in  the  dark,  upon  what  the 
exercife  of  our  living  powers  depejids,  fo  we  are  whol- 
ly ignorant  what  the  powers  themfelves  depend  up- 
on ;  the  powers  themfelves  as  diftinguiOied,  not  only 
from  their  adual  exercife,  but  alfo  from  the  prefent 
capacity  of  exercifing  them  ;  and  as  oppofed  to  their 
deftruftion  :  For  fleep,  or  however  a  fwoon,  Ihews  us, 
not  only  that  theffe  powers  exift  when  they  are  not  ex- 
ercifed,  as  the  paflive  power  of  motion  does  in  inani^ 
mate  matter  j  but  fhews  alfo  that  they  exift,  when 
there  is  no  prefent  capacity  of  exercifing  them  ;  or 
that  the  capacities  of  exercifing  them  for  the  prefent, 
as  well  as  the  a6lual  exercife  of  them,  may  be  luf- 
pended,  and  3^et  the  powers  themfelves  remain  unde- 
ftroyed.  Since  then  we  know  not  at  all  upon  what 
the  exiftence  of  our  living  powers  depends,  this  fliews 
further,  there  can  no  probability  be  collected  from 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  71 

the  reafoh  of  the  thing,  that  death  will  be  their  de- 
ftrildion  ;  becaufe  their  exiftence  may  depend  upon 
lomewhat  in  no  degree  affeded  by  death,  upon  fome- 
vvhat  quite  out  of  the  reach  of  this  king  of  terrors. 
So  that  there .  is  nothing  more  certain,  than  that  the 
reafon  of  the  thing'  fhews  us  no  connexion  between 
death,  and  the  deftruftion  of  living  agents.  Nor  can 
we  find  any  thing  throughout  the  whole  analogy  of 
7iature^  to  afford  us  even  the  flighteft  prefumption, 
that  animals  ever  lofe  their  living  powers  ;  much  lefs, 
if  it  were  poffible,  that  they  lofe  them  by  death  ;  for 
we  have  no  faculties  wherewith  to  trace  any  beyond  or 
through  it,  fo  as  to  fee  what  becomes  of  them.  This 
event  removes  them  from  our  view.  It  defbroys  the 
fenfible  proof,  which  we  had  before  their  death,  of 
their  being  pofTelfed  of  living  powers,  but  does  not 
appear  to  aiford  the  leaft  reafon  to  believe  that  they 
are,  then,  or  by  that  event,  deprived  of  them. 

And  our  knowing  that  they  were  pofTeffed  of  theie 
powers,  up  to  the  very  period  to  which  we  have  facul- 
ties capable  of  tracing  them,  is  itfelf  a  probability  of 
their  retaining  them  beyond  it.  And  this  is  confirm- 
ed, and  a  fenfible  credibiHty  is  given  to  it,  by  obferving 
the  very  great  and  aftoniihing  changes  which  we  have 
experienced  j  fo  great,  that  our  exiftence  in  another 
ftate  of  life,  of  perception  and  of  adlion,  will  be  but 
according  to  a  method  of  providential  conduQ:,  the 
like  to  which  has  been  already  exercifed  even  with  re- 
gard to  ourfelves  ;  according  to  a  courfe  of  nature, 
the  like  to  which  we  have  already  gone  through. 

However,  as  one  cannot  but  be  greatly  fenfible 
how  difhcult  it  is  to  lilence  imagina.tion  enough  to 
make  the  voice  of  reafon  even  diftinftly  heard  in  this 
cafe  ;  as  we  are  accuftomed,  from  our  youth  up,  to  in- 
dulge that  forward  delufive  faculty,  ever  obtruding 
beyond  its  fphere  ;  of  fome  afTiftance  indeed  to  appre- 
henfion,  but  the  author  of  all  error  j  as  we  plainly  lofe 

ourfelvei 


7^  ^f  ^  Future  Life. 

ourfeltes  in  grofs  and  crude  conceptions  of  things, 
taking  for  granted  that  we  are  acquainted  with  what 
indeed  we  are  wholly  ignorant  of ;  it  may  be  proper  to 
confider  tiie  imaginary  prefumptions,  that  death  will 
be  our  deftruftion,  ariling  from  thefe  kinds  of  early  and 
lading  prejudices ;  and  to  fhew  how  little  they  can  re- 
ally amount  to,  even  though  we  cannot  wholly  diveft 
ourfelves  of  them.     And, 

I.   All  prefumption  of  death's  being  the  deftruc- 
tion  of  living  beings,  muft  go  upon  fuppoiition  that 
they  are  compounded,  and  fo  difcerptible^     But  fince 
confcioufnefs  is  a  fingle  and  indivifible  power,  it  Ihould 
feem  that  the  fubjedl  in  which  it  refides  mufl  be  fo 
too.     For  were  tlic  motion  of  any  particle  of  matter 
abfolutely  one  and  indivifible,  fo  as  that  it  fhould  im- 
ply a  contradiclion  to  fuppofe  part  of  this  motion  to 
exift,  and  part  not  to  exill,  i.  e.  part  of  this  matter  to 
move,  and  part  to  be  at  reft,  then  its  power  of  motion 
would  be  indivifible  ;  and  fo  alfo  would  the  fubjecft  in 
which  the  power  inheres,  namely,  the  particle  of  mat- 
ter ;  For  if  this  could  be  divided  into  two,  one  part 
might  be  moved  and  the  other  at  reft,  which  is  con- 
trary to  the  fuppofition.     In  like  manner  it  has  been 
argued,*  and,  for  any  thing  appearing  to  the  contrary, 
juftly,  that  fince  the  perception  or  confcioufnefs,  which 
we  haVe  of  our  own  exiftence,  is  indivifible,  fo  as  that 
it  is  a  contradiclion  to  fuppofe  one  part  of  it  fliould  be 
here  and  the  other  there,  the  perceptive  power,  or  the 
power  of  confcioufnefs,  is  indivifible  too  ;  and  confe- 
cjuently  the  fubject  in  which  it  refides,  i,  e.  the  con- 
fcious  being.    Now  upon  fuppofition  that  living  agent 
each  man  calls  himfeif,  is  thus  a  fingle  being,  which 
there  is  at  leaft  no  more  difficulty  in  conceiving  than  in 
conceiving  it  to  be  a  compound,  and  of  which  there  is 
the  proof  now  mentioned,  it  follows,  that  our  organ- 
ized bodies  are  no  more  ourfelves  or  part  of  ourfelves, 

than 

*  See  Dr.  Clarie's  Letter  to  Mr.  Doliud/,  and  the  defences  of  it. 


Chap.  I.  0/  ^  Future  Life.  75 

than  any  other  matter  around  us.  And  It  is  as  eafy 
to  conceive  how  matter,  which  is  no  part  of  ourfelves, 
may  be  apjjropriated  to  us  in  the  manner  which  our 
prefent  bodies  are,  as  how  we  can  receive  impreffions 
from,  and  have  power  over  any  matter.  It  is  as  eafy 
to  conceive  .that  we  may_exifl  out  of  bodies,  as  in 
them ;  that  we  might  have  animated  bodies  of  any 
other  organs  and  fenfcs  wholly  different  frofn  thefe 
now  given  us,  and  that  we  may  hereafter  animate  thefe 
fame  or  new  bodies  varioufly  modified  and  organized, 
as  to  conceive  how  we  can  animate  fuch  bodies  as  our 
preient.  And  lafllv,  the  difTolution  of  all  thefe  feveral 
organized  bodies,  iuppoling  ourfelves  to  have  fuccef- 
fively  animated  them,  would  have  no  more  conceiva- 
ble tendency  to  deflroy  the  living  beings  ourfelves,  or 
deprive  us  of  living  faculties,  the  faculties  of  percep- 
tion and  of  action,  than  the  diflblution  of  any  foreign 
matter,  which  we  are  capable  of  receiving  impre (lions 
from,  and  making  ufe  of  for  the  common  occafions  of 
life. 

II.  The  iimplicity  and  abfolute  onenefs  of  a  living 
agent  cannot,  indeed,  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be 
properly  proved  by  experimental  obfervations.  But 
as  thefe  fall  in  with  the  fuppofition  of  its  unity,  fo 
they  plainly  lead  us  to  conclude  certainly,  that  our 
grofs  organized  bodies,  with  which  we  perceive  the 
objects  of  fenfe,  and  with  which  we  act,  are  no  part  of 
ourfelves ;  and  therefore  fhow  us,  that  we  have  no 
reafon  to  believe  their  deftruftion  to  be  ours,  even 
without  determinins;  whether  our  living  fubflances  be 
material  or  immaterial.  For  we  fee  by  experience, 
that  men  may  lofe  their  limbs,  their  organs  of  fenfe, 
and  even  the  greateft  part  of  thefe  bodies,  and  yet  re- 
main the  farrke  living  agents.  And  perfons  can  trace 
up  the  exidence  of  themielves  to  a  time,  when  the 
bulk  of  their  bodies  v/as  extremely  fmall,  in  compan- 
ion of  what  it  is  in  mature  age  i  and  we  cannot  but 
F  think 


74  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  T. 

tlilnk  that  they  might  then  have  lo(l  a  confiderable 
part  of  tliat  fmall  body,  and  yet  have  remained  the 
iame  Hving  agents ;  as  they  may  now  lofe  great  f)art 
ot  their  ])rerent  body,  and  remain  ("o.  And  it  is  cer- 
tain that  the  bodies  of  all  animals  arc  in  a  conftant 
flux,  from  that  never  ceafing  attrition  which  there  is 
m  every  part  of  them.  Now  things  of  this  kind  un- 
avoidably teach  us  to  didinguifli  between  thefe  living 
agents  ourlelves,  and  large  cjuantities  of  matter,  in 
which  we  are  very  nearly  intereded  ;  fmcc  thefe  may 
be  alienated,  and  actually  arc  in  a  daily  courfe  of  iuc- 
ceffion,  and  changing  their  owners  ;  whilfl  we  are  al- 
lured, tha<:  each  living  agc'nt  remains  one  and  the  fame 
})crmanent  being.*'  And  this  general  obfervation  leads 
us  on  to  the  following  ones. 

Firjly  That  we  have  no  way  of  determining  by  ex- 
}")erience,  what  is  the  certain  bulk  of  the  living  being 
each  man  calls  himlelf  j  and  yet,  till  it  be  determined 
that  it  is  larger  in  bulk  than  the  folid  elementary  par- 
ticlcs  of  matter,  which  there  is  no  ground  to  think  any 
natural  power  can  diilolve,  there  h  no  fort  c>f  reaibn 
to  think  death  to  be  the  diliblution  of  it,  of  the  living 
being,  even  though  it  fliould  not  be  abfoiutely  indif- 
cer])tible. 

Sccond/y^  From  our  being  fo  nearly  related  to  and 
intercRetl  in  certain  fyflems  of  matter,  fuppofc  our 
llclh  and  bones,  and  atterwards  ceafmi>;  to  be  at  all  re- 
lated  to  them,  the  living  agents  ourlelves  remaining 
all  this  while  undcftroyed,  notwithftanding  Inch  alie- 
nation ;  and  conlequently  thefe  fyllems  ot  matter  not 
being  ourfelves,  it  follows  further,  that  we  have  no 
ground  to  conclude  any  other,  fuppofc  internal fvjlems 
ol  matter,  to  be  the  living  agents  ourlelves  y  bccauic 
wc  can  have  no  ground  to  conclude  this,  but  troni 
our  relation  to  and  interefl  in  Inch  other  fyilems  of 
u'.atler ;  and  therefore  we  can  have  no  reafon  to  con- 
clude, 

*  Sec  D'Jfi.rtuiiw  I. 


CiiAP.  I.  Of  n  Future  Life,  y^ 

elude,  what  bcfals  tliofc  fyftems  of  matter  at  death,  to 
be  the  deflruftion  of  the  living  agents.  We  have  al- 
ready fevcral  times  over  loll  a  great  part  or  perhaps 
the  whole  of  our  body,  according  to  certain  common 
eftablilhed  laws  of  nature,  yet  we  remain  the  fame 
living  agents ;  when  we  Ihall  lofe  as  great  a  part,  or 
the  whole,  by  another  common  eftablilhed  law  of  na- 
turcj  dcatii,  wliy  may  we  not  alfo  reniain  the  fame  ? 
That  the  alienation  has  been  gradual  in  one  cafe,  and 
in  the  other  will  b«  more  at  once,  does  not  prove  any 
thing  to  the  contrary.  We  have  paflcd  undcftroyed 
through  thole  many  and  great  revolutions  of  matter, 
fo  peculiarly  appropriated  to  us  ourfelves  ;  why  fliould 
we  imagine  death  will  be  fo  fatal  to  us  ?  Nor  can  it 
be  objected,  that  what  is  thus  alienated  or  loll,  is  no 
part  of  our  original  Iblid  body,  but  only  adventitious 
matter  ;  becauie  we  may  lo(e  entire  limbs,  which  muft. 
have  contained  many  folid  parts  and  vellels  of  the 
original  body  ;  or  if  this  be  not  admitted,  we  have 
no  jjroof,  that  any  of  thefe  folid  parts  are  diffolved  or 
alienated  by  death.  Though,  l)y  the  way,  we  arc 
very  nearly  related  to  that  extraneous  or  adventltiou:; 
matter,  whilft  it  continues  united  to  and  diftending 
the  feveral  parts  of  our  Iblid  body.  But  after  all,  the 
relation  a  perfon  bears  to  thofe  parts  of  his  body  to 
which  he  is  the  mod  nearly  related,  what  docs  it  ap- 
pear to  amount  to  but  this,  that  the  living  agent  and 
thofe  parts  of  the  body  mutually  affed:  each  other  ? 
And  tlie  fame  thing,  the  fame  thing  in  kind,  though 
not  in  degree,  may  be  faid  of  ^i// foreign  matter,  which 
gives  us  ideas,  and  which  we  have  any  power  over. 
From  thefe  obfervations,  the  whole  ground  of  the 
imagination  is  removed,  that  the  diirolutioix  of  any 
matter  is  the  cieftruftion  of  a  living  agent  from  the 
intereft  he  once  had  in  fuch  matter. 

Thirdly^  If  v/e  confjdcr  oiir  body  fomewhat  more 

diftinctly,  ar.  made  up  of  organs  and  inilruments  of 

F  ?.  perception 


76  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  L 

perception  and  of  motion,  it  will  bring  us  to  the  fame 
conclufion.  Thus  the  common  optical  experiments 
fhow,  and  even  the  obfervation  how  light  is  aflifted  by 
glafles  fhows,  that  we  fee  with  our  eyes  in  the  famer 
lenfe  as  we  fee  with  glalTes.  Nor  is  there  any  reafon 
to  believe,  that  we  fee  with  them  in  any  other  fenfe  ; 
any  other,  I  mean,  whieh  would  lead  us  to  think  the 
eye  itfelf  a  percipient.  The  like  is  to  be  faid  of  hear- 
ing ;  and  our  feehng  diftant  folid  matter  by  means  of 
fomewhat  in  our  hand,  feems  an  inftance  of  the  like 
kind  as  to  the  fubjedt  we  are  confidering.  All  thele 
are  inftances  of  foreign  m.atter,  or  fuch  as  is  no  part  of 
our  body,  being  inftrumental  in  preparing  objeds  for, 
and  conveying  them  ta  the  perceiving  power,  in  a 
manner  fmiilar  or  like  to  the  manner  in  which  our 
organs  of  fenfe  prepare  and  convey  them.  Both  are 
in  a  like  way  inftruments  of  our  receiving  fuch  ideas 
from  external  objects,  as  the  Author  of  nature  ap- 
pointed thofe  external  objefts  to  be  the  occafions  of 
exciting  in  us.  However,  glaiTes  are  evidently  in- 
ftances of  this ;  namely  of  matter  which  is  no  part  of 
our  body,  preparing  objefts  for  and  conveying  them 
towards  the  perceiving  power,  in  like  manner  as  our 
bodily  organs  do.  And  if  we  fee  with  our  eyes  only 
in  the  fame  manner  as  we  do  with  glafles,  the  like 
may  juftly  be  concluded,  from  analogy,  of  all  our  other 
fenfes.  It  is  not  intended,  by  any  thing  here  faid, 
to  affirm^  that  the  whole  apparatus  of  vifion,  or  of 
perception  by  any  other  of  our  fenfes,  can  be  traced, 
through  all  its  fteps,  quite  up  to  the  living  power  of 
feeing,  or  perceiving  •;  but  that  fo  far  as  it  can  be  trac- 
ed by  experimental  obfervations,  fo  far  it  appears,  that 
our  organs  of  fenfe  prepare  and  convey  on  objefts,  in 
order  to  their  being  perceived,  in  like  manner  as  for- 
eign matter  does,  without  affording  any  fhadow  of  ap- 
pearance that  they  themfelves  perceive.  And  that  we 
have  no  reafon  to  think  our  organs  of  fenfe  percipi- 
ents, 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  ^^j 

ents,  is  confirmed  by  inftances  of  perfons  lofing  fome 
of  them,  the  living  beings  themfelves,  their  former 
occupiers,  remaining  unimpaired.  It  is  confirmed 
alfo  by  the  experience  of  dreams  ;  by  which  we  find 
we  are  at  prefent  poflefled  of  a  latent,  and,  what  would 
otherwife  be,  an  unimagined,  unknown  power  of  per- 
ceiving fenfible  objefts,  in  as  ftrong  and  lively  a  man- 
ner without  our  external  organs  of  fenfe  as  with  them. 

So  alfo  with  regard  to  our  power  of  moving,  or  di- 
recting motion  by  will  and  choice  :  Upon  the  deftruc- 
tion  of  a  limb,  this  aO;ive  power  remains,  as  it  evi- 
dently feems,  unleflened  ;  fo  as  that  the  living  being, 
who  has  fuffered  this  lofs,  would  be  capable  of  mov- 
ing as  before,  if  it  had  another  limb  to  move  with. 
It  can  walk  by  the  help  of  an  artificial  leg  j  juft  as  it 
can  make  ufe  of  a  pole  or  a  leaver,  to  reach  towards 
itfelf,  and  to  move  things,  beyond  the  length  and  the 
power  of  its  natural  arm  ;  and  this  lafl;  it  does  in  the 
fame  manner  as  it  reaches  and  moves,  with  its  natural 
arm,  things  nearer  and  of  lefs  weight.  Nor  is  there 
fo  much  as  any  appearance  of  our  limbs  being  endu- 
ed with  a  power  of  moving  or  direfting  themfelves, 
though  they  are  adapted,  like  the  feveral  parts  of  a 
machine,  to  be  the  inftruments  of  motion  to  each 
other,  and  fome  parts  of  the  fame  limb,  to  be  inftru- 
nients  of  motion  to  other  parts  of  it. 

Thus  a  man  determines,  that  he  will  look  at  fuch 
an  obje£t  through  a  microfcope  ;  or  being  lame  fup- 
pofe,  that  he  will  walk  to  fuch  a  place  with  a  ftaff  a 
week  hence.  His  eyes  and  his  feet  no  more  deter- 
mine in  thefe  cafes,  than  the  microfcope  and  the 
ftaff.  Nor  is  there  any  ground  to  think  they  any 
more  put  the  determination  in  practice  ;  or  that  his 
eyes  are  the  feers  or  his  feet  the  movers,  in  any  other 
fenfe  than  as  the  microfcope  and  the  fliaff  are.  Upon 
the  whole  then,  our  organs  of  fenie  and  our  limbs  are 
certainly  inftruments,  which  the  living  peribns  our- 

felves 


78  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I. 

felves  make  ufe  of  to  perceive  and  move  with  ;  there 
is  not  any  probability  that  they  are  any  more,  nor  con- 
fequently,  that  we  have  any  other  kind  of  relation  to 
them,  than  what  we  may  have  to  any  other  foreign 
matter  formed  into  inftruments  of  perception  and 
motion,  fuppofe  into  a  microfcope  or  a  ftafF;  (I  fay 
any  other  kind  of  relation,  for  I  am  not  fpeaking  of 
the  degree  of  it)  nor  confequently  is  there  any  proba- 
bility, that  the  alienation  or  dilTolution  of  thefe  in- 
ftrmnents  is  the  deftruftion  of  the  perceiving  and 
moving  ag-ent. 

And  thus  our  finding,  that  the  dilTolution  of  mat- 
ter, in  which  living  beings  were  moft  nearly  interefhed, 
is  not  their  diffolution,  and  that  the  deflruftion  of 
feveral  of  the  organs  and  inftruments  of  perception  and 
of  motion  belonging  to  them,  is  not  their  deftruction, 
fhows  demonftratively,  that  there  is  no  ground  to 
think  that  the  diflblution  of  any  other  matter,  or  dc- 
ftruftion  of  any  other  organs  and  inftruments,  will  be 
the  diflblution  or  deftruction  of  living  agents,  from 
the  like  kind  of  relation.  And  we  have  no  reafon  to 
think  we  ftand  in  any  other  kind  of  relation  to  any 
thing  which  we  find  diflblved  by  death. 

But  it  is  faid  thefe  obfervations  are  equally  applicable 
to  brutes  ;  and  it  is  thought  an  infupcrable  difficulty, 
that  they  Ihould  be  immortal,  and  by  confequence  ca- 
pable of  everlafting  happinefs.  Now  this  manner  of 
expreflion  is  both  invidious  and  weak  ;  but  the  thing 
intended  by  it,  is  really  no  difficulty  at  all,  either  in  the 
way  of  natural  or  moral  confiderat  ion.  Fori/?.  Sup- 
pofe  the  invidious  thing,  defigned  in  fiach  a  manner  of 
expreffion,  were  really  implied,  as  it  is  not  in  the  Icaft 
in  the  natural  immortality  of  brutes  j  namely,  that 
they  muft  arrive  at  great  attainments,  and  become  ra^ 
tional  and  moral  agents  ;  even  this  would  be  no  diffi- 
culty, fince  we  know  not  what  latent  powers  and  ca- 
pacities they  may  be  endued  with.     There  was  o;ice, 

prior 


Chap.  I.  0/"  ^  Future  Life.  79 

prior  to  experience,  as  great  prefiimption  againft  hu- 
man creatures,  as  there  is  againftthe  brute  creatures,  ar- 
riving at  that  degree  of  underftanding,  which  we  have 
in  mature  age.  For  we  can  trace  up  our  ov/n  exift- 
-ence  to  the  fame  original  with  theirs.  And  we  find  it 
to  be  a  general  law  of  nature,  that  creatures  endued 
with  capacities  of  virtue  and  rehgion,  iliould  be  placed 
in  a  condition  of  being,  in  which  they  are  altogether 
without  the  ufe  of  them,  for  a  confiderable  length  of 
their  duration  ;  as  in  infancy  and  childhood.  And 
great  part  of  the  human  Ipecies  go  out  of  the  prefent 
world,  before  they  come  to  the  exercife  of  thefe  ca- 
pacities in  any  degree  at  all.  But  then,  2^/v,  the  nat- 
ural immortality  of  brutes  does  not  in  the  lead  im- 
ply, that  they  are  endued  with  any  latent  capacities  of 
a  rational  or  moral  nature.  And  the  economy  of  the 
univerfe  might  require,  that  there  {hould  be  living  crea- 
tures without  any  capacities  of  this  kind.  And  all  dif- 
ficulties as  to  the*  manner  how  they  are  to  be  difpofed 
of,  are  fo  apparently  and  wholly  founded  in  our  ig- 
norance, that  it  is  wonderful  they  ihould  be  infifted 
upon  by  any,  but  fuch  as  are  weak  enough  to  think 
they  are  acquainted  with  the  whole  fyftem  of  things. 
There  is  then  abfolutely  nothing  at  all  in  this  objec- 
tion which  is  fo  rhetorically  urged  againfh  the  greatefh. 
part  of  the  natural  proofs  or  prefumptions  of  the  im- 
mortality of  human  minds  :  I  fay  the  greateft  part  ; 
for  it  is  lefs  applicable  to  the  following  obfervation, 
which  is  more  peculiar  to  mankind  : 

III.  That  as  it  is  evident  our  prefent  powers  and  ca- 
pacities of  reafon,  memory  and  aifedtion,  do  not  de- 
pend upon  our  grofs  body  in  the  manner  in  which  per- 
ception by  our  organs  of  fenfe  does  ;  fo  they  do  not 
appear  to  depend  upon  it  at  all  in  any  fuch  manner, 
as  to  give  ground  to  think,  that  the  diffolution  of  this 
body,  will  be  the  deftrudlion  of  thefe  our  prefent  pow- 
ers of  refleclion,  as  it  will  of  our  powers  of  ienfation-; 

or 


So  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I. 

or  to  give  ground  to  conclude  even  that  it  will  be  fo 
much  as  a  fufpenfion  of  the  former. 

Human  creatures  exifl  at  prefent  in  two  ftates  of 
life  and  perception,  greatly  different  from  each  other  ; 
each  of  which  has  its  own  peculiar  laws,  and  its  own 
peculiar  enjoyments  and  fuiFerings.  When  any  of  our 
lenfes  are  affedted  or  appetites  gratified  with  the  ob- 
jects of  them,  we  may  be  faid  to  exift  or  live  in  a  ftate 
of  fenfation.  When  none  of  our  fenfes  are  afFefted  or 
appetites  gratified,  and  yet  we  perceive  and  reafon  and 
act,  we  may  be  faid  to  exift  or  live  in  a  flate  of  reflect 
tion.  Now  it  is  by  no  means  certain,  that  any  thing 
which  is  diiTolved  by  death,  is  any  way  necelfary  to  the 
living  being  in  this  its  flate  of  relledion,  after  ideas  are 
gained.  For,  though  from  our  prefent  conffitution 
and  condition  of  being,  our  external  organs  of  fenfe 
are  neceiTary  for  conveying  in  ideas  to  our  reilefting 
powers,  as  carriages  and  leavers  and  fcaffolds  are  in  ar-. 
chitecture  ;  yet  when  thele  ideas  are  brought  in,  we 
are  capable  of  reflecting  in  the  moft  intenfe  degree,  and 
of  enjoying  the  greatefl  pleafure,  and  feeling  the  great- 
eft  pain  by  means  of  that  refleftion,  without  any  af- 
fiilance  from  our  fenfes  ;  and  without  any  at  all,  which 
we  know  of,  from  that  body  which  vv^ill  be  diifolved  by 
death.  It  does  not  appear  then,  that  the  relation  of 
this  grofs  body  to  the  reflecting  being,  is,  in  any  de- 
gree, neceffary  to  thinking  ;  to  our  intelleclual  enjoy- 
ments or  fufferings  :  Nor,  confequently,  that  the  dif- 
folution  or  alienation  of  the  former  by  death,  will  be 
the  deftruftion  of  thole  prefent  powers,  which  render 
us  capable  of  this  ftate  of  reflcftion.  Further,  there 
are  inftances  of  mortal  difeafes,  which  do  not  at  all  af- 
fedt  our  prefent  intellectual  powers  \  and  this  affords 
a  prefumption,  that  thofe  difeafes  will  not  deftroy  thefe 
prefent  powers.  Indeed,  from  the  obfervations  made 
above,*  it  appears,  that  there  is  no  prefumption,  from 
their  mutually  affeCting  each  ether,  that  the  diflblu- 

tion 

■*  ^'  74'  75j  7^' 


Chap,  I.  O/*  ^  Future  Life.  Zi 

tlon  of  the  body  is  the  deftrucftion  of  the  living  agent. 
And  by  the  ilime  reafoning,  it  mufb  appear  too,  that 
there  is  no  prelumption,  from  their  mutually  affefting 
each  other,  that  the  diflblution  of  the  body  is  the  de- 
ftraftion  of  our  prelent  reflecting  powers  j  but  infta  nces 
of  their  not  affe6ling  each  other,  afford  a  prefump- 
tion  of  the  contrarj''.  Inftances  of  mortal  difeafes  not 
impairing  our  prefent  refledting  powers,  evidently  turn 
our  thoughts  even  from  imagining  fuch  difeafes  to  be 
the  deftruftion  of  them.  Several  things  indeed  great- 
ly affecfl  all  our  living  powers,  and  at  length  fufpend 
the  exercife  of  them ;  as  for  inftiuice  drowfinefs,  in- 
creafmg  till  it  ends  in  found  fleep  ;  and  from  hence 
we  might  have  im.agined  it  would  deftroy  them,  till 
we  found  by  experience  the  weaknefs  of  this  way  of 
judging.  But  in  the  difeafes  now  mentioned,  there  is 
not  fo  much  as  this  fliadow  of  probability,  to  lead  us 
to  any  fuch  conclulioii,  as  to  the  reflecting  powers 
which  we  have  at  prefent  ;  for  in  thofe  difeafes,  per- 
fons  the  moment  before  death  appear  to  be  in  the. 
higheft  vigour  of  life ;  they  difcover  apprehenfion, 
memory,  reafon,  all  entire  ;  with  the  utmoft  force  of 
affection  ;  fenfe  of  a  character,  of  iliame  and  honour  ; 
and  the  higheft  mental  enjoy nients  and  futierings, 
even  to  the  laft  gafp  :  And  thefe  furely  prove  even 
greater  vigour  of  life  than  bodily  ftrength  does.  Now 
what  pretence  is  there  for  thinking,  that  a  progrefTive 
clifeafe  when  arrived  to  fuch  a  degree,  I  mean  that  de- 
gree which  is  mortal,  will  deftroy  thofe  powers  wliich 
were  not  impaired,  which  were  not  afleited  by  it,  dur- 
ing its  whole  progrefs  quite  up  to  that  degree  ?  And 
if  death,  by  difeafes  of  this  kind,  is  not  the  deftruc- 
tion  of  our  prefent  reflefting  powers,  it  will  fcarce  be 
thought  that  death  by  any  other  means  is. 

It  is  obvious  that  this  general  obfervation  may  be 
carried  on  further ;  and  there  appears  fo  little  con- 
nexion between  our  bodily  powers  of  fenfation,  and 
cur  Drefent  powers  cf  refledtion,  that  there  is  no  reafon 

to 


Si  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I. 

to  conclude,  that  death,  which  deflroys  the  former, 
does  fo  much  as  fu{]:)en.d  the  exercife  of  the  latter,  or 
interrupt  our  contimmig  to  exift  in  the  like  ilate  of  re^ 
fle6tion  which  we  do  now.  For  fufpenfion  of  reafon, 
memory,  and  the  affections  which  they  excite,  is  no 
part  of  the  idea  of  death,  nor  is  implied  in  our  notion 
of  it.  And  our  daily  experiencing  thefe  powers  to  be 
exercifed,  vv'ithout  any  aiTiftance,  that  we  know  of, 
from  thofe  bodies,  which  will  be  diffolved  by  death  ; 
and  our  finding  often  that  the  exercife  of  them  is  fo 
lively  to  the  laft  ;  thefe  things  afford  a  fenfible  appre- 
henfion,  that  death  may  not  perhaps  be  fo  much  as  a 
difcontinuance  of  the  exercife  of  thefe  powers,  nor  of 
the  enjoyments  and  fufferings  which  it  implies.*  So 
that  our  poflhuraous  life,  whatever  there  may  be  in  it 
additional  to  our  prefent,  )^et  may  not  be  entirely  be- 
ginning anew,  but  going  on.  Death  may,  in  fome 
fort,  and  in  ioxno:  refpefts,  anfwer  to  our  birth  ;  which 
is  not  a  fufpenfion  of  the  faculties  which  we  had  be- 
fore it,  or  a  total  change  of  the  ftate  of  life  in  which 
we  exifted  when  in  the  womb  ;  but  a  continuation  of 
both,  with  i'uch  and  fuch  great  alterations. 

Nay,  for  what  we  know  of  ourfelves,  of  our  prefent 
life  and  of  death,  death  may  immediately,  in  the  nat- 
ural courfe  of  things,  put  us  into  a  higher  and  more 
enlarged  ftate  of  life,  as  our  birth  does  y^  a  ftate  in 

which 

*  There  are  three  diflinft  queftions,  relating  to  a  future  life,  here  confid- 
ered  :  Whether  death  be  the  deilruftion  of  living  agents  ;  if  not,  Whether 
it  be  the  deflrudtionof  their  -prefent  powers  of  reflection,  as  it  certainly  is 
tli.e  deftruiflion  of  their  prefent  powers  of  fenfation  ;  and  if  not,  Whether  it 
be  the  fuf[)enUon,  or  difcontinuance  of  the  exercife,  of  thefe  prefent  refledl- 
ing  powers.  Now,  if  there  be  no  reafon  to  believe  the  laft,  there  will  be,  if 
that  were  poilible,  Icl's  for  the  next,  and  lefs  ftill  for  the  firfl. 

t  This,  according  to  Strabo,  was  the  opinion  of  the  Brachmans, 
1/ofAiy^iiv  fA.iv  yocp  ^Yi  Tov  yXv  iv^u^s  ^401/,  cjf  o-v  dy.[/.7tv  avoy.ivuv 
elvxi'  tcjv  ^i  ^avccTOv,  yevEcriv  £i?  rov  ovrug  (^'O"*  '*^*  ''"'"'  ^'^oocmovx 
ro7g  ^iXo<TO(pri<Toc<n'  Lib.  XV.  p.  1039.  Ed.  Amft.  1707.  To 
which  opinion  perhaps  Antotiinu!  may  allude  in  thele  words, 
t^g  i/uv  ZTB^if^svEig,  TTOTS  sjIaS^uo!/  l>i  T^ij  yxgr^og  rni/  yvvxmog  (TH 
l^ixB'-/},  isrccg  iK^ey^ea-^'xi  ty\v  uipocv  h  r,  ro  ^xj-^x^iov  <TZ  T2J  JAuT^a 
fdTii  v.iins-uro'A.     Lib.  IX.  c.  3. 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  Z^ 

which  our  capacities  and  fphere  of  perception  and 
of  aftion  may  be  much  greater  than  at  prefent.  For 
as  our  relation  to  our  external  organs  of  fenfe  ren- 
ders us  capable  of  exifting  in  our  prefent  ftate  of 
fenfation,  fo  it  may  be  the  only  natural  hindrance 
to  our  exifting,  immediately  and  of  courfe,  in  a 
higher  ftate  of  reflection.  The  truth  is,  reafon  does 
not  at  all  fhew  us  in  what  ftate  death  naturally  leaves 
us.  But  were  we  fure  that  it  would  fufpend  all  our 
perceptive  and  a6tive  powers,  yet  the  fufpenfion  of 
a  power  and  the  deftruclion  of  it  are  effefts  fo  to- 
tally different .  in  kind,  as  we  experience  from  fleep 
and  a  fwoon,  that  we  cannot  in  any  wife  argue  from 
one  to  the  other,  or  conclude,  even  to  the  loweft 
degree  of  probability,  that  the  fame  kind  of  force 
which  is  fufficient  to  fufpend  our  faculties,  though 
it  be  increafed  ever  fo  much,  will  be  fufficient  to 
deftroy  them. 

Thefe  obfervations  together  may  be  fufficient  to 
lliew,  how  little  nrefumption  there  is,  that  death  is 
the  deftruftion  of  human  creatures.  However,  there 
is  the  Ihadow  of  an  analogy  which  may  lead  us  to 
imagine  it  is  ;  the  fuppofed  likenefs  which  is  obferv- 
ed  between  the  decay  of  vegetables,  and  of  living 
creatures.  And  this  likenefs  is  indeed  fufficient  to 
afford  the  poets  very  apt  allulions  to  the  flowers  of 
the  field,  in  their  piftures  of  the  frailty  of  our  prefent 
life.  But  in  reafon,  the  analogy  is  fo  far  from  hold- 
ing, that  there  appears  no  ground  even  for  the  com- 
parilbn,  as  to  the  prefent  queftion  ;  becaufe  one  of  the 
two  fubjeds  compared  is  wholly  void  of  that^  which  is 
the  principal  and  chief  thing  in  the  other,  the  power 
of  perception  and  of  adlion,  and  which  is  the  only 
thing  we  are  inquiring  about  the  continuance  of;  fo 
that  the  deftruftion  of  a  vegetable  is  an  event  not 
finiilar  or  analogous  to  the  deft ru'51: ion  of  a  living 
aeeut. 

But 


84  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I. 

But  if,  as  was  above  intimated,  leaving  off  the  de- 
luiive  cuftom  of  fubflituting  imagination  in  the  room 
of  experience,  we  would  confine  ourfelves  to  what  we 
do  know  and  underfland,  if  we  would  argue  only  from 
that,  and  from  that  form  our  expectations,  it  would 
appear  at  firfl  fight,  that  as  no  probability  of  living 
beings  ever  ceafing  to  be  fo,  can  be  concluded  from 
the  reafon  of  the  thing,  fo  none  can  be  collected  from 
the  analogy  of  nature,  becaufe  we  cannot  trace  any 
living  beings  beyond  death.  But  as  we  are  confcicus 
that  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of  perception  and 
of  action,  and  are  living  perfons,  what  we  are  to  go 
upon  is,  that  we  Ihall  continue  fo,  until  we  forelee 
fome  accident  or  event  which  will  endanger  thofe  ca- 
pacities, or  be  likely  to  deflroy  us  ;  which  death  does 
in  no  wife  appear  to  be. 

And  thus,  when  we  go  out  of  this  world,  we  may 
pafs  into  new  fcenes,  and  a  new  flate  of  life  and  ac- 
tion, juft  as  naturally  as  we  came  into  the  prefent. 
And  this  new  ftate  may  naturally  be  a  focial  one. 
And  the  advantages  of  it,  advantages  of  every  kind, 
may  naturally  be  beftowed,  according  to  fome  fixed 
general  lavv'S  of  wifdom,  upon  every  one  in  proportion 
to  the  degrees  of  his  virtue.  And  though  the  ad- 
vantages of  that  future  natural  flate,  fliould  not  be 
beftowed,  as  thefe  of  the  prefent  in  fome  meafure  are, 
by  the  will  of  the  fociety,  but  entirely  by  his  more 
immediate  aftion,  upon  whom  the  whole  frame  of  na- 
ture depends  ;  yet  this  diftribution  may  be  juft  as 
natural  as  their  being  diftributcd  here  by  the  inftru- 
mentality  of  men.  And  indeed,  though  one  were  to 
allow  any  confufed  undetermined  icnfe,  v/hich  people 
pleafe  to  put  upon  the  word  natural,  it  would  be  a 
Ihortnefs  of  thought  fcarce  credible,  to  imagine  that 
110  fyftem  or  courfe  of  things  can  be  fo,  but  only  what 
we  fee  at  prefent ;  efpecially  whilft  the  probability  of 
a  future  life,  or  the  natural  immortality  of  the  foul,  is 

admitted 


Chap.  I.  Q/*  ^  Future  Life.  85 

admitted  upon  the  evidence  of  reafon  ;  becaufe  this  is 
really  both  admittirig  and  denying  at  once,  a  ftate  of 
being  different  from  the  prelent  to  be  natural.  Eul: 
the  only  diftindl  meaning  of  that  word  is  Jiated,fixed^ 
ov  fettled ;  fince  what  is  natural,  as  much  requires  and 
prefuppofes  an  intelligent  agent  to  render  it  fo,  i.  e.  to 
effect  it  continually  or  at  ftated  times,  as  what  is  fu- 
pernatural  or  miraculous  does  to  effect  it  for  once- 
And  from  hence  it  muil  follow,  that  perfons'  notion  of 
what  is  natural,  will  be  enlarged  in  proportion  to  their 
greater  knowledge  of  the  works  of  God,  and  the  dif- 
penfations  of  his  providence.  Nor  is  there  any  ab- 
iurdity  in  fuppofing,  that  there  may  be  beings  in  the 
univerfe,  whofe  capacities,  and  knowledge,  and  views, 
may  be  fo  extenfive,  as  that  the  whole  Chriftian  dif- 
penfation  may  to  them  appear  natural,  i.  e.  analogous 
or  conformable  to  God's  dealings  with  other  parts  of 
his  creation  ;  as  natural  as  the  vifible  known  courfe 
of  things  appears  to  us.  For  there  feems  fcarce  any 
other  poffible  fenfe  to  be  put  upon  the  word,  but  that 
only  in  which  it  is  here  ufed  ;  llmilar,  ftated,  or 
Uniform. 

This  credibihty  of  a  future  life,  which  has  been 
here  infifted  upon,  how  little  foever  it  may  fatisfy  our 
curiofity,  feems  to  anfwer  all  the  purpofes  of  religion, 
in  like  manner  as  a  demonftrative  proof  would.  In- 
deed a  proof,  even  a  demoniirative  one,  of  a  future 
life,  v/oald  not  be  a  proof  of  religion.  For  that  we 
are  to  live  hereafter,  is  juft  as  reconcileable  with  the 
icheme  of  atheifm,  and  as  well  to  be  accounted  for  by 
it,  as  that  we  are  now  alive,  is ;  and  therefore  nothing 
can  be  more  abfurd  than  to  argue  from  that  fcheme, 
that  there  can  be  no  future  ftate.  But  as  religion  im- 
plies a  future  ftate,  any  prefumption  a'gainft  fuch  a 
ftate  is  a  prefumption  againft  religion.  And  the  fore- 
going obfervations  remove  all  prefumptions  of  that 
fort,  and  prove,  to  a  very  confiderable  degree  of  prob- 

,   ability. 


86  Of  the  Government  .of  Gcd  P  a r  t  L 

ability,  one  fundamental  doctrine  of  religion  ;  which, 
if  believed,  would  greatly  open  and  difpofe  the  mind 
feriouily  to  attend  to  the  general  evidence  of  the 
whole. 


CHAP.    n. 

Of  the  Covernment  of  God  bv  Rezvards  and  Punifti* 
ments  ;  ayid  particular h  of  the  latter. 

JL  HAT  which  makes  t\\t  qucftion  con* 
cerning  a  future  life  to  be  of  fo  great  importance  to 
us,  is  our  capacity  of  happinefs  and  mifery.  And  that 
which  makes  the  conlideration  of  it  to  be  of  fo  great 
importance  to  us,  is  the  fuppofition  of  our  happinefs 
and  mifery  hereafter  depending  upon  our  aftions  here. 
Without  this,  indeed,  curiofity  could  not  but  fome- 
times  bring  a  fubje*^,  in  which  we  may  be  io  highly 
interefted,  to  our  thoughts  ;  efpecially  upon  the  mor- 
tality of  others,  or  the  near  proipeft  of  our  own.  But 
reafonable  men  would  not  take  any  farther  thought 
about  hereafter,  than  what  fliould  happen  thus  occa- 
iionally  to  rife  in  their  minds,  if  it  were  certain  that  our 
future  intereft  no  way  depended  upon  our  prefent  be- 
haviour ;  whereas,  on  the  contrary,  if  there  be  ground, 
either  from  analogy  or  any  thing  elfe,  to  think  it  does, 
then  there  is  reafon  alfo  for  the  mofh  aclrve  thought 
and  folicitude  to  fecure  that  intereft,  to  behave  fo  as 
that  we  may  efcape  that  mifery  and  obtain  that  hap- 
pinefs in  another  life,  which  we  not  only  fuppofe  our- 
felves  capable  of,  but  which  we  apprehend  alfo  is  put  in 
our  own  power.  And  whether  there  be  ground  for  this 
Lift  apprehenfion,  certainly  would  deferve  to  be  moft  fe- 
rioufly  confidered,  were  there  no  other  proof  of  a  future 
life  and  intereft  than  that  prefumptive  one  which  the 
foregoing  obfervations  amount  to.  Now 


Chap.  II.         by  Rewards  and  PimiJJiments.  S7 

Now  in  the  prefent  flate,  all  which  we  enjo}^,  and  a 
great  part  of  what  we  Tuffcr,  is  put  in  our  own  power. 
For  plealbre  and  pain  are  the  coiifequences  of  our  ac- 
tions ;  and  we  are  endued  by  the  Author  of  our  na- 
ture with  capacities  of  forefeeing  thefe  confequences. 
We  find  by  experience  he  does  not  fo  much  as  pre- 
ferve  our  lives,  excluiively  of  our  own  care  and  atten- 
tion to  provide  ourfelves  with,  and  to  make  ufe  of, 
that  fuftehance,  by  which  he  has  appointed  our  lives 
fliall  be  preferved,  and  without  which,  he  has  appoint- 
ed they  lliall  not  be  preferved  at  all.  And  in  general 
we  forefee  that  the  external  things,  which  are  the  ob- 
jects of  our  various  palTions,  can  neither  be  obtained 
nor  enjoyed  without  exerting  ourfelves  in  fucli  and 
fuch  manners  ;  but  by  thus  exerting  ourfelves,  we 
obtain  and  enjoy  thefe  objects  in  v/hich  our  natural 
good  confifts  ;  or,  by  this  means  God  gives  us  the 
pofleffion  and  enjoyment  of  them.  I  know  not  that 
we  have  any  one  kind  or  degree  of  enjoyment,  but  by 
the  means  of  our  own  anions.  And  by  prudence  and 
care  we  may,  for  the  moft  part,  pafs  our  days  in  tol- 
erable eafe  and  quiet  ;  or,  on  the  contrary,  we  may  by 
ralhnefs,  ungoverned  pafTion,  wilfulnefs,  or  even  by 
negrligence,  make  ourfelves  as  miferable  as  ever  we 
pleafe.  And  many  do  pieai'e  to  make  themfelves  ex- 
tremely miferable,  i.  e.  to  do  what  they  know  befoie- 
hand  will  render  them  fo.  They  follow  thofe  ways, 
the  fruit  of  which  they  know  by  inftruction,  example, 
experience,  will  be  difgrace,  and  poverty,  and  ficknefs, 
and  untimely  death.  This  every  one  obferves  to  be 
the  general  courfe  of  things  ;  though  it  is  to  be  al- 
lowed, w^e  cannot  find  by  experience,  that  all  our  fuf- 
ferings  are  owing  to  our  own  follies. 

Why  the  Author  of  nature  does  not  give  his  crea- 
tures promifcuoufly  fuch  and  fiich  perceptions,  with- 
out regard  to  their  behaviour ;  why  he  does  not  make 
them  happy  without  the  inftrumentality  of  their  own 

adions. 


88  Of  the  Government  of  Go^  PartL 

aft  ions,  and  prevent  their  bringing  any  fufferings  up- 
on themfelves,  is  another  matter.  Perhaps  there  may 
be  fome  impoflibihties  in  the  nature  of  things,  which 
we  are  unacquainted  with.  Or  lefs  happinels,  it  may 
be,  would  upon  the  whole  be  produced  by  fuch  a 
method  of  conduft,  than  is  by  the  prefent.  Or  per- 
haps divine  goodnefs,  with  which,  if  I  miftake  not,* 
we  make  very  free  in  our  fpeculations,  may  not  be  a 
bare  fingle  difpofition  to  produce  happinefs,  but  a  dif- 
pofition  to  make  the  good,  the  faithful,  the  honeft 
man  happy.  Perhaps  an  infinitely  perfeft  Mind  may 
be  pleafed  with  feeing  his  creatures  behave  fuitably 
to  the  nature  which  he  has  given  them,  to  the  rela- 
tions which  he  has  placed  them  in  to  each  other,  and 
to  that  which  they  ftand  in  to  himfelf ;  that  relation 
to  himfelf,  which,  during  their  exiftence,  is  even 
neceflary,  and  which  is  the  moft  important  one  of  all. 
Perhaps,  I  fay,  an  infinitely  perfect  Mind  may  be 
pleafed  with  this  moral  piety  of  m.oral  agents,  in  and 
for  itfelf ;  as  well  as  upon  account  of  its  being  eflen- 
tially  conducive  to  the  happinefs  of  his  creation.  Or 
the  whole  end,  for  which  God  made,  and  thus  governs 
the  world,  may  be  utterly  beyond  the  reach  of  our 
faculties  ;  there  may  be  ibmewhat  in  it  as  impoffible 
for  us  to  have  any  conception  of,  as  for  a  blind  man 
to  have  a  conception  of  colours.  But  however  this  be, 
it  is  certain  matter  of  univerfal  experience,  that  the 
general  method  of  divine  adminiftration  is  forewarn- 
ing us,  or  giving  us  capacities  to  forefee,  with  more  or 
lefs  clearnefs,  that  if  we  aft  fo  and  fo,  we  fliall  have 
fuch  enjoyments,  if  fo  and  fo,  fuch  fufferings  ;  and 
giving  us  thofe  enjoyments,  and  making  us  feel  thole 
fufferings,  in  conlequence  of  our  aftions. 

"  But  all  this  is  to  be  afcribed  to  the  general  courfe 
of  nature."  True.  This  is  the  very  thing  which  I 
am  obferving.  It  is  to  be  afcribed  to  the  general  courfe 
of  nature  }  i.  e.  not  furelv  to  the  words  or  ideas,  courfe 

"S 


Chap.  II.        ^y  Rewards  and  PuniJIments.  8^ 

cf  nature,  but  to  him  who  appointed  it,  and  put 
things  into  it  ;  or  to  a  courfe  of  operation,  from  its 
uniformity  or  conftancy,  called  natural ;  *  and  which 
neceflarily  implies  an  operating  agent.  For  when 
men  find  themfelves  neceffitated  to  confefs  an  Author 
of  nature,  or  that  God  is  the  natural  Governor  of  the 
world,  they  muft  not  deny  this  again,  becaufe  his 
government  is  uniform  ;  they  muft  not  deny  that  he 
does  things  at  all,  becaufe  he  does  them  conftantly  ; 
becaufe  the  effects  of  his  afting  are  permanent,  wheth- 
er his  acting  be  fo  or  not,  though  there  is  no  reafon  to 
think  it  is  not.  In  fliort,  every  man,  in  every  thing 
he  does,  naturally  afts  upon  the  forethought  and  ap- 
prehenfion  of  avoiding  evil  or  obtaining  good  ;  and  if 
the  natural  courfe  of  things  be  the  appointment  of 
God,  and  our  natural  faculties  of  knowledge  and  ex- 
perience are  given  us  by  him,  then  the  good  and  bad 
confequences  which  follow  our  actions  are  his  appoint- 
ment, and  our  forefight  of  thofe  confequences  is  a 
warning  given  us  by  him,  how  we  are  to  a^l. 

"  Is  the  pleafure  then  naturally  accompanying  every 
particular  gratification  of  paflion  intended  to  put  us 
upon  gratifying  curfelves  in  every  fuch  particular  in- 
ftance,  and  as  a  reward  to  us  for  fo  doing  V  No  cer- 
tainly. Nor  is  it  to  be  faid,  that  our  eyes  were  natu- 
rally intended  to  give  us  the  fight  of  each  particular 
objed:,  to  which  they  do  or  can  extend  ;  objeds  which 
are  defti\id:ive  of  them,  or  which,  for  any  other  rea- 
fon, it  may  become  us  to  turn  our  eyes  from.  Yet 
there  is  no  doubt  but  that  our  eyes  were  intended  for 
us  to  fee  with.  So  neither  is  there  any  doubt  but 
that  the  forefecn  pleafures  and  pains  belonging  to  the 
paffions  Vv^ere  intended,  in  general,  to  induce  mankind 
to  a6t  in  fuch  and  fuch  manners. 

Nov;  from  this  general  obiervation,  obvious  to  eve- 
ry one,  that  God  has  given  us  to  underfland  he  has  ap- 

G  pointQ4 


96  Of  the  Government  of  God  Part  f, 

pointed  fatlsfadion  and  delight  to  be  the  confequence 
of  our  ading  in  one  manner,  and  pain  and  uneafinefs 
of  our  ading  in  another,  and  of  our  not  ading  at  all ; 
and  that  we  find  the  confequences  which  we  were  be- 
forehand informed  of  uniformly  to  fjllow — we  may 
learn,  that  we  are  at  prefent  adually  under  his  govern- 
ment in  the  ftrideft  and  moft  proper  fenfe  ;  in  fuch  ^ 
fenfe,  as  that  he  rewards  and  puniflies  us  for  our  ac- 
tions. An  Author  of  nature  being  fuppofed,  it  is  not 
fb  much  a  dedudion  of  reafon  as  a  matter  of  expe- 
rience, that  we  are  thus  under  his  government  ;  under 
his  government,  in  the  fame  fenfe  as  we  are  under  the 
government  of  civil  magiftrates.  Becaufe  the  annex- 
ing pleafure  to  fome  adions  and  pain  to  others,  in  our 
power  to  do  or  forbear,  and  giving  notice  of  this  ap- 
pointment beforehand  to  thofe  whom  it  concerns,  is 
the  proper  formal  notion  of  government.  Whether 
the  pleafure  or  pain  which  thus  follows  upon  our  be* 
haviour  be  owing  to  the  Author  of  nature's  ading  up- 
on us  every  moment  which  we  feel  it,  or  to  his  having 
at  once  contrived  and  executed  his  own  part  in  the 
plan  of  the  world,  makes  no  alteration  as  to  the  mat- 
ter before  us.  For  if  civil  magiftrates  eould  make 
the  fandions  of  their  laws  take  place,  without  inter-* 
pofing  at  all  after  they  had  paffed  them,  without  a  tri- 
al and  the  formalities  of  an  execution  ;  if  they  were 
able  to  make  their  laws  execute  themfelves,  or  every 
offender  to  execute  them  upon  himfelf  j  w^e  fliould  be 
juft  in  the  fame  fenfe  under  their  government  then,  as 
v/e  are  now,  but  in  a  much  higher  degree,  and  more 
perfed  manner.  Vain  is  the  ridicule,  with  which  one 
fore  fees  fome  perfons  will  divert  themfelves,  upon 
finding  lefTer  pains  confidered  as  inflances  of  divine 
punifhment.  There  is  no  pofTibiiity  of  anfwering  or 
evading  the  general  thing  here  intended,  without  de- 
nying all  final  caufes.  For  final  cauies  being  admit- 
ted,' the  pleafures  and  pains  now  mentioned  muit  be 

admitted 


Chap.  II.         hy  Rewards  and  Vunijliments.  91 

admitted  too  as  inftances  of  them.  And  If  they  are, 
if  God  annexes  delight  to  fome  actions  and  uneaiinefs 
to  others,  with  an  apparent  deii^n  to  induce  us  to  a6t 
fo  and  fo,  then  he  not  only  difpenfes  happinefs  and 
mifery,  but  alfo  rewards  and  punifhes  ad:ions.  If,  for 
example,  the  pain  which  we  feel,  upon  doing  what 
tends  to  the  deftruAion  of  our  bodies,  fuppofe  upon 
too  near  approaches  to  fire,  or  upon  wounding  our- 
felvcs,  be  appointed  by  the  Author  of  nature  to  pre- 
vent our  doing  what  thus  tends  to  our  deftrudiion,  this 
is  altogether  as  much  an  inftance  of  his  punitliing' 
our  actions,  and  confequently  of  our  being  under 
his  government,  as  declaring  by  a  voice  from 
heaven  that  if  we  afted  {o^  he  would  inflict  fuch 
pain  upon  us,  and  inflicting  it,  whether  it  be  greater 
or  lefs. 

Thus  we  find,  that  the  true  notion  or  conception 
of  the  Author  of  nature  is  that  of  a  mafter  or  govern- 
or, prior  to  the  confideration  of  his  moral  attributes. 
The  fa6t  of  our  cafe,  which  we  find  by  experience,  is, 
that  he  a£tually  exercifes  dominion  or  government 
over  us  at  prefent,  by  rewarding  and  punilhing  us  for 
our  actions,  in  as  ftridt  and  proper  a  fenfe  of  thefe 
words,  and  even  in  the  fame  fenfe,  as  children,  fer- 
vants,  fubjedt?,  are  rewarded  and  puniflied  by  thofc 
who  govern  them. 

And  thus  the  v/hole  analogy  of  nature,  the  whole 
prefent  courfe  of  things,  moft  fully  fhows,  that  there 
is  nothing  incredible  in  the  general  do6trine  of  relig- 
ion, that  God  will  reward  and  punifh  men  for  their 
a£tions  hereafter  ;  nothing  incredible,  I  mean,  ariiing 
out  of  the  notion  of  rewarding  and  punifhing.  For 
the  whole  courfe  of  nature  is  a  preient  inftance  of  his 
cxercifmg  that  government  over  us,  which  implies  in 
it  rewarding  and  puniQiing.    . 

G2,  BUT 


g%  Of  the  Government  of  God  Part  I. 

BUT  as  divine  punifhment  is  what  men  chiefly 
object  againft,  and  are  mofl  unwiUing  to  allow,  it 
may  be  proper  to  mention  fome  cirCumftances  in 
the  natural  courfe  of  pimifbments  at  prefent,  which 
are  analogous  to  what  religion  teaches  us  concerning 
a  future  ftate  of  punifhm.ents ;  indeed  fo  analogous, 
that  as  they  add  a  farther  credibility  to  it,  fo  they 
cannot  b^^t  raife  a  mofl  ferious  apprehenfi-r^n  of  it  in 
tliofe  who  will  attend  to  them. 

It  has  been  now  obferved,that  fuch  and  fuch  miferies 
naturally  follow  fuch  and  inch  aftions  of  imprudence 
and  wilfulnefs,  as  well  as  adions  more  commonly  and 
more  diftin6tly  confidered  as  vicious ;  and  that  thefe 
confequences,  when  they  may  be  forefeen,  are  proper- 
ly natural  punifhments  annexed  to  fuch  actions.  For 
the  general  thing  here  infifted  upon  is,  not  that  we 
fee  a  great  deal  of  mifery  in  the  world,  but  a  great  deal 
which  men  bring  upon  themfelves  by  their  own  be- 
haviour, which  they  might  have  forefeen  and  avoided. 
Nov/  the  circumftances  of  thefe  natural  pimifhments 
particularly  deferving  our  attention,  are  fuch  as  thefe  : 
That  oftentimes  they  follow  or  are  infli6ted  in  confe- 
quence  of  adlions,  which  procure  many  prefent  ad- 
vantages, and  are  accompanied  with  much  prefent 
pleafure  ;  for  inftance,  ficknefs  and  untimely  death  is 
the  confequence  of  intemperance,  though  accompa- 
riied  with  the  highefl  mirth  and  jollity  :  That  thefe 
punilhments  are  often  much  greater  than  the  advan- 
tages  or  pleafures  obtained  by  the  anions  of  which  they 
are  the  punifhments  or  confequences  :  That  though 
we  may  imagine  a  eonftitution  of  nature,  in  which 
thefe  natural  punifhments  which  are  in  fact  to  follow 
would  follow,  immediately  upon  iuch  aftions  being 
done,  or  very  foon  after  ;  we  find  on  the  contrary  in 
our  world,  that  they  are  often  delayed  a  great  while, 
fometimes  even  until  long  after  the  aftions  occafioning 
them  are  forgot  j  lb  that  the  conflitution  of  nature  is 

fuch. 


Chap.  II.  hy  Punijliments.  93 

fuch,  that  delay  of  punifhment  is  no  fort  nor  degree 
of  prefumption  of  final  impunity  :  That  after  fuch 
delay,  thefe  natural  punifliments  or  miferies  often 
come,  not  by  degrees,  but  fuddenly,  with  violence, 
and  at  once  ;  however,  the  chief  mifery  often  does  : 
That  as  certainty  of  fuch  diftant  mife-ry  following  fuch 
aftions  is  never  afforded  perfgns,  fo  perhaps  during 
the  aftions  they  have  feldom  a  diftind:  full  expecta- 
tion of  its  following  ■,  *  and  many  times  the  cafe  is 
only  thus,  that  they  fee  in  general,  or  may  fee,  the 
credibility  that  intemperance,  fuppofe,  will  bring  after 
it  difeafes,  civil  crimes  civil  punifhments,  when  yet 
the  real  probability  often  is  that  they  ihall  efcape  ; 
but  things  notwithftanding  take  their  deftined  courfe, 
and  the  mifery  inevitably  follows  at  its  appointed 
time,  in  very  many  of  thefe  cafes.  Thus  alfo,  though 
youth  may  be  alleged  as  an  excufe  for  raflinefs  and 
folly,  as  being  nati.iraliy  thoughtlefs,  and  not  clearly 
forefeeing  all  the  conlbquences  of  being  untradlable 
and  profligate,  this  does  not  hinder,  but  that  thefe 
confequences  follow,  and  are  grievoufly  felt  throughout 
the  whole  courfe  of  mature  life.  Habits  contrafted 
even  in  that  age  are  often  utter  ruin  ;  and  men's  fuc- 
cefs  in  the  world,  not  only  in  the  corjimon  fenfe  of 
worldly  fuccefs,  but  their  real  happinefs  and  mifery 
depends,  in  a  great  degree,  and  in  various  ways,  upon 
the  manner  in  which  they  pafs  their  youth  ;  which 
confequences  they  for  the  moft  part  negleft  to  con- 
fider,  and  perhaps  feldom  can  properly  be  faid  to  be- 
lieve, beforehand.  It  requires  alfo  to  be  mentioned, 
that  in  numberlefs  cafes  the  natural  courfe  of  thino;s 
affords  us  opportunities  for  procuring  advantages  to 
ourfeives  at  certain  times,  which  we  cannot  procure 
when  we  will,  nor  ever  recal  the  opportunities,  if  we 
have  neglefted  them.  Indeed  the  general  courfe  of 
nature  is  an  example  of  this.  If,  during  the  oppor- 
tunity 

*  See  Part  II.  Chap.  vi. 


94  Of  the  Government  of  God  Paut  I, 

tunity  of  youth,  perfons  are  indocile  and  felf  willed, 
they  inevitably  fuffer  in  their  future  life  for  want  of 
thofe  ace]uirements  which  they  negle6ted  the  natural 
lealbn  of  attaining.  If  the  hufbandman  lets  his  feed 
time  pafs  without  fowing,  the  whole  year  is  loft  to  him 
beyond  recovery.  In  like  manner,  though  after  men 
liave  been  guilty  of  folly  and  extravagance  up  to  a  cer* 
tain  degresy  it  is  often  in  their  power,  for  inftance,  to 
retrieve  their  affairs,  to  recover  their  health  and  char- 
after,  at  leaft  in  good  meafure  ;  yet  real  reformation 
is,  in  many  cafes,  of  no  avail  at  all  towards  preventing 
the  miferies,  poverty,  ficknefs,  infamy,  naturally  an- 
nexed to  folly  and  extravagance  exceeding  that  degree. 
There  is  a  certain  bound  to  imprudence  and  mifoe- 
haviour,  which  being  tranfgrelled,  there  remains  no 
place  for  repentance  in  the  natural  courfe  of  things. 
It  is  further  very  much  to  be  remarked,  that  neglects 
from  inconlideratenefs,  want  of  attention,*  not  look-s. 
ing  about  us  to  fee  v^hat  v/e  have  to  do,  are  often  atr 
tended  with  confequences  altogether  as  dreadful  as 
any  aftive  mifbehaviour,  from  the  moft  extravagant 
pallion.  And  laftly,  civil  government  being  natural, 
the  punifhments  of  it  are  fo  too  ;  and  fome  of  thefe 
punilhments  are  capital,  as  the  effects  of  a  diffolute 
courfe  of  pleafure  are  often  mortal.  So  that  many 
natural  punilhments  are  final -f  to  him  who  incurs 

them, 

*  Part  II.  Chap.  vi. 

f  The  general  confideration  of  a  future  flateof  puniihment,  nioft  e\-ident- 
ly  belongs  to  the  fubjett  of  natural  rehgion.  But  if  any  of  thefe  refledtions 
Ihould  be  thought  to  relate  n^ore  particularly  to  this  doftrine,  ab  taught  in 
fcripture,  the  reader  is  defired  to  obferve  that  gentile  writers,  both  moralills 
and  poets,  fpeak  of  the  future  punifhment  of  the  wicked,  both  as  to  the  du- 
ration and  dvgree  of  it,  in  a  like  ma'.ner  of  exprelFion  and  of  dcfcription  as 
the  fcripture  does.  So  that  all  which  can  pohtivcly  be  alfcrted  to  be  mattei- 
of  mere  revelation,  with  regard  to  this  doctrine,  feems  to  be,  that  the  great 
diftinclion  between  the  righteous  and  the  wicked  Ihall  be  made  at  the  end  of 
this  world;  ttiat  each  Ihall //4f«  receive  according  to  his  defcits:.  P.eafon 
<'id,  as  it  well  might,  conclude  that  it  llrould,  finally  and  upon  the  whole,  be 
vvell  with  the  righteous  and  ill  with  the  wicked  ;  but  it  could  not  be  deter- 
mined upon  any  principles  of  reafon,  Vvihether  lii'.man  creatures  might  not 
bave  heen-sppomted  to  pafs  through  otlker  ftate=  of  life  and  being,  before  that 

dillributivii 


Chap.  II.  hy  Piinijfimenis,  95 

them,  if  confidered  only  in  his  temporal  capacity  j  and 
feem  inflidied  by  natural  appointment,  either  to  re- 
move the  oifender  out  of  the  way  of  being  further  mif- 
chievous ;  or  as  an  example,  though  frequently  a  dif- 
regarded  one,  to  thofe  who  are  left  behind. 

Thefe  things  are  not  what  we  call  accidental,  or  to 
be  met  with  only  now  and  then  j  but  they  are  things 
of  every  day's  experience  :  They  proceed  from  gene^ 
ral  laws,  very  general  ones,  by  which  God  governs  the 
world,  in  the  natural  courfe  of  his  providence.  And 
they  are  fo  analogous  to  what  rehgion  teaches  us  con- 
cerning the  future  punifiiment  of  the  wicked,  fo  much 
of  a  piece  with  it,  that  both  would  naturally  be  ex- 
prclTed  in  the  very  fame  words  and  manner  of  defcrip- 
tion.  In  the  book  of  Proverbs,*  for  inftance,  Wif- 
dom  is  introduced  as  frequenting  the  moft  public 
places  of  refort,  and  as  rejedied  when  ihe  offers  herfelf 
as  the  natural  appointed  guide  of  human  life.  How 
long,  fpeaking  to  thole  who  are  paiTmg  through  it, 
kow  long,  yefimple  ones,  will  ye  love  folly,  and  the  [com- 
ers delight  in  their  [corning,  and  fools  hate  knowledge  f 
Turn  ye  at  my  reproof.  Behold,  I  will  pour  out  my  Spirit 
upon  you,  I  will  make  known  my  words  unto  you.  But 
upon  being  neglefted,  Becaufe  /  have  called,  and  ye 
refufed,  I  have  Jiretched  out  my  hand,  and  no  man  re- 
garded ;  but  ye  have  fet  at  nought  all  my  counfel,  and 
would  none  of  my  reproof :  I  a  Jo  will  laugh  at  your  ca- 
lamity, I  will  mock  when  your  fear  cometli ;  when  your 
fear  comet h  as  defolation .  and  your  definition  comet h  as  a 
whirlzvind ;  when  difirefs  and  anguijh  cometh  upon  yon. 
Then  [hall  they  call  upon  me,  but  I  will  7iot  anfwer  ;  they 
fliall  feck  me  early  ^  but  they  fliall  not  find  me.     This  paf- 

fage 

diftributive  juftlcc  fhould  finally  and  efFeftually  take  place.  Revelation 
teaches  us,  that  the  next  ftate  of  things  after  the  prefe  it  is  appointed  for  the 
execution  of  this  juflice,  that  it  fliall  be  no  longer  delayed  ;  but  the  msfiery  of 
Cod,  the  great  niyftery  of  his  fuffering  vice  and  confufioa  to  prevail, /,i<z// /■/;!« 
he  finiJJicd  ;  and  he  will  tale  ta  him  his  great  powrr  and  wih'  rcig'i,  by  ."cndering 
tu  every  one  according  to  iiis  works. 

*  Chap,  i. 


^6  Of  the  Government  of  God  Part  I. 

fage  every  one  fees  is  poetical,  and  fome  parts  of  it  are 
highly  figurative  ;  but  their  meaning  is  obvious. 
And  the  thing  intended  is  exprefled  more  literally  in 
the  following  words  :  For  that  they  hated  knowledge^ 
and  did  not  choofe  the  fear  of  the  Lord — therefore  fliall 
they  eat  of  the  fruit  of  their  own  way^  and  be  filled  with 
their  own  devices.  For  the  fecnrity  of  the  fimple  (liatl 
flav  them,  and  the  prcfperity  of  fools  jhall  deftroy  them. 
And  the  whole  paflage  is  lb  equally  applicable  to 
v/hat  we  experience  in  the  prefent  world  concerning 
the  confequences  of  men's  aftions,  and  to  what  re-- 
ligion  teaches  us  is  to  be  expected  in  another,  that  it 
may  be  queftioned  which  of  the  two  was  principally 
intended. 

Indeed  when  one  has  been  recollecting  the  proper 
proofs  of  a  future  flate  of  rewards  and  punifliments, 
nothing  methinks  can  give  one  fo  fenfible  an  apprc- 
henlion  of  the  latter,  or  reprefentation  of  it  to  the 
mind,  as  obferving,  that  after  the  many  difregarded 
checks,  admonitions  and  warnings,  which  people  meet 
"with  in  the  ways  of  vice  and  folly  and  extravagance  j 
warnings  from  their  very  nature  ;  from  the  examples 
of  others  ;  from  the  lelfer  inconveniences  which  they 
bring  upon  themfeives  ;  from  the  infhrudlions  of  wife 
and  virtuous  men — after  thefe  have  been  long  -defpif-^ 
ed,  fcorned,  ridiculed  ;  after  the  chief  bad  confe- 
quences, temporal  confequences,  of  their  follies  have 
been  delayed  for  a  great  while  ;  at  length  they  break 
in  irrefiftibly,  like  an  armed  force  ;  repentance  is  too 
late  to  relieve,  and  can  ferve  only  to  aggravate,  their 
diftrefs ;  the  cafe  is  become  defperate,  and  poverty  and 
iicknefs,  remorfe  and  anguifh,  infamy  and  death,  the 
eifcfts  of  their  own  doings,  overwhelm  them,  beyond 
poffibility  of  remedy  or  efcape.  This  is  an  account 
of  what  is  in  facft  the  general  conftitution  of  nature. 

It  is  not  in  any  fort  meant,  that  according  to  what 
appears  at  prefent  of  the  natural  courfe  of  things,  men 

are 


Chap.  II.  'hy  PmiJIiments.  97 

are  always  uniformly  puniihed  in  proportion  to  their 
mifbehaviour  ;  but  tliat  tliere  are  very  many  inflances 
of  mifbehaviour  punifhed  in  the  feveral  ways  now 
mentioned,  and  very  dreadful  inftances  too  ;  fufficient 
to  (how  what  the  laws  of  the  univerfe  may  admit,  and, 
if  thoroughly  confidered,  fufficient  fully  to  anfwer  all 
objeftions  againft  the  credibility  of  a  future  ftate  of 
puniiliments,  from  any  imaginations  that  the  frailty 
of  our  nature  and  external  temptations  almou:  annihi- 
late the  guilt  of  human  vices,  as  well  as  objections  of 
another  fort,  from  necellity,  from  iuppofitions  that 
the  will  of  an  infinite  Being  cannot  be  contradict- 
ed, or  that  he  mud  be  incapable  of  offence  and 
provocation.* 

Reflections  of  this  kind  are  not  without  their  ter- 
rors to  ferious  perfuns,  the  moil  free  from  enthufiafm, 
and  of  the  greateft  ftrength  of  mind  ;  but  it  is  fit 
things  be  ftated  and  confidered  as  they  really  are. 
And  there  is,  in  the  prefent  age,  a  certain  fearlefsnefs, 
with  regard  to  what  may  be  hereafter  under  the  gov- 
ernment of  God,  which  nothing  but  3,n  univeriaily 
acknowledged  demonftration  on  the  fide  of  atheifm 
can  juflify  ;  and  which  makes  it  quite  neceifary,  that 
men  be  reminded,  and  if  pofTible  made  to  feel,  that 
there  is  no  fort  of  ground  for  being  thus  prefumptu- 
ous,  even  upon  the  mofl  fceptical  principles.  For, 
may  it  not  be  faid  of  any  perfon  upon  his  being  born 
into  the  world,  he  may  behave  fo  as  to  be  of  no  feryice 
to  it,  but  by  being  made  an  example  of  the  vvoful  ef- 
fects of  vice  and  folly  ?  That  he  may,  as  any  one  may, 
if  he  will,  incur  an  infamous  execution  from  the  hands 
of  civil  juftice  ;  or  in  iome  other  courle  of  extrava- 
gance fliorten  his  days  ;  or  bring  upon  himfelf  infamy 
and  difeafes  worie  than  death  ?  So  that  it  had  been 
better  for  him,  even  with  regard  to  the  prefent  world, 
that  he  had  never  been  born.  And  is  there  any  pre- 
tence 

*  See  Chap.  iv.  and  vi. 


^t  Of  the  Moral  Part  L 

tence  of  reafon,  for  people  to  think  tbemfelves  fecure, 
and  talk  as  if  they  had  certain  proof,  that  let  them  adt 
as  licentioufly  as  they  will,  there  can  be  nothing  anal- 
ogous to  this,  with  regard  to  a  future  and  more  gene- 
ral intereft,  under  the  providence  and  government  of 
fche  fame  God  ? 


CHAP.     III. 
Of  the  Moral  Government  cf  God. 

jc\S  the  manifold  appearances  of  defiga 
and  of  final  caufes,  in  the  conftitution  of  the  world, 
prove  it  to  be  the  work  of  an  intelligent  Mind,  fo  the 
particular  final  caufes  cf  pleafure  and  pain  diftributed 
amongft  his  creatures,  prove  that  they  are  under  his 
government,  j  what  may  be  called  his  natural  govern- 
ment of  creatures  endued  with  fenfe  and  reafon.  This, 
however,  implies  fom^ewhat  more  than  feems  ufually 
attended  to,  when  we  fpeak  of  God's  natui*al  govern- 
ment of  the  world.  It  implies  government  of  the 
very  fam.e  kind  with  that,  which  a  mafter  exercifes 
over  his  fervants,  or  a  civil  magiftrate  over  his  fub- 
jefts.  Thefe  latter  inftances  of  final  caufes  as  really 
prove  an  inteUigent  Governor  of  the  world,  in  the  fenlc 
now  mentioned,  and  before*  difhinftly  treated  of,  as 
any  other  infbances  of  final  caufes  prove  an  intelligent 
Maker  of  it. 

But  this  alone  does  not  appear  at  firft  fight  to  de- 
termine any  thing  certainly,  concerning  the  moral 
chara6ter  of  the  Author  of  nature,  confidered  in  this 
relation  of  governor ;  does  not  afcertain  his  govern- 
ment to  be  moral,  or  prove  that  he  is  the  righteous 

Judge 

*  Ch.  ii. 


Chap.  III.  GovcnuJicnt  of  God.  99 

Judge  of  the  world,  Moral  government-  conlllls,  not 
barely  in  rewarding  and  punifhing  men  tor  their  ac- 
tions, which  the  moft  tyrannical  peribn  may  do  ;  but 
in  rewarding  the  righteous  and  punifhiiig  the  wicked, 
in  rendering  to  men  according  to  their  actions,  con- 
fidered  ar,  good  or  evil.  And  the  perfeftion  of  moral 
governm.ent  confifts  in  doing  this,  with  regard  to  all 
intelligent  creatures,  in  an  exa£t  proportion  to  their 
perfonal  merits  or  demerits. 

Some  men  feem  to  think  the  only  chara6:er  of  the 
Author  of  nature  to  be  that  of  (imple  abiolute  benev- 
olence. This,  confidered  as  a  principle  of  adion  and 
infinite  in  degree,  is  a  difpofition  to  produce  the  great-- 
efl  poffible  happinefs,  without  regard  to  perfons'  be- 
liaviour,  othervviie  than  as  fuch  regard  would  produce 
higher  degrees  of  it.  And  ilippoling  this  to  be  the 
only  character  of  God,  veracity  and  juflice  in  him 
would  be  nothing  but  benevolence  condudcd  by  wil- 
dom.  Now  furely  this  ought  not  be  alierted,  unlefs 
it  can  be  proved  ;  for  we  Ihould  fpcak  with  cautious 
reverence  upon  luch  a  llibje*5t.  And  whether  it  can 
be  proved  or  not,  is  not  the  thing  here  to  be  inquired 
into  5  but  wJiether  in  the  conftitution  and  condud  of 
the  world  a  righteous  government  be  not  difcernibly 
planned  out  ;  which  neceffarily  implies  a  rigliteous 
Governor.  There  miay  poiTibiy  be  in  the  creation  be- 
ings, to  whom  the  Author  of  nature  manifefts  himfelf 
under  this  moft  amiable  of  all  characters,  this  of  infi- 
nite abfolute  benevolence  ;  for  it  is  the  moft  amiable, 
fuppofing  it  not,  as  perhaps  it  is  not,  incompatible 
with  juftice  ;  but  he  manifefts  himlelf  to  us  under 
the  character  of  a  righteous  Governor.  He  may,  con- 
liftently  with  this,  be  fnuply  and  abfolutely  benevo- 
lent, in  the  ^t^n^t  now  explained  ;  but  he  is,  for  he  has 
given  us  a  proof  in  the  conftitution  and  condud;  of 
the  world  that  he  is,  a  governor  over  fervants,  as  he 
rewards  and  punifhes  us  for  our  actions.     And  in  tlic 

conftitution 


loo  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 

conftltutlon  and  condud  of  it,  he  may  alfo  have  giv- 
en, beiides  the  reafon  of  the  thing,  and  the  natural 
prefages  of  confcience,  clear  and  diftin6l  intimations 
that  his  government  is  righteoi:;s  or  moral  ;  clear  to 
fuch  as  think  the  nature  of  it  deferving  their  atten- 
tion ;  and  yet  not  to  every  carelefs  perfon,  who  caft§ 
a  tranfient  refledion  i^pon  the  fubjeft,^ 

But  it  is  particularly  to  be  obferved,  that  the  divine 
government,  which  we  experience  ourfelves  under  in 
the  prefent  ftate,  taken  alone,  is  allowed  not  to  be  the 
perfeclion  of  moral  government.  And  yet  this  by  ng 
means  hinders  but  that  there  may  be  fomewhat,  be  it 
more  or  lefs,  truly  moral  in  it.  A  righteous  govern- 
ment m.ay  plainly  appear  to  be  carried  on  to  fome  de- 
gree ;  enough  to  give  us  the  apprehenlion  that  it  lliall 
be  completed,  or  carried  on  to  that  degree  of  perfec- 
tion which  religion  teaches  us  it  fliall ;  but  which  can- 
not appear,  till  much  more  of  the  divine  adminiftra-' 
tion  be  feen,  than  can  in  the  pr-efent  life.  And  the 
defign  of  this  Ciiapter  is  to  inquire,  how  far  this  is  the 
cafe;  how  far,  over  and  above  the  moral  nature -J- 
which  God  has  given  us,  and  our  natural  notion  of 
him  as  righteous  Governor  of  thofe  his  creatures,  to 
whom  he  has  given  this  nature  ;  I  fay  how  far  beiides 
this,  the  principles  and  beginnings  of  a  moral  govern- 
ment over  the  world  may  be  difcerned,  notvvithftand- 
ins:  and  amidfl;  all  the  confufion  and  diforder  of  it. 

Now  one  might  mention  here,  what  has  been  often 
urged  with  great  force,  that  in  general  lefs  uneaiinefs 
and  more  fatisfaclion  are  the  natural  confequences  %  of 

a  virtuous 

*  The  objeftions  ajainfl:  religion,  from  the  evidence  of  it  not  being  uni- 
verfal,  nor  fo  ilrong  as  might  polFibly  have  been,  may  be  urged  agamft  nat- 
ural religion,  as  well  as  againft  revealed  ;  and  therefore  the  confideration  of 
tiiem  belong,  to  the  firft  part  of  this  Treatife,  as  well  as  the  fecond.  But  as 
.thefe  objections  are  chiefly  urged  againil:  revealed  religion,  I  chofe  to  con- 
fider  them  in  the  fecond  part.  And  the  anfu-ei-  to  tliem  there,  Ch.  vi.  as 
urged  againft  Chriflianity,  being  almoft  equally  applicable  to  them  as  urged 
aga»ift  the  religion  of  nature  ;  to  avoid  rcpetitiooj  the  reader  isYeferred  to 
that  chapter. 

f  Dijfcrtation   II. 

+  See  Lord  Slwjtjhury'%  Inquiry  concerning  Virtue,  Part  II, 


Chap.  III.  Gcvernment  of  God.  loi 

a  virtuous  than  of  a  vicious  courfe  of  life,  in  the  pref- 
ent  ftate,  as  an  inftance  of  a  moral  government  eftab- 
lifhed  in  nature  ;  an  inftance  of  it,  collefted  from  ex- 
perience and  prefent  matter  of  fad:.  But  it  n^uft  be 
owned  a  thing  of  difficulty  to  weigh  and  balance  pleaf- 
ures  and  unealineffes,  each  amongft  themfelves,  and 
alfo  againft  each  other,  fo  as  to  make  an  eftimate,  with 
any  exaftnefs,  of  the  overplus  of  happinefs  on  the  fide 
of  virtue.  And  it  is  not  impoflible,  that,  amidft  the 
infinite  diforders  of  the  world,  there  may  be  excep- 
tions to  the  happinefs  of  virtue,  even  with  regard  to 
thofe  perfons  whofe  courfe  of  life,  from  their  youth  up, 
has  been  blamelefs ;  and  more  with  regard  to  thofe 
who  have  gone  on  for  fome  time  in  the  ways  of  vice, 
and  have  afterwards  reformed.  For  fuppofe  an  in- 
ftance of  the  latter  cafe  ;  a  perfon  with  his  paflions  in- 
flamed, his  natural  faculty  of  felf-government  impair- 
ed by  habits  of  indulgence,  and  with  all  his  vices  about 
him,  like  fo  many  harpies,  craving  for  their  accuftomed 
gratifications,  who  can  fay  how  long  it  might  be,  be- 
fore fuch  a  perfon  would  find  more  fatisfadlion  in  the 
reaibnablenefs  and  prefent  good  confequences  of  vir- 
tue, than  difficulties  and  felf  denial  in  the  reftraints  of 
it  ?  Experience  alfo  ftiows,  that  men  can,  to  a  great 
degree,  get  over  their  fenfe  of  ihame,  fo  as  that  by 
profeffing  themfelves  to  be  without  principle,  and 
avowing  even  direft  villany,  they  can  fupport  them- 
felves againft  the  infamy  of  it.  But  as  the  ill  actions 
of  any  one  will  probably  be  more  talked  of,  and  oftener 
thrown  in  his  way,  upon  his  reformation,  fo  the  infamy 
of  them  will  be  much  more  felt,  after  the  natural  fenfe 
of  virtue  and  honour  is  recovered.  UneafinelTes  of 
this  kind  ought,  indeed,  to  be  put  to  the  account  of 
former  vices ;  yet  it  will  be  faid,  they  are  in  part  the 
confequences  of  reformation.  Still  I  am  far  from  al- 
lowing it  doubtful,  whether  virtue,  upon  the  v/hole,  be 
happier  than  vice  in  the  prefent  world.     But  if  it  were, 

vet 


102  Of  the  Mora!  Part  1 

yet  the  beginnings  of  a  righteous  adminiftration  may, 
beyond  ail  queflion,  be  found  in  nature,  if  we  will  at* 
tentively  inquire  after  them.     And, 

I.  In  whatever  manner  the  notion  of  God's  moral 
government  over  the  world  might  be  treated,  if  it  did 
not  appear  whether  he  were  in  a  proper  fenfe  our  gov- 
ernor at  all,  yet  when  it  is  Certain  matter  of  experience, 
that  he  does  manifefl;  himfelf  to  lis  under  the  charac- 
ter of  a  governor,  in  the  ienfe  explained,*  it  muft  de- 
fervc  to  be  confidered,  whether  there  be  not  reafon  to 
apprehend,  that  he  may  be  a  righteous  or  moral  Govi* 
ernor.  Since  it  appears  to  be  fad:,  that  God  does  gov- 
ern mankind  by  the  method  of  rewards  and  puniili- 
ments,  according  to  fome  fettled  rules  of  diftribution, 
it  is  furely  a  queilion  to  bd  afked,  What  prefumption 
is  there  againfh  his  finally  rewarding  and  punifhing 
them,  according  to  this  particular  rule,  namely,  as  they 
aft  reafonably  or  unreaibnably,virtuoufly  or  vicioufly  ? 
fince  rendering  men  happy  or  miferable  by  this  rule, 
certainly  falls  in,  much  miore  falls  in,  with  our  natural 
apprehenfions  and  fenfe  of  things,  than  doing  fo  by 
any  other  rule  whatever  ;  fmce  rewarding  and  punifh- 
ing anions  by  any  other  rule,  vvould  appear  much 
harder  to  be  accounted  for  by  minds  formed  as  he  has 
formed  ours.  Be  the  evidence  of  religion  then  more 
or  Icfs  clear,  the  expeftation  which  it  raifes  in  us,  that 
the  righteous  fhall,  upon  the  whole,  be  happy,  and  the 
wicked  miferable,  cannot  however  poffibly  be  conlid'- 
ered  as  abfurd  or  chimerical ;  becaufe  it  is  no  more 
than  an  expectation,  that  a  method  of  government 
already  begun,  iliall  be  carried  on,  the  method  of  re- 
warding and  punilliing  actions ;  and  iliall  be  carried 
on  by  a  particular  rule,  which  unavoidably  appears  to 
us  at  firft  fight  more  natural  than  any  other,  the  rule 
which  we  call  dlftributivc  juftice.     Nor, 

II.  Ought  it  to  be  entirely  paffed  over,  that  tran- 
quillity, fatisfa(5tion,  and  external  advantages,  being 

the 

*  Chap.  ii. 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God.  lo^ 

the  natural  confequences  of  prudent  management  of 
ourfelves,  and  our  affairs  ;  and  rafhnefs,  profligate  neg- 
ligence, and  wilful  folly,  bringing  after  them  many  in- 
conveniences and  fufferings ;  thefe  afford  inftances  of 
1  right  conflitution  of  nature  ;  as  the  correction  of 
children,  for  their  own  fakes,  and  by  way  of  example, 
when  they  rim  into  danger  or  hurt  themfelves,  is  a 
part  of  right  education.  And  thus,  that  God  governs 
the  world  by  general  fixed  laws,  that  he  has  endued 
us  with  capacities  of  retieflin2:  upon  this  conftitution 
of  things,  and  forefeeing  the  good  and  bad  confe- 
quences  of  our  behaviour,  plainly  implies  feme  fort  of 
moral  government  ;  fince  from  fuch  a  conititution  of 
things  it  cannot  but  follow,  that  prudence  and  impru- 
dence, which  are  of  the  nature  of  virtue  and  vice,* 
mud  be,  as  they  are,  refpedively  rewarded  and  pun- 
iihed. 

III.  From  the  natural  courfe  of  things,  vicious  ac- 
tions are,  to  a  great  degree,  aftually  punifhed  as  mif- 
chievous  to  fociety  °,  and  befides  punifhment  ad:ualiy 
inflicted  upon  this  account,  there  is  alfo  the  fear  and 
apprehenfion  of  it  in  thofe  perfons,  whofe  crimes  have 
rendered  them  obnoxious  to  it,  in  cafe  of  a  difcovery  ; 
this  flate  of  fear  being  itfelf  often  a  very  coniidcrable 
punifhment.  The  natural  fear  and  apprehenfion  of  it 
too,  which  reftrains  from  fuch  crimes,  is  a  declaration 
of  nature  againft  them.  It  is  neceiTary  to  the  very 
being  of  focietv,  that  vices  deftruftive  of  it  fhould  be 
punifhed  as  being  fo  ;  the  vices  of  falfehood,  injuftice, 
cruelty ;  which  punifhment  therefore  is  as  natural  as 
fociety,  and  fo  is  an  inflance  of  a  kind  of  moral  gov- 
ernment, naturally  eftablifhed  and  adtually  taking 
place.  And,  fmce  the  certain  natural  courfe  of  things 
is  the  conduct  of  Providence  or  the  government  of 
God,  though  carried  on  by  the  inilrumentaiity  of 
men,  the  obfervation  here  made  amounts  to  this,  that 

mankind 


104  ^f  i^^^  Moral  Part  I. 

mankind  find  themfelves  placed  by  him  in  fuch  cir- 
cumftances,  as  that  they  are  unavoidably  accountable 
for  their  behaviour,  and  are  often  punifhed,  and  fome- 
times  rewarded  under  his  government,  in  the  view  of 
tlieir  being  mifchievous,  or  eminently  beneficial  to 
fociety. 

If  it  be  obje6ted  that  good  aftions,  and  fuch  as 
are  beneficial  to  fociety,  are  often  puniflied,  as  in  the 
cafe  of  perfecution  and  in  other  cafes,  and  that  ill  and 
mifchievous  adtions  are  often  rewarded,  it  may  be  an- 
fwered  diftinftly,  firft,  that  this  is  in  no  fort  necelfary, 
and  confequently  not  natural,  in  the  fenfe  in  which  it 
is  neceiiary,  and  therefore  natural,  that  ill  or  mif- 
chievous actions  fhould  be  punillied  ;  and  in  the  next 
place,  that  good  adlions  are  never  punifhed,  confider- 
ed  as  beneficial  to  fociety,  nor  ill  actions  rewarded,  un- 
der the  view  of  their  being  hurtful  to  it.  So  that  it 
ilands  good,  without  any  thing  on  the  lide  of  vice  to 
be  fet  over  againft  it,  that  the  Author  of  nature  has 
as  truly  diredted,  that  vicious  adions,  confidered  as 
mifchievous  to  fociety,  fhould  be  punifhed,  and  put 
mankind  ujidei*  a  neceffity  of  thus  punifhing  them,  as 
he  has  dire^'ted  and  neceffitated  us  to  preferve  our 
lives  by  food. 

IV.  In  the  natural  courfe  of  things,  virtue  as  fuck 
is  actually  rewarded,  and  vice  as  fuch  punifhed  ;  which 
feems  to  afford  an  inftance  or  example,  not  only  of 
government,  but  of  moral  government,  begun  and 
eftablilbed  ;  moral  in  the  ftricteft  fenfe,  though  not  in 
that  perfeftion  of  degree,  which  religion  teaches  us  to 
exped:.  In  order  to  fee  this  more  clearly,  we  mufb 
diftinguiili  betw&m  aftions  themfelves,  and  that  qual- 
ity afcribed  to  them,  which  we  call  virtuous  or  vi- 
cious. The  gratification  itfelf  of  every  natural  paffion, 
muft  be  attended  with  delight ;  and  acquifitions  of 
fortune,  however  made,  are  acquifitions  of  the  means 
or  materials   of  enjoyment.      An  aftion  then,   by 

whicli 


Chap.  ill.  Government  of  God.  205 

which  any  natural  paffion  Is  gratified  or  fortune  ac- 
quired, procures  delight  or  advantage,  abftra£led  from 
all  confideration  of  the  morality  of  fuch  action.  Con- 
fequently,  the  pleafure  or  advantage  in  this  cafe  is 
gained  by  the  a£tion  itfelf,  not  by  the  morality,  the 
virtuoufnefs  or  vicioufnefs  of  it ;  though  it  be,  per- 
haps, virtuous  or  vicious.  Thus,  to  fay  fuch  an  ac- 
tion or  courfe  of  behaviour  procured  fuch  pleafure  or 
advantage, or  brought  on  fuch  inconvenience  and  pain, 
is  quite  a  different  thing,  from  faying,  that  fuch  good  or 
bad  effect  was  owing  to  the  virtue  or  vice  of  fuch  ac- 
tion or  behaviour.  In  one  cafe,  an  action,  ab{tra(5led 
from  all  moral  confideration,  produced  its  effed  ;  in 
the  other  cafe,  for  it  will  appear  that  there  are  fuch 
cafes,  the  morality  of  the  aftion,  the  action  under  a 
moral  confideration,  i.  e.  the  virtuoufnefs  or  viciouf- 
nefs of  it,  produced  the  effeft.  Novv^  I  fay,  virtue,  as 
fuch,  naturally  procures  confidcrable  advantages  to  the 
virtuous,  and  vicCjiis  fuch,  naturally  occafions  great  in- 
convenience and  even  mifery  to  the  vicious,  in  very 
many  inftanceSi  The  irnmediate  effefts  of  virtue  and 
vice  upon  the  mind  and  temper  are  to  be  mentioned 
as  inftances  of  it^  Vice,  as  fuch,  is  naturally  attended 
with  fome  fort  of  uneafinefs,  and,  not  uncommonly, 
with  great  difturbance  and  apprehenfion.  That  in- 
ward feeling,  which  refpeding  leiTer  matters,  and  in 
familiar  fpeech,  we  call  being  vexed  with  onefelf,  and 
in  matters  of  importance  and  in  more  ferious  language, 
remorfe,  is  an  uneafinefs  naturally  arifing  from  an  ac- 
tion of  a  man's  own,  reflected  upon  by  himfelf  as 
wrong,  unreafonable,  faulty,  i.  e.  vicious  in  greater  or 
lefs  degrees  ,  and  this  manifeftly  is  a  different  feeling 
from  that  uneafinefs  which  arifes  from  a  ^tw^o.  of  mere 
lofs  or  harm.  What  is  more  common,  than  to  hear 
a  man  lamenting  an  accident  or  event  and  adding, — 
but  however  he  has  the  fiitisfadion  that  he  cannot 
blame  himfelf  for  it ;  or  on  the  con:rary,  that  he  has 
H  the 


iqS  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 

the  uneafinefs  of  being  fenfible  it  was  his  own  doing  ? 
Thus  alfo  the  diflurbance  and  fear,  which  often  follow 
upon  a  man's  having  done  an  inj  ury,  arife  from  a  fenfe 
of  his  being  blameworthy  ;  otherwife  there  would,  in 
many  cafes,  be  no  ground  of  difturbance,  nor  any  rea- 
fon  to  fear  refentment  or  Ihame.  On  the  other  hand, 
inward  fecurity  and  peace,  and  a.  mind  open  to  the 
feveral  gratifications  of  life,  are  the  natural  attendants 
of  innocence  and  virtue.  To  which  mufl  be  added 
the  complacency,  fatisfa£tion,  and  even  joy  of  heart, 
which  accom.pany  the  exercife,  the  real  exercife,  of 
gratitude,  friendfhip,  benevolence. 
v^  And  here,  I  think,  ov\ght  to  be  mentioned,  th« 
fears  of  future  puniflmient,  and  peaceful  hopes  of  a 
better  life,  in  thofe  who  fully  believe,  or  have  any  fe- 
rious  apprehenfion  of  religion^  becaufe  thefe  hopes  and 
fears  are  prefent  uneafinefs  and  fatisfaftion  to  the 
mind  ;  and  cannot  be  got  rid  of  by  great  part  of  the 
world,  even  by  men  who  have  thought  mofl  thor- 
oughly upon  the  fubjed  of  religion.  And  no  one  can 
fay,  how  confiderable  this  uneafinefs  and  fatisficlion 
may  be,  or  what  upon  the  whole  it  may  amount  to. 
In  the  next  place  comes  in  the  confideration,  that 
all  honefl  and  good  men  are  difpofed  to  befriend  hon- 
efl  good  men,  as  fuch,  and  to  difconntenance  the  vi- 
cious, as  fuch,  and  do  fo  in  fome  degree,  indeed  in  a 
confiderable  degree  ;  from  which  favour  and  difcour- 
agement  cannot  but  ariie  confiderable  advanta2;e  and 
inconvenience.  And  though  the  generality  of  the 
world  have  little  regard  to  the  morality  of  their  own 
adtions,  and  may  be  fuppofed  to  have  lefs  to  that  of 
others,  when  they  themfelves  are  not  concerned,  yet 
let  any  one  be  known  to  be  a  man  of  virtue,  fome 
how  or  other  he  will  be  favoured,  and  good  offices 
will  be  done  him,  from  regard  to  his  chara<fler  with- 
out remote  views,  occalionally,  and  in  fome  low  de- 
gree, I  think,  by  the  generality  of  the  world,  as  it  hap- 


Gkap.  III.  Gov  eminent  of  God.  toy 

pens  to  come  in  their  way.  Public  honours  too  and 
advantages  are  the  natural  confequences,  are  fome- 
times  at  leaft  the  confequences  in  fa6t,  of  virtuous  ac- 
tions ;  of  eminent  juftice,. fidelity,  charity,  love  to  our 
country,  confidered  in  the  vievr  of  being  virtuous. 
And  fometimes  even  death  itfeif,  often  infamy  and 
external  inconveniences,  are  the  public  confequences 
of  vice,  as  vice.  For  inflance,  the  (enfe  which  man- 
kind have  of  tyranny,  injuflice,  opprefTion,  additional 
to  the  mere  feehng  or  fear  of  mifery,  has  doubtlefs 
been  inftrumental  in  bringing  aboilt  revolutions, 
which  make  a  figure  even  in  the  hiftory  of  the  worlds 
For  it  is  plain,  men  refent  injuries  as  implying  faulti- 
nefs,  and  retaliate,  not  merely  under  the  notion  of 
having  received  harm,  but  of  having  received  wrong; 
and  they  have  this  refentment  in  ^behalf  of  others,  as 
well  as  of  themfelves.  So  likewife  even  the  generality 
are,  in  fome  degree,  grateful,  and  difpofed  to  return 
good  offices,  not  merely  becaufe  fuch  an  one  has  been, 
the  occafion  of  good  to  them,  but  under  the  vievv'^, 
that  fuch  good  offices  implied  kind  attention  and 
good  defert  in  the  doer.  To  all  this  may  be  added 
two  or  three  particular  things,  which  many  perfons 
will  think  frivolous ;  but  to  me  nothing  appears  fo$ 
which  at  all  comes  in  towards  determining  a  queilion 
of  fuch  importance,  as,  whether  there  be  or  be  not  a 
moral  inftitution  of  government,  in  the  ftrideft  fenfe 
moral,  vijibly  eftablifhed  and  begun  in  nature.  The 
particular  things  are  thefe  :  That  in  domeftic  govern- 
ment, which  is  doubtlefs  natural,  children  and  others 
alfo  are  very  generally  punifhed  for  faliehood  and  in- 
juflice and  ill  behaviour,  as  fuch,  and  rewarded  for  the 
contrary  ;  which  are  inflances  where  veracity  and  juf- 
tice, and  right  behaviour,  as  fuch,  are  naturally  en- 
forced by  rewards  and  punilhments,  whether  more  or 
lefs  confiderable  in  degree  ;  That,  though  civil  gov- 
ernment be  fappofed  to  take  cognizance  of  actions  in. 
H  2  no 


loS  Of  the  Moral  Part  t 

no  other  view  than  as  prejudicial  to  fociety,  without 
refpecl  to  the  immoraHty  of  them  ;  yet  as  fuch  ac- 
tions are  immoral,  fo  the  fenfe  which  men  have  of  the 
immorality  of  them  very  greatly  contributes,  in  differ- 
ent ways,  to  bring  offenders  to  juftice  ;  and,  that  en- 
tire abfence  of  all  crime  and  guilt  in  the  moral  fenfe, 
when  plainly  appearing,  will  almofh  of  courfe  procure, 
and  circumftances  of  aggravated  guilt  prevent,  a  re- 
miffion  of  the  penalties  annexed  to  civil  crimes,  in 
many  cafes,  though  by  no  means  in  all. 

Upon  the  whole  then,  befides  the  good  and  bad  ef-^ 
lefts  of  virtue  and  vice  upon  nien's  own  minds,  the 
courfe  of  the  world  does,  in  feme  meafure,  turn  upon 
the  approbation  and  difapprobation  of  them,  as  fuch, 
in  others.  The  fenfe  of  well  and  ill  doing,  the  pre- 
fages  of  confcience,  the  love  of  good  charafters  and 
diflike  of  bad  ones,  honour,  fhame,  refentment,  grati- 
tude ;  all  thefe,  confidered  in  themfelves,  and  in  their 
effefts,  do  afford  manifeft  real  inflances  of  virtue,  as 
fuch,  naturally  favoured,  and  of  vice,  as  fuch,  difcoun-- 
tenanced,  more  or  lefs,  in  the  daily  courfe  of  human 
life  ;  in  every  age,  in  every  relation,  in  every  general 
circumftance  of  it.  That  God  has  given  us  a  moral 
nature,^  may  moft  juftly  be  urged  as  a  proof  of  our 
being  Under  his  moral  government  ;  but  that  he  has 
placed  us  in  a  condition,  which  gives  this  nature,  as 
one  may  fpeak,  fcope  to  operate,  and  in  which  it  does- 
unavoidably  operate,  i.  q.  influence  mankind  to  ad:, 
fo  as  thus  to  favour  and  reward  virtue,  and  difcoun- 
tenance  and  punilh  vice^ — this  is  not  the  fame,  but  a 
further  additional  proof  of  his  moral  government,  for 
it  is  an  inftance  of  it.  The  firft  is  a  proof  that  hef 
will  finally  favour  and  fupport  virtue  effedually  ;  the 
fecond  is  an  example  of  his  favouring  and  fupporting 
it  at  prefent,  in  fome  degree. 

If  a  more  diftind:  inquiry  be  made,  whence  it  arifes 
that  virtue,  as  fuch,  is  often  rewarded,  and  vice,  as 

fiichy 

*  See  Dijffrtation  II. 


Chap.  HI.  Government  of  God.  3^9 

fuch,  is  punifhed,  and  this  rule  never  inverted — it 
will  be  found  to  proceed,  in  part,  immediately  from 
the  moral  nature  itfelf,  which  God  has  given  us  ;  and 
alfo,  in  part,  from  his  having  given  us,  together  with 
this  nature,  fo  great  a  pov/er  over  each  other's  happinefs 
and  mifery.  For  JlrJ},  it  is  certain  that  peace  and  de- 
light, in  fome  degree  and  upon  fome  occalions,  is  the 
neceflary  and  prefent  effeft  of  virtuous  pradiice  ;  an 
i^ffecb  arifing  immediately  from  that  conftitution  of 
our  nature.  We  are  fo  made,  that  well  doing,  as 
fuch,  gives  us  fatisfaftion  at  leafl  in  fome  infbances ; 
ill  doing,  as  fuch,  in  none.  And  fecond/y,  from  our 
moral  nature,  joined  with  God's  having  put  our  hap- 
pinefs and  mifery  in  many  refpefts  in  each  other's 
power,  it  cannot  but  be  that  vice,  as  fuch,  fomi 
kinds  and  inftances  of  it  at  leaii,  will  be  infamous, 
and  men  will  be  difpofed  to  punifh  it,  as  in  itfelf  de- 
teftable  ;  and  the  villain  will  by  no  means  be  able  al- 
ways to  avoid  feeling  that  infamy,  any  more  than  he 
will  be  able  to  efcape  this  further  punifh ment,  which 
mankind  v/ill  be  difpofed  to  inflidt  upon  him,  under 
the  notion  of  his  deferving  it.  But  there  can  be  noth- 
ing on  the  iide  of  vice  to  anfwer  this,  becaufe  there  is 
nothing  in  the  human  mind  contradidory,  as  the  lo- 
gicians fpeak,  to  virtue.  For  virtue  confifts  in  a  re- 
gard to  what  is  right  and  reafonable,  as  being  fo  ;  in 
a  regard  to  veracity,  juftice,  charity,  in  themfelves  i 
and  there  is  furely  no  fuch  thing  as  a  like  natural  re- 
gard to  falfehood,  injuftice,  cruelty.  If  it  be  thought 
that  there  are  inftances  of  an  approbation  of  vice,  as 
iuch,  in  itfelf,  and  for  its  own  fake,  (though  it  does 
not  appear  to  me  that  there  is  any  fuch  thing  at  all ; 
but  fuppofing  there  be,)  it  is  evidently  monftrous ;  as 
much  fo  as  the  moft  acknowledged  perverfion  of  any 
paffion  whatever.  Such  inftances  of  perverfion  then 
being  left  out,  as  merely  imaginary,  or,  however,  un- 
natural, it  muft  follow  from  the  frame  of  our  nature, 

and 


no  Of  the  Moral  Part  I, 

and  from  our  condition,  in  the  refpeds  now  defcribed, 
that  vice  cannot  at  all  be,  and  virtue  cannot  but  be 
favoured,  as  fi^ch,  by  others,  upon  fome  occafions,  and 
happy  in  itfelf  in  fome  degree.  For  what  is  here  in- 
filled upon,  is  not  the  degree  in  which  virtue  and  vice 
are  thus  diftinguifhed,  but  only  the  thing  itfelf,  that 
they  are  fo  in  fome  degree,  though  the  vv^hole  good 
and  bad  efFeQ:  of  virtue  and  vice,  as  fuch,  is  not  in- 
confiderable  in  degree.  But  that  they  muft  be  thus 
diflinguiihed  in  fome  degree,  is  in  a  manner  necef- 
fary  j  it  is  matter  of  fad:  of  daily  experience,  even  in  i 
the  greatefl  confufion  of  human  affairs. 

It  is  not  pretended  but  that  in  the  natural  courfe 
of  things,  happinefs  and  raifery  appear  to  be  diftrib- 
uted  by  other  rules  than  only  the  perfonal  merit  and 
demerit  of  charaders.  They  may  fometimes  be  dif- 
tributed  by  way  of  mere  difcipline.  There  may  be 
the  wifeft  and  bed  reafons,  why  the  world  Hiould  be 
governed  by  general  laws,  from  whence  fuch  promif- 
cuous  diftribution  perhaps  mud  follow,  and  alfo  why 
our  happinefs  and  mifery  Ihould  be  put  in  each  other's 
power  in  the  degree  which  they  are.  And  thefe 
things,  as  in  general  they  contribute  to  the  rewarding 
virtue  and  punifliing  vice,  as  fuch,  fo  they  often  con- 
tribute alfo,  not  to  the  inverfion  of  this,  which  is  im- 
poffible,  but  to  the  rendering  perfons  profperous, 
though  wicked  j  afflicted,  though  righteous ;  and, 
which  is  worfe,  to  the  rewarding  fome  a^ions^  though 
vicious,  and  punijhing  other  a£fwns,  though  virtuous. 
But  all  this  cannot  drown  the  voice  of  nature  in  the 
conduct  of  Providence,  plainly  declaring  itfelf  for  vir- 
tue, by  way  of  diftinftion  from  vice,  and  preference  to  ' 
it.  For,  our  being  fo  confdtuted,  as  that  virtue  and 
vice  are  thus  naturally  favoured  and  difcountenanced, 
rewarded  and  punilhed  reipeftively,  as  fuch,  is  an  in- 
tuitive proof  of  the  intent  of  nature  that  it  fhould  be 
fo  J  otherwife  the  conflitution  of  our  mind,  from 

whicl]^ 


Chap.  III.  Govtrnment  of  God.  iii 

tvhich  it  thus  immediately  and  diredly  proceeds,  would 
be  abfurd.  But  it  cannot  be  faid,  becaufe  virtuous 
anions  are  fometimes  puniihed,  and  vicious  adions 
rewarded,  that  nature  intended  it.  For,  though  this 
great  diforder  is  brought  about,  as  all  adtions  are 
done,  by  means  of  fome  natural  pafllon,  yet  this  may 
he,  as  it  undoubtedly  is,  brought  about  by  the  perver- 
fion  of  fuch  paflion,  implanted  in  us  for  other  and 
thofe  very  good  purpofes.  And  indeed  thele  other 
and  good  purpofes,  even  of  every  paffion,  may  be 
clearly  feen. 

We  have  then  a  declaration  in  fome  degree  of  pref- 
ent  effed:,  from  Him.  who  is  fupreme  in  nature,  which 
fide  he  is  of,  or  what  part  he  takes ;  a  declaration  for 
virtue,  and  againft  vice.  So  far  therefore  as  a  man  is 
true  to  virtue,  to  veracity  and  juftiee,  to  equity  and 
charity,  and  the  right  of  the  cafe,  in  whatever  he  is 
concerned,  fo  far  he  is  on  the  fide  of  the  divine  ad- 
miniftration,  and  cooperates  with  it  ;  and  from  hence, 
to  fuch  a  man  arifes  naturally  a  fecret  fatisfadlion  and 
fenfe  of  fecurity,  and  implicit  hope  of  fomewhat  fur- 
ther.    And, 

V.  This  hope  is  confirmed  by  the  neceflary  tenden-' 
cies  of  virtue,  which,  though  not  of  prefent  efFed,  yet 
are  at  prefent  difcernible  in  nature,  and  fo  afford  an 
inftance  of  fomewhat  moral  in  the  effential  conftitu- 
tion  of  it.  There  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  a  ten- 
dency in  virtue  and  vice  to  produce  the  good  and  bad 
efFefts  now  mentioned  in  a  greater  degree  than  they  do 
in  fad:  produce  them.  For  inftance  ;  good  and  bad 
men  would  be  much  more  rewarded  and  puniihed,  as 
fuch,  were  it  not  that  juftice  is  often  artificially  eluded, 
that  characters  are  not  known,  and  many,  who  would 
thus  favour  virtue  and  difcouragc  vice,  are  hindered 
from  doing  fo  by  accidental  caufes.  Thefe  tendencies 
of  virtue  and  vice  are  obvious  with  regard  to  individ' 
uals.     But  it  may   require  more  particularly  to  be 

confidered^ 


JI2  Of  tie  Moral  Part  I, 

confidered,  that  power  is  ^ifonety,  by  being  under  the 
direftion  of  virtue,  naturally  increafes,  and  has  a  nee- 
eflary  tendency  to  prevail  over  oppoiite  power,  not  un-^ 
der  the  dired.ion  of  it  ;  in  like  manner  as  power,  by 
being  under  the  diredion  of  reafon,  increafes,  and  has 
a  tendency  to  prevail  over  brute .  force.  There  are 
feveral  brute  creatures  of  equal,  and  feveral  of  fuperior 
flrength,  to  that  of  men,  and  poffibly  the  fum  of  the 
whole  flrength  of  brutes  may  be  greater  than  that  of 
mankind  ;  but  reafon  gives  us  the  advantage  and  fu- 
periority  over  them,  and  thus  man  is  the  acknowledg- 
ed governing  animal  upon  the  earth.  Nor  is  this  iu- 
periority  confidered  by  any  as  accidental,  but  as  what 
reafon  has  a  tendency,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  to 
obtain.  And  yet  perhaps  difficulties  may  be  raifed 
about  the  meaning  as  well  as  the  truth  of  the  affertion, 
that  virtue  has  the  like  tendency. 

To  obviate  thefe  difficulties,  let  us  fee  more  diftind^ 
ly  how  the  cafe  ftands  with  regard  to  reafon,  which 
is  fo  readily  acknowledged  to  have  this  advantageous 
tendency.  Suppofe  then  two  or  three  men,  of  the 
beft  and  moft  improved  underftanding,  in  a  defolate 
open  plain,  attacked  by  ten  times  the  number  of  beafts 
of  prey — would  their  reafon  fecure  them  the  viftory 
in  this  unequal  con^bat  ?  Power  then,  though  join- 
ed with  reafon,  and  under  its  direftion,  cannot  bo 
expefted  to  prevail  over  oppofite  power,  though  mere- 
ly brutal,  unlefs  the  one  bears  fome  proportion  to  the 
other.  Again — put  the  imaginary  cafe,  that  rational 
and  irrational  creatures  were  of  like  external  iliape  and 
manner  ;  it  is  certain,  before  there  were  opportunities 
for  the  firft  to  diftinguilh  each  other,  to  feparate  from 
their  adverfaries,  and  to  form  an  union  among  them- 
felves,  they  miglit  be  upon  a  level,  or  in  feveral  re-r 
fpeds  upon  great  difadvantage,  though  united  they 
might  be  vaftly  fuperior  ;  fince  union  is  of  fuch  effi- 
cacy, that  ten  men,  united,  might  be  able  to  accom- 

plilh 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God,  113 

plifh  what  ten  thoufand  of  the  fame  natural  flrength 
^nd  underflanding,  wholly  ununited,  could  not.  In 
this  cafe  then,  brute  force  might  more  than  maintain 
its  ground  againtl  reafon,  for  want  of  union  among 
the  rational  creatures.  Or  fuppofe  a  number  of  men 
to  land  upon  an  ifland  inhabited  only  by  wild  beads, 
a  number  of  men,  who,  by  the  regulations  of  civil 
government,  the  inventions  of  art,  and  the  experience 
of  fome  years,  could  they  be  preferved  fo  long,  would 
be  really  fufficient  to  fubdue  the  wild  beads,  and  to 
preferve  themfelves  in  fecurity  from  them  ;  yet  a  con- 
jund:ure  of  accidents  might  give  fuch  advantage  to 
the  irrational  animals,  as  that  they  might  at  once 
overpower,  and  even  extirpate,  the  whole  fpecies  of 
rational  ones,  Length  of  time  then,  proper  fcope  and 
opportunities  for  reafon  to  exert  itfelf,  may  be  abfo-<' 
lutely  neceffary  to  its  prevailing  oyer  brute  force. 
Further  flill — there  are  many  inftances  of  brutes  fuc- 
ceeding  in  attempts  which  they  could  not  have  un-r 
dertaken  had  not  their  irrational  nature  rendered  them 
incapable  of  forefeeing  the  danger  of  fuch  attempts, 
or  the  fury  of  paflion  hindered  their  attending  to  it ; 
and  there  are  inftances  of  reafon  and  real  prudence 
preventing  men's  undertaking  what,  it  hath  appeared 
afterwards,  they  might  have  fucceeded  in  by  a  lucky 
raiiinefs.  And  in  certain  conjunftures,  ignorance 
and  folly,  weaknefs  and  difcord,  may  have  their  ad-r 
vantages.  So  that  rational  animals  have  not  necef- 
farily  the  fuperiority  over  irrational  ones ;  but,  hov>r 
improbable  ibever  it  may  be,  it  is  evidently  poffiblc, 
that,  in  fome  globes,  the  latter  may  be  fuperior. 
And  were  the  former  wholly  at  variance  and  difunit- 
ed,  by  falfe  felf  interefl  and  envy,  by  treachery  ■^nd  in- 
juftice,  and  confequent  rage  and  mahce  againii  each 
other,  whilil  the  latter  were  firmly  united  among 
themfelves  by  inilind,  this  might  greatly  contribute 
to  the  introducing  fuch  an  inverted  order  of  things. 

For 


114  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 

For  every  one  would  conrider  it  as  Inverted,  finee  rea- 
fon  has,  in  the  nature  of  it,  a  tendency  to  prevail  over 
brute  force ;  notwithftanding  the  poflibility  it  may 
not  prevail,  and  the  neceility  which  there  is  of  many 
concurring  circumftances  to  render  it  prevalent. 

Now  I  fay,  virtue  in  a  fociety  has  a  like  tendency 
to  procure  fuperiority  and  additional  power,  whether 
this  power  be  confidered  as  the  means  of  fecurity  from 
oppofite  power,  or  of  obtaining  other  advantages. 
And  it  has  this  tendency,  by  rendering  public  ^ood 
an  objed  and  end  to  every  member  of  the  fociety  j 
by  putting  every  one  upon  coniideration  and  diligence, 
recolledtion  and  felf  government,  both  in  order  to  fee 
what  is  the  moil  effedual  method,  and  alfo  in  order 
to  perform  their  proper  part  for  obtaining  and  pre- 
ferving  it ;  by  uniting  a  fociety  within  itfelf,  and  fo 
increafmg  its  ftrpngth  ;  and,  which  is  particularly  to 
be  mentioned,  unitmg  it  by  means  of  veracity  and  juf- 
tice.  For  as  thefe  laft  are  principal  bonds  of  union, 
fo  benevolence  or  public  fpirit,  undirected,  unreftrain- 
ed  by  them,  is,  nobody  knows  what. 

And  fuppofe  the  invifible  world,  and  the  invifible 
difpeniations  of  Providence,  to  be  in  any  fort  analo- 
gous to  what  appears,  or  that  both  together  make  up 
one  uniform  fcheme,  the  two  parts  of  which,  the  part 
which  we  fee,  and  that  which  is  beyond  our  obferva- 
tion,  are  analogous  to  each  other,  then  there  mufh  be 
a  like  natural  tendency  in  the  derived  power,  through- 
out the  univerfe,  under  the  diredlion  of  virtue,  to  pre- 
vail in  general  over  that  which  is  not  under  its  protec- 
tion, as  there  is  in  reafon,  derived  reafon  in  the  uni- 
verfe, to  prevail  over  brute  force.  But  then,  in  order 
to  the  prevalence  of  virtue,  or  that  it  may  aftually  pro- 
duce what  it  has  a  tendency  to  produce,  the  like  concur- 
rences are  neceflary  as  are  to  the  prevalence  of  reafon. 
There  mufl  be  fome  proportion  between  the  natural 
power  or  force  which  is,  and  that  which  is  not,  under 

the 


.Chap.  III.  Government  of  God.  115 

the  diredion  of  virtue ;  -there  mufl  be  fufficient  -length 
of  time  ;  for  the  complete  fuccefs  of  virtue,  as  of  rea- 
fon,  cannot,  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be  other- 
wile  than  gradual ;  there  muft  be,  as  one  may  fpeak, 
a  fair  field  of  trial,  a  ftage  large  and  extenfive  enough, 
proper  occafions  and  opportunities,  for  the  virtuous  to 
join  together  to  exert  themfelves  againft  lawlefs  force, 
and  to  reap  the  fruit  of  their  united  labours.  Now 
indeed  it  is  to  be  hoped,  that  the  difpioportion  be- 
tween the  good  and  bad,  even  here  on  earth,  is  not  fo 
great  but  that  the  former  have  natural  power  fufficient 
to  their  prevailing  to  a  confiderable  degree,  if  circum- 
ftances  would  permit  this  power  to  be  united.  For 
much  lefs,  very  much  lefs  power  under  the  direftion  of 
virtue,  would  prevail  over  much  greater  not  under  the 
diretlion  of  it.  However,  good  men  over  the  face  of 
the  earth  cannot  unite,  as  for  other  rcafons,  fo  becaufe 
they  cannot  be  fufficiently  afcertained  of  each  other's 
charafters.  And  the  known  courfe  of  human  things, 
the  fcene  we  are  now  paffing  thrQugh,  particularly  the 
(hortnefs  of  life,  denies  to  virtue  its  full  fcgpe  in  feve- 
ral  other  refpects.  The  natural  tendency,  which  we 
have  been  confidering,  though  real,  is  hindered  from 
being  carried  into  eifed;  in  the  prefent  ftate  ;  but  thefs 
hindrances  may  be  removed  in  a  future  one.  Virtue, 
to  borrow  the  Chriftian  allufion,  is  militant  here,  and 
various  untoward  accidents  contribute  to  its  being  oft- 
en overborne  j  but  it  may  combat  with  greater  ad- 
vantage hereafter,  and  prevail  completely,  and  enjoy 
its  confequent  rewards  in  fonT.e  future  ftates.  Neg- 
ledted  as  it  is,  perhaps  unknown,  perhaps  defpifed  and 
oppreffed  here,  there  may  be  fcenes  in  eternity  lafting 
enough,  and  in  every  other  way  adapted,  to  afford  it  a 
fufficient  fphere  of  adion,  and  a  fufficient  fphere  for 
the  natural  confequences  of  it  to  follow  in  fad.  If  the 
foul  be  naturally  immortal,  and  this  ifate  be  a  progrefs 
towards  a  future  one,  as  childhood  is  towards  mature 


ii5  Of  the  Moral  Part  L 

age,  good  men  may  naturally  unite,  not  only  amongft 
themfelves,  but  alio  with  other  orders  of  virtuous  crea- 
tures, in  that  future  (late.  For  virtue,  from  the  very 
nature  of  it,  is  a  principle  and  bond  of  union,  in  fome 
degree,  amongf:  all  v/ho  are  endued  with  it,  and 
known  to  each  other ;  fo  as  that  by  it  a  good  man 
cannot  but  recommend  himfelf  to  the  favour  and  pro- 
tedlion  of  all  virtuous  beings,  throughout  the  whole 
univerfe,  who  can  be  acquainted  with  his  charader, 
and  can  any  way  interpofe  in  h'ls  behalf  in  any  part  of 
his  duration.  And  one  might  add,  that  fuppofe  all 
this  advantageous  tendency  of  virtue  to  become  effedl, 
amongft  one  or  more  orders  of  creatures,  in  any  dif- 
tant  fcenes  and  periods,  and  to  be  feen  by  any  orders 
of  vicious  creatures  throughout  the  univerfal  kingdom 
of  God,  this  happy  effedt  of  virtue  would  have  a  ten- 
dency, by  way  of  example,  and  pofiibly  in  other  ways, 
to  amend  thofe  of  them  who  are  capable  of  amend- 
ment, and  being  recovered  to  a  jvift  fenfe  of  virtue. 
If  our  notions  of  the  plan  of  Providence  were  enlarged, 
in  any  fort  proportionably  to  what  late  difcoveries  have 
enlarged  our  views  with  refpeft  to  the  material  world, 
reprefentations  of  this  kind  v/ould  not  appear  abfurd  or 
extravagant.  However,  they  are  not  to  be  taken  as 
intended  for  a  literal  delineation  of  what  is  in  fad  the 
particular  fcheme  of  the  univerfe^  which  cannot  be 
known  without  revelation  ;  for  fuppofitions  are  not  to 
be  looked  on  as  true,  becaufe  not  incredible,  but  they 
are  mentioned  to  Ihew,  that  our  finding  virtue  to  be 
hindered  from  procuring  to  itfelf  fuch  iuperiority  and 
advantages  is  no  objedion  againft  its  having,  in  the 
effential  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency  to  procure 
them.  And  the  fuppofitions  now  mentioned  do  plain- 
ly ihew  this  ;  for  they  fhew  that  thefe  hindrances  are 
fo  far  from  being  necelfary,  that  we  ourfelves  can  eafi- 
ly  conceive  how  they  may  be  removed  in  future  ftates, 
and  full  fcope  be  granted  to  virtue.     And  all  thefe  ad* 

vantageous 


Chap.  til.  Cover nmcnt  of  God.  117 

tantageous  tendencies  of  it  are  to  be  confidered  as  dec- 
larations of  God  in  its  favour.  This,  however,  is  tak- 
ing a  pretty  large  compafs ;  though  it  is  certain  that, 
as  the  material  world  appears  to  be,  in  a  manner, 
boundlefs  and  immenfe,  there  muft  ho.  fame  fcheme  of 
Providence  vaft  in  proportion  to  it. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  earth  our  habitation,  and 
we  fhall  fee  this  happy  tendency  of  virtue,  by  imagin- 
ing an  inftance  not  lb  vaft  and  remote  ;  by  fuppofing 
a  kingdom  or  fociety  of  men  upon  it,  perfectly  virtu- 
ous, for  a  fuccellion  of  many  ages,  to  which,  if  you 
pleafe,  may  be  given  a  fituation  advantageous  for  uni- 
verfal  monarchy.  In  fuch  a  ftate  there  v/ould  be  no 
fuch  thing  as  faction  ;  but  men  of  the  greateft  capac- 
ity would  of  courfe,  all  along,  have  the  chief  dire(^ion 
of  affairs  willingly  yielded  to  them  ;  and  they  would 
fliare  it  among  themfelves  without  envy.  Each  of 
thefe  would  have  the  part  afiigned  him  to  which  his 
genius  was  peculiarly  adapted  ;  and  others,  who  had 
not  any  difhinguifhed  genius,  would  be  fafe,  and  think 
them^feives  very  happy,  by  being  under  the  protection 
and  guidance  of  thofe  who  had.  Public  determina- 
tions would  really  be  the  refult  of  the  united  vv^ifdom 
of  the  community  ;  and  they  would  faithfully  be  exe- 
cuted, by  the  united  ftrength  of  it.  Some  would  in 
a  higher  way  contribute,  but  all  would  in  fome  way 
contribute,  to  the  public  profperity  ;  and  in  it,  each 
would  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  own  virtue.  And  as  in- 
juftice,  whether  by  fraud  or  force,  would  be  unknown 
among  themfelves,  fo  they  would  be  fufficiently  fe- 
cured  from  it  in  their  neighbours ;  for  cunning  and 
falfe  felf  intereft,  confederacies  in  injuftice,  ever  flight, 
and  accompanied  with  faction  and  inteftine  treachery  ; 
thefe  on  one  hand  would  be  found  mere  childiili  folly 
and  weaknefs,  when  fet  in  oppoiidon  againft  wifdom, 
public  fpirit,  union  inviolable,  and  fidelity  en  the 
other  ;  allowing  both  a  fufficient  len2:th  of  vcars  to 

try 


T>  A--n  -»>    ■» 


liS  Of  the  Moral  Part 

try  their  force.  Add  the  general  influence  which  fuch 
a  kingdom  would  have  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  by 
way  of  example  particularly,  and  the  reverence  which 
would  be  paid  it.  It  would  plainly  be  fuperior  to  all 
others,  and  the  world  muft  gradually  come  under  its 
empire  ;  not  by  means  of  lawlefs  violence,  but  partly 
by  what  muft  be  allowed  to  be  juft  conqueft,  and  part- 
ly by  other  kingdoms  fubmitting  themfelves  volun- 
tarily to  it,  throughout  a  €Ourfe  of  ages,  and  claiming 
its  proteftion,  one  after  another,  in  fucceffive  exi- 
gencies. The  head  of  it  would  be  an  univerfal  mon- 
arch, in  another  fenfe  than  any  mortal  has  yet  been  ; 
and  the  eaftern  ftyle  would  be  literally  applicable  to 
him,  that  all  -people^  nations  and  languages  Jlwiild  few* 
Aim.  And  though  indeed  our  knowledge  of  human 
nature,  and  the  whole  hiftory  of  mankind,  fhew  the 
impoffibility,  without  fome  miraculous  interpolition, 
that  a  number  of  men,  here  on  earth,  fhould  unite  iri 
one  fociety  or  government,  in  the  fear  of  God  and  uni- 
verfal praflice  of  virtue  ;  and  that  fuch  a  government 
fhould  continue  fo  united  for  a  fucceflion  of  ages ;  yet 
admitting  or  fuppofmg  this,  the  efFe6t  would  be  as 
now  drawn  out.  And  thus,  for  inftance,  the  wonder- 
ful power  and  profperity  promifed  to  the  Jewifli  na- 
tion in  the  fcripture,  would  be,  in  a  great  meafure,  the 
confequence  of  what  is  predifted  of  them, — that  the 
people  fmdd  be  all  righteous  and  inherit  the  land  for- 
ever^* were  we  to  underftand  the  latter  phrafe  of  a 
long  continuance  only,  fufficient  to  give  things  iirrie 
to  work.  The  predictions  of  this  kind,  for  there  are 
many  of  them,  cannot  come  to  pafs  in  the  prefent 
known  courfe  of  nature  ;  but  fuppofe  them  come  to 
pafs,  and  then  the  dominion  and  preeminence  promif- 
ed muft  naturally  follow,  to  a  very  confiderable  degree. 
Confider  now  the  general  fyftem  of  religion  ;  that 
the  government  of  the  world  is  uniform,  and  one,  and 

moral  i 

*  Ifai.  Ix.  21. 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God.  119 

moral ;  that  virtue  and  right  fhall  finally  have  the  ad* 
vantage,  and  prevail  over  fraud  and  lawlefs  force,  over 
the  deceits  as  well  as  the  violence  of  wickednefs,  un« 
der  the  conduct  of  one  fupreme  Governor  j  and  from, 
the  obfervations  above  made,  it  will  appear,  that  God 
has,  by  our  reafon,  given  us  to  fee  a  peculiar  connex- 
ion in  the  feveral  parts  of  this  fcheme,  and  a  tendency 
towards  the  completion  of  it,  arifing  out  of  the  very 
nature  of  virtue  ;  which  tendency  is  to  be  conlidered 
as  fomewhat  moral  in  the  effential  conftitution  of 
things.  If  any  one  lliould  think  all  this  to  be  of  lit- 
tle importance,  I  defire  him  to  conlider  what  he  would 
think  if  vice  had,  ellentially  and  in  its  nature,  thefe 
advantageous  tendencies  >  or  if  virtue  had  elTentially 
the  dire<5t  contrary  ones. 

But  it  may  be  objected,  that,  notwithftanding  all 
thefe  natural  effefts  and  thefe  natural  tendencies  of 
virtue,  yet  things  may  be  now  going  on  throughout 
the  univerfe,  and  may  go  on  hereafter,  in  the  fame 
mixed  way  sts  here  at  prefent  upon  earth  ;  virtue  fome- 
times  profperous,  fometimes  deprefied  ;  vice  fome-^ 
times  punilhed,  fometimes  fuccefsful.  The  anfwer  to 
which  is,  that  it  is  not  the  purpofe  of  this  chapter,  nor 
of  this  treatife,  properly  to  prove  God's  perfed;  moral 
government  over  the  world,  or  the  truth  of  religion, 
but  to  obferve  what  there  is  in  the  conftitution  and 
courfe  of  nature  to  confirm  the  proper  proof  of  it^ 
fuppofed  to  be  known ;  and  that  the  v/eight  of  the 
foregoing  obfervations  to  this  purpofe  may  be  thus 
diftindly  proved.  Pleafure  and  pain  are,  indeed,  to  a 
certain  degree,  fay  to  a  very  high  degree,  diftributed 
amongft  us  without  any  apparent  regard  to  the  merit 
or  demerit  of  characters.  And  were  there  nothing 
elfe,  concerning  this  matter,  difcernible  in  the  confti- 
tution and  courfe  of  nature,  there  would  be  no  ground 
from  the  conftitution  and  courfe  of  nature,  to  hope  or 
to  fear  that  men  would  be  rewarded  or  punifhed  here- 
after 


IZQ  Of  the  Moral  Part  t 

after  according  to  their  deferts ;  which,  however,  it  is 
to  be  remarked,  imphes  that  even  then  there  would  be 
no  ground  from  appearances  to  think,  that  vice  upon 
the  whole  would  have  the  advantage,  rather  than  that 
virtue  would.  And  thus  the  proof  of  a  future  ftate  of* 
retribution  would  reft  upon  the  ulual  known  argu- 
ments for  it  ;  which  are,  I  think,  plainly  unanfwera- 
ble,  and  would  be  fo,  though  there  were  no  additional 
confirmation  of  them  from  the  things  above  infifted 
on  r  But  thefe  things  are  a  very  ftrong  confirmation 
of  them.     For, 

Firfi,  They  Ihew  that  the  Author  of  nature  is  not 
indifierent  to  virtue  and  vice.  They  amount  to  a 
declaration  from  him,  determinate  and  not  to  be  evad- 
ed, in  favour  of  one,  and  againft  the  other;  fach  a. 
declaration,  as  there  is  nothing  to  be  let  over  againft 
or  aniwer,  on  the  part  of  vice.  So  that  were  a  man, 
laying  afide  the  proper  proof  of  religion,  to  determine 
from  the  courfe  of  nature  only,  whether  it  were  moft 
probable  that  the  righteous  or  the  wicked  would  have 
the  advantage  in  a  future  life,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
but  that  he  would  determine  the  probability  to  be, 
that  the  former  would.  The  courfe  of  nature  then, 
in  the  view  of  it  now  given,  furniflies  us  with  a  real 
practical  proof  of  the  obligations  of  religion. 

Secondly,  When,  conformably  to  what  religion 
teaches  us,  God  fliall  reward  and  punifh  virtue  and 
vice,  as  fuch,  fo  as  that  every  one  Ihall,  upon  the  whole, 
have  his  deferts,  this  diftributive  juftice  will  not  be  a 
thing  different  in  kind,  but  only  in  degree,  from  what 
We  experience  in  his  prefent  government.  It  will  be 
that  in  effe^,  towards  which  we  now  fee  a  tendency^ 
It  will  be  no  more  than  the  completion  of  that  morai 
government,  the  principles  and  beginning  of  which  have 
been  Hiewn,  beyond  all  difputc,  difcernible  in  the  pref- 
fent  conftitution  and  courfe  of  nature.  And  from 
hence  it  follows. 

Thirdly^ 


CptAP.  III.  Gevernment  of  Qod.  12 1 

Thirdly y  That  as  under  the  natural  government  of 
God,  our  experience  of  thofe  kinds  and  degrees  of 
happinefs  and  mifery  which  we  do  experience  at  pref- 
ent,  gives  jufl  ground  to  hope  for  and  to  fear  higher 
degrees  and  other  kinds  of  both  in  a  future  Hate,  fup- 
pofing  a  future  flate  admitted,  io  under  his  moral 
government,  our  experience,  that  virtue  and  vice  are, 
in  the  manners  above  mentioned,  actually  rewarded 
and  punilhed  at  prefent,  in  a  certain  degree,  gives  jufh 
ground  to  hope  and  to  fear  that  they  7yiay  be  rewarded 
and  puniilied  in  an  higher  degree  hereafter.  It  is  ac- 
knowledged indeed  that  this  alone  is  not  fufficient 
ground  to  think  that  they  (i5itially  will  be  rewarded 
and  punifhed  in  a  higher  degree,  rather  than  in  a  low- 
er ;  but  then, 

Lafilyy  There  is  fufficient  ground  to  think  fo,  from 
ihe  good  and  bad  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice.  For 
thefe  tendencies  are  eifential,  and  founded  in  the  na- 
ture of  things,  whereas  the  hindrances  to  their  becom- 
ing effecl,  are,  in  numberlefs  cafes,  not  neceffary,  but 
artificial  only.  Now  it  may  be  much  more  flrongly 
argued,  that  thefe  tendencies,  as  well  as  the  adlual  re- 
wards and  punilhments  of  virt\ie  and  vice,  which  arile 
diredtiy  out  of  the  nature  of  things,  will  remain  here- 
after, than  that  the  accidental  hindrances  of  them 
will.  And  if  thefe  hindrances  do  not  remain,  thofe 
rewards  and  punifliments  cannot  but  be  carried  on 
much  further  towards  the  perfection  of  moral  govern- 
jnent,  i.  e.  the  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice  will  be- 
come effed  ;  but  when,  or  where,  or  in  v^rhat  particu- 
lar way,  cannot  be  known  at  all,  but  by  revelation. 

Upon  the  whole,  there  is  a  kind  of  moral  govern- 
ment implied  in  God's  natural  government ;  *  virtue 
and  vice  are  naturally  rewarded  and  puniihed  as  ben- 
eficial and  mifchievous  to  fociety,-!-  and  rewarded  and 
puniilied  directly  as  virtue  and  vice.  \     The  notion 

I  then 

''  p.  to;.  i  P.  loj.  +  P,  ip4,  &c. 


122         Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God.       P  A  Ff  t  L 

then  of  a  moral  fcheme  of  government  is  not  fi(^itlous 
but  natural,  for  it  is  fuggefted  to  our  thoughts  b)^  the 
eonflitution  and  eourfe  of  nature  ;  and  the  execution 
of  this  fcheme  is  adlually  begun,  in  the  inftances  here 
mentioned.'  And  thefe  things  are  to  be  confidered  as 
a  declaration  of  the  Author  of  nature  for  virtue  and 
againft  vice  ;  they  give  a  credibility  to  the  fuppoiition 
of  their  being  rewarded  and  puniflied  hereafter,  and 
alfo  ground  to  hope  and  to  fear  that  they  may  be  re- 
warded and  punifhed  in  higher  degrees  than  they  are 
here.  And  as  all  this  is  confirmed,  fo  the  argument 
for  religion  from  the  eonftitution  and  eourfe  of  nature 
is  carried  on  farther,  by  obferving,  tlmt  there  are  nat* 
ural  tendencies,  and,  in  innumerable  cafes,  only  artifi- 
cial hindrances,  to  this  moral  fcheme^s  being  carried 
on  much  farther  towards  perfedliion  than  it  is  at  pref- 
ent.*  The  notion  then  of  a  moral  fcheme  of  govern-* 
ment  much  more  perfe^b  than  wh-a.4:  is  feen,  is  not  a 
fiftitious  but  a  natural  notion,  for  it-  is  fuggefted  to 
our  thoughts  by  the  eflential  tendencies  of  virtue  and 
vice.  And  thefe  tendencies  are  k)  be  confidered  as  in- 
timations, as  imphcit  promifes  and  threatenings  from 
the  Authod-  of  nature,  of  irtuch  greater  rewards  and 
punifliments  to  follow  virtue  and  vice  than  do  at  pref-* 
ent.  And  indeed,  every  natural  tendency  which  is  to 
continue,  but  which  is  hindered  from  becoming  effeft 
by  only  accidental  caufes,  affords  a  prefumption  that 
fuch  tendency  will,  fome  time  or  other,  become  effe£t  5 
a  prefumption  in  degree  proportionable  to  the  length 
of  the  duration  through  which  fuch  tendency  will  con- 
tinue. And  from  thefe  things  together  arifes  a  real 
prefumption,  that  the  moral  fcheme  of  government 
eilabhfhed  in  nature  fiiall  be  carried  on  much  farther 
towards  perfeftion  hereafter,  and,  I  think,  a  prefump- 
tion that  it  will  be  abfolutely  completed.  But  from 
thefe  things,  joined  with  the  moral  nature  which  God 

has 

*  Pr  III,  he. 


C S  A  P .  I V.  Of  a  State  of  Trial  123 

has  given  us,  confidered  as  given  us  by  him,  arifes  a 
praftical  proof*  that  it  will  be  completed ;  a  proof 
from  fa6t,  and  therefore  a  difbin6t  one  from  that  which 
is  deduced  from  the  eternal  and  unalterable  relations, 
the  fitnefs  and  unfitnefs  of  adions. 


CHAP.     IV. 

X)f  a  State  of  Probation,  as  implving  Trial,  Difficulties 
and  Danger. 

X  HE  general  doftrine  of  religion,  that 
our  prefent  life  is  a  fbate  of  probation  for  a  future  one, 
comprehends  under  it  feveral  particular  things  diflindt 
from  each  other.  But  the  firft  and  moft  common 
meaning  of  it  feems  to  be,  that  our  future  interefb  is 
now  depending,  and  depending  upon  ourfelves  ;  that 
we  have  fcope  and  opportunities  here  for  that  good 
and  bad  behaviour,  which  God  will  reward  and  punilh. 
hereafter  ;  together  with  temptations  to  one,  as  well 
as  inducements  of  reafon  to  the  other.  And  this  is, 
in  great  meafure,  the  fame  with  faying,  that  we  are  un- 
der the  moral  government  of  God,  and  to  give  an  ac- 
count of  our  actions  to  him..  For  the  notion  of  a 
future  account  and  general  righteous  judgment  im- 
plies fome  fort  of  temptations  to  what  is  wrong,  oth- 
erwife  there  would  be  no  moral  poffibility  of  doing 
wrong,  nor  ground  for  judgment  or  difcrimination. 
But  there  is  this  difference,  that  the  word  probation  is 
more  diilinflly  and  particularly  expreffive  of  allure- 
ments to  wrong,  or  difficulties  in  adhering  uniformly 
ro  what  is  right,  and  of  the  danger  of  mifcariying  by 
fuch  temptations,  than  the"  words  moral  government. 

I  2  A  ftate 

*  See  this  proof  drawn  out  briefly,  Ch.  vi. 


124  <y  ^  State  of  TriaL  P  a R  t  I. 

A  ftate  of  probation  then,  as  thus  particularly  imply- 
ing in  it  trial,  difficulties  and  danger,  may  require  to 
be  coniidered  diftinftly  by  itfelf. 

And  as  the  moral:  government  of  God,  which  re- 
ligion teaches  us,  implies  that  we  are  in  a  ftate  of  tri- 
al with  regard  to  a  future  world,  fo  alfo  his  natural 
government  over  us  implies  that  we  are  in  a  ftate  of 
trial  in  the  like  fenfe  with  regard  to  the  prefent  world- 
Natural  government  by  rewards  and  puniftiments  as 
much  implies  natural  trial  as  moral  government  does 
moral  trial.     The  natural  government  of  God  here 
meant,*  confifts  in  his  annexing  pleafure  to  fome  ac- 
tions and  pain  to  others,  which  arc  in  our  power  to 
do  or  forbear,  and  in  giving  us  notice  of  fuch  appoint- 
ment beforehand.     This  necefTirily  implies,  that  he 
has  made  our  happinefs  and  mifery,  or  our  intereft,  to 
depend  in  part  upon  ourfelves.     And  fo  far  as  men- 
have  temptations  to  any  courfe  of  ad:ion  which  wil! 
probably  occalion  them  greater  temporal  inconveni- 
ence and  uneafxiiefs  than  fatisfa£tion,  fo  far  their  tem- 
poral intereft  is  in  danger  from  themfelves,  or  they 
are  in  a  ftate  of  trial  with  refpeft  to  it.     Now  people 
often  blame  others,  and  even  themfelves^  f^r  their  mif- 
condud;  in  their  temporal  concerns.     And  we  find 
many  are  greatly  wanting  to  themfelves,  and  mifs  of 
that  natural  happinefs  which  they  might  have  obtain- 
ed in  the  prefent  life  ;  perhaps  every  one  does  in  fome 
degree.     But  many  run  themfelves  into  great  incon- 
venience, and  into  extreme  diftrefs  and  mifery  ;  not 
through  incapacity  of  knowing  better,  and  doing  bet- 
ter for  themfelves,  which  would  be  nothing  to  the 
prefent  purpofe,  but  through  their  own  fault.     And 
thefe  things  neceffarily  imply  temptation,  and  danger 
of  mifcarrying,  in  a  greater  or  lefs  degree,  with  relpe(ft 
to  our  worldly  intereft  or  happinefs.     Every  one  too, 
without  having  religion  in  his  thoughts,  fpeaks  of  the 

hazards 

*  Ch,  ii. 


Chap.  IV.  Of  a  State  of  Wtah  ii^ 

hazards  which  young  people  run,  upon  their  fetting 
out  in  the  world  j  hazards  from  other  caufes  than 
merely  »their  ignorance  and  unavoidable  accidents. 
And  fome  courfes  of  vice,  at  leaft,  being  contrary  to 
men's  worldly  intereft  or  good,  temptations  to  thefe 
muft  at  the  fame  time  be  temptations  to  forego  our 
prefent  and  our  future  intereft.  Thus  in  our  natural 
or  temporal  capacity  we  are  in  a  flate  of  trial,  i.  e.  of 
^difficulty  and  danger  analogous  or  like  to  our  moral 
and  religious  trial. 

This  will  more  diftin^lly  appear  to  any  one  who 
thinks  it  worth  while  more  diftinftly  to  confider 
what  it  is  which  conftitutes  our  trial  in  both  capaci- 
ties, and  to  obferve  how  mankind  behave  under  it. 

And  that  which  conftitutes  this  our  trial,  in  both 
thefe  capacities,  muft  be  fomewhat  either  in  our  ex- 
ternal circumftances,  or  in  our  nature.  For,  on  the 
one  hand,  perfons  may  be  betrayed  into  wrong  be- 
haviour upon  furprife,  or  overcome  upon  any  other 
very  fingular  and  extraordinary  external  occaiions,  who 
would  otiijerwile  have  preferved  their  charafter  of  pru- 
dence and  of  virtue ;  in  which  cafes,  every  one,  in 
(peaking  of  the  wrong  behaviour  of  thefe  perfons, 
would  impute  it  to  fuch  particular  external  circum- 
ftances :  And  on  the  other  hand,  men  who  have  con- 
tracted habits  of  vice  and  folly  of  any  kind,  or  have 
fome  particular  paffions  in  excefs,  will  feek  opportu- 
nities, and,  as  it  were,  go  out  c^  their  way  to  gratify 
themfelves  in  thefe  refpefts,  at  the  expenfe  of  their 
wifdom  and  their  virtue  ;  led  to  it,  as  every  one  would 
fay,  not  by  external  temptations,  but  by  fuch  habits 
and  paflions.  And  the  account  of  this  laft  cafe  is, 
that  particular  paflions  are  no  more  coincident  with 
prudence,  or  that  reafonable  feif  love,  the  end  of  which 
is  our  worldly  intereft,  than  they  are  with  the  princi- 
ple of  virtue  and  religion,  but  often  draw  contrary 
■ways  to  one  as  well  as  to  the  other  5  and  fo  fuch  par- 
ticular 


126  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  Part  I. 

ticular  paflions  are  as  much  temptations  to  aft  im- 
prudently with  regard  to  our  worldly  intereft,  as  to  aft 
vicioully.*  However,  as  when  we  fay,  men  are  mif- 
led  by  external  circumftances  of  temptation,  it  cannot 
but  be  underflood  that  there  is  fomewhat  within 
themfelves  to  render  thofe  circumftances  temptations, 
or  to  render  them  fufceptible  of  imprefTions  from 
them  ;  fo  when  we  fay,  they  are  mifled  by  paffions, 
it  is  always  fuppofed  that  there  are  occafions,  circum- 
ftances and  objefts,  exciting  thefe  paffions,  and  afford- 
ing means  for  gratifying  them.  And  therefore, 
temptations  from  within  and  from  without  coincide 
and  mutually  imply  each  other.  Now  the  feveral 
external  objefts  of  the  appetites,  paffions  and  affec- 
tions being  prefent  to  the  lenfes,  or  offering  themfelves 
to  the  mind,  and  fo  exciting  emotions  fuitable  to 
their  nature,  not  only  in  cafes  where  they  can  be  grat- 
ified confiftently  with  innocence  and  prudence,  but 
alfo  in  cafes  where  they  cannot,  and  yet  can  be  grati- 
fied imprudently  and  vicioufly  ;  this  as  really  puts 
them  in  danger  of  voluntarily  foregoing  their  prefent 
intereft  or  good  as  their  future,  and  as  really  renders 
felf  denial  as  neceffary  to  fecure  one  as  the  other ;  i.  e. 
■we  are  in  a  like  ftate  of  trial  with  refpeft  to  both,  by 
the  very  fame  paffions,  excited  by  the  very  fame 
means.  Thus  mankind  having  a  temporal  intereft 
depending  upon  themfelves,  and  a  prudent  courfe  of 
behaviour  being  neceffary  to  fecure  it,  paffions  inor- 
dinately excited,  whether  by  means  of  example,  or  by 
any  other  external  circumftance,  towards  flich  objefts, 
at  liTch  times,  or  in  fuch  degrees,  as  that  they  cannot 
be  gratified  confiftently  with  worldly  prudence,  are 
temptations,  dangerous  and  too  often  fuccefsful  temp- 
tations, to  forego  a  greater  temporal  good  for  a  lefs ; 
i.  e.  to  forego  what  is,  upon  the  whole,  our  temporal 

intereft, 

*  See  Sermons  preached  at  the  Ro/is,  1716.  zd.  Ed.  p.  205,  &c.    Pref.  p. 
25,  (sfc,    Serm.  p.  21,  ^c 


Crr  A  p .  I V .  Of  a  State'  of  Trial.  iij 

intereft,  for  the  fake  of  a  prefent  gratification.  This 
is  a  defcription  of  our  ftate  of  trial  in  our  temporal  ea-> 
pacity.  Subftitute  now  the  \NOxd  futitre  for  temporal, 
and  virtue  for  prudence^  and  it  will  be  juft  as  proper  a 
defcription  of  our  ftate  of  trial  in  our  religious  capac- 
ity ;  fo  analogous  are  they  to  each  other. 

If,  fi'om  confideration  of  this  our  like  ftate  of  trial' 
m  both  capacities,  we  go  on  to  obferve  farther  how 
mankind  behave  under  it,  we  fliall  find  there  are  fome 
•who  have  fo  little  fenfe  of  it  that  they  fcarce  look  be- 
yond the  pafiing  day  ;  they  are  fo  taken  up  with  pref- 
ent gratifications  as  to  have^  in  a  manner,  no  feeling 
of  confequences,  no  regard  to  their  future  eafe  or  for- 
tune in  this  life,  any  more  than  to  their  happinefs  in 
another.  Some  appear  to  be  blinded  and  deceived  by 
inordinate  pafTion  in  their  worldly  concerns  as  much 
as  in  religion.  Others  are  not  deceived,  but  as  it  were 
forcibly  carried  away  by  the  like  pafTions,  againft  their 
better  judgment  and  feeble  refolutions  too  of  a^iing 
better.  And  there  are  men,  and  truly  they  are  not  a 
few,  who  lliamelefsly  avow,  not  their  intereft,  but  their 
mere  will  and  pleafure,  to  be  tlieir  law  of  life,  and  who, 
in  open  defiance  of  every  thing  that  is  reafonable,  will 
go  on  in  a  courfe  of  vicious  extravagance,  forefeeing, 
with  no  remorfe  and  fittle  fear,  that  it  will  be  their 
temporal  ruin,  and  fome  of  them  under  the  apprehen- 
fion  of  the  conlequences  of  wickednefs  in  another 
ftate.  And  to  fpeak  in  the  moft  moderate  way,  hur 
man  creatures  are  not  only  continually  liable  to  go 
wrong  voluntarily,  but  we  (ee  hkewife  that  they  often 
adtually  do  fo,  with  refped  to  their  temporal  interefts 
as  well  as  with  refpeft  to  religion. 

Thus  our  difiiculties  and  dangers,  or  our  trials,  in 
our  temporal  and  our  religious  capacity,  as  they  pro- 
ceed from  the  fame  caufes,  and  have  the  fame  effeft 
upon  men's  behaviour,  are  evidently  analogous  and' 
of  the  fame  kind, 

It 


128  Of  a  State  of  TriaL  P  ar  t  I. 

It  may  be  added,  that  as  the  difficulties  and  dangers 
of  mifcarrying  in  our  rehgious  ftate  of  trial  are  greatly 
increaied,  and  one  is  ready  to  think  in  a  manner  wholly 
made^  by  the  ill  behaviour  of  others ;  by  a  wrong  edu- 
cation, wrong  in  a  moral  fenfe,  fometimes  pofitively 
vicious ;  by  general  bad  example ;  by  the  difhoneft 
artifices  which  are  got  into  bufmefs  of  all  kinds  ;  and, 
in  very  many  parts  of  the  world,  by  religion's  being 
corrupted  into  fuperftitions,  which  indulge  men  in 
their  vices  ;  fo  in  like  manner,  the  difficulties  of  con- 
ducing ourfelves  prudently  in  refpedt  to  our  prefent 
intereft,  and  our  danger  of  being  led  afide  from  purfu- 
ing  it,  are  greatly  increafed  by  a  foolifli  education ; 
and,  after  we  come  to  mature  age,  by  the  extravagance 
and  careleflhefs  of  others  whom  we  have  intercourfe 
with,  and  by  miftaken  notions,  very  generally  preva- 
knt,  and  taken  up  from  common  opinion,  concerning 
temporal  happinefs,  and  wherein  it  confifls.  And  per- 
fons,  by  their  own  negligence  and  folly  in  their  tem- 
poral affairs,  no  lefs  than  by  a  courfe  of  vice,  bring 
themfelves  into  new  difficulties,  and,  by  habits  of  in- 
dulgence, become  lefs  qualified  to  go  through  them  ; 
and  one  irregularity  after  another  embarralTes  things 
to  fuch  a  degree,  that  they  know  not  whereabout 
they  are,  and  often  makes  the  path  of  condud  fo  in- 
tricate and  perplexed,  that  it  is  difficult  to  trace  it 
out,  difficult  even  to  determine  what  is  the  prudent 
or  the  moral  part.  Thus,  for  inftance,  wrong  beha- 
viour in  one  ftage  of  life,  youth ;  wrong,  I  mean,  con- 
fidering  ourfelves  only  in  our  temporal  capacity,  with- 
out taking  in  religion  ;  this,  in  feveral  ways,  increafes 
the  difficulties  of  right  behaviour  in  mature  age  ;  i.  e. 
puts  us  into  a  more  difadvantageous  {late  of  trial  in 
our  temporal  capacity. 

We  are  an  inferior  part  of  the  creation  of  God. 
There  are  natural  appearances  of  our  being  in  a  ftate 
of  degradation.     And  we  certainly  arc  in  a  condition, 

which 


Chap.  IV.  Of  a  State  of  TdaL  12.9 

which  does  not  feem,  by  any  means,  the  mod  advanta- 
geous we  could  imagine  or  deiire,  either  in  our  natural 
or  moral  capacity,  for  fecuring  either  our  prefent  or 
future  intereft.  However,  this  condition,  low  and 
careful  and  uncertain  as  it  is,  does  not  atford  any  jufi 
ground  of  complaint.  For,  as  men  may  manage  their 
temporal  affairs  with  prudence,  and  fo  pafs  their  days 
here  on  earth  in  tolerable  eafe  and  fatisfacftiun,  by  a 
moderate  degree  of  care,  fo  likewife  with  regard  to  re- 
ligion, there  is  no  more  required  than  what  they  are 
well  able  to  do,  and  what  they  muft  be  greatly  want- 
ing to  themfeives  if  they  negleft.  And  for  perlbns 
to  have  that  put  upon  them  which  they  are  well  able 
to  go  through,  and  no  more,  we  naturally  coniidcr  as 
an  equitable  thing,  fuppofmg  it  done  by  proper  au- 
thority. Nor  have  we  any  more  reafon  to  complain 
of  it,  with  regard  to  the  Author  of  nature,  than  of 
his  not  having  given  us  other  advantages,  belonging 
to  other  orders  of  creatures. 

But  the  thing  here  infifled  upon  is,  that  the  (late  of 
trial,  which  religion  teaches  us  we  are  in,  is  rendered 
credible  by  its  being  throughout  uniform  and  of  a 
piece  with  the  general  conduct  of  Providence  towards 
us,  in  all  other  refpevls  within  the  compafs  of  our 
knowledge.  Indeed  if  mankind,  confidered  in  their 
natural  capacity,  as  inhabitants  of  this  world  only, 
found  themfeives,  from  their  birth  to  their  death,  in  a 
fettled  flate  of  fecurity  and  happinefs,  without  any  fo^ 
licitude  or  thought  of  their  ovv^n  ;  or  if  they  were  in 
no  danger  of  being  brought  into  inconveniences  and 
difhrefs,  by  careleffnefs,  or  the  folly  of  pafTion,  through 
bad  example,  the  treachery  of  others,  or  the  deceitful 
appearances  of  things  j  were  this  our  natural  condi- 
tion, then  it  might  feem  ftrange,  and  be  fome  pre- 
fumption  againfl  the  truth  of  religion,  that  it  repre- 
ients  our  future  and  more  general  interef!:,  as  not  ie- 
cure  -of  GovKifej  biU  as  -depending  upon  our  behaviour, 

and 


l-jo  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  Part  I. 

and  requiring  recolledion  and  felf  government  to  ob- 
tain it.  For  it  might  be  alleged,  "  What  you  fay  is 
our  condition  in  one  reipedl  is  not  in  any  wife  of  a  fort 
with  what  we  find,  by  experience,  our  condition  is  in 
another.  Our  whole  preient  intereft  is  fecured  to  our 
hands,  without  any  folicitude  of  ours  ;  and  why  fliould 
not  our  future  intereft,  if  we  have  any  fuch,  be  fo 
too  ?"  But  iince,  on  the  contrary,  thought  and  con- 
fideration,  the  voluntary  denying  ourfelves  many 
things  which  we  defire,  and  a  courfe  of  behaviour  far 
from  being  always  agreeable  to  us,  are  abfolutely  nec- 
elTary  to  our  adling  even  a  common  decent  and  com- 
mon prudent  part,  fo  as  to  pafs  with  any  fatisfadiion 
through  the  prefent  world,  and  be  received  upon  any 
tolerable  good  terms  in  it ;  Iince  this  is  the  cafe,  all 
prefumption  againft  felf  denial  and  attention  being 
neceffary  to  fecure  our  higher  intereft,  is  removed. 
Had  we  not  experience,  it  might,  perhaps  fpecioufly, 
be  urged,  that  it  is  improbable  any  kind  of  hazard 
and  danger  fhould  be  put  upon  us  by  an  infinite  Be- 
ing, when  every  thing  which  is  hazard  and  danger  in 
our  manner  of  conception,  and  will  end  in  error,  con- 
fufion  and  mifery,  is  now  already  certain  in  his  fore- 
knovv'ledge.  And  indeed,  why  any  thing  of  hazard 
and  danger  fliould  be  put  upon  fuch  frail  creatures  as 
we  are,  may  well  be  thought  a  difficulty  in  fpecula- 
tion,  and  cannot  but  be  fo  till  we  know  the  whole,  or, 
however,  much  more  of  the  cafe.  But  ftill  the  con- 
ftitution  of  nature  is  as  it  is.  Our  happinefs  and  mif- 
ery are  trufted  to  our  condu£t,  and  made  to  depend 
upon  it.  Somewhat,  and  in  many  circumftances  a 
great  deal  too,  is  put  upon  us,  either  to  do  or  to  fuf- 
ter,  as  we  choofe.  And  all  the  various  miferies  of  life 
which  people  bring  upon  themfelves  by  negligence 
and  folly,  and  might  have  avoided  by  proper  care,  are 
inftances  of  this ;  which  miferies  are  beforehand  juft 
as  contingent  and  undetermined  as  their  cojiduft,  and 
left  to  be  determined  by  it.  Thefe 


'/ 


C  H  A  P .  V .       Of  a  State  of  Moral  Difclpline.  1 3  t 

Thefe  obfervations  are  an  anfwer  to  the  objections 
ag;ainft  the  credibihty  of  a  flate  of  trial,  as  implying 
temptations,  and  real  danger  of  mifcarrying  with  re- 
gard to  our  general  intereft,  under  the  moral  govern-: 
ment  of  God  ;  and  they  fhew  that,  if  we  are  at  all  to 
be  confidered  in  fuch  a  capacity,  and  as  having  fuck 
an  intereft,  the  general  analogy  of  Providence  muft 
lead  us  to  apprehend  ourielves  in  danger  of  mifcarry- 
ing, in  different  degrees,  as  to  this  intereft,  by  our 
neglecting  to  adt  the  proper  part  belonging  to  us  in 
that  capacity.  F^or  we  have  a  prefent  intereft,  under 
the  government  of  God  which  we  experience  here  upon 
earth.  And  this  intereft,  as  it  is  not  forced  upon  us,- 
fo  neither  is  it  offered  to  our  acceptance,  but  to  our 
acquifition,  in  fuch  fort  as  that  we  are  in  danger  of 
miffing  it,  by  means  of  temptations  to  negled:,  or 
a6t  contrary  to  it ;  and  without  attention  and  felf 
denial  muft  and  do  mifs  of  it.  It  is  then  perfectly 
credible  that  this  may  be  our  cafe,  with  refpedt  to  that 
chief  and  final  good  which  religion  propofes  to  us. 

C  H   A  P.     V. 

Of  a  State  of  Probation^  as  intended  for  Moral  Dfci- 
pline  and  Improvement. 

JCROM  the  conlideration  of  our  being 
in  a  probation  ftate,  of  fo  much  difficulty  and  hazard, 
naturally  arifes  the  queftion,  how  we  came  to  be  placed 
in  it.  But  fuch  a  general  inquiry  as  this  would  be 
found  involved  in  inluperable  difficulties.  For  though 
fome  of  thefe  difficulties  would  be  leffened,  by  obferv- 
ing  that  all  wickednefs  is  voluntary,  as  is  implied  in 
its  very  notion,  and  that  many  of  the  miferies  of  life 

have 


ij?  Of  a  State  of  Part  L 

have  apparent  good  eflTeds,  yet  when  we  confider  other 
circumftanc€s  belonging  to  both,  and  what  muft  be 
thfe  confequence  of  the  former  in  a  life  to  come,  it 
cannot  but  be  acknowledged  plain  folly  and  prefump- 
tion  to  pretend  to  give  an  account  of  the  whole  realbns 
of  this  matter  j  the  whole  reafons  of  our  being  allot- 
ted a  condition,  out  of  which  fo  much  wickednefs  and' 
mifery,  fo  circumftanced,  would  in  fad  arife.  Wheth- 
er it  be  not  beyond  our  faculties,  not  only  to  find  out, 
but  even  to  underiland,  the  whole  account  of  this ;  or, 
though  we  fhould  be  fuppofed  capable  of  underfland-' 
ing  it,  yet,  whether  it  would  be  of  fervice  or  prejudice 
to  us  to  be  informed  of  it,  is  impoffible  to  fay.  But 
as  our  prefent  condition  can  in  no  wife  be  (hewn  in- 
confiftent  with  the  peifed:  moral  government  of  God, 
fo  religion  teaches  us  we  were  placed  in  it  that  we 
might  qualify  ourfelves,  by  the  praftice  of  virtue,  for 
another  flate  v/hich  is  to  follow  it.  And  this,  though 
but  a  partial  anfwer,  a  very  partial  one  indeed,  to  the 
inquiry  now  mentioned,  yet  is  a  more  fatisfaftory  an- 
fwer to  another,  which  is  of  real,  and  of  the  utmofl 
importance  to  us  to  have  aniwered, — the  inquiry. 
What  is  our  bufinefs  here  ?  The  known  end,  then, 
why  we  are  placed  in  a  ftate  of  fo  much  affliftion, 
hazard  and  difficulty,  is,  our  improvement  in  virtue 
and  piety,  as  the  requifite  qualification  for  a  future 
llate  of  fecurity  and  happinefs. 

Now  the  beginning  of  life,  confidered  as  an  educa- 
tion for  mature  age  in  the  prefent  world,  appears  plain- 
Jy,  at  firfl  fight,  analogous  to  this  our  trial  for  a  future 
one  ;  the  former  being  in  our  temporal  capacity,  what 
the  latter  is  in  our  religious  capacity.  But  fome  ob- 
servations common  to  both  of  them,  and  a  more  dif- 
tinct  confideration  of  each,  v/ili  more  diftin6tiy  lliew 
the  extent  and  force  of  the  analogy  between  them,  and 
the  credibility  which  arifes  from  hence,  as  well  as  fr^m 

the 


CiiAP.  V.  Mcrai  DifcipKne.  133 

the  nature  of  tlie  thing,  that  the  prefent  life  was  in- 
tended to  be  a  ftate  of  difcipline  for  a  future  one. 

I.  Every  ipecies  of  creatures  is,  we  i'ee,  deligned  for 
a  particular  way  of  life  ;  to  V\rhich  the  nature,  the  ca- 
pacities, temper,  and  quahfications  of  each  fpecies,  are 
as  neceffary  as  their  external  circumftjmces.  Both 
come  into  the  notion  of  fuch  ftate,  or  particular  way 
of  hfe,  and  are  conilituent  parts  of  it.  Change  a 
man's  capacities  or  charafter,  to  the  degree  in  which 
it  is  conceivable  they  may  be  changed,  and  he  would 
be  altogether  incapable  of  a  human  courfe  of  life,  and 
human  happinefs  ;  as  incapable  as  if,  his  nature  con- 
tinuing unchanged,  he  were  placed  in  a  v/orid  where 
he  had  no  fphere  of  aftion,  nor  any  obje^s  to  anfwer 
his  appetites,  paftions,  and  aifections  of  any  fort.  One 
thing  is  fet  over  againfl  another,  as  an  ancient  writer 
expreffes  it.  Our  nature  correfponds  to  our  external 
condition  :  Without  this  correfpondence,  there  would 
be  no  poflibility  of  any  fuch  thing  as  human  life  and 
human  happinefs ;  which  life  and  happinefs  are,  there- 
fore, ^  refult  from  our  nature  and  condition  jointly; 
meaning  by  human  life,  not  living  in  the  literal  fenfe, 
but  the  whole  complex  notion  commonly  underftood 
by  thofe  words.  So  that  without  determining  what 
will  be  the  employraent  and  happinefs,  the  particular 
hfe  of  good  men  hereafter,  there  muft  be  fome  deter- 
minate capacities,  fome  neceffary  charafter  and  qual- 
ifications, without  which  perfons  cannot  but  be  utterly 
incapable  of  it ;  in  like  manner  as  there  muft  be  fome, 
without  which  men  would  be  incapable  of  their  pref- 
ent ftate  of  life.     Now, 

II.  The  conftitution  .of  hum.an  creatures,  and  in- 
deed of  all  creatures  which  come  under  our  notice,  is 
fuch,  as  that  they  are  capable  of  naturally  becoming- 
qualified  for  ftates  of  life,  for  which  they  were  once 
v/holly  uhqualified.  In  imagination  we  may  indeed 
conceive  of  creatures  as  incapable  of  having  any  of 

their 


134  ■  Q/"  ^  ^^"f^  of  Part  I. 

their  faculties  naturally  enlarged,  or  as  being  unable 
naturally  to  acquire  any  new  qualifications  j  but  the 
'faculties  of  every  fpecies  known  to  us  are  made  for 
enlargement,  for  acquirements  of  experience  and  hab* 
■its.  We  find  ourfelves  in  particular  endued  with  ca- 
pacities, not  only  of  perceiving  ideas,  and  of  knowl- 
edge or  perceiving  truth,  but  alfo  of  floring  up  our 
ideas  and  knowledge  by  memory*  We  are  capable, 
not  only  of  afting,  and  of  having  different  momentary 
imprelTions  made  upon  us,  but  of  getting  a  new  fa- 
cihty  in  any  kind  of  action,  and  of  fettled  alterations 
in  our  temper  or  charadler.  The  power  of  the  two 
;laft  is  the  power  of  habits  ;  but  neither  the  percep- 
•tion  of  ideas,  nor  knowledge  of  any  fort,  are  habits, 
though  abfolutely  necelTary  to  the  forming  of  them. 
However,  apprehenfion,  reafon,  memory,  which  are 
the  capacities  of  acquiring  knowledge,  are  greatly  im- 
proved by  exercife.  Whether  the  word  kabii  is  ap- 
plicable to  all  thefe  improvements,  and  in  particular 
Low  far  the  powers  of  memory  and  of  habits  may  be 
powers  of  the  fame  nature,  I  fliall  not  inquire.  But 
that  perceptions  come  into  our  minds  readily  and  of 
courfe,  by  means  of  their  having  been  there  before, 
feems  a  thing  of  the  fame  fort  as  readinefs  in  any  par- 
ticular kind  of  adlion,  proceeding  from  being  accuf- 
tomed  to  it.  And  aptnefs  to  recoiled  pradical  ob- 
fervations  of  fervice  in  our  conduft,  is  plainly  habit  in 
many  cafes.  There  are  habits  of  perception,  and  hab- 
its of  adion.  An  inflance  of  the  former  is  our  con- 
ftant  and  even  involuntarily  readinefs,  in  correfting 
the  imprefTions  of  our  fight  concerning  magnitudes 
and  diftances,  fo  as  to  fubftitute  judgment  in  the  room 
of  fenfation  imperceptibly  to  ourfelves.  And  it  feems 
as  if  all  other  alTociations  of  ideas  not  naturally  con- 
neded,  might  be  called  pafTive  habits,  as  properly  as 
our  readinefs  in  underftanding  languages  upon  fight, 
or  hearing  of  words.     And  our  readinefs  in  fpeaking 

and 


Chap.  V.  Moral  D if cipline.  135 

and  writing  tliem  is  an  inftance  of  the  latter,  of  a6bive 
habits.  For  diftindnefs,  we  may  confider  habits  as 
belonging  to  the  body  or  the  mind  ;  and  the  latter 
will  be  explained  by  the  former.  Under  the  former 
are  comprehended  all  bodily  activities  or  motions, 
whether  graceful  or  unbecoming,  which  are  owing  to 
ule  ;  under  the  latter,  general  habits  of  life  and  con- 
duct, fuch  as  thcrfe  of  obedience  and  fubmiffion  to  au- 
thority, or  to  any  particular  perfon  ;  thofe  of  veracit}'^, 
juftice  and  charity  ;  thofe  of  attention,  induftrV,  felf 
government,  envy,  revenge.^  And  habits  of  this  latter 
kind  feem  produced  by  repeated  a6^s,  as  well  as  the 
former.  And  in  like  manner  as  habits  belonging  tc* 
the  body  are  produced  by  external  a6i:s,  fo  habits  of 
the  mind  are  produced  by  the  exertion  of  inward 
practical  principles,  i.  e.  by  carrying  them  into  a£l,  or 
acting  upon  them  j  the  principles  of  obedience,  of  ve- 
racity, juftice  and  charity.  Nor  can  thofe  habits  be 
formed  by  any  external  courfe  of  a6tion,  othervvife 
than  as  it  proceeds  from  thefe  principles  ;  becaufe  it  is 
only  thefe  inward  principles  exerted,  which  are  ftridly 
adls  of  obedience,  of  veracity,  of  juftice,  and  of  charity. 
So  likewife  habits  of  attention,  induftry,  felf  govern- 
ment, are  in  the  fame  manner  acquired  by  exereife  ; 
and  habits  of  envy  and  revenge  by  indulgence,  whether 
in  outward  aft,  or  in  thought  and  intention,  i.  e.  in- 
ward aft  ;  for  fuch  intention  is  an  aft.  Refolutions 
alio  to  do  well,  are  properly  afts.  And  endeavouring 
to  enforce  upon  our  own  minds  a  practical  fenfe  of 
virtue,  or  to  beget  in  others  that  praftical  fenfe  of  it 
which  a  man  really  has  himfelf,  is  a  virtuous  aft.  All 
thefe,  therefore,  may  and  will  contribute  towards 
forming  good  habits.  But  going  over  the  theory  of 
virtue  in  one's  thoughts,  talking  well,  and  drawing  fine 
piftures  of  it, — this  is  fo  far  from  neceffarily  or  cer- 
tainly conducing  to  form  an  habit  of  it,  in  him  who 
thus  employs  himfelf,  that  it  may  harden  the  mind  ia 

a  contrary 


ijo  Of  a  State  of  T^art  L 

a  contrary  courle,  and  render  it  gradually  more  inlen- 
fible,  i.  c.  form  an  habit  of  infenfibility  to  all  moral 
confiderations.  For,  from  om:  very  faculty  of  habits, 
pafTive  irapreilions,  by  being  repeated,  grow  weaker^ 
Thoughts,  by  often  palling  through  the  mind,  are  felt 
lefs  fenfibly  ;  being  accuftomed  to  danger  begets  in- 
trepidity, i.  e.  leffens  fear  ;  to  diftrefs,  leffens  the  paf- 
lion  of  pity  ;  to  inftances  of  others'  mortality,  leffen^ 
the  fenfible  apprehenfion  of  our  own.  And  from 
thefe  two  obfervations  together, — that  practical  habits 
are  formed  and  ftrengthened  by  repeated  a6\:s,  and  that 
paffive  impreffions  grow  weaker  by  being  repeated  up- 
on us, — it  mufl  follow,  that  aftive  habits  may  be 
gradually  forming  and  ftrengthening,  by  a  courfe  of 
acting  upon  fuch  and  fuch  motives  and  excitements, 
Vvhilil  thefe  motives  and  excitements  themfelves  are, 
by  proportionable  degrees,  growing  kfs  fenfible,  i.  e. 
are  continually  lefs  and  lefs  fenfibly  felt,  even  as  the 
adbive  habits  flrengthen.  And  experience  confirms 
this  ;  for  a<5tive  principles,  at  the  very  time  that  they 
are  lefs  lively  in  perception  than  they  were,  are  found 
to  be,  feme  how,  wrought  more  thoroughly  into  the 
temper  and  character,  and  become  more  efFedtual  in 
influencing  our  praftice.  The  three  things  juft  men- 
tioned, may  afford  inftances  of  it.  Perception  of  dan- 
ger is  a  natural  excitement  of  paflive  fear,  and  aSive 
caution  ;  and  by  being  inured  to  danger,  habits  of  the 
latter  are  gradually  wrought,  at  the  fame  time  that 
the  former  gradually  lefiens.  Perception  of  diflrefs  in 
others  is  a  natural  excitem.ent,  pafiively  to  pity,  and 
actively  to  relieve  it ;  but  let  a  man  fet  himfelf  to  at- 
tend to,  inquire  out,  and  relieve  diftrelTed  perlbns,  and 
he  cannot  but  grow  lefs  and  lefs  fenfibly  affedted  with 
the  various  miferies  of  life  with  which  he  muft  become 
acquainted,  when  yet  at  the  fame  time  benevolence, 
confidered  not  as  a  pafTion,  but  as  a  praftical  principle 
of  action,  will  Ibengthen ;  and  whiiil  he  pafTively  com- 

pafTionates 


ChAP.V.  Moral  D if cipline.  23 7 

paffionates  the  diftreffed  lefs,  he  will  acquire  a  greater 
aptitude  adlively  to  affifl  and  befriend  them.  So  aUb 
at  the  fame  time  that  the  daily  inflances  of  men's  dy- 
ing around  us  give  us  daily  a  lefs  fenfible  paffive  feel- 
ing or  apprehenfion  of  our  own  mortality,  fuch  in- 
ftances  greatly  contribute  to  the  ftrengthening  a  prac- 
tical regard  to  it  in  ferious  men,  i.  e.  to  forming  an 
habit  of  acting  with  a  conftant  view  to  it.  And  this 
feems  again  farther  to  Ihew,  that  paffive  impreffions 
made  upon  our  minds  by  admonition,  experience,  ex- 
ample, though  they  may  have  a  remote  efficacy,  and 
a  very  great  one,  towards  forming  adive  habits,  yet 
can  have  this  efficacy  no  otherwife  than  by  inducing 
us  to  fuch  a  courfe  of  action  ;  and  that  it  is,  not  be- 
ing affe<5ted  fo  and  fo,  but  a<5ting,  which  forms  thofe 
habits ;  only  it  muft  be  always  remembered,  that  real 
endeavours  to  enforce  good  impreffions  upon  ourfelves, 
are  a  fpecies  of  virtuous  a£tion.  Nor  do  we  know 
how  far  it  is  poffiible,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  ef- 
fe6ts  fliould  be  wrought  in  us  at  once,  equivalent  to 
habits,  i.  e.  what  is  wrought  by  ufe  and  exercife. 
However,  the  thing  infifled  upon  is,  not  what  may  be 
poffible,  but  what  is  in  fadt  the  appointment  of  nature; 
which  is,  that  aftive  habits  are  to  be  formed  by  exer- 
cife. Their  progrefs  may  be  fo  gradual  as  to  be  im- 
perceptible in  its  fteps  ;  it  may  be  hard  to  explain  the 
faculty  by  which  we  are  capable  of  habits  throughout 
its  feveral  parts,  and  "to  trace  it  up  to  its  original,  fo 
as  to  diftinguifli  it  from  all  others  in  our  mind  ;  and 
it  feems  as  if  contrary  effects  were  to  be  afcribed  to  it. 
But  the  thing  in  general,  that  our  nature  is  formed  to 
yield,  in  fome  fuch  manner  as  this,  to  ufe  andexercife, 
is  matter  of  certain  experience. 

Thus,  by  accuftoming  ourfelves  to  any  courfe  of 
aftion,  we  get  an  aptnefs  to  go  on,  a  facility,  readinefs, 
and  often  pleafure  in  it.  The  incHnations  which  ren- 
dered us  averfe  to  it  grow  weaker  ;  the  difficulties  in 

K  it. 


138  Of  a  State  of  ?art  fl- 

it, not  oiily  the  imaginary  but  the  real  ones,  lefTen  ; 
the  reafons  for  it  offer  themfelves  of  courfe  to  our 
thoughts  upon  all  occafions,  and  the  lead  gllmpfe  of 
them  is  fufficient  to  make  us  go  on  in  a  courfe  of  ac- 
tion to  which  we  have  been  accuftomed.  And  prac- 
tical principles  appear  to  grow  ftronger  abfolutely  in 
themfelves  by  exercife,  as  well  as  relatively  with  re- 
gard to  contrary  principles,  which,  by  being  accuf- 
tomed  to  fubmit,  do  fo  habitually  and  of  courfe.  And 
thus  a  new  character  in  feveral  refpects  may  be  form- 
ed, and  many  habitudes  of  life  not  given  by  nature, 
but  which  nature  direds  us  to  acquire. 

Hi.  Indeed  we  may  be  aflured,  that  we  fhould 
never  have  had  thefe  capacities  of  improving  by  expe- 
rience, acquired  knowledge  and  habits,  had  they  not 
been  neceflary,  and  intended  to  be  made  ufe  of.  And 
accordingly  we  find  them  fo  neceflary,  and  fo  much 
intended,  that  without  them  we  fliould  be  utterly  in- 
tapable  of  that  which  was  the  end  for  which  we  were 
made,  confidered  in  our  temporal  capacity  only,  the 
employments  and  fatisfaftions  of  our  mature  ilate  of 
life. 

Nature  does  in  no  wife  qualify  us  wholly,  much  lefs 
at  once,  for  this  mature  ftate  of  life.  Even  maturity 
of  underftanding  and  bodily  ftrength  are  not  only  ar- 
rived to  gradually,  but  are  alfo  very  much  owing  to  the 
continued  exercife  of  our  powers  of  body  and  mind, 
from  infancy.  But  if  we  fuppofe  a  perfon  brought  into 
the  world  with  both  thefe  in  m.aturity,  as  far  as  this  is 
conceivable,  he  would  plainly  at  firft  be  as  unqualified 
for  the  human  life  of  mature  age  as  an  idiot.  He 
would  be  in  a  manner  diftrafted  with  aftonilhment, 
and  apprehenfion,  and  curiofity,  and  fufpenfe  ;  nor  can 
one  guefs  how  long  it  would  be  before  he  would  be 
familiarized  to  himfelf,  and  the  objeds  about  him, 
enough  even  to  fet  himfelf  to  anything.  It  may  be 
queftioned  too,  wlicther  the  natural  information  of  his 

fight 


v   ■ 

Chap.  V.  Moral  l)tfcipline.  13^ 

fight  and  hearing  ;vduld  be  of  any  manner  of  ufe  at  all 
to  him  in  acting,  before  experience.  And  it  feems, 
that  men  would  be  ftrangely  headftrong  and  felf  will- 
ed, and  difpofed  to  exert  themfelves  with  an  impetuofi- 
ty  which  would  render  fociety  infupportable,  and  the 
living  in  it  impra(3:icable,  were  it  not  for  fome  acquir- 
ed moderation  and  felf  government,  fome  aptitude 
d,nd  readinefs  in  reftraining  themfelves,  and  conceal- 
ing their  fenfe  of  things.  Want  of  every  thing  of 
this  kind  which  is  learnt,  would  render  a  man  as  un - 
capable  of  fociety  as  want  of  language  would,  or  as 
his  natural  ignorance  of  any  of  the  particular  employ- 
ments of  life  would  render  him  uncapaple  of  provid- 
ing himfelf  with  the  common  conveniences,  or  fup- 
plying  the  necelTar}''  wants  of  it.  In  thefe  refpects, 
and  probably  in  many  more,  of  which  we  have  no  par- 
ticular notion,  mankind  is  left  by  nature  an  unform- 
ed, unfinilljed  creature,  utterly  deficient  and  unquali- 
fied, before  the  acquirement  of  knowledge,  experience 
and  habits,  for  that  mature  ftate  of  life  which  was  the 
end  of  his  creation,  conlidering  him  as  related  only  to 
this  world. 

But  then,  as  nature  has  endued  us  with  a  power  of 
fupplying  thofe  deficiencies  by  acquired  knowledge, 
experience  and  habits,  fo  likewife  we  are  placed  in  a 
condition,  in  infancy,  childhood  and  youth,  fitted  for 
it ;  fitted  for  our  acquiring  thofe  qualifications  of  all 
fortS)  which  we  ftand  in  need  of  in  mature  age. 
Hence  children,  from  their  very  birth,  are  daily  grow- 
ing acquainted  with  the  objefts  about  them,  with  the 
fcene  in  v/hich  they  are  placed  and  to  have  a  future 
part,  and  learning  fomewhat  or  other  neceflary  to  the 
performance  of  it.  Th^  fubordinations  to  which  they 
are  accuftomed  in  domeftic  life,  teach  them  felf  gov- 
ernment in  common  behaviour  abroad,  and  prepare 
them  for  fubjeftion  and  obedience  to  civil  authority. 
What  pafles  before  their  eyes,  and  daily  happens  to 
K  2  them. 


i'40  Of  a  State  of  Part  L 

them,  gives  them  experience,  caution  agalnil  treache- 
ry and  deceit,  together  with  numberlefs  Httle  rules  of 
aftion  and  condu6t,  which  we  could  not  live  without, 
and  which  are  learnt  fo  infenfibly  and  fo  perfe6tly  as  to 
be  miftaken  perhaps  for  inftinft,  though  they  are  the 
effed:  of  long  experience  and  exercife,  as  much  fo  as 
language,  or  knowledge  in  particular  bufinefs,  or  the 
qualifications  and  behaviour  belonging  to  the  feveral 
ranks  and  profeffions.  Thus  the  beginning  of  our 
days  is  adapted  to  be,  and  is,  a  flate  of  education  in 
the  theory  and  pra£lice  of  mature  life.  We  are  much 
affifted  in  it  by  example,  inftruAion,  and  the  care  of 
others ;  but  a  great  deal  is  left  to  ourfelves  to  do. 
And  of  this,  as  part  is  done  eafily  and  of  courfe,  fo- 
part  requires  diligence  and  care,  the  voluntary  forego- 
/ing  many  things  which  we  defire,  and  fet ting  ourfelves 
to  what  we  fliould  have  no  inclination  to,  but  for  the 
necefilty  or  expedience  of  it.  For,  that  labour  and 
induflry  which  the  ftation  of  fo  many  abfolutely  re- 
quires, they  would  be  greatly  unqualified  for  in  ma- 
turity, as  thofg  in  other  flations  v/ould  be  for  any  oth- 
er forts  of  application,  if  both  were  not  accuflomed  ta 
them  in  their  youth.  And  according  as  perfons  be- 
have themfelves,  in  the  general  education  which  all 
go  through,  and  in  the  particular  ones  adapted  to  par- 
ticular employments,  their  character  is  formed  and 
made  appear  ;  they  recommend  themfelves  more  or 
lefs,  and  are  capable  of  and  placed  in  different  flations 
in  the  fociety  of  mankind. 

The  former  part  of  life  then  is  to  be  confidered  a?- 
an  important  opportunity  which  nature  puts  into  our 
hands,  and  which,  when  loft,  is  not  to  be  recovered. 
And  our  being  placed  in  a  ftate  of  difcipline  through- 
out this  life  for  another  world,  is  a  providential  difpo- 
fition  of  things,  exadly  of  the  fame  kind  as  our  being 
placed  in  a  ftate  of  difcipline  during  childhood,  for 
mature  age.  Our  condition  in  both  refpeds  is  uni- 
form 


Chap.  V.  Moral  DlJcipUne.  141 

form  and  of  a  piece,  and  comprehended  under  one 
and  the  fame  general  law  of  nature. 

And  if  we  were  not  able  at  all  to  difcern  how  or  in 
what  way  the  prefent  life  coyld  be  our  preparation  for 
another,  this  would  be  no  obje,Q:ion  againll  the  credi- 
bility of  its  being  fo.  For  we  do  not  difcern  how 
food  and  fleep  contribute  to  the  growth  of  the  bod3% 
nor  could  have  any  thought  that  they  would  before  we 
had  experience.  Nor  ido  children  at  "all  think,  on  the 
-One  hand,  that  the  fports  and  exercifes  to  which  they 
are  fo  much  addidted  contribute  to  their  health  and 
.growth  ;  nor  on  the  other,  ef  the  neceflity  which  there 
is  for  their  being  reflrained  in  them  ;  nor  are  they 
capable  of  underlianding  the  ufe  of  many  parts  of  dlf- 
cipline,  which  neverthelefs  they  muft  be  made  to  go 
througli,  in  order  to  qualify  them  for  the  bufinefs  of 
mature  age.  Were  we  not  able  then  to  difcover,  in 
what  refpecis  the  prefent  life  could  form  us  for  a  fu- 
ture one,  yet  nothing  v;ould  be  more  fuppofeable 
than  that  it  might,  in  fome  refpecis  or  other,  from 
the  genera!  analogy  of  Providence.  And  this,  for 
ought  I  fee,  might  reafonably  be  faid,  even  though 
we  fhould  not  take  in  the  confideration  of  God^s 
moral  government  over  the  world.     But, 

IV.  Take  in  this  confideration,  and  confeqiiently 
that  the  character  of  virtue  and  piety  is  a  neceflary 
qualification  for  the  future  flate,  and  then  we  may 
diftindly  fee  how,  and  in  what  refpefts,  the  prefent 
life  may  be  a  preparation  for  it  ;  fince  we  ijcant^  and 
are  capable  of^  improvement  in  that  chara^er,  by  moral 
and  religious  habits^  and  the  prefent  life  is  fit  to  be  aflate 
cf  difcipline  for  fuck  improvement ;  in  like  manner  as  we 
have  already  obferved  how,  and  in  what  refpects,  in- 
fancy, childhood  and  youth  are  a  neceflary  prepara- 
tion, and  a  natural  ftate  of  difcipline,  for  mature  age. 

Nothing  which  we  at  prefent  fee  would  lead  us  to 
the  thought  of  a  folitary  unadive  ftate  hereafter ;  but, 

if 


142-  Of  a  State  of  Part  I, 

if  we  judge  at  all  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  we  muft 
fuppofe,  according  to  the  Scripture  account  of  it,  that 
it  will  be  a  community.  And  there  is  no  lliadow  of 
any  thing  unreafonable  in  conceiving,  though  there 
be  no  analogy  for  it,  that  this  community  will  be,  as 
the  Scripture  reprefents  it,  under  the  more  immediate, 
or,  if  fuch  an  exprelTion  may  be  ufed,  the  more  fenfi- 
ble  government  of  God.  Nor  is  our  ignorance  what 
will  be  the  employments  of  this  happy  community,  nor 
our  confequent  ignorance  what  particular  fcope  or  ocr 
cafion  there  will  be  for  the  exercife  of  veracity,  juftice 
and  charity  amongfl  the  members  of  it  with  regard  to 
each  other,  any  proof  that  there  will  be  no  fphere  of 
exercife  for  thofe  virtues ;  much  lefs,  if  that  were  pof- 
fible,  is  our  ignorance  any  proof,  that  there  will  be  no 
occafion  for  that  frame  of  mind,  or  character,  which  is 
formed  by  the  daily  practice  of  thofe  particular  virtues 
here,  and  which  is  a  refult  from  it.  This  at  lead 
muft  be  owned  in  general,  that,  as  the  government 
eftablifhed  in  the  univerfe  is  moral,  the  chara^fter  of 
virtue  and  piety  muft,  in  fome  way  or  other,  be  the 
condition  of  our  happinefs,  or  the  qualification  for  it. 
Now  from  what  is  above  cbferved,  concerning  our 
natural  power  of  habits,  it  is  eafy  to  fee  that  we  are 
capable  of  moral  improvement  by  difcipline.  And 
how  greatly  we  want  it,  need  not  be  proved  to  any  one 
who  is  acquainted  with  the  great  wickednefs  of  man- 
kind, or  even  with  thofe  imperfections  which  the  beft 
are  confcious  of.  But  it  is  not  perhaps  diftinftly  at- 
tended to  by  every  one,  that  the  occafion  which  hur 
man  creatures  have  for  difcipline,  to  improve  in  them 
this  character  of  virtue  and  piety,  is  to  be  traced  up 
higher  than  to  excefs  in  the  paffions,  by  indulgence 
and  habits  of  vice.  Mankind,  and  perhaps  all  finite 
creatures,  from  the  very  conftitution  of  their  nature, 
before  habits  of  virtue,  are  deficient,  and  in  danger  of 
deviating  from  what  is  right  j  and  therefoi^e  ftancj  iji 

need 


Ckap.  V.  Moral  Bijclpline.  143 

need  of  virtuous  habits,  for  a  fecurity  agalnft  this  dan- 
ger. For,  together  with  the  general  principle  of  moral 
underflanding,  we  have  in  our  inward  frame  various 
affedions  towards  particular  external  objects.  Thefe 
affetflions  are  naturally  and  of  right  fubjed  to  the 
-government  of  the  moral  principle,  as  to  the  occafioqiS 
upon  which  they  may  be  gratified,  as  to  the  times,  de- 
grees and  manner  in  which  the  objedls  of  them  may  be 
purfued  ;  but  then  the  principle  of  virtue  can  neither 
.excite  them,  nor  prevent  their  being  excited.  On 
the  contrary,  they  are  naturally  felt,  when  the  objects 
of  them  are  prefent  to  the  mind,  not  only  before  all 
conlideration  whether  they  can  be  obtained  by  lawful 
means,  but  after  it  is  found  they  cannot.  For  the 
;iatural  objeds  of  a,fFe£lion  continue  fo  j  the  necefla- 
ries,  conveniences  and  pleai'ures  of  life  remain  naturally 
defirable,  though  they  cannot  be  obtained  innocently  \ 
nay,  though  they  cannot  podibly  be  obtained  at  alL 
And  when  the  objeAs  of  any  aifedlion  whatever  can- 
not be  obtained  without  unlawful  means,  but  may  be 
.obtained  by  them,  fuch  affedion,  though  its  being  ex- 
cited, and  its  continuing  fome  time  in  the  mind,  be  it 
as  innocent  as  it  is  natural  and  neceflary,  yet  cannot 
but  be  conceived  to  have  a  tendency  to  incline  perfons 
to-  venture  upon  fuch  unlawful  means,  and  therefore 
niuft  be  conceived  as  putting  them  in  fome  danger  of 
jt.  Now  what  is  the  general  fecurity  againll  this  dan- 
ger, againfl  their  adually  deviating  from  right  ?  As 
the  danger  is,  fo  alio  mud  the  fecurity  be  from  withr- 
in ;  from  the  pradical  principle  of  virtue.*     And  the 

ftrcngthening 

*  It  may  be  thought,  that  a  fenfe  of  intereft  wcalJ  as  efi'edlually  reftrain 
creatures  from  doing  wrong.  But  if  by  a  fuiji  of  intercjl  is  meant  a  fpecu- 
lative  coavidtion  or  belief,  that  fuch  and  fuch  indulgence  would  occafion 
them  greater  uneafinefs,  upon  the  whole,  than  fati->fa(5tion,  it  is  contrary  to 
prefent  e.xperience  to  fay,  that  this  fenfe  of  intereft  is  fufficient  to  reftrain 
them  from  thus  indulging  themfelves.  And  if  by  Aj'enje  nf  intereji  is  rncaut 
a  pradlical  regard  to  what  is,  upon  the  whole,  our  happinefs,  this  is  not  only 
coincident  with  the  principle  of  virtue  or  moral  reditude,  but  is  a  part  of  the 
idea  itfelf.    And  it  is  evident  this  reafonable  felf  love  wants  to  be  improved, 


J44  ^f  ^  ^f^t^  9f  Part  I, 

ftrengthening  or  improving  this  principle,  confidered 
as  praclical,  or  as  a  principle  of  adion,  will  leffen  the 
danger,  or  increafe  the  fecurity  againft  it.  And  this 
moral  principle  is  capable  of  improvement  by  proper 
difcipline  and  exercife,  by  recollecting  the  praftical 
impreflions  which  example  and  experience  have  made 
upon  us,  and,  inftead  of  following  humour  and  mere 
inclination,  by  continually  attending  to  the  equity  and 
tight  of  the  cafe  in  whatever  we  are  engaged,  be  it  in 
greater  or  lefs  matters,  and  accuftoming  ourfelves  al- 
ways to  ad  upon  it,  as  being  itfelf  the  juft  and  natural 
motive  of  adion  ;  and  as  this  m.oral  courfe  of  beha- 
viour muft  necefTarily,  under  divine  government,  be 
our  final  intereft.  Thus  the  principle  of  virtue,  im- 
proved into  an  habit,  of  which  improvemerd  ive  are  thus 
capable,  will  plainly  be,  in  proportion  to  the  flrength  of  it, 
a  fecurity  againfi  the  danger  zvhich  finite  creatures  are  in, 
from  the  very  nature  of  propenfion,  or  particular  affeElions^ 
This  way  of  putting  the  matter  fuppofes  particular  af- 
fedions  to  remain  in  a  future  ftate,  which  it  is  fcarce 
poffible  to  avoid  fuppofing.  And  if  they  do,  we  clear- 
ly fee  that  acquired  habits  of  virtue  and  felf  govern- 
ment may  be  neceflary  for  the  regulation  of  them. 
However,  though  we  v/ere  not  diftindly  «ito  take  in 
this  fuppofition,  but  to  fpeak  only  in  general,  the 
thing  really  comes  to  the  fame.  For  habits  of  virtue, 
thus  acquired  by  difcipUne,  are  improvement  in  vir- 
tue ;  and  improvement  in  virtue  muft  be  advance- 
ment in  happinefs,  if  the  government  of  the  univerfe 
be  moral. 

From  thefe  things  we  may  obferve,  and  it  will  far- 
ther fhcw  this  our  natural  and  original  need  of  being 

improved 

as  really  as  any  principle  in  our  nature.  For  we  daily  fee  it  overmatched, 
nnt  only  by  the  more  boillerous  paffions,  but  by  curiofity,  fliame,  love  of  imir 
ration,  by  any  thing,  even  indolence  ;  efpecially  if  the  interefl,  tl»e  temporal 
interefl,  fuppofe,  which  is  the  end  of  fuch  felf  love,  be  at  a  diflance.  So 
greatly  are  profligate  men  miflaken,  when  they  affirm  they  are  wholly  j^ov- 
erned  by  intereftednefs  and  felf  love.  And  fo  little  caufe  is  there  for  moral-. 
ills  to  difclaim  this  principle.     See  p.  125,  126. 


Chap.  V,  Mora/  Difcipline.  145 

improved  by  difcipline,  how  it  comes  to  pafs,  that 
creatures  made  upright  fall ;  and  that  thofe  who  pre- 
ferve  their  uprightnefs,  by  fo  doing  raife  themfelves  to 
a  more  fecure  ftate  of  virtue.  To  fay  that  the  former 
is  accoijnted  for  by  the  nature  of  liberty,  is  to  fay  no 
more  than  that  an  event's  ad;ually  happening  is  ac- 
counted for  by  a  mere  poffibility  of  its  happening. 
But  it  feems  diftinftly  conceivable  from  the  very  na- 
ture of  particular  affettions  or  propenlions.  For, 
fuppofe  creatures  intended  for  fuch  a  particular  ftate 
of  life  for  which  fuch  propenfions  were  neceffary  i  fup- 
pofe them  endued  with  fuch  propenfions,  together 
with  mioral  underftanding,  as  well  including  a  pradii- 
cal  fenfe  of  virtue  as  a  fpeculative  perception  of  it, 
and  that  all  thefe  feverai  principles,  both  natural  and 
moral,  forming  an  inward  conftitution  of  mind,  were 
in  the  moil  exa£t  proportion  poffible,  i.  e.  in  a  pro- 
portion the  m.oft  exadly  adapted  to  their  intended 
ftate  of  life  ;  fuch  creatures  would  be  made  upright, 
or  finitely  perfect.  Now  particular  propenfions,  from 
their  very  nature,  muft  be  felt,  the  objeds  of  them 
being  prefent,  though  they  cannot  be  gratified  at  all, 
or  not  with  the  allowance  of  the  moral  principle.  But 
if  they  can  be  gratified  without  its  allovv-ance,  or  by 
cohtradi6f  ing  it,  then  they  muft  be  conceived  to  have 
fome  tendency,  in  how  low  a  degree  foever,  yet  fome 
tendency,  to  induce  perfons  to  fuch  forbidden  gratifi- 
cation. This  tendency,  in  fome  one  particular  pro- 
penfion,  may  be  increafed  by  the  greater  frequency  of 
occaiions  naturally  exciting  it,  than  of  occauons  ex- 
citing others.  The  leaft  voluntary  indulgence  in  for- 
bidden circumftances,  though  but  in  thought,  v/ill 
jncreafe  this  wrong  tendency,  and  may  increafe  it  fur- 
ther, until,  peculiar  conjunctures  perhaps  confpiring, 
it  becomes  eifeft  ;  and  danger  of  deviating  from  right, 
ends  in  aftual  deviation  from  it ;  a  danger  ncceiilirily 
arifing  from  the  very  nature  of  propenfion,  and  which 

thereforo 


14^  Of  a  Sfate  of  Part  I, 

tbereforG  could  not  have  b'een  prevented,  though  it 
might  have  been  elcaped,  or  got  innocently  through. 
The  cafe  would  be  as  if  we  were  to  fuppofe  a  ftrait 
path  marked  out  for  a  perfon,  in  which  fuch  a  degree 
of  attention  would  keep  him  fteady  ;  but  if  he  would 
not  attend  in  this  degree,  any  one  of  a  thoufand  ob- 
jects catching  his  eye  might  lead  him  out  of  it.  Now 
it  is  impoflible  to  fay  how  much,  even  the  firft  full 
overt  a6t  of  irregularity,  might  diforder  the  inward 
conftitution,  unfettle  the  adjuftments,  and  alter  the 
proportions  which  formed  it,  and  in  which  the  up^ 
rightnefs  of  its  make  confifted  ;  but  repetition  of  ir- 
regularities would  produce  habits  :  And  thus  the  con- 
flitution  w^ould  be  fpoiled,  and  creatures  made  upright 
become  corrupt  and  depraved  in  their  fettled  char- 
acter, proportionably  to  their  repeated  irregularities  in 
occafional  adls.  But  on  the  contrary,  thefe  creatures 
might  have  improved,  and  railed  themfelves  to  an 
higher  and  more  fecure  ftate  of  virtue,  by  the  con- 
trary behaviour  ;  by  fbeadiiy  following  the  moral  prin- 
ciple, fuppofed  to  be  one  part  of  their  nature,  and 
thus  withftanding  that  unavoidable  danger  of  defec- 
tion, which  neceflarily  arofe  from  propenfion,  the  other 
part  of  it.  For,  by  thus  preferving  their  integrity  for 
Ibme  time,  their  danger  would  leffen,  fmce  propenr 
fions  by  being  inured  to  fubmit,  would  do  it  more  ea- 
fily  and  of  courfe  ;  and  their  fecurity  againfl  this  lef- 
fening  danger  would  increafe,  fince  the  moral  princir 
pie  would  gain  additional  flrength  by  exercife  ;  both 
which  things  are  implied  in  the  notion  of  virtuous 
habits.  Thus  then,  vicious  indulgence  is  not  only 
criminal  in  itfelf,  but  alfo  depraves  the  inward  confti- 
tution and  character.  And  virtuous  felf  government 
is  not  only  right  in  itfelf,  but  alfo  improves  the  inward 
conftitution  or  character  ;  and  may  improve  it  to  fuch 
a  degree,  that  though  we  fnould  fuppofe  it  impoffible 
for  particular  affedtions  to  be  abfoluteiy  coincident 

with 


Chap.  V,  Moral  DifcipHne.  147 

with  the  moral  principle,  and  confequently  fhould  aU 
Jow,  that  fuch  creatures  as  have  been  above  fuppofed 
would  forever  remain  defe^hit^le,  yet  their  danger  of 
adlualiy  deviating  from  right  may  be  ahnoft  infinitely 
lelfened,  and  they  fully  fortified  againfl  what  remains 
of  it,  if  that  may  be  called  danger  againft  which  there 
is  an  adequate  efFeftual  lecurityo  JBut  ftill  this  their 
Jiighe.r  perfedtion  may  continue  to  confift  in  habits  of 
virtue,  formed  in  a  (late  of  difciplint;;,  and  this  their 
more  complete  fecurity  remain  to  proceed  from  them. 
And  thus  it  is  plainly  conceivable,  that  creatures  with- 
out blemilh,  as  they  came  out  cf  the  hands  of  God, 
may  be  in  danger  of  going  wrong,  and  Iq  ir^ay  ftand  in 
need  of  the  fecurity  of  virtuous  habits,  additional  to 
the  moral  principle  wrought  into  their  natures  by  him. 
That  which  is  th^  grouiid  of  their  danger,  or  their 
want  of  fecurity,  may  be  confidered  as  a  deficiency  in 
them,  to  which  virtuous  habits  are  the  nqitural  fcpply^ 
And  as  they  are  naturally  capable  of  being  raifed  and 
improved  by  dilcipline,  it  may  be  a  thing  fit  and 
requifite  that  they  fliould  be  placed  in  circumftances 
with  an  eye  to  it ;  in  circumftances  peculiarly  fitted 
to  be  to  them  a  ftate  of  difciplinc  for  their  improver 
ment  in  virtue. 

But  how  much  more  ftrongly  muft  this  hold  with 
refped  to  thole  who  have  corrupted  their  natures,  are 
fallen  from  their  original  rectitude,  and  whofe  paflions 
are  become  exceffive  by  repeated  violations  of  their 
inward  conftitution  ?  Upright  creatures  may  want  to 
be  improved  ;  d^pi'^-ved  creatures  want  to  be  renew- 
ed. Education  and  dilcipline,  which  may  be  in  all 
degrees  and  forts  of  gentlcnefs  and  of  feverity,  is  ex- 
pedient for  thofe,  but  muft  be  abfolutely  necelTary  for 
theie.  For  thefe,  difcipline  of  the  feverer  fort  too, 
and  in  the  higher  degrees  of  it,  muft  be  neceliary,  ir). 
order  to  v/ear  out  vicious  habits;  to  recover  t^  .:. 
primitive  ftrength  of  felf  governmentj  which  : 


^4^  Of  a  State  of  Part  L 

gence  muft  have  weakened  ;  to  repair,  as  well  as  raife 
into  an  habit,  the  moral  principle,  in  order  to  their 
arriving  at  a  fecure  ftate  of  virtuous  happinefs. 

Now  whoever  will  confider  the  thing,  may  clearly 
fee,  that  the  prefent  world  is  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  ftate 
of  diicipline  for  this  purpofe,  to  fuch  as  will  fet  them- 
felves  to  mend  and  improve.  For,  the  various  temp^ 
tations  v/ith  which  we  are  furrounded  ;  our  experience 
of  the  deceits  of  wickednefs ;  having  been  in  many 
inftances  led  wrong  ourielves ;  the  great  vicioufnefs  of 
the  world  ;  the  infinite  diforders  confequent  upon  it  j 
our  being  made  acquainted  with  pain  and  forrow,  ei- 
ther from  our  owmfeeling  of  it,  or  from  the  fight  of 
it  in  others  ;  thefe  things,  though  fome  of  them  may 
indeed  produce  wrong  effefts  upon  our  minds,  yet 
when  duly  reflefted  upon,  have,  all  of  them,  a  dired 
tendency  to  bring  us  to  a  fettled  moderation  and  rea- 
fonablenefs  of  temper,  the  contrary  both  to  thought- 
lels  levity,  and  alio  to  that  unreftrained  felf  will,  and 
violent  bent  to  follov/  prefent  inclination,  which  may 
be  obferved  in  undifciplined  minds.  Such  experience 
as  the  prefent  ftate  affords,  of  the  frailty  of  our  nature  ; 
of  the  boundlefs  extravagance  of  ungoverned  pafhon  ; 
of  the  power  which  an  infinite  Being  has  over  us,  by 
the  various  capacities  of  mifery  which  he  has  given  us  ; 
in  fliort,  that  kind  and  degree  of  experience  which  the 
prefent  ftate  affords  us,  that  the  conftitution  of  nature 
is  fuch  as  to  admit  the  polTibility,  the  danger,  and  the 
adlual  event  of  creatures  lofina;  their  innocence  and 
happmeis,  and  becommg  vicious  and  wretched,  hath 
a  tendency  to  give  us  a  practical  fenfe  of  things  very 
different  from  a  mere  fpeculative  knowledge,  that  we 
are  liable  to  vice,  and  cajDable  of  mifery.  And  who 
knows,  whether  the  fecurity  of  creatures  in  the  high- 
eft  and  m,oft  fettled  ftate  of  perfedion  may  not  in  part 
arife  from  their  having  had  fuch  a  fenfe  of  things  as 
this,  formed  and  habitually  fixed  within  them,  in  Ibme 

ftate 


Chap.  V.  Moral  Difcipline.  149 

ftate  of  probation.  And  paffing  through  the  prefent 
world  with  that  mora),  attention  which  is  neceliary  to 
the  a£ting  a  right  part  in  it,  may  leave  everlafling  im- 
preffions  of  this  fort  upon  o"cr  minds.  But  to  be  a 
little  more  diflinct — allurements  to  what  is  wrong  ; 
difficulties  in  the  difcharge  of  our  duty  ;  our  not  be- 
ing able  to  aft  an  uniform  right  part  without  fome 
thought  and  care  ;  and  the  opportunities  which  we 
have,  or  imagine  we  have,  of  avoiding  what  we  diflike, 
or  obtaining  what  we  defire,  by  unlawful  means,  when 
we  either  cannot  do  it  at  all,  or  at  leaft  not  fo  eafily, 
by  lawful  ones ;  thefe  things,  i.  e.  the  fnares  and 
temptations  of  vice,  are  what  render  the  prefent  world 
peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  ftate  of  difcipline  to  thofe  who 
will  preferve  their  integrity,  becaufe  they  render  being 
upon  our  guard,  refolution,  and  the  denial  of  our 
paflions  necefl'ary  in  order  to  that  end.  And  the 
exercife  of  fuch  particular  recolleftion,  intention  of 
mind,  and  felf  government  in  the  praiSlice  of  virtue 
has,  from  the  make  of  our  nature,  a  pecuHar  tendency 
to  form  habits  of  virtue,  as  implying  not  only  a  real 
but  alfo  a  more  continued  and  a  more  intenfe  exercife 
of  the  virtuous  principle,  or  a  more  conftant  and  a 
ftronger  effort  of  virtue  exerted  into  acl.  Thus  fup-, 
pofe  a  perfon  to  know  himfelf  to  be  in  particular  dan- 
ger for  fome  time  of  doing  any  thing  wrong,  which 
yet  he  fully  refolves  not  to  do  ;  continued  recolledion, 
and  keeping  upon  his  guard,  in  order  to  make  good 
his  refolution,  is  a  continued  exerting  of  that  ad  of  vir- 
tue in  a  high  degree^  which  need  have  been,  and  per- 
haps would  have  been,  only  injiantaneous  and  weak, 
had  the  temptation  been  fo.  It  is  indeed  ridiculous 
to  affert,  that  felf  denial  is  eilential  to  virtue  and  piety; 
but  it  would  have  been  nearer  the  truth,  though  not 
ftridly  the  truth  itfelf,  to  have  faid,  that  it  is  elfential 
to  difcipline  and  improvement.  For  though  actions 
materially  virtuous,  which  have  no  fort  of  difnculty, 

but 


i^5  Of  a  State  of  Part  L 

but  are  perfeftly  agreeable  to  our  particular  Inclina- 
tions, may  polTibly  be  done  only  from  thele  particu- 
lar inclinations,  and  fo  may  not  be  any  exercife  of  the 
principle  of  virtue,  i.  e.  not  be  virtuous  adlions  at  all  , 
yet  on  the  contrary,  they  ,may  be  an  exercife  of  that 
principle  ;  and  vv^hen  they  are,  they  have  a  tendency 
to  form  and  fix  the  habit  of  virtue.  But  when  the 
exercife  of  the  virtuous  principle  is  more  continued, 
oftener  repeated,  and  more  intenfe,  as  it  muft  be  in 
circumftances  of  danger,  temptation,  and  difficulty 
of  any  kind  and  in  any  degree,  this  tendency  is  in- 
creafed  proportionably,  and  a  more  confirmed  habit  is 
the  confequence. 

This  undoubtedly  holds  to  a  certain  length  ;  but 
how  far  it  may  hold  }  know  not.  Neither  our  intel- 
ic6lual  powers,  nor  our  bodily  ftrength,  can  be  im- 
proved beyond  fuch  a  degree  ;  and  both  may  be  over- 
VvTOUght.  Poffibly  there  may  be  fomewhat  analogous 
to  this,  with  refpeft  to  the  moral  character,  which  is 
fcarce  worth  conlidering.  And  I  mention  it  only,  left 
it  lliould  com-c  into  fome  perfons'  thoughts,  not  as  aa 
exception  to  the  foregoing  obfervations,  which  perhaps 
it  is,  but  as  a  confutation  of  them,  v/hich  it  is  not. 
And  there  may  be  feveral  other  exceptions.  Obfer- 
vations of  this  kind  cannot  be  fu]:)pofed  to  hold  mi- 
nutely and  in  every  cafe.  It  is  enough  that  they  hold 
in  general.  And  thefe  plainly  hold  fo  far,  as  that 
from  them  may  be  feen  diflinilly,  which  is  all  that  is 
intended  by  them,  that  the  prefent  world  is  peadiarly 
fit  to  be  a  fate  of  dfcipline^  for  our  improvement  in  vir- 
tue and  piety,  in  the  fame  fenfe  as  ibme  fciences,  by 
requiring  and  engaging  the  attention,  not  to  be  fure 
ot  iucxi  perfons  as  will  not,  but  of  fuch  as  will,  fet 
themfelves  to  them,  are  fit  to  form  the  mind  to  habits 
of  attention. 

Indeed  the  prefent  ftate  is  fo  far  from  proving,  in 
event,  a  difcipline  of  virtue  to  the  generahty  of  men, 

that. 


C  H  A  p .  V .  Moral  hijcipline-.  i'  5 1 

that,  on  the  contrar\%  they  feem  to  make  it  a  difci-* 
pline  of  vice.     And  the  vicioufnefs  of  the  world  is,  in 
different  ways,  the  great  temptation  which  renders  it 
a  ftate  of  virtuous  difcipiine,  in  the  degree  it  is,  to 
good  men.     The  whole  end  and  the  whole  occafion 
of  mankind's  being  placed  in  fuch  a  flate  as  the  pref- 
ent,  is  not  pretended  to  be  accounted  for.     That 
which  appears  amidft  the  general  corruption,  is,  that 
there  are  ibme  perfons,  who,  having  within  them  the 
principle  of  amendment  and  recovery,  attend  to  and 
follow  the  notices  of  virtue  and  religion,  be  they  more 
clear  or  more  obfcure,  which  are  afforded  them  ;  and 
that  the  prefent  world  is,  not  only  an  exercife  of  vir- 
tue in  thefe  perfons,  but  an  exercife  of  it  in  ways  and 
degrees  peculiarly  apt  to  improve  it  j  apt  to  improve 
it,  in  fome  refpeds,  even  beyond  what  would  be  by 
the  exercife  of  it  required  in  a  perfedly  virtuous  foci- 
ety,  or  in  a  fociety  of  equally  imperfed:  virtue  with 
themfelves.     But  that  the  prefent  world  does  not  ac- 
tually become  a  ftate  of  moral  difcipiine  to  many, 
even  to  the  generality,  i.  e.  that  they  do  not  improve 
or  grow  better  in  it,  cannot  be  urged  as  a  proof  that 
it  was  not  intended  for  moral  difcipiine,  by  any  who 
at  all  obferve  the  analogy  of  nature.     For,  of  the  nu- 
merous feeds  of  vegetables  and  bodies  of  animals, 
which  are  adapted  and  put  in  the  way  to  improve  to 
fuch  a  point  or  ftate  of  natural  maturity  and  perfec- 
tion, we  do  not  fee  perhaps  that  one  in  a  million  ac- 
tually does.     Far  the  greateft  part  of  them  decay  be- 
fore they  are  improved  to  it,  and  appear  to  be  abfo- 
lutely  deftroyed.     Yet  no  one,  who  does  not  deny  aU 
final  caufes,  will  deny  that  thofe  feeds  and  bodies 
which  do  attain  to  that  point  of  maturity  and  perfec- 
tion, anfwer  the  end  for  which  they  were  really  defign- 
cd  by  nature,  and  therefore  that  nature  defigned  them 
for  fuch  perfection.     And  I  cannot  forbear  adding, 
though  it  is  not  to  the  prefent  purpoie,  that  the  ay^ 

pearance 


t^'z  Of  a  State  of  Part  L 

fearance  of  fucli  an  amazing  wafie  in  nature,  with  re- 
fpecl  to  thefe  feeds  and  bodies,  by  foreign  caufes,  is  to 
lis  as  unaccountable,  as,  what  is  much  more  terrible, 
the  prefent  and  future  min  of  fo  many  moral  agents 
by  themfelves,  i.  e.  by  vice; 

Againft  this  whole  notion  of  moral  difcipline  it  may 
be  objected  in  another  way,  that  fo  far  as  a  courfe  of 
behaviour,  materially  virtuous,  proceeds  from  hope 
^  .       and  fear,  fo  far  it  is  only  a  difcipline  and  ftrengthen- 
J  in<5-  of  felf  love.     But  doing  what  God  commands, 

becaufe  he  commands  it,  is  obedience,  though  it  pro-, 
ceeds  from  hope  or  fear.  And  a  courfe  of  fuch  obe- 
dience will  form  habits  of  it.  And  a  conftant  regard 
to  veracity,  juftice  and  charity  may  form  diftinft  hab- 
its of  thefe  particular  virtues,  and  will  certainly  form 
habits  of  felf  government,  and  of  denying  our  inclina- 
tions, whenever  veracity,  juftice  or  charity  requires 
it.  Nor  is  there  any  foundation  for  this  great  nicety, 
with  which  fome  affeft  to  diftinguith  in  this  cafe,  in 
order  lo  depreciate  all  religion  proceeding  from  hope 
or  fear.  For,  veracity,  juftice  and  charity,  regard  to 
God's  authority,  and  to  our  own  chief  intereft,  are  not 
only  all  three  coincident,  but  each  of  them  is,  in  it- 
felf,  a  juft  and  natural  motive  or  principle  of  aftion. 
And  he  who  begins  a  good  life  from  any  one  of  them., 
and  perfeveres  in  it,  as  he  is  already  in  fome  degree, 
fo  he  cannot  fail  of  becoming  more  and  more  of  that 
character,  which  is  correfpondent  to  the  conftltution 
of  nature  as  moral,  and  to  the  relation  which  God 
ftands  in  to  us  as  moral  governor  of  it  ;  nor  confe- 
quently  can  he  fail  of  obtaining  that  happinefs  which 
tlfis  conft.itution  and  relation  neceflarily  fuppofe  con- 
nefted  with  that  charader. 

Thefe  feveral  obfervations  concerning  the  adive 
principle  of  virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  commands 
£.re  applicable  to  pafTive  fubmiffion  or  reiignation  to 
his  will,  which  is  another  eflential  part  of  a  right  char- 

ader. 


Chap.  V.  Moral  Difcipline.  15 


:>:> 


after,  connefted  with  the  former,  and  very  much  in. 
our  power  to  form  ourfelves  to.  It  may  be  ima<gined, 
that  nothing  but  afilidions  can  give  occafion  for  or 
require  this  virtue  ;  that  it  can  have  no  refpeft  to,  nor 
be  any  way  neceffary  to  qiiahfy  for,  a  ftate  of  perfect 
happinefs  ;  but  it  is  not  experience  which  can  make 
us  think  thus.  Profperity  itfelf,  whiift  any  thing  fup- 
poied  defirable  is  not  ours,  begets  extravagant  and  un- 
bounded thoughts.  Imagination  is  altogether  as 
much  a  fource  of  difcontent  as  any  thing  in  our  exter- 
nal condition.  It  is  indeed  true,  that  there  can  be  no 
fcope  for  patience,  when  forrow  (hall  be  no  more ;  but 
there  may  be  need  of  a  temper  of  mind  which  Ihall 
have  been  formed  by  pd,tience.  For  though  felf  love, 
coniidered  merely  as  an  aftive  principle  leading  us  to 
purfue  our  chief  intereft,  cannot  but  be  uniformly  co- 
incident with  the  principle  of  obedience  to  God's 
commands,  our  intereft  being  rightly  underflood  ;  be- 
caufe  this  obedience,  and  the  purfuit  of  our  own  chief 
intereft,  muft  be  in  every  cafe  one  and  the  fame  thing  ; 
yet  it  may  be  queftioned,  wdiether  felf  love,  coniidered 
merely  as  the  defire  of  our  own  intereft  or  happinefs, 
can,  from  its  nature,  be  thus  abfolutely  and  uniformly 
coincident  with  the  will  of  God,  any  more  than  par- 
ticular affe6tions  can  ;  coincident  in  fuch  fort,  as  not 
to  be  liable  to  be  excited  upon  occafions  and  in  de- 
grees, impoiTible  to  be  gratified  confiftently  wdth  the 
€onftitution  of  things,  or  the  divine  appointments. 
So  that  habits  of  reiignation  may,  upon  this  account, 
be  requifite  for  all  creatures  ;  habits,  I  fay,  which  fig- 
nify  what  is  formed  by  ufe.  However,  in  general  it 
is  obvious,  that  both  felf  love  and  particular  affeftions 
in  human  creatures,  confidered  only  as  paftive  feelings, 
diftort  and  rend  the  mind,  and  therefore  ftand  in  need 
of  difcipline.  Now  denial  of  thofe  particular  affec- 
tions, in  a  v,ourle  of  active  virtue  and  obedience  to 
God's  will,  hss  a  tendency  to  moderate  them,  and 
L  feems 


1^4  Of  a  State  of  ?art  L 

feems  alfo  to  have  a  tendency  to  habituate  the  mind 
to  be  eafy  and  fatisfied  with  that  degree  of  happinefs 
which  is  allotted  us,  i.  e.  to  moderate  felf  love.  But 
the  proper  dilbipline  for  refignation  is  affliftion.  For 
a  right  behaviour  under  that  trial ;  recolleding  our- 
ielves  fo  rjs  to  confider  it  in  the  view  in  which  religion 
tearches  us  to'  confider  it,  as  from  the  hand  of  God  ; 
receiving  it  as  what  he  appoints,  or  thinks  proper  to 
permit,  in  his  world  and  under  his  government  ;  this 
will  habituate  the  mind  to  a  dutiful  lubmifTion.  And 
fuch  fubmiffion,  together  with  the  adive  principle  of 
obedience,  make  up  the  temper  and  character  in  us 
which  anfwers  to  his  fovereignty,  and  which  abfolute- 
ly  belongs  to  the  condition  of  our  being,  as  depend- 
ent creatures.  Nor  can  it  be  faid  that  this  is  onl)r 
breaking  the  mind  to  a  fubmiffion  to  mere  power,  for 
mere  power  may  be  accidental,  arid  precarious,  and 
ufurped  ;  but  it  is  forming  within  ourfelves  the  tem- 
per of  refignation  to  his  rightful  authority,  v»'ho  is,  by 
nature,  fupreme  over  all. 

Upon  the  whole,  fuch  a  character,  and  fuch  qual- 
ifications, are  neceflary  for  a  mature  ftate  of  life  in  the 
prefent  world,  as  nature  alone  does  in  no  wife  beftow, 
but  has  put  it  upon  us  in  great  part  to  acquire,  in  our 
progrefs  from  one  ftage  of  life  to  another,  from  child- 
hood to  mature  age  ;  put  it  upon  us  to  accjuire  them., 
by  giving  us  capacities  of  doing  it,  and  by  placing  us, 
jn  the  beginning  of  life,  in  a  condition  fit  for  it.  And 
this  is  a  general  analogy  to  our  condition  in  the  pref- 
ent world",  as  in  a  ftate  of  moral  difcipline  for  another. 
It  is  in  vain  then  to  objed  againft  the  credibility  of 
the  prefent  life's  being  intended  for  this  purpofe,  that 
all  the  trouble  and  the  danger  unavoidably  accompa- 
nying fuch  difcipline  might  have  been  faved  us,  by  our 
being  made  at  once  the  creatures  and  the  characters 
which  zve  zvere  to  be.  For  we  experience,  that  what 
ive  were  to  he  was  to  be  the  effcft  of  wliat  we  would 

do  i 


Chap.  V.  Moral  D if cipline.  j^i 


:>o 


do  ;  and  that  the  general  conduft  of  nature  is,  not  to 
fave  us  trouble  or  danger,  but  to  make  us  capable  of 
going  through  them,  and  to  put  it  upon  Us  to  do  fo. 
Acquirements  of  our  own,  experience  and  habits,  are 
the  natural  fupply  to  our  deficiencies,  and  fecurity 
againft  our  dangers,  (ince  it  is  as  plainly  natural  to  {tt 
ourfelves  to  acquire  the  qualifications,  as  the  external 
things,  which  we  ftand  in  need  of.  In  particular,  it 
is  as  plainly  a  general  law  of  nature  that  we  fliould, 
with  regard  to  our  temporal  intereft,  form  and  culti- 
vate practical  principles  within  us,  by  attention,  ufe 
and  difcipline,  as  any  thing  whatever  is  a  natural  law  ; 
chiefly  in  the  beginning  of  life,  but  alio  throughout 
the  whole  courie  of  it.  And  the  alternative  is  left  to 
our  choice,  either  to  iniprove  ourfelves,  and  better 
our  condition,  or,  in  default  of  fjch  improvement,  to 
remain  deficient  and  wretched.  It  is  therefore  per- 
fectly credible,  from  the  analogv  of  nature,  that  the 
fame  may  be  our  cafe,  with  reipett  to  the  happincfs  of 
a  future  ftate,  and  the  qualifications  necellary  for  it. 

There  is  a  third  thing,  which  may  feem  implied  in 
the  prefent  world's  being  a  ftate  of  probation  ;  that  it 
is  a  theatre  of  aftion  for  the  manifeftation  of  perfons* 
characters,  wqth  refpedt  to  a  future  one  ;  not  to  be 
fure  to  an  all  knowing  Being,  but  to  his  creation  or 
part  of  it.  This  may,  perhaps,  be  only  a  confequence 
of  our  being  in  a  ftate  of  probation  in  the  other  fenfes. 
However,  it  is  not  impofiibie  that  men's  iliewing  and 
making  manifcft  what  is  in  their  heart,  what  their  re- 
al character  is,  may  have  refpeft  to  a  future  life,  in 
ways  and  manners  which  we  are  not  acquainted  with  ; 
particularly  it  may  be  a  means,  for  the  Author  of  na- 
ture does  not  appear  to  do  any  thing  without  means, 
of  their  being  difpofed  of  fuitably  to  their  characters  ; 
.md  of  its  being  known  to  the  creation,  by  way  of  ex- 
ample, that  they  are  thus  difpofed  of.  But  not  to 
enter  upon  any  conjeCtural  account  of  this,  ov£.  may 
L  2,  iuf: 


i^S  Of  the  Opinion  of  Nee effity.  Part  1 

juft  mention,  that  the  manifeftation  of  perfons'  char- 
afters  contributes  very  much,  in  various  ways,  to  the 
carrying  on  a  great  part  of  that  general  courfe  of  na- 
ture, refpeding  mankind,  which  comes  under  our  ob- 
iervation  at  prefent.  I  fhall  only  add,  that  probation^ 
in  both  thefe  fenfes,  as  well  as  in  that  treated  of  in  the 
foregoing  chapter,  is  implied  in  moral  government, 
fince  by  perfons'  behaviour  under  it  their  charaders 
cannot  but  be  manifefted,  .and,  if  they  behave  well, 
improved. 

CHAP.     VI. 

Of  the  Opinion  of  NeceJJity,  conjidered  as  influencing 
Pradice. 

Throughout  the  foregoing  trea- 
tife  it  appears,  that  the  condition  of  mankind,  confid- 
ered  as  inhabitants  of  this  world  only,  and  under  the 
government  of  God  which-  we  experience,  is  greatly 
analogous  to  our  condition  as  defigned  for  another 
world,  or  under  that  farther  government  which  relig- 
ion teaches  us.  If  therefore  any  affert,  as  a  fatalill 
muft,  that  the  opinion  of  univerfal  neceflity  is  recon- 
cileable  with  the  former,  there  imm.ediately  arifes  a 
queflion  in  the  way  of  analogy,  whether  he  muft  not 
alio  own  it  to  be  reconcileable  with  the  latter,  i.  e. 
with  the  fyftem  of  reHgion  itfelf,  and  the  proof  of  it. 
The  reader  then  will  obferve,  that  the  queftion  now 
before  us  is  not  abiblute,  Whether  the  opinion  of  fate 
be  reconcileable  with  religion  ;  but  hypothetical. 
Whether,  upon  fuppofition  of  its  being  reconcileable 
with  the  conftitution  of  nature,  it  be  not  reconcileable 
with  religion  alfo ;  or,  what  pretence  a  fatalift,  not 

other 


Ckap.  VI.  as  influencing  Pra8ice.  15; 7 

other  perfons,  but  a  fotalift,  has  to  conchide  from  his 
opinion  that  there  can  be  no  (lich  thing  as  reHgion. 
And  as  the  puzzle  and  obfcurity  which  muft  unavoid- 
ably arife  from  arguing  upon  fo  abfurd  a  fuppofitioii 
as  that  of  univerfal  neceffity  will,  I  fear,  eafily  be  feen, 
it  will,  I  hope,  as  eafUy  be  excufed. 

But  fmce  it  has  been  all  along  taken  for  granted,  as 
a  thing  proved,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of 
nature,  or  natural  Governor  of  the  world  ;  and  fince 
an  objection  may  be  made  againft  the  proof  of  this, 
from  the  opinion  of  univerfal  neceffity,  as  it  may  be 
fuppofed  that  fuch  neceffity  will  itfelf  account  for  the 
origin  and  prefervation  of  all  things,  it  is  requiiite  that 
this  objection  be  difbindly  anfv^^ered,  or  that  it  be 
fhewn  that  a  fatality,  fuppofed  confiftent  with  what 
we  certainly  experience,  does  not  deftroy  the  proof  of 
an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor  of  nature,  before 
we  proceed  to  confider  whether  it  dellroys  the  proof 
of  a  moral  Governor  of  it,  or  of  our  being  in  a  (late  of 
religion. 

Now,  when  it  is  faid  by  a  fatalift,  that  the  whole 
conftitution  of  nature,  and  the  actions  of  men,  that 
every  thing,  and  every  mode  and  circumftance  of  ev- 
ery thing,  is  neceflary,  and  could  not  poffibly  have 
been  othenvife,  it  is  to  be  obferved,  that  this  necef- 
fity does  not  exclude  deliberation,  choice,  preference, 
and  adting  from  certain  principles,  and  to  certain 
ends  ;  becaufe  all  this  is  matter  of  undoubted  expe- 
rience, acknowledged  by  all,  and  what  every  man 
may,  every  moment,  be  confcious  of.  And  from 
hence  it  follows,  that  neceflity,  alone  and  of  itfelf,  is 
in  no  fort  an  account  of  the  conftitution  of  nature, 
and  how  things  came  to  be  and  to  continue  as  they  are  ; 
but  only  an  account  of  this  circumjlance  relating  to 
their  origin  and  continuance,  that  they  could  not  have 
been  otherwife  than  they  are  and  have  been.  The 
aflertion  that  every  thing  is  by  neceffity  of  nature,  is 

not 


158  Of  the  Opinion  of  Ncceffity,  P  a  r  t  I. 

not  an  anfwer  to  the  qucftion,  Whether  the  world 
came  into  being  as  it  is,  by  an  intelligent  Agent  form- 
ing it  thus,  or  not  ;  but  to  quite  another  queftion. 
Whether  it  came  into  being  as  it  is,  in  that  way  and 
manner  which  we  call  necejj'arily ^  or  in  that  way  and 
manner  which  we  call  freely.  For  fuppofe  farther, 
that  one  who  was  a  falalift,  and  one  who  kept  to  his 
natural  fenfe  of  things,  and  believed  himfelf  a  free 
agent,  were  difputing  together,  and  vindicating  their 
refpective  opinions,  and  they  fliould  happen  to  inftance 
in  a  houfe,— they  would  agree  that  it  was  built  by  an 
architeft.  Their  difference  concerning  neceflity  and 
freedom  would  occafion  no  diiference  of  judgment 
concerning  this,  but  only  concerning  another  matter, 
whether  the  architect  built  it  neceffarily  or  freely. 
Suppofe  then  they  fliould  proceed  to  inquire  concern- 
ing the  conftitution  of  nature  ;  in  a  lax  way  of  fpeak- 
ing,  one  of  them  might  fay  it  was  by  necefTity,  and 
the  other  by  freedom  ;  but  if  they  had  any  meaning 
to  their  words,  as  the  latter  muft  mean  a  free  agent, 
lo  the  former  mufb  at  length  be  reduced  to  mean  an 
agent,  whether  he  would  fay  one  or  more,  aiding  by 
ueceffity  ;  for  abftract  notions  can  do  nothing.  In- 
deed we  afcribe  to  God  a  necellt^ry  exiftence,  uncaufed 
by  any  ageqt.  For  we  find  within  ourfelves  the  idea 
of  infinity,  i.  e.  immeniity  and  eternity,  impofhble, 
even  in  imagination,  to  be  removed  out  of  being. 
We  feem  to  difcern  intuitively  that  there  muft  and 
cannot  but  be  fomewhat,  external  to  ourfelves,  anfwer- 
ing  this  idea,  or  the  archetype  of  it.  And  from 
hence  (for  this  abfiraEl^  as  much  as  any  other,  implies 
a  concrete')  we  conclude  that  there  is,  and  cannot  but 
be,  an  infinite  and  immenfe  eternal  Being,  exifting 
prior  to  all  defign  contributing  to  his  exiftence  and 
exclufive  of  it.  And  from  the  icantinefs  of  lano;uap;e, 
a  manner  of  fpeaking  has  been  introduced,  that  necef- 
fity  is  the  foundation,  the  reafon,  the  account  of  the 

exiftencQ 


Crap.  VI.  as  influencing  Practice.  159 

exiflence  of  God.  But  it  is  not  alleged,  nor  can  it  be 
at  all  intended,  that  every  thing  exiils  as  it  does,  by 
this  kind  of  neceflity,  a  neceffity  antecedent  in  nature 
to  defign  :  It  cannot,  I  fay,  be  noeant  th-at  every  thing 
exifls  as  it  does,  by  this  ki-nd  of  neceffity,  upon  feveral 
accounts  ;  and  particularly  becaufe  it  is  admitted, 
that  defign,  in  the  actions  of  men,  contributes  to  ma- 
ny alterations  in  nature.  For  if  any  deny  this,  I  fliall 
not  pretend  to  reafon  with  them. 

From  thefe  things  it  follows,  Firji^  That  when  a  fa- 
talift  alTerts  that  every  thing  is  by  necejjiiy,  he  muft 
mean  by  an  agent  acting  necejfarily  ;  he  muft,  I  lay, 
mean  this,  for  I  am  very  fenfible  he  would  not  choole 
to  mean  jt  :  And,  Secondly,  That  the  neceffity  by 
which  fuch  an  agent  is  fuppofed  ,to  aft  does  not  ex- 
clude intelligence  and  deli,<n.  So  that  were  the  lyf- 
tem  of  fatality  admitted,  it  would  juft  as  much  ac- 
count for  the  formation  of  the  world  as  for  the  ftruc- 
ture  of  an  lK)ufe,  and.  no  more.  Neceffity  as  much 
requires  and  fuppofes  a  neceffary  agent,  as  freedom 
requires  and  fuppofes  a  free  agent,  to  be  the  former  of 
the  world.  And  the  appearances  of  defign  and  oi final 
caufes  in  the  conftitution  of  nature  as  really  prove  this 
.a6ling  agent  to  be  an  intelligent  dejiguer^  or  to  act  from 
choice,  upon  the  fcheme  of  neceffity,  fuppofed  pof- 
fible,  asjupon  that  of  freedom. 

It  appearing  thus,  that  the  notion  of  neceffity  does 
not  deftroy  the  proof  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Au- 
thor of  nature  and  natural  Governor  of  the  world,  the 
prefent  queftion,  which  the  analogy  before  mention- 
ed* fuggefts,  and  which,  I  think,  it  will  anfwer,  is 
this, — Whether  the  opinion  of  neceffity,  fuppofed 
confiftent  with  poffibihty,  with  the  conftitution  of  the 
world,  and  the  natural  government  which  we  expe- 
rience exercifed  over  it,  deftroys  all  reafonable  ground 
of  belief  that  we  are  in  a  ftate  of  religion  ;  or  whether 

thiit 
*?.  156, 


T  6 o  Of  the  Opinion  of  NeceJJity,  Part  L 

that  opinion  be  reconcileable  with  religion,  with  the 
fyitem  and  the  proof  of  it.  « 

Suppofe  then  a  fatahll  to  educate  an}''  one,  from  his 
youth  up,  in  his  own  principles  ;  that  the  child 
fnould  reafon  upon  them,  and  conclude  that  lince  he 
cannot  poffibly  behave  otherwife  than  he  does,  he  is 
not  a  fubjeft  of  blame  or  commeridation,  nor  can  de- 
ferve  to  be  rewarded  or  punilhed  :  Imagine  him  to 
eradicate  the  very  perceptions  of  blame  and  commen- 
dation out  of  his  mind,  by  means  of  this  fyftem  ;  to 
form  his  temper,  and  character,  and  behaviour  to  it, 
and  from  it  to  judge  of  the  treatment  he  was  to  ex- 
pert, lay  from  reafonable  men,  upon  his  coming  abroad 
into  the  world  ;  as  the  fatalift  judges  from  this  fyftem 
what  he  is  to  expert  from  the  Author  of  nature  and 
with  regard  to  a  future  ftate.  I  cannot  forbear  flop- 
ping here  to  aik,  whether  any  one  of  common  fenfe 
would  think  fit  that  a  child  (liould  be  put  upon  thefe 
fpeculations,  and  be  left  to  apply  them  to  pradice, 
And  a  man  has  little  pretence  to  reafon,  who  is  not 
fenfible  that  we  are  all  children  in  fpeculations  of  this 
kind.  However,  the  child  would  doubtlefs  be  highly 
delighted  to  find  himfelf  freed  from  the  reftraints  of 
fear  and  fhame,  with  which  his  playfellov/s  were  fet- 
tered and  embarralled,  and  highly  conceited  in  his  fu- 
pcrior  knowledge,  fo  far  beyond  his  years.  But  con- 
ceit and  vanity  would  be  the  leaft  bad  part  of  the  in- 
fluence which  thefe  principles  muft  have,  when  thus 
reafoned  and  afted  upon,  during  the  courfe  of  his  ed- 
ucation. He  muft  either  be  allowed  to  go  on  and  be 
the  plague  of  all  about  him,  and  himfelf  too,  even  to 
his  ov^n  deftruclion,  or  elie  corredtion  muft  be  con- 
tinually made  ufe  of,  to  fupply  the  want  of  thofe  nat- 
ural perceptions  of  blame  and  commendation  which 
we  have  luppofed  to  be  removed,  and  to  give  him  a 
practical  imprefTion  of  what  he  had  reafoned  himlelf 
out  of  the  belief  of,  that  he  v»^as  in  fa6l  an  accountable 

child. 


Chap.  VI.  as  influencing  VraFike.  i6i 

.child,  and  to  be  puniflied  for  doing  what  he  was  fofr- 
bid.  It  is  therefore  in  realit)/^  impoffible,  but  that  the 
correction  which  he  muft  meet  with,  in  the  courfe  of 
his  education,  mull  conviace  him  that  if  the  fcheme 
he  was  inftructed  in  were  not  faU'e,  yet  that  he  reafon- 
ed  inconclufively  upon  it,  and  fome  how  or  other  mif- 
appHed  it  to  practice  and  common  Ufe  ;  as  what  the 
fatahil  experiences  of  the  condu6t  of  Providence  at 
prefent,  ought  in  all  reafon  to  convince  him  that  this 
fcheme  is  mifapplied  when  applied  to  the  fubjeft  of 
religion.  But  fuppofmg  the  child's  temper  could  re-r 
main  ftill  formed  to  the  fyftem,  and  his  expeftation 
of  the  treatment  he  v/as  to  have  in  the  world  be  regu- 
lated by  it,  fo  a,s  to  exped  that  no  reafonable  man 
would  blame  or  punilh  him  for  any  thing  which  he 
fhould  do,  becaufc  he  could  not  help  doing  it — upon 
this  fuppofition  it  is  manifeft  he  would,  upon  his  comr- 
ing  abroad  into  the  world,  be  infupportable  to  focie- 
ty,  and  the  treatment  which  he  would  receive  from  it 
would  render  it  fo  to  him,  and  he  could  not  fail  of  do- 
ing fomewhat  very  loon  for  which  he  would  be  deliv- 
ered over  into  the  hands  of  civil  juftice.  And  thus, 
in  the  end,  he  would  be  convinced  of  the  obligations 
he  was  under  to  his  wife  inilruclor.  Or  fuppofe  this 
fcheme  of  fatality  in  any  other  way  applied  to  practice, 
fuch  practical  application  of  it  will  be  found  equally 
abfurd,  equally  fallacious  in  a  practical  fenfe.  For 
inltance,  that  if  a  man  be  dellined  to  live  fuch  a  time, 
he  lliall  live  to  it,  though  he  take  no  care  of  his  own 
prefervatlon  ;  or  if  he  be  dellined  to  die  before  that 
time,  no  care  can  prevent  it ;  therefore  all  care  about 
preferving  one's  life  is  to  be  neglected,  which  is  the 
fallacy  inftanced  in  by  the  ancients.  But  now  on  the 
contrary,  none  of  thefe  pradical  abfurdities  can  be 
drawn  from  reafoning  upon  the  fuppofition  that  we  are 
free  ;  but  all  fuch  reafoning  with  regard  to  the  com- 
nion  affairs  of  life  is  juftihed  by  experience.     And 

therefore. 


1 62  Of  the  Opinion  of  NeceJJity^  Part  I. 

therefore,  though  it  were  admitted  that  this  opinion 
of  neceflity  were  fpeculatively  true,  yet  with  regard  to 
praftice  it  is  as  if  it  were  falle,  fo  far  as  our  experience 
reaches ;  that  is,  to  the  whole  of  our  prefent  Hfe. 
For,  the  conflitution  of  the  prefent  world,  and  the 
condition  in  which  we  are  adually  placed,  is  as  if  we 
were  free.  And  it  may  perhaps  juftly  be  concluded, 
that  fmce  the  v/hole  procefs  of  afliion,  through  every 
ftep  of  it,  fufpenfe,  deliberation,  inclining  one  way, 
determining,  and  at  laft  doing  as  we  determine,  is  as 
if  we  were  free,  therefore  we  are  fo.  But  the  thing 
here  inlifled  upon  is,  that  unckr  the  prefent  natural 
government  of  the  world,  we  find  we  are  treated  and 
dealt  with  as  if  we  were  free,  prior  to  all  conlideration 
whether  we  are  or  not.  Were  this  opinion  therefore 
of  neceflity  admitted  to  be  ever  fo  true,  yet  fuch  is  in 
fa6t  our  condition  and  the  natural  courle  of  things, 
that  whenever  we  apply  it  to  life  and  pradice,  this  ap- 
plication of  it  always  mifieads  us,  and  cannot  but  mif- 
iead  us,  in  a  moft  dreadful  manner,  with  regard  to 
our  prefent  intcreft.  And  how  can  people  think 
themfelves  fo  very  fecure  then,  that  the  fame  applica- 
tion of  the  fame  opinion  may  not  miflead  them  alfo, 
.in  fome  analogous  manner,  with  reipe6t  to  a  future 
or  more  general  and  m.ore  important  intereft  ?  For, 
religion  being  a  pradiical  fubje<5t,  and  the  analogy  of 
nature  Ihewing  us  that  we  have  not  faculties  to  apply 
this  opinion,  were  it  a  true  one,  to  practical  fubjedts, 
whenever  we  do  apply  it  to  the  fubjed;  of  religion,  and 
thence  conclude  that  we  are  tree  from  its  obligations, 
it  is  plain  this  conclufion  cannot  be  depended  upon. 
There  will  ftill  remain  juft  reafon  to  think,  whatever 
appearances  are,  that  we  deceive  ourlelves  j  in  fomewhat 
of  a  like  manner,  as  when  people  fancy  they  can  draw 
contradidory  conclufions  from  the  idea  of  infinity. 

From  thefe  things  together,  the  attentive  reader 
will  fee  it  follows,  that  if  upon  fuppofition  of  freedom 

the 


C II A  P .  V I .  tis  influencittg  PraElke.  163 

the  evidence  of  religion  be  conclufive,  it  remains  ib 
upon  fiippofition  of  neceflit}^  becaufe  the  notion  of 
neceflity  is  not  appHcable  to  pra<5lical  fiibjccfts,  i.  e. 
Vv'ith  refped  to  them,  is  as  if  it  Vv'ere  not  true.  Nor 
does  this  contain  any  reflexion  upon  reafon,  but  only 
upon  what  is  unreafonable.  For  to  pretend  to  ad 
upon  reafon,  in  oppofition  to  praftical  principles, 
which  the  Author  of  our  nature  gave  us  to  aft  upon, 
and  to  pretend  to  apply  our  reafon  to  fubjecls,  with 
regard  to  which  our  own  Ihort  views,  and  even  -our 
experience,  will  (hew  us  it  cannot  be  depended  upon, 
and  i'ucli  at  beft  the  fubject  of  neceffity  muft  be,  this 
is  vanity,  conceit  and  unreafonablenefs. 

But  this  is  not  all ;  for  we  find  within  ourfelves  a 
will,  and  are  confcious  of  a  charadler.  Now  if  this  in 
us  be  reconciieable  with  fate,  it  is  reconcileable  with  it 
in  the  Author  of  nature.  And  befides,  natural  gov- 
ernment and  final  caufes  imply  a  character  and  a  will 
in  the  Governor  and  Defigner  ;*  a  will  concerning  the 
creatures  whom  he  governs.  The  Author  of  nature 
then  being  certainly  of  fome  character  or  other,  not- 
withftanding  neceffity,  it  is  evident  this  neceffity  is  as 
reconcileable  with  the  particular  charafter  of  benevo- 
lence, veracity  and  juftice  in  him,  which  attributes  are 
the  foundation  of  religion,  as  with  any  other  charac- 
ter ;  fince  we  find  this  neceffity  no  more  hinders  me/i 
from  being  benevolent  than  cruel,  true  than  faithlefs, 
juft  than  unjuft,  or  if  the  fataliil  pleafes,  what  we  call 
unjuft.  For  it  is  faid  indeed,  that  what,  upon  fuppo- 
fition  of  freedom,  would  be  juft  punill"iment,upon  fup- 
pofition  of  neceffity  becomes  manifeftly  unjuft,  becaufe 
it  is  punifliment  inflided  for  doing  that  Vv'hich  perfons 
could  not  avoid  doing ;  as  if  the  neceffity  which  is 
fuppofed  to  deftroy  the  injuftice  of  murder,  for  in- 

ftance, 

*  By  ivill  5nd  charaElcr  is  meant  that,  which,  in  fpeaking  of  men,  we 
ftiould  expref'-.,  not  only  by  thefe  words,  hut  alfo  by  t!ie  words  tentper,  taj}{, 
difpofilioKiy  praSiical  principles  ;  that  wkok  frame  of  mind,  from  whence  "J-'c  a£l  in 
QHi  manner  rather  that;  another. 


J  64  Of  the  opinion  of  Nee  ejfity.  Part  I. 

fiance,  would  not  alfo  deftroy  the  injuftice  of  puniflii- 
ing  it.  However,  as  little  to  the  purpofe  as  this  ob- 
jedion  is  in  itfelf,  it  is  very  much  to  the  purpofe  to 
obferve  from  it  how  the  notions  of  juftice  and  injuftice 
remain,  even  whilft  we  endeavour  to  fuppofe  them  re- 
moved ;  how  they  force  themfelves  upon  the  mind, 
even  whilft  we  are  making  fuppofitions  deftruftive  of 
them  ;  for  there  is  not,  perhaps,  a  man  in  the  world, 
but  would  be  ready  to  make  this  objection  at  firft 
thought. 

But  though  it  is  moft  evident,  that  univerfal  necef- 
iity,  if  it  be  reconcileable  with  any  thing,  is  reconcile- 
abie  with  that  charafter  in  the  Author  of  nature  which 
is  the  foundation  of  rehgion,  "  Yet,  does  it  not  plain- 
ly deftroy  the  proof  that  he  is  of  that  charader,  and 
confequently  the  proof  of  religion  ?"  By  no  means. 
For  we  find,  that  happinefs  and  mifery  are  not  our  fate, 
in  any  fuch  fenfe  as  not  to  be  the  confequences  of  our 
behaviour ;  but  that  they  are  the  confequences  of  it.* 
We  find  God  exercifes  the  fame  kind  of  government 
over  us  with  that  which  a  father*  exercifes  over  his 
children,  and  a  civil  magiftrate  over  his  fubjefts. 
Now,  whatever  becomes  of  abilrad  queftions  con- 
cerning liberty  and  necefFity,  it  evidently  appears  to 
•us,  that  veracity  and  juftice  muft  be  the  natural  rule 
and  meafure  of  exercifing  this  authority  or  govern- 
ment, to  a  Being  who  can  have  no  competitions,  or 
interfering  of  interefts,  with  his  creatures  and  his 
fubjeds. 

But  as  the  do6trine  of  liberty,  though  we  experience 
its  truth,  may  be  perplexed  with  difficulties  which  run 
up  into  the  moft  abftrufe  of  all  fpeculations,  and  as 
the  opinion  of  neceffity  feems  to  be  the  very  bafis  up- 
on which  infidelity  grounds  itfelf,  it  may  be  of  fome 
ufe  to  offer  a  more  particular  proof  of  the  obligations 
t)f  religion,  which  may  diftindly  be  lliewn  not  to  be 
deftroyed  by  this  opinion.  The 

*Chap.  ii. 


€ H  A  p .  Vf .  ds  influencing  PraHice.  1 6 ^ 

The  proof  from  final  caufes  of  an  intelligent  Author 
t£  nature  is  not  affected  by  the  opinion  of  neceflity, 
fuppofing  neceflity  a  thing  pofTible  in  itfelf,  and  recon- 
cileable  with  the  coniJitution  of  things.*     And  it  is  a 
matter  of  fadt,  independent  on  this  or  any  other  fpec- 
iilation,  that  he  governs  the  world  by  the  method  of 
rewards  and  punifliments  j-f-  and  alfo  that  he  hath 
given  us  a  moral  faculty,  by  which  wc  diftinguifli  be- 
tween adtions,  and  approve  fome  as  virtuous  and  of 
good  defert,  and  difapprove  others  as  vicious  and  of 
ill  defert.  \     Now  this  moral  difcernment  implies  in- 
the  notion  of  it  a  rule  of  action,  and  a  rule  of  a  very 
peculiar  kind  ;  for  it  carries  in  it  authority  and  a  right 
of  diredlion  ;  authority  in  fuch  a  fenfe,  as  that  we  can- 
not depart  from  it  without  being  feif  condemned.  § 
And  that  the  dictates  of  this  moral  faculty,  which  are 
by  nature  a  rule  to  us,  are  moreover  the  laws  of  God, 
laws  in  a  fenfe  including  fanftions,  may  be  thus  proved. 
Confcioufnefs  of  a  rule  or  guide  of  action,  in  creatures 
who  are  capable  of  conlidering  it  as  given  them  by 
their  Maker,  not  only  raifes  immediately  a  fenfe  of 
duty,  but  alfo  a  {tn^Q  of  fecurity  in  following  it,  and 
of  danger  in  deviating  from  it.     A  diredlion  of  the 
Author  of  nature,  given  to  creatures  capable  of  look- 
ing upon  it  as  fuch,  is  plainly  a  command  from  him  ; 
and  a  command  from  him  necefTarily  includes  in  it, 
at  leaft,  an  implicit  promife  in  cafe  of  obedience,  or 
threatening  in  cafe  of  difobedience.     But  then  the 
fenfe  or  perception  of  good  and  ill  defert,  ||  which  is 
contained  in  the  moral  difcernment,  renders  the  fanc- 
tion  explicit,  and  makes  it  appear,  as  one  may  fay,  ex- 
prefled.     For  fince  his  method  of  government  is  to  re- 
ward and  punilh  adions,  his  having  annexed  to  fome 
a6tions  an  infeparable  fenfe  of  good  defert,  and  to 
others  of  ill,  this  furely  amou;its  to  declaring  upon 

whom 

*  p.  157,  Jcc.  f  Ch.  ii.  1  Bifftrtamn  11. 

§  Sermon  i.  at  the  RcU:.  J|  D'Jfertation  II. 


1 66  Of  the  Opinion  of  NeceJJity^  Part  I. 

whom  his  punifliments  fhall  be  inflided,  and  his  re- 
wards be  beftowed.  For  he  muft  have  given  us  this 
difcernment  and  fenfe  of  things,  as  a  prefentiment  of 
what  is  to  be  hereafter  ;  that  is,  by  way  of  informa- 
tion beforehand  what  we  are  finally  to  expe^l  in  his 
world.  There  is  then  moft  evident  groimd  to  think, 
that  the  government  of  God,  upon  the  whole,  will  be 
found  to  correfpond  to  the  nature  which  he  has  given 
us ;  and  that  in  the  upihot  and  iflue  of  things,  happi- 
nefs  and  mifery  fhall,  in  fadt  and  event,  be  made  to 
follow  virtue  and  vice  refpeftively,  as  he  has  already, 
in  fo  peculiar  a  manner,  afTociated  the  ideas  of  them 
in  our  minds.  And  from  hence  might  eafily  be  de- 
duced the  obligations  of  rehgious  worlliip,  were  it  on- 
ly to  be  confidered  as  a  means  of  preferving  upon  our 
minds  a  fenfe  of  this  moral  government  of  God,  and 
fccuring  our  obedience  to  it ;  which  yet  is  an  ex- 
tremely imperfeft  view  of  that  mofi;  important  dutv. 
Now  I  fay,  no  objeftion  from  neccffity  can  lie 
againft  this  general  proof  of  religion.  None  againft 
the  propofition  reafoned  upon,  that  we  have  fuch  a 
moral  faculty  and  difcernment,  becaufe  this  is  a  mere 
matter  of  fad,  a  thing  of  experience,  that  human  kind 
is  thus  conftituted  ;  none  againft  the  concluiion,  be- 
caufe it  is  immediate  and  wholly  from  this  fa6t.  For 
the  concluiion,  that  God  will  finally  reward  the  righ- 
teous and  punifh  the  wicked,  is  not  here  drawn  from 
its  appearing  to  us  fit*  that  he Jliould,  but  from  its  ap- 
pearing 

*  However,  I  am  far  from  intending  to  deny  that  the  will  of  God  is  deter- 
mined, by  what  is  fit,  by  the  right  and  reafon  of  the  cafe  ;  though  one  chooi'es 
to  decline  matters  of  fuch  abftraft  fpeculation,  and  to  fpeak  with  caution 
when  one  does  fpeak  of  them.  But  if  it  be  intelligible  to  fay,  that  it  isfii  and 
reajonahte  for  every  one  to  coufutt  kU  otvn  kappi7icfs,  then  fitnefs  of  aih'of;,  or  I'u 
right  and  re.ijon  of  the  cafe,  is  an  intelligible  manner  of  fpeaking.  And  it  feeni- 
2S  inconceivable  to  fuppofe  God  to  approve  one  courfe  of  adlion,  or  one  end, 
preferably  to  another,  which  yet  his  acting  at  all  from  dcfigu  implies  th:.t  he- 
does,  without  fuppofmg  fomewhat  prior  in  that  end  to  be  tha  ground  of  thr 
preference,  as  to  fuppofe  him  to  difcern  an  abflradl  propofition  to  be  true, 
without  fuppofing  fomewhat  prior  in  it  to  be  the  ground  of  the  difcernment. 
It  doth  not  therefore  appear,  that  moral  right  is  any  more  relative  to  percep- 
tion than  abflrafl  truth  is ;  or  that  it  is  any  more  improper  to  fpeak  of  the 
fitnefs  and  rightnefs  of  adf  ions  and  ends,  as  founded  in  the  r-ature  of  thinjSi 
than  to  fpeak  of  abHradt  trail),  as  thus  founded. 


GilAP.  VI.  as  influencing  Pra6iice.  16  j 

pearing  that  he  has  told  us  /le  will.  And  this  he  hath 
certainly  told  us,  in  the  promife  and  threatening  which 
it  hath  been  obferved  the  notion  of  a  command  im- 
plies, and  the  fenfe  of  good  and  ill  defert  which  he  has 
given  us,  more  diftinftly  expreffes.  And  this  reafon- 
ing  from  faft  is  confirmed,  and  in  fome  degree  even 
verified,  by  other  fafts ;  by  the  natural  tendencies  of 
virtue  and  of  vice  ;  *  and  by  this,  that  God,  in  the 
natur-al  courfe  of  his  providence,  puniflies  vicious  ac- 
tions as  milchievous  to  fociety,  and  alfo  vicious  ac- 
tions, as  fuch,  in  the  llridtefl.  fenfe.-f  So  that  the  gen- 
eral proof  of  religion  is  unanfwerably  real,  even  upon 
the  wild  fuppofition  which  we  are  arguing  upon. 

It  mud  likewife  be  obierved  farther,  that  natural 
religion  hath,  befides  this,  an  external  evidence,  which 
the  doctrine  of  neceffity,  if  it  could  be  true,  would 
not  affedt.  For  fuppofe  a  perfon,  by  the  obiervations 
and  reafoning  above,  or  by  any  other,  convinced  of  the 
truth  of  religion  ;  that  there  is  a  God,  who  made  the 
world,  who  is  the  moral  Governor  and  Judge  of  man- 
kind, and  will  upon  the  whole  deal  with  every  one  ac- 
cording to  his  works ;  I  lay,  fuppofe  a  perfon  con- 
vinced of  this  by  reaion,  but  to  know  nothing  at  all 
of  antiquity,  or  the  prefent  (late  of  mankind  ;  it  would 
be  natural  for  fuch  an  one  to  be  inquifitivc  what  was 
the  hiftory  of  this  fyftem  of  dodrine  ;  at  what  time, 
and  in  what  manner,  it  came  fi^ril  into  the  world,  and 
whether  it  were  believed  by  any  confiderable  part  of  it. 
And  were  he  upon  inquiry  to  find,  that  a  particular 
perfon  in  a  late  age  firft  of  all  propofed  it,  as  a  deduc- 
tion of  reafon,  and  that  mankind  were  before  wholly 
ignorant  of  it ;  then,  though  its  evidence  from  reafon 
would  remain,  there  would  be  no  additional  proba- 
bility of  its  truth,  from  the  account  of  its  difcovery. 
But  inftead  of  this  being  the  fa6t  of  the  cafe,  on  the 
contrary  he  would  find,  what  could  not  but  aiTord 

hin'i 

'*•  P.  iir.  f  p.  10.^,  &:C. 


1 68  Of  the  Opinion  of  Nee  ejfity.  Part  L 

him  a  very  ftrong  confirmation  of  its  truth,  Firf, 
That  fomewhat  of  this  fyftem,  with  more  or  fewer  ad- 
ditions and  alterations,  hath  been  profefied  in  all  ages 
and  countries,  of  which  we  have  any  certain  informa- 
tion relating  to  this  matter.  Secondly,  That  it  is  cer- 
tain hiflorical  fa£t,  fo  far  as  we  can  trace  things  up, 
that  this  whole  fyftem  of  behef,  that  there  is  one  God, 
the  Creator  and  moral  Governor  of  the  world,  and  that 
mankind  is  in  ?.  ftate  of  religion,  was  received  in  the 
firft  ages.  And,  Thirdly,  That  as  there  is  no  hint  or 
intimation  in  hiftory,  that  this  fyftem  was  firft  reafon- 
ed  out,  lb  there  is  exprefs  hiftorical  or  traditional  evi- 
dence, as  ancient  as  hiftory,  that  it;  was  taught  firft  by 
revelation.  Now  thefe  things  muft  be  allowed  to  be 
of  great  v/eight.  The  firft  of  them,  general  confent, 
flievvs  this  fyftem  to  be  conformable  to  the  common 
fenfe  of  mankind.  The  fecond,  namely,  that  religion 
was  beUeved  in  the  firft  ages  of  the  world,  efpecially 
as  it  does  not  appear  that  there  were  then  any  fuper- 
ftitious  or  falfe  additions  to  it,  cannot  but  be  a  farther 
confirmation  of  its  truth.  For  it  is  a  proof  of  this 
alternative,  either  that  it  came  into  the  world  by  rev- 
elation, or  that  it  is  natural,  obvious,  and  forces  itfelf 
upon  the  mind.  The  former  of  thefe  is  the  conclu- 
lion  of  learned  men.  And  whoever  will  confider  how 
unapt  for  fpcculation  rude  and  uncultivated  minds 
are,  will,  perhaps  from  hence  alone,  be  ftrongly  in- 
clined to  believe  it  the  truth.  And  as  it  is  fliewn  in 
die  fecond  part*  of  this  treatife,  that  there  is  noth- 
ing of  fuch  peculiar  prefumption  againft  a  revelation 
in  the  beginning  of  the  world,  as  there  is  fuppofed  to 
be  againft  fubfequent  ones,  a  fceptic  could  not,  I 
think,  give  any  account,  which  would  appear  more 
probable  even  to  himfelf,  of  the  early  pretences  to  rev- 
elation, than  by  fuppofing  fome  real  original  one, 
from  whence  they  were  copied.     And  the  third  thing 

above 

*  Ch.  ii. 


Chap.  VI.  ds  injiiiencing  PraSiice.  169 

above  mentioned,  that  there  is  exprefs  hiflorlcal  or 
traditional  evidence  as  aacient  as  hiftory,  of  the  fyf- 
tem  of  rehgion  being  taught  mankind  by  revelation  ; 
this  muft  be  admitted  as  fome  degree  of  real  proof 
that  it  was  fo  taught.  For  why  fhould  not  the  moft 
ancient  tradition  be  admitted,  as  fome  additional 
proof  of  a  faft,  againft  which  there  is  no  prefumption  ? 
And  this  proof  is  mentioned  here,  becaufe  it  has  its 
weight  to  fhew,  that  religion  came  into  the  world  by 
revelation,  prior  to  all  confideration  of  the  proper  au- 
thority of  any  book  fuppoied  to  contain  it,  and  even 
prior  to  all  conlideration  whether  the  revelation  itfelf 
be  uncorruptly  handed  down  and  related,  or  mixed 
and  darkened  with  fables.  Thus  the  hiftorical  ac- 
count which  we  have  of  the  origin  of  religion,  taking 
in  ail  circumftances,  is  a  real  confirmation  of  its  truth 
no  way  afFefted  by  the  opinion  of  neceflity.  And  the 
external  evidence,  even  of  natural  religion,  is  by  no 
means  inconfiderable. 

But  it  is  carefully  to  be  obferved,  and  ought  to  be 
recolledled  after  all  proofs  of  virtue  and  religion,  which 
are  only  general,  that  as  fpeculative  reafon  may  be 
neglected,  prejudiced  and  deceived, — fo  alfo  may  our 
moral  underftanding  be  impaired  and  perverted,  and 
the  dictates  of  it  not  impartially  attended  to.  This 
indeed  proves  nothing  againft  the  reality  of  our  fpec- 
ulative or  practical  faculties  of  perception  ;  againft 
their  being  intended  by  nature  to  inform  us  in  the 
theory  of  things,  and  inftruft  us  how  we  are  to  be- 
have, and  what  we  are  to  exped:  in  confequence  of 
our  behaviour.  Yet  our  liablenefs,  in  the  degree  we 
are  liable,  to  prejudice  and  perveriion,  is  a  moft  ferious 
admonition  to  us  to  be  upon  our  guard  with  refpedt 
to  what  is  of  ftich  confequence  as  our  determinations 
concerning  virtue  and  religion,  and  particularly  not  to 
take  cuftom,  and  fafhion,  and  flight  notions  of  hon- 
our, or  imaginations  of  prefent  eafe,  ufe  and  conve- 
nience to  mankind,  for  the  only  moral  rule.* 

*  Dijjiitathn  II.  M  The 


1 70  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necejfity,  Part  I, 

The  foregoing  obfervations,  drawn  from  the  nature 
of  the  thnig,  and  the  hiflory  of  rehgion,  amount, 
when  taken  together,  to  a  real  praftical  proof  of  it, 
not  to  be  confuted  ;  fuch  a  proof  as,  confidering  the 
infinite  importance  of  the  thing,  I  apprehend  would 
be  admitted  fully  fufficient,  in  reafon,  to  influence  the 
adions  of  men  who  aft  upon  thought  and  refleftion, 
if  it  were  admitted  that  there  is  no  proof  of  the  con- 
trary. But  it  may  be  faid,  "  There  are  many  proba- 
bilities, which  cannot  indeed  be  confuted,  i.  e.  (hewn 
to  be  no  probabilities,  and  yet  may  be  overbalanced 
by  greater  probabiUties  on  the  other  fide  ;  much  more 
by  demonflratlon.  And  there  is  no  oceafion  to  objedt 
againfb  particular  arguments  alleged  for  an  opinion, 
when  the  opinion  itfelf  may  be  clearly  fhewn  to  be 
falfe,  without  meddling  with  fuch  arguments  at  all, 
but  leaving  them  juil  as  they  are.  Now  the  method 
of  government  by  rewards  and  punifhments,  and  ef- 
pecially  rewarding  and  puniiliing  good  and  ill  defert, 
as  fuch,  refpedtively,  muft  go  upon  fuppofition  that 
we  are  free,  and  not  neceffary  agents.  And  it  is  in- 
credible that  the  Author  of  nature  ihould  govern  us 
upon  a  fuppofition  as  true,  which  he  knows  to  be  falfe  ; 
and  therefore  abfurd  to  think  he  will  reward  or  punilh 
us  for  our  adions  hereafter,  efpecially  that  he  will  do 
it  under  the  notion  that  they  are  of  good  or  ill  defert.'* 
Here  then  the  matter  is  brought  to  a  point.  And  the 
anlwer  to  all  this  is  full,  and  not  to  be  evaded,  that 
the  whole  conftitution  and  courfe  of  things,  the  whole 
analogy  ot  Providence,  fhews  beyond  poflibility  of 
doubt,  that  the  conclufion  from  this  reafoning  is  falfe, 
wher  ever  the  fallacy  lies.  The  do6trine  of  freedom 
indeed  clearly  fhows  where ;  in  fuppoiing  ourielves 
neceflary,  when  in  truth  we  are  free, agents.  But  up- 
on the  iiippclition  of  neceifity,  the  fallacy  lies  in  tak- 
ing for  granted,  that  it  is  incredible  necelfary  agents 
ihould  be  rewarded  and  punilhed.     But  that,  fome 

how 


Chap.  VI.  as  utfluencing  PraBice*  171 

Jiow  or  other,  the  conclufion  now  mentioned  is  fahe, 
is  moft  certain.  For  it  is  fad:,  that  God  does  govern 
even  brute  creatures  by  the  method  of  rewards  and 
punifhments,  in  the  natural  courle  of  things.  And 
men  are  rewa'rded  and  punifhed  for  their  actions,  pun- 
ilhed  for  aftions  mifchievous  to  fociety  as  being  fo, 
punilhed  for  vicious  actions,  as  fuch,  by  the  natural 
inftrumentahty  of  each  other,  under  the  prefent  con- 
duct of  Providence.  Nay  even  tlie  affection  of  grati- 
tude, and  the  paffion  of  refentment,  and  the  rewards 
and  punifliments  following  from  them,  which  in  gen- 
eral are  to  be  confidered  as  natural,  i.  e.  from  the  Au- 
thor of  nature, — thefe  rewards  and  punifhments,  be- 
ing naturally*  annexed  to  aftions  confidered  as  imply- 
ing good  intention  and  good  defert,  ill  intention  and 
ill  defert, — thefe  natural  rewards  and  punifhments,  I 
fay,  are  as  much  a  contradi6tion  to  the  conclufion 
above,  and  fhew  its  falfehood,  as  a  more  exad:  and 
complete  rewarding  and  punifliing  of  good  and  ill  de- 
fert, as  fuch.  So  that  if  it  be  incredible  that  neceflary 
agents  fliould  be  thus  rewarded  and  punifhed,  then 
men  are  not  neceliary,  but  free  ;  fmce  it  is  matter  of 
fad  that  they  are  thus  rewarded  and  punifhed.  But 
if,  on  the  contrary,  which  is  the  fuppofition  we  have 
been  arguing  upon,  it  be  infifted  that  men  are  necef- 
fary  agents,  then- there  is  nothing  incredible  in  the  far- 
ther fuppolition  of  necefTary  agents  being  thus  reward- 
ed and  punifhed,  fince  we  ourfelves  are  thus  dealt  with. 
From  the  whole,  therefore,  it  muft  follow,  that  a 
neceffity  fuppofed  polTible,  and  reconcileable  with  the 
conftitution  of  things,  does  in  no  fort  prove  that  the 
Author  of  nature  will  not,  nor  deftroy  the  proof  that 
he  will,  finally  and  upon  the  whole,  in  his  eternal  gov- 
ernment, render  his  creatures  happy  or  miferable,  by 
fome  means  or  other,  as  they  behave  well  or  ill.  Or, 
to  exprefs  this  conclufion  in  words  conformable  to  the 
M  2  title 

*  Sermon  8  th,  at  the  Rolh. 


Tt"]!  The  Government  of  God,  Fart  L 

title  of  the  chapter,  the  analogy  of  nature  Ihews  us, 
that  the  opinion  of  neceffity,  confidered  as  practical, 
is  falfe.  And  if  neceffity,  upon  the  fuppofition  above 
mentioned,  doth  not  deftroy  the  proof  of  natural  re- 
ligion, it  evidently  makes  no  alteration  in  the  proof 
of  revealed. 

From  thele  things  likewife  we  may  learn,  in  what 
fenfe  to  underftand  that  general  affertion,  that  the 
opinion  of  neceffity  is  efTentially  deftru6live  of  all  re- 
ligion. Firfl:  in  a  praftical  fenfe  ;  that  by  this  notion, 
atheiftical  men  pretend  to  fatisfy  and  encourage  them- 
felves  in  vice,  and  juftify  to  others  their  difregard  to 
all  religion.  And  fecondly,  in  the  ftrifteft  fenle,  that 
it  is  a  contradiction  to  the  whole  conftitution  of  na- 
ture, and  to  what  we  may  every  moment  experience 
in  ourfelves,  and  fo  overturns  every  thing.  But  by 
no  means  is  this  affertion  to  be  underftood,  as  if  ne- 
ceffity, fuppofing  it  could  poffibly  be  reconciled  with 
the  conftitution  of  things  and  with  what  we  experi- 
ence, were  not  alfo  reconcileable  with  religion ;  for 
upon  this  fuppofition  it  demonftrably  is  fo. 

CHAP.     VII. 

Of  the  Government  of  God,  conjtdered  as  a  Scheme  or 
Conflitution,  im-perfe£tly  comprehended. 

X  HOUGH  it  be,  as  it  cannot  but  be, 
acknowledged,  that  the  analogy  of  nature  gives  a 
ftrong  credibility  to  the  general  doftrine  of  religion, 
and  to  the  feveral  particular  things  contained  in  it, 
confidered  as  fo  many  matters  of  fa6t,  and  likewife 
that  it  fhews  this  credibility  not  to  be  deilroyed  by 
any  notions  of  neceffity, — ^yet  ftill  objedions  may  be 

infifted 


Ch  A p .  V II .        a  Scheme  incomprehenjtble.  173 

infifted  upon  againft  the  wifdom,  equity  and  goodnefs 
of  the  divine  government  implied  in  the  notion  of  re- 
ligion, and  againft  the  method  by  which  this  govern- 
ment is  condtifted  ;  to  which  Gbjections  analogy  can 
be  no  direft  anfwer.  For  the  credibihty  or  the  cer- 
tain truth  of  a  matter  of  fad:  does  not  immediately 
prove  any  thing  concerning  the  wifdom  or  goodnefs 
of  it ;  and  analogy  can  do  no  more,  immediately  or 
-diredly,  than  fliew  fuch  and  fuch  things  to  be  true  or 
credible,  conlidered  only  as  matters  of  fadt.  But  ftill, 
if,  upon  fuppofeion  of  a  moral  conftitution  of  nature 
and  a  moral  government  over  it,  analogy  fuggellis  and 
makes  it  credible  that  this  government  muft  be  a 
fcheme,  fyftem,  or  conftitution  of  government,  as  dif- 
tinguiftied  from  a  number  of  fmgle  unconnected  ads 
of  diftributive  juftice  and  goodnefs,  and  likewife  that 
it  muft  be  a  fcheme  fo  imperfectly  comprehended,  and 
of  fuch  a  fort  in  other  refpefts,  as  to  aftbrd  a  direct 
general  anfwer  to  all  objedions  againft  the  juftice  and 
goodnefs  of  it, — then  analog}'  is,  remotely,  of  great  fer- 
\ict  in  anfwcring  thofe  objedions,  both  by  fuggefting 
the  anfwer^  and  ihewing  it  to  be  a  credible  one. 

Now  this,  upon  inquiry,  will  be  found  to  be  the 
cafe.  For,  Firji^  Upon  fuppofition  that  God  exer- 
cifes  a  moral  government  over  the  world,  the  analogy 
of  his  natural  government  fuggefts  and  makes  it  cred- 
ible that  his  moral  government  muft  be  a  fcheme  quite 
beyond  our  compreheniion  ;  and  this  affords  a  general 
anfwer  to  all  objedions  againft  the  juftice  and  good- 
nefs of  it.  "And,  Secondly^  A  more  diftind  obfervation 
of  fome  particular  things  contained  in  God's  fcheme 
of  natural  government,  the  like  things  being  fuppofed 
by  analogy  to  be  contained  in  his  moral  government, 
will  farther  fliew  how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon 
thefe  objedions. 

I.  Upon  fuppofition  that  God  exercifes  a  moral 
government  over  the  world,  the  analogy  of  his  natural 

government 


174  T^^^^  Government  of  God,  Part  I. 

government  fuggefts  and  makes  it  credible  that  his 
moral  government  muft  be  a  icheme  quite  bej'ond  our 
comprehenfion  j  and  this  affords  a  general  anfvver  to 
all  objections  againfl  the  juftice  and  goodnefs  of  it. 
It  is  moft  obvious,  analogy  renders  it  highly  credible, 
that  upon  fuppolition  of  a  moral  government,  it  muft 
be  a  fcheme  ;  for  the  world,  and  the  whole  natural 
government  of  it,  appears  to  be  lb,  to  be  a  fcheme,  fyf- 
tem,  or  conftitution,  whofe  parts  correfpond  to  each 
other  and  to  a  v/hole,  as  really  as  any  work  of  art,  or 
as  any  particular  model  of  a  civil  conftitution  and 
government.  In  this  great  fcheme  of  the  natural 
world,  individuals  have  various  peculiar  relations  to 
other  individuals  of  their  own  fpecles.  And  whole 
fpecies  are,  we  find,  varioufly  related  to  other  fpecies 
upon  this  earth.  Nor  do  we  know  how  much  farther 
thefe  kinds  of  relations  may  extend.  And,  as  there  is 
not  any  aft  ion  or  natural  event,  which  we  are  ac- 
quainted with,  fo  fingle  and  unconnected  as  not  to 
have  a  refpedl  to  fome  other  adions  and  events, — fo 
poffibly  each  of  them,  when  it  has  not  an  immediate, 
may  yet  have  a  remote  natural  relation  to  other  aftions 
and  events,  much  beyond  the  compafs  oi  this  prefent 
world.  There  feems  indeed  nothing  from  whence  we 
can  fo  much  as  make  a  conjefture,  whether  all  crea- 
tures, actions  and  events,  throughout  the  whole  of 
nature,  have  relations  to  each  other.  But,  as  it  is  ob- 
vious that  all  events  have  future  unknown  confe- 
quences,  fo  if  we  trace  any  as  far  as  we  can  go  into 
what  is  connected  with  it,  we  fhall  find,  that  if  fuch 
event  were  not  connefted  with  fomewhat  farther  in  na- 
ture unknown  to  us,  fomevv^hat  both  pafb  and  prefent, 
fuch  event  could  not  poffibly  have  been  at  all.  Nor 
can  we  give  the  whole  account  of  any  one  thing  what- 
ever ;  of  all  its  caufes,  ends  and  ncceffary  adjundls  ; 
thofe  adjuncts,  I  mean,  without  which  it  could  not 
have  been.      By   this   moil  aftonilhing  connexion, 

thefc 


C  H  A  p .  VI I .       a  Scheme  incomprehenftble.  175 

t\\t(&  reciprocal  correfpondencies  and  mutual  relations, 
every  thing  which  we  fee  in  the  courfe  of  nature  is  ac- 
t^Lially  brought  about.  And  things  feemingly  the 
mofl  infignihcant  imaginable,  are  perpetually  obferv- 
ed  to  be  necelTary  conditions  to  other  things  of  the 
greateft  importance  ;  fo  that  any  one  thing  whatever 
may,  for  ought  we  know  to  the  contrary,  be  a  necefla- 
ry  condition  to  any  other.  The  natural  world  then, 
and  natural  government  of  it,  being  fuch  an  incom- 
prehenfible  fcheme,  fo  incomprehenfible  that  a  man 
m.uft  really  in  the  literal  fenle  know  nothing  at  all, 
who  is  not  fenfible  of  his  ignorance  in  it,  this  imme- 
diately fuggefts,and  ftrongly  (hews  the  credibility,  that 
the  moral  world  and  government  of  it  may  be  fo  too. 
Indeed  the  natural  and  moral  conftitution  and  govern- 
ment of  the  world  are  fo  connefted,  as  to  make  up  to- 
gether but  one  fcheme  ;  and  it  is  highly  probable, 
that  the  firft  is  formed  and  carried  on  merely  in  fub- 
ferviency  to  the  latter,  as  the  vegetable  world  is  for 
the  animal,  and  organized  bodies  for  minds.  But 
the  thing  intended  here  is,  without  inquiring  how  far 
the  adminiftration  of  the  natural  world  is  fubordinate 
to  that  of  the  moral,  only  to  obferve  the  credibility 
that  one  fhould  be  analogous  or  fimilar  to  the  other  ; 
that  therefore  every  aft  of  divine  juftice  and  goodnefs 
maybe  fuppofed  to  look  much  beyond  itfelf,  and  its  im- 
liiediate  objecb ;  may  have  fome  reference  to  other  parts 
of  God's  moral  adminiftration,  and  to  a  general  moral 
plan  ;  and  that  every  circumftance  of  this  his  moral 
government  may  be  adjuiled  beforehand  with  a  view 
to  the  whole  of  it.  Thus  for  example  ; — the  deter- 
mined length  of  time,  and  the  degrees  and  ways  in 
which  virtue  is  to  remain  in  a  ftate  of  warfare  and  dif- 
cipline,  and  in  which  wickednefs  is  permitted  to  have 
its  progrefs  ;  the  times  appointed  for  the  execution  of 
juftice  ;  the  appointed  inftruments  of  it  ;  the  kinds  of 
rewards  and  puniiliments,  and  /llie  manners  of  their 

dillribution  ^  - 


176  The  Government  of  God,  Part  I. 

diftributlon. ;  all  particular  inftances  of  divine  juftice 
and  goodnefs,  and  every  circumiLance  of  them,  may 
have  fuch  refpefts  to  each  other  as  to  make  up  all  to- 
gether a  whole,  connected  and  related  in  all  its  parts ; 
a  fcheme  or  fyfbem  which  is  as  properly  one  as  the 
natural  v^rorld  is,  and  of  the  like  kind.  And  fuppof- 
ing  this  to  be  the  cafe,  it  is  mofh  evident  that  we  are 
not  competent  judges  of  this  fcheme,  from  the  fmall 
parts  of  it  which  come  within  our  view  in  the  prefent 
life  ;  and  therefore  no  objeftions  againft  any  of  thele 
parts  can  be  infifted  upon  by  reafonable  men. 

This  our  ignorance,  and  the  confequence  here 
drawn  from  it,  are  univerfally  acknowledged  upon 
other  occafions ;  and,  though  fcarce  denied,  yet  are 
univerfally  forgot,  when  perfons  come  to  argue  againft 
religion.  And  it  is  not  perhaps  eafy,  even  for  the 
moffc  reafonable  men,  always  to  bear  in  mind  the  de- 
gree of  our  ignorance,  and  make  due  allowances  for  it. 
Upon  thefe  accounts,  it  may  not  be  ufelefs  to  go  on  a 
little  farther,  in  order  to  fhew  more  diftindly  how  juft 
an  anfwer  our  ignorance  is,  to  objections  againft  the 
fcheme  of  Providence.  Suppofe  then  a  perfon  boldly 
to  alTert  that  the  things  complained  of,  the  origin  and 
continuance  of  evil,  might  eafJy  have  been  prevent- 
ed by  repeated  interpofitions  ;*  interpofitions  fo 
guarded  and  circumftanced,  as  would  preclude  all  mif- 
chief  arifing  from  them  ;  or,  if  this  were  impradica- 
ble,  that  2,  fcheme  of  government  is  itfelf  an  imperfec- 
tion, fince  more  good  might  have  been  produced  with- 
out any  fcheme,  fyftem,  or  conftitution  at  all,  by  con- 
tinued fmgle  unrelated  a6ts  of  diftributive  juftice  and 
goodnefs  ;  becaufe  thefe  would  have  occafioned  no  ir- 
regularities. And  farther  than  this,  it  is  prefumed, 
the  objections  will  not  be  carried.  Yet  the  anfwer  is 
obvious,  that  were  thefe  alTertions  true,  ftill  the  obfcr- 
vations  above,  concerning  our  ignorance  in  the  fchem^e 

of 

*  p.  179,  i8o. 


Chap.  VII.        a  Scheme  incomprehenjible.  177 

of  divine  government,  and  the  confequence  drawn 
from  it,  would  hold  in  great  meafure,  enough  to  vin- 
dicate religion  againft  all  objeftions  from  the  diforders 
of  the  preient  fbate.  Were  thefe  allertions  true,  yet 
the  government  of  the  world  might  be  juft  and  good 
notwithftanding ;  for,  at  the  mod,  they  would  infer 
nothing  more  than  that  it  might  have  been  better. 
But  indeed  they  are  mere  arbitrary  affertions,  no  man 
being  fufficiently  acquainted  v»^ith  the  poflibilities  of 
things  to  bring  any  proof  of  them  to  the  loweft  de- 
gree of  probability.  For  however  poffible  what  is  af- 
ferted  may  feem,  yet  many  infbances  may  be  alleged; 
in  things  much  lefs  out  of  our  reach,  of  fuppolitions 
abfolutely  impoffible,  and  reducible  to  the  mofh  pal- 
pable felf  contradidions,  which  not  every  one  by  any 
means  would  perceive  to  be  fuch,  nor  perhaps  any  one 
at  firft  fight  fufpecl.  From  thefe  things  it  is  eafy  to 
fee  difbin61:ly  how  our  ignorance,  as  it  is  the  common, 
is  really  a  fatisfaftory  anfwer  to  all  objeftions  againft 
thejuftice  and  goodnefs  of  Providence.  If  a  man, 
contemplating  any  one  providential  difpenfation,  which 
had  no  relation  to  any  others,  fliould  obje£t,  that  he 
difcerned  in  it  adifregard  to  jufhice,  or  a  deficiency  of 
froodnefs,  nothinsi;  would  be  lefs  an  anfwer  to  fuch  ob- 
jedtion  than  our  ignorance  in  other  parts  of  Providence, 
or  in  the  poffibilities  of  things  no  way  related  to  what 
he  was  contemplating.  But  when  we  know  not  but 
the  parts  objected  againft  may  be  relative  to  other 
parts  unknown  to  us,  and  when  we  are  unacquainted 
with  what  is  in  the  nature  of  the  thing  pradiicable  in 
the  cafe  before  us,  then  our  ignorance  is  a  fatisfac- 
tory  anfwer  ;  becaufe,  fome  unknown  relation,  or 
fom.e  unknown  impofiibility  may  render  Vsfhat  is  ob- 
jected againft  juft  and  good  ;  nay,  good  in  the  higheft 
practicable  degree. 

II.    And  how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon  fuch 
objections  will  farther  appear,  by  a  more  diftinct  ob- 

fervation 


r^8  The  Government  of  God ^  Part  I. 

fervation  of  fome  particular  things  contained  in  the 
natural  government  of  God,  the  like  to  which  may  be 
fuppokd,  from  analogy,  to  be  contained  in  his  moral 
government. 

Firjfy  As  in  the  fcheme  of  the  natural  world  no 
ends  appear  to  be  accomplifhed  without  means,  fo  we 
find  that  means  very  undefirable  often  conduce  to 
bring  about  ends,  in  fuch  a  meafure  defirable  as  great- 
ly to  overbalance  the  difagreeablenefs  of  the  means. 
And  in  cafes  where  fuch  means  are  conducive  to  fuch 
ends,  it  is  not  reafon,  but  experience,  w^iich  fhews  us 
that  they  are  thus  conducive.  Experience  alfo  fhews 
many  means  to  be  conducive  and  neceflary  to  accom- 
plilh  ends,  which  means,  before  experience,  we  Ihiould 
have  thought  would  have  had  even  a  contrary  tenden- 
cy. Now  from  thefe  obfervations  relating  to  the  nat- 
ural fcheme  of  the  world,  the  moral  being  fuppofed 
analogous  to  it,  arifes  a  great  credibility,  that  the  put- 
ting our  mifery  in  each  other's  power  to  the  degree  it 
is,  and  making  men  liable  to  vice  to  the  degree  we 
are, — and  in  general,  that  thofe  things  which  are  ob- 
jected againft  the  moral  fcheme  of  Providence,  may 
be,  upon  the  whole,  friendly  and  affiftant  to  virtue, 
and  productive  of  an  overbalance  of  happinefs,  i.  e, 
the  things  objefted  againft  may  be  means,  by  which 
an  overbalance  of  good  will,  in  the  end,  be  found  pro- 
duced. And  from  the  fame  obfervations,  it  appears 
to  be  no  prefumption  againft  this,  that  we  do  not, 
if  indeed  we  do  not,  fee  thofe  means  to  have  any  fuch 
tendency,  or  that  they  feem  to  us  to  have  a  contrary 
one.  Thus  thofe  things  which  we  call  irregularities, 
may  not  be  fo  at  all ;  becaufe  they  may  be  means  of 
accompliftiing  wife  and  good  ends  more  confiderable. 
And  it  may  be  added,  as  above,  that  they  may  alfo 
be  the  only  means  by  which  thefe  wife  and  good  ends 
are  capable  of  being  accomplifhed. 

After 


Chap.VIT.        a  Scheme  hicomprehenf.hk.  179 

After  thefe  obfervations  it  may  be  proper  to  add,  in 
order  to  obviate  an  abfurd  and  wicked  conclufioii  from 
any  of  them,  that  though  the  conftitution  of  our  na- 
ture from  whence  we  are  capable  of  vice  and  mifery, 
may,  as  it  undoubtedly  does,  contribute  to  the  per- 
feftion  and  happinefs  of  the  world  ;  and  though  the 
aftual  permiffion  of  evil  may  be  beneficial  to  it,  (i.  e.  it 
would  have  been  m.ore  mifchievous,  not  that  a  wicked 
perfon  had  himfelf  abftained  from  his  own  wicked nefs, 
but  that  any  one  had  forcibly  prevented  it,  than  that 
it  was  permitted)  yet  notwithflanding,  it  might  have 
been  much  better  for  the  world  it  this  very  evil  had 
never  been  done.  Nay,  it  is  mofh  clearly  conceivable, 
that  the  very  commiflion  of  wickednefs  may  be  bene- 
ficial to  the  world,  and  yet  that  it  would  be  infinitely 
more  beneficial  for  men  to  refrain  from  it.  For  thus,  ■ 
in  the  wife  and  good  conftitution  of  the  natural  world, 
there  are  diforders  which  bring  their  own  cures,  dif- 
eafes  which  are  themielves  remedies.  Many  a  man 
would  have  died,  had  it  not  been  for  the  gout  or  a 
fever ',  yet  it  would  be  thought  madnefs  to  aliert,  that 
ficknefs  is  a  better  or  more  perfect  ftrte  than  health, 
though  the  like  with  regard  to  the  moral  world  has 
been  aflerted.     But, 

Secondly,  The  natural  government  of  the  world  is 
carried  on  by  general  laws.  For  this  there  may  be 
wife  and  good  reafons  ;  the  wifeft  and  beft,  for  ought 
we  know  to  the  contrary.  And  that  there  are  fuch 
reafons,  is  fuggelled  to  our  thoughts  by  the  analogy  of 
nature  ;  by  our  being  made  to  experience  good  ends 
to  be  accompliihed,  as  indeed  all  the  good  •which  we 
enjoy  is  accompliihed,  by  this  means,  that  the  laws  by 
which  the  world  is  governed  are  general.  For  we  have 
Icarce  any  kind  of  enjoyments  but  what  we  are,  in 
fome  way  or  other,  inftrumental  in  procuring  our- 
felves,  by  afting  in  a  manner  which  we  foreiee  likely  to 
procure  them ,  now  this  forefight  could  not  be  at  ail, 

were 


X  8  o  The  Government  of  Gody  Part  I . 

were  not  the  government  of  the  world  carried  on  by 
general  laws.  And  though,  for  ought  we  know  to  the 
contrary,  every  fingle  cafe  may  be  at  length  found  to 
have  been  provided  for  even  by  thefe,  yet  to  prevent 
all  irregularities,  or  remedy  them  as  they  arife,  by 
the  wifeft  and  befh  general  laws,  may  be  impoffible  in 
the  nature  of  things,  as  we  fee  it  is  abfolutely  impoffi- 
ble in  civil  government.  But  then  we  are  ready  to 
think,  that,  the  conftitution  of  nature  remaining  as  it 
is,  and  the  courfe  of  things  being  permitted  to  go  on 
in  other  refpe6ts  as  it  does,  there  might  be  interpo- 
fitions  to  prevent  irregularities,  though  they  could  not 
have  been  prevented  or  remedied  by  any  general  laws. 
And  there  would  indeed  be  reafon  to  wifh,  which,  by 
the  way,  is  very  different  from  a  right  to  claim,  that  all 
irregularities  were  prevented  or  remedied  by  prefent 
interpolitions,  if  thefe  interpofitions  would  have  no 
other  efFe6t  than  this.  But  it  is  plain  they  would  have 
fome  vifibie  and  immediate  bad  effects  ;  for  inftance, 
they  would  encourage  idlenefs  and  negligence,  and 
they  would  render  doubtful  the  natural  rule  of  life, 
which  is  afcertained  by  this  very  thing,  that  the  courfe 
of  the  world  is  carried  on  by  general  laws.  And  far- 
ther, it  is  certain  they  would  have  diftant  eftecfts,  and 
very  great  ones  too,  by  means  of  the  wonderful  con- 
nexions before  mentioned.*  So  that  we  cannot  fo  much 
as  guefs  what  would  be  the  whole  refult  of  the  inter- 
pofitions defired.  It  may  be  faid,  any  bad  refult  might 
be  prevented  by  farther  interpofitions,  whenever  there 
was  occafion  for  them  ;  but  this  again  is  talking  quite 
at  random,  and  in  the  dark.  ^  Upon  the  whole  then, 
we  fee  wife  reafons,  why  the  courfe  of  the  world  fhould 
be  carried  on  by  general  laws,  and  ?ood  ends  accom- 
plifhed  by  this  means ;  and,  for  ought  we  know,  there 
may  be  the  wifeft  reafons  for  it,  and  the  beft  ends  ac- 
compliflied  by  it.    We  have  no  ground  to  believe,  that 

all 

*P.  174,  &C.  fP-I/^;   177- 


Chap.  VII.        a  Scheme  incomprehenfMe-.  i8r 

all  irregularities  could  be  remedied  as  they  arile,  or 
could  have  been  precluded,  by  general  laws.  We  find 
that  interpolitions  would  produce  evil,  and  prevent 
good  ;  and,  for  ought  vv^e  know,  they  would  produce 
greater  evil  than  they  would  prevent  3  and  prevent 
greater  good  than  they  would  produce.  And  if  this 
be  the  cafe,  then  the  not  interpofing  is  fo  far  from  be- 
ing a  ground  of  complaint,  tiiat  it  is  an  inftance  of 
goodnefs.  This  is  intelligible  and  fufficient,  and  go- 
ing farther  feems  beyond  the  utmoft  reach  of  our  fac- 
ulties. 

But  it  may  be  faid,  that  "  after  all,  thefe  fuppofed 
impoffibilities  and  relations  are  what  we  are  unac- 
quainted with,  and  we  mufh  judge  of  religion,  as  of 
other  things,  by  what  we  do  know,  and  look  upon 
the  reft  as  nothing  ;  or  however,  that  the  anfwers  here 
given  to  what  is  objefted  againft  religion,  may  equally 
be  made  uie  of  to  invalidate  the  proof  of  it,  fmce  their 
ilrefs  lies  fo  very  much  upon  out"  ignorance."      But, 

F/V/r,  Though  total  ignorance  in  any  matter  does 
indeed  equally  deftroy,  or  rather  preclude  all  pro(3f 
concerning  it,  and  objeftions  againft  it,  yet  partial  ig- 
norance does  not.  For  we  may  in  any  degree  be  coht 
vinced,  that  a  perfon  is  of  fuch  a  character,  and  con- 
fequently  will  purlue  fuch  ends,  though  we  are  greatly 
ignorant  what  is  the  proper  way  of  acting,  in  order  the 
moft  effe(^lually  to  obtain  thofe  ends ;  and  in  this  cafe, 
objections  againft  his  manner  of  afting,  as  feemingly 
not  conducive  to  obtain  them,  might  be  anfwered  by 
our  ignorance,  though  the  proof  that  fuch  ends  were 
intended  might  not  at  all  be  invalidated  by  it.  Thus 
the  proof  of  religion  is  a  proof  of  the  moral  character 
of  God,  and  confequently  that  his  government  is  mor- 
al, and  that  every  one  upon  the  whole  fhall  receive  ac- 
cording to  his  deferts ;  a  proof  that  this  is  thedefigned 
end  of  his  government.  But  we  are  not  competent 
judges  what  is  the  proper  way  of  afting,  in  order  the 

mod 


iBz  '  The  Government  of  God,  Part  L 

mofl  effedually  to  accomplifh  this  end.*  Therefore 
our  ignorance  is  an  anfwer  to  objedions  againft  the 
condu6l  of  Providence  in  permitting  irregularities,  as 
feeming  contradiftory  to  this  end.  Now,  fmce  it  is 
fo  obvious  that  our  ignorance  may  be  a  fatisfatflory 
anfwer  to  objeftions  againft  a  thing,  and  yet  not  afre6l 
the  proof  of  it,  till  it  can  be  Ihewn,  it  is  frivolous  to 
affert  that  our  ignorance  invalidates  the  proof  of  relig- 
ion, as  it  does  the  objedtions  againft  it. 

Secondly^  Suppofe  unknow^n  impoffibilities  and  un- 
known relations  might  juftly  be  urged  to  invalidate 
the  proof  of  religion,  as  well  as  to  anfvv^er  objections 
sgainft  it,  and  that  in  confequence  of  this  the  proof 
of  it  were  doubtful, — yet  ftill,  let  the  aflertion  be  de- 
ipifed,  or  let  it  be  ridiculed,  it  is  undeniably  true  that 
moral  obligations  would  remain  certain,  though  it 
were  not  certain  what  would,  upon  the  whole,  be  the 
confequences  of  obferving  or  violating  them.  For, 
thefe  obligations  arife  immediately  and  necelfarily  from 
the  judgment  of  our  own  mind,un]efs  perverted,  which 
*u'e  cannot  violate  without  being;  felf  condemned.  And 
they  would  be  certain  too,  from  confiderations  of  in- 
tereft.  For  though  it  were  doubtful  what  will  be  the 
future  confequences  of  virtue  and  vice,  )'et  it  is,  how- 
ever, credible,  that  they  may  have  thofe  confequences 
which  religion  teaches  us  they  will ;  and  this  credibil- 
ity is  a  certain >^-  obligation  in  point  of  prudence,  to 
abftain  from  all  wickednefs,  and  to  live  in  the  confci- 
entious  praclice  of  all  that  is  good.     But, 

Thirdly^  The  anfwers  above  given  to  the  objedlions 
againft  religion,  cannot  equally  be  made  ufe  of  to  in- 
validate the  proof  of  it.  For,  upon  fuppofition  that 
God  exercifes  a  moral  government  over  the  world, 
analogy  does  moft  ftrongly  lead  us  to  conclude,  that 
this  moral  government  muft  be  a  ibheme  or  conftitu- 
tion  beyond  our  comprehenfion.     And  a  thoufand 

particular 

*  p.  6i,  6a.  t  P-  57-  and  Part  II.  Ch.  vi. 


Chap.  VII.       a  Scheme  incomp-ehenfihk.  183 

particular  analogies  fliew  us,  that  parts  of  fuch  a 
fcheme,  from  their  relation  to  other  parts,  may  con- 
duce to  accomphfh  ends,vvhich  weiliould  have  thought 
they  had  no  tendency  at  all  to  accompliiln  ;  nay  ends, 
which  before  experience  we  lliould  have  thought  fuch 
parts  were  contradidory  to,  and  had  a  tendency  X<::> 
prevent.  And  therefore  all  thefe  analogies  Ihew,  that 
the  way  of  arguing  made  ufe  of  in  objedling  againir 
religion,  is  deluiive  ;  becaufe  they  Ihew  it  is  not  at  ail 
incredible,  that,  could  we  comprehend  the  whole,  we 
fliould  find  the  permiffion  of  the  diforders  objected 
againft  to  be  confiftent  with  juflice  and  goodneis,  and 
even  to  be  inflances  of  them.  Now  this  is  not  appli- 
cable to  the  proof  of  religion,  as  it  is  to  the  objections 
againft  it  j*  and  therefore  cannot  invalidate  that  proof, 
as  it  does  thefe  objections. 

Lajily,  From  the  obfervation  now  made,  it  is  eafy 
to  fee,  that  the  anfwers  above  given  to  the  objeftions 
againft  Providence,  though  in  a  general  way  of  fpeak- 
ing,  they  may  be  faid  to  be  taken  from  our  ignorance, 
yet  are  by  no  means  taken  merely  from  that,  but  from 
fomewhat  which  analogy  fliews  us  concerning  it.  For 
analogy  ihews  us  pofitively,  that  our  ignorance  in  the 
poiTibilities  of  things,  and  the  various  relations  in  na- 
ture, renders  us  incompetent  judges,  and  leads  us  to 
faife  concluiions,  in  cafes  iimilar  to  this,  in  which  we 
pretend  to  judge  and  to  objeft.  So  that  the  things 
above  infifted  upon,  are  not  mere  fuppofitions  of  un- 
known impoffibilities  and  relations,  but  they  are  fug- 
gefted  to  our  thoughts  and  even  forced  upon  the  ob- 
lervation  of  ferious  men,  and  rendered  credible  too,  by 
the  analogy  of  nature.  And  therefore,  to  take  theie 
things  into  the  account,  is  to  judge  by  experience  and 
what  we  do  know  ;  and  it  is  not  judging  fo,  to  take 
no  notice  of  them. 

CONCLUSION. 

*  Seimoo  at  the  RoUt,  p,  312.  2d  EJ, 


r  184  ] 


CONCLUSION. 

JL  HE  obfervations  of  the  laft  chapter  lead 
us  to  confider  this  httle  fcene  of  human  Hfe,  in  which 
we  are  fo  bufiiy  engaged,  as  having  a  reference,  o£ 
lome  fort  or  other,  to  a  much  larger  plan  of  things- 
Whether  we  are  any  way  related  to  the  more  diftant 
parts  of  the  boundlefs  univerfe,  into  which  we  are 
brought,  is  altogether  uncertain.  But  it  is  evident 
that  the  courfe  of  things  which  comes  within  our  view 
is  connected  with  fomewhat  paft,  prefent,  and  future, 
beyond  it.*  So  that  we  are  placed,  as  one  may  fpeak, 
in  the  middle  of  a  fcheme,  not  as  a  fixed  but  a  pro^ 
greffive  one,  every  way  incomprehenfible  ;  incompre- 
henfible  in  a  manner  equally  with  refpedt  to  what  has 
been,  what  now  is,  and  what  fhall  be  hereafter.  And 
this  fcheme  cannot  but  contain  in  it  fomewhat  as  won- 
derful and  as  much  beyond  our  thought  and  concep- 
tion-f-  as  any  thing  in  that  of  religion.  For,  will  any 
man  in  his  fenfes  fay,  that  it  is  lefs  difficult  to  conceive 
how  the  world  came  to  be  and  to  continue  as  it  is, 
without,  than  with,  an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor 
of  it  ?  or,  admitting  an  intelligent  Governor  of  it, 
that  there  is  fome  other  rule  of  government  more  nat- 
ural and  of  eafier  conception  than  that  which  we  call 
moral  ?  Indeed,  without  an  intelligent  Author  and 
Governor  of  nature,  no  account  at  all  can  be  given 
how  this  univerfe,  or  the  part  of  it  particularly  in 
which  we  are  concerned,  came  to  be,  and  the  courfe 
of  it  to  be  carried  on,  as  it  is  ;  nor  any  of  its  general 
end  and  defign,  without  a  moral  Governor  of  it. 
That  there  is  an  intellig-ent  Author  of  nature  and 
natural  Governor  of  the  world,  is  a  principle  gone  up- 
on in  the  foregoing  treatife,  as  proved,  and  generally 

known 

*  p.  174,  &c,  f  See  Part  II.  Ch.  ii. 


1?ART  I.        CONCLUSION.  185 

known  and  confelTed  to  be  proved.  And  the  very- 
notion  of  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature,  proved  b}'' 
particular  final  caufes,  implies  a  v/iil  and  a  character.* 
Now  as  our  whole  nature,  the  nature  which  he  has 
given  us,  leads  us  to  conclude  his  will  and  character  to 
be  moral,  jufh  and  good, — fo  we  can  fcarce  in  imag- 
ination conceive  what  it  can  be  othetwife.  Hov/ever, 
in  confequence  c^  this  his  will  and  character,  v/hatever 
it  be,  he  formed  the  univerfe  as  it  is,  and  carries  on 
the  courfe  of  it  as  he  does,  rather  than  in  any  other 
manner  ;  and  has  afTigned  to  us,  and  to  all  living 
creatures,  a  part  and  a  lot  in  it.  Irrational  creatures 
acl  this  their  part,  and  enjoy  and  undergo  the  pleaf- 
ures  and  the  pains  allotted  them,  without  any  reflec- 
tion. But  one  would  think  it  impolTible,  that  crea- 
tures endued  with  reafon  could  avoid  refleding  fome- 
times  upon  all  this  ;  reficfting,  if  not  from  whence  vm 
came,  yet,  at  leaft,  whither  we  are  going  ;  and  what 
the  myflerious  fcheme,  in  the  midft  of  which  we  find 
ourfelves,  will,  at  length,  come  out  and  produce  ;  a 
fcheme  in  which  it  is  certain  we  are  highly  intercfied, 
and  in  which  we  may  be  interefled  even  beyond  con- 
ception. For  many  things  prove  it  palpably  abfurd  to 
conclude,  that  we  lliall  ceafe  to  be  at  death.  Partic- 
ular analogies  do  moft  fenfibiy  fnew  us,  that  there  ir. 
nothing  to  be  thought  ftrange,  in  our  being  to  exlft 
in  another  (late  of  life.  And  that  v/e  are  no|  living 
beings  affords  a  ftrong  probability  that  we  fliall  con- 
timie  fo,  unlefs  there  be  fome  politive  ground,  and 
there  is  none  'from  reafon  or  analogy,  to  think  death 
will  deflroy  us.  Were  a  perfuafion  of  this  kind  ever 
fo  well  grounded,  there  would  fureiy  be  little  reafon  to 
take  pleafure  in  it.  But  indeed  it  can  have  no  other 
ground,  than  ibme  fuch  imagination  as  that  of  our 
grofs  bodies  being  ourfelves  ;  which  is  contrary  to  ex- 
perience.    Experience  too  mcfb  clearly  fiiews  us  the 

N  '  foily 

=^p.  16::. 


lS6  CONCLUSIO?r.        Part  t 

folly  of  concluding,  from  the  body  and  the  living 
agent  afFefting  each  other  mutually,  that  the  dlflblu- 
tion  of  the  former  is  the  deftruftion  of  the  latter. 
And  there  are  remarkable  inftances  of  their  not  affect- 
ing each  other,  which  lead  us  to  a  contrary  conclufion. 
The  fuppofition  then,  which  in  all  reafon  we  are  to 
go  upon,  is,  that  our  living  nature  will  continue  after 
death.'     And  it  is  infinitely  unreafonable  to  form  an 
inftitution  of  life,  or  to  a6l,  upon  any  other  fuppofition. 
Now  all  exped:ation  of  immortality,  whether  more  or 
lefs  certain,  opens  an  unbounded  profpe(5l  to  our  hopes 
and  our  fears  ;  fince  we  fee  the  confbitution  of  nature 
15  fuch  as  to  admit  of  mifery,  as  well  as  to  be  produc- 
tive of  happinefs,  and  experience  ourfelves  to  partake 
of  both  in  fome  degree  ;  and  fince  we  cannot  but  knovsr 
what  higher  degrees  of  both  we  are  capable  of.     And 
there  is  no  prefumption  againft  believing  farther,  that 
our  future  intereil  depends  upon  our  prefent  beha- 
viour ;  for  we  fee  our  prefent  intereft  doth,  and  that 
the  happinefs  and  mifery  which  are  naturally  annexed 
to  our  aftions,  very  frequently  do  not  follow  till  long 
after  the  actions  are  done  to  which  they  are  refpeftive- 
ly  annexed.     So  that  were  fpeculation  to  leave  us  un- 
certain whether  it  were  likely  that  the  Author  of  na- 
ture, in  giving  happinefs  and  mifery  to  his  creatures^ 
hath  regard  to  their  aftions  or  not,  yet  fince  we  find 
by  experience  that  he  hath  fuch  regard,  the  whole 
fenfe  of  things  which  he  has  given  us  plainly  leads  us, 
at  once  and  without  any  elaborate  inquiries,  to  think 
that  it  may,  indeed  muft,  be  to  good  aftions  chiefly 
that  he  hath  annexed  happinefs,  and  to  bad  aftions 
mifery  ;  or  that  he  will,  upon  the  whole,  reward  thofe 
who  do  well,  and  puniOi  tliofe  who  do  evil.     To  con- 
firm this  from  the  confbitution  of  the  world,  it  has 
been  obferved,  that  fbme  ibrt  of  moral  government 
is  necefianly  implied  in  that  natural  government  of 
God,  which  we  experience  ourfelves  under  3  that  good 

and 


Part  I.         CONCLUSION.  187 

and  bad  actions  at  prefent  are  naturally  rewarded  and 
puniflied,  nbt  only  as  beneficial  and  mifchievous  to 
lociety,  but  alfo  as  virtuous  and  vicious ;  and  that 
there  is,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency  to 
their  being  rewarded  and  puniflied  in  a  much  higher 
degree  than  they  are  at  prefent.  And  though  this 
higher  degree  of  diftributlve  juftice,  which  nature  thus 
points  out  and  leads  towafds,  is  prevented  for  a  time 
from  taking  place,  it  is  by  obftacles  which  the  ftate  of 
this  world  unhappily  throws  in  its  way,  and  which 
therefore  are  in  their  nature  temporary.  Now  as  thefe 
things,  in  the  natural  conduct  of  Providence,  are  ob- 
fervable  on  the  fide  of  virtue,  ib  there  is  nothing  to  be 
fet  againft  them  on  the  fide  of  vice.  A  moral  icheme 
of  government  then  is  vitibly  eftabliflied,  and  in  ibme 
degree  carried  into  execution  ;  and  this,  together  with 
the  elTential  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice  duly  confid- 
ered,  naturally  raife  in  us  an  apprehenfion,  that  it  will 
be  carried  on  farther  towards  perfection  in  a  future 
ftate,  and  that  every  one  fhall  there  receive  according 
to  his  deferts.  And  if  this  be  lb,  then  our  future  and 
general  intereft,  under  the  moral  government  of  God, 
is  appointed  to  depend  upon  our  behaviour,  notwith- 
(landing  the  difficulty  which  this  may  occafion  of  fe- 
curing  it,  and  the  danger  of  lofing  it,  jufh  in  the  fame 
manner  as  our  temporal  intereft,  under  his  natural  gov- 
ernment, is  appointed  to  depend  upon  our  behaviour, 
notwithftanding  the  like  difficulty  and  danger.  For, 
from  our  original  conftitution,  and  that  of  the  world 
which  we  inhabit,  we  are  naturally  trufted  with  our- 
felves,  with  our  own  condud:  and  our  own  intereft". 
And  from  the  fame  conftitution  of  nature,  efpecially 
joined  with  that  courfe  of  things  which  is  owing  to 
men,  we  have  temptations  to  be  unfaithful  in  this 
truft,  to  forfeit  this  intereft,  to  neglect  it,  and  run 
ourfelves  into  mifery  and  ruin.  From  thefe  tempta- 
tions arife  the  difficulties  of  behaving  fo  as  to  fecure 
N  a  our 


i88  CONCLUSION,        Part  t 

our  temporal  intereft,  and  the  hazard  of  behaving  fo 
as  to  mifcarry  in  it.     There  is  therefore  nothing  in- 
credible in  fuppofing,  there  may  be  the  Hke  difficulty 
and  hazard  with  regard  to  that  chief  and  final  good 
which  religion  lays  before  us.     Indeed  the  whole  ac- 
count, how  it  came  to  pafs  that  we  were  placed  in 
fuch  a  condition  as  this,  muft  be  beyond  our  compre- 
henfion  ;  but  it  is  in  part  accounted  for  by  what  re- 
ligion teaches  us,  that  the  charafter  of  virtue  and  piety 
muft  be  a  neceflary  qualification  for  a  future  ftate  of 
fecurity  and  happinefs  under  the  moral  government  of 
God,  in  like  manner  as  fome  certain  quahfications  or 
other  are  neceflary  for  every  particular  condition  of  life 
under  his  natural  government ,  and  that  the  prefent 
ftate  was  intended  to  be  a  fchool  of  drfcipline  for  im- 
proving in  ourfelvSs  that  character.   Now  this  intention 
of  nature  is  rendered  highly  credible  by  obferving,  that 
we  are  plainly  made  for  improvement  of  all  kinds  ; 
that  it  is  a  general  appointment  of  Providence  that  we 
cultivate  practical  principles,  and  form  within  ourfelves 
habits  of  aftion,  in  order  to  become  fit  for  what  wc 
were  wholly  unfit  for  before  ;  that  in  particular,  child- 
hood and  youth  is  naturally  appointed  to  be  a  ftate  of 
difcipline  for  mature  age  ;  and  that  the  prefent  world 
is  peculiarly  fitted  for  a  ftate  of  moral  difcipline.    And 
whereas  objections  are  urged  againft  the  whole  notion 
of  moral  government  and  a  probation  ftate,  from  the 
opinion  of  neceffity,  it  has  been  fliewn,  that  God  has 
given  us  the  evidence,  as  it  were,  of  experience,  that 
all  objediions  againft  religion  on  this  head  are  vain  and 
delulive.    He  has  alfo,  in  his  natural  government,  fiag- 
gefted  an  anfwer  to  all  our  Oiort  fighted  objections 
againft  the  equity  and  goodnefs  of  his  moral  govern- 
ment ;  and  iii  general  he  has  exemplified  to  us  the 
latter  by  the  former. 

Thefe  things,  which,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  are 
matters  of  fad,  ought,  in  all  common  fenfe,  to  awakeii 

mankind  ; 


Part  I.         CONCLUSION^.  iSg 

mankind  ;  to  induce  them  to  confider  in  earneft  their 
condition,  and  what  they  have  to  do.     It  is  abfurd, 
abfurd  to  the  degree  of  being  ridiculous,  if  the  fubje6t 
were  not  of  fo  feriotis  a  kind,  for  men  to  think  them- 
felves  fecure  in  a  vicious  hfe,  or  even  in  that  immoral 
thoughtleffnefs  which  far  the  greatefl  part  of  them  are 
fallen  into.    And  the  credibility  of  religion,arilmg  from 
-experience  and  fafts  here  confidered,  is  fully  fufficient, 
in  reafon,  to  engage  them  to  live  in  the  general  prac- 
tice of  all  virtue  and  piety  ;  under  the  ferious  appre- 
henlion,  though  it  fhould  be  mixed  with  fome  doubt,* 
of  a  righteous  adminiftration  eftablifhed  in  nature, 
and  a  future  judgment  in  confequence  of  it  ;  efpec- 
ially  when  we  confider  how  very  queftionable  it  is, 
whether  any  thing  at  all  can  be  gained  by  vice  ;  -f  how 
unqueftionably  little,  as  well  as  precarious,  the  pleaf- 
ures  and  profits  of  it  are  at  the  bell ;  and  how  foon 
they  mufl  be  parted  with  at  the  longeft.     For,  in  the 
deliberations  of  reafon,  concerning  what  we  are  to  pur- 
fue,  and  what  to  avoid,  as  temptations  to  any  thing 
from  mere  paffion,  are  fuppofed  out  of  the  cafe, — fo  in- 
ducements to  vice,  from  cool  expeftations  of  pleafure 
and  intereft  fo  fmall  and  uncertain  and  fhort,  are  re- 
ally fo  infignificant,  as,  in  the  view  of  reafon,  to  be  al- 
moft  nothing  in  themfelves  j  and  in  comparifon  with 
the  importance  of  religion,  they  quite  difappear  and 
are  lofb.     Mere  paffion  indeed  may  be  alleged,  though 
not  as  a  reafon,  yet  as  an  excufe,  for  a  vicious  courfe  of 
life.     And  how  forry  an  excufe  it  is  will  be  manifeft 
by  obferving,  that  we  are  placed  in  a  condition,   in 
which  we  are  unavoidably  inured  to  govern  our  paf- 
(ions,  by  being  neceffitated  to  govern  them  ;  and  to 
lay  ourfelves  under  the  fame  kind  of  reftraints,  and  as 
great  ones  too,  from  temporal  regards,  as  virtue  and 
piety  in  the  ordinary  courfe  of  things  require.     The 
plea  of  ungovernable  paffion  then,  on  the  fide  of  vice, 

is 

*  Part  II.  Ch.  vi»  f  P.  loo;  loi. 


I90  CONCLUSION.        Part  I. 

is  the  poorefl  of  all  things ;  for  it  is  no  reafon,  and 
but  a  poor  excufe.  But  the  proper  motives  to  relig- 
ion are  the  proper  proofs  of  it,  from  our  moral  nature, 
from  the  prefages  of  confcience,  and  our  natural  ap- 
prehenfion  of  God  under  the  charafter  of  a  righteous 
governor  and  judge  ;  a  nature  and  confcience  and  ap- 
prehenfion  given  us  by  him  ;  and  from  the  confirma- 
tion of  the  diftates  of  reafon,  by  life  and  immortn/itv 
brought  to  light  by  the  Gofpel ;  and  the  wrath  of  God 
revealed  from  heaven^  ciga'wfi  all  tmgodlinefs,  and  wir^ 
righteoufnefs  of  men. 


Thk  end  of  thf.  first  PART. 


ANALOGY 


O      F 


RELIGION 

TO      THE 

Constitution  and  Course  of  Nature. 


PART      II. 

Of  Revealed    Religion. 

C  H  A  P.      I. 

Of  the  Importance  of  Chriflianity, 

i^OME  perfons,  upon  pretence  of  the  fuf- 
iiclency  of  the  hght  of  nature,  avowedly  reject  all  rev- 
elation, as  in  its  very  notion  incredible,  and  what  muft 
be  fictitious.  And  indeed  it  is  certain  no  revelation 
would  have  been  given,  had  the  light  of  nature  been 
fufficient  in  fuch  a  fenfe  as  to  render  one  not  wanting 
and  ufelefs.  But  no  man,  in  ferioufnefs  and  fimplicity 
of  mind,  can  poffibly  think  it  fo,  who  confiders  the 
ftate  of  religion  in  the  heathen  world,  before  revela- 
tion, and  its  prefent  ftate  in  thofe  places  which  have 
borrowed  no  light  from  it  ;  particularly  the  doubt' 
fulnefs  of  fome  of  the  greateft  men  concerning  things 
of  the  utmoft  importance,  as  well  as  the  natural  inat-^ 
tention  and  ignorance  of  mankind  in  general.  It  is 
impoffible  to  fay  v/ho  would  have  been  able  to  have 

reafoned 


igz  Of  the  Importance  Part  II. 

reafoned  out  that  whole  fyfteai,  which  we  call  natural 
rehgion,  in  its  genuine  fimpilcity,  clear  otTuperftition  ; 
but  there  is  certainly  no  ground  to  affirm  that  the 
generality  could.  If  they  could,  there  is  no  fort  of 
probability  that  they  would.  Admitting  there  were, 
they  would  highly  want  a  {landing  admonition,  to  re- 
mind them  of  it,  and  inculcate  it  upon  them.  And 
farther  flill,  were  they  as  much  difpofed  to  attend  to 
religion  as  the  better  fort  of  men  are,  yet  even  upon 
this  fuppofition  there  would  be  various  occafions  for 
fupernatural  inftruclion  and  affiftancc,  and  the  greateft 
advantages  might  be  afforded  by  them.  So  that  to 
fay,  revelation  is  a  thing  fuperfluous,  what  there  was 
no  need  of,  and  what  can  be  of  no  fervice,  is,  I  think, 
to  talk  quite  wildly  and  at  random.  Nor  would  it 
be  more  extravagant  to  affirm,  that  mankind  is  fo  en- 
tirely at  eafe  in  the  prefent  ftate,  and  life  fo  complete- 
ly happy,  that  it  is  a  contradidion  to  fuppofe  our  con- 
dition capable  of  being  in  any  refpedl  better. 

There  are  other,  perfons,  not  to  be  ranked  with 
thefe,  who  feem  to  be  getting  Into  a  way  of  negledl- 
ing,  and,  as  it  were,  overlooking  revelation  as  of  fmall 
importance,  provided  natural  religion  be  kept  to. 
With  little  regard  either  to  the  evidence  of  the  former, 
or  to  the  objections  againfh  it,  and  even  upon  fuppo- 
iition  of  its  truth,  *'  the  only  delign  of  it,"  fay  they, 
"  muft  be  to  eflablilli  a  belief  of  the  moral  fyflcm  of 
nature,  and  to  enforce  the  practice  of  natural  piety 
and  virtue.  The  belief  and  practice  of  thefe  things 
were,  perhaps,  much  promoted  by  the  firfl  publication 
of  Chrifcianity  ;  but  whether  they  are  believed  and 
pradtifed,  upon  the  evidence  and  motives  of  nature  or 
of  revelation,  is  no  great  matter."  *    This  way  of  con- 

fidering 

*  Invsnis  multos propterea  nolle  fieri  Chriflianos,  quia  quafi  faffic;- 

unt  fibi  de  bona  vita  fua.  Bene  vivere  opus  eft,  ait.  Quid  mi  hi  pi  juceptur 
rus  eft  Chrillus  ?  Ut  bene  vivam  ?  jana  bene  vivo.  Quid  mihi  uecefTarius 
eft  Chriftus  ?  Nullum  liomicidium,  nullum  furtura,  nuliam  rapinam  faciu, 
res  alienas  iion  concupifco,  nullo  adulterio  contaminor.  Nam  inveniatur 
in  vita  msa  aliouid  quod  reprehendatur,  et  qui  reprehenderit  faclat  Chrifti- 
anum.  ^'lug.  in  FfuLxxxx, 


Chap.  I.  of  Chrijlianity.  193 

fidering  revelation,  though  it  is  not  the  fame  with  the 
former,  yet  borders  nearly  upon  it,  and  very  much,  at 
length,  runs  up  into  it,  and  requires  to  be  particularly 
conlidered,  with  regard  to  the  perfons  who  feem  to  be 
getting  into  this  way.  The  conftderation  of  it  will 
likewife  farther  ihew  the  extravagance  of  the  former 
opinion,  and  the  truth  of  the  obfervations  in  anfwer  to 
it,  juft  mentioned.  And  an  inquiry  into  the  import- 
ance of  Chriftianity,  cannot  be  an  improper  introduc- 
tion to  a  treatife  concerning  the  credibility  of  it. 

Now  if  God  has  given  a  revelation  to  mankind,  and 
commanded  thofe  things  which  are  com.manded  in 
Chriftianity,  it  is  evident,  at  firft  fight,  that  it  cannot 
in  any  wife  be  an  indifferent  matter,  whether  we  obey 
or  difobey  thofe  commands,  unlefs  we  are  certainly  af- 
fured  that  we  know  all  the  reafons  for  them,  and  that 
all  thofe  reafons  are  now  ceafed,  with  regard  to  man- 
kind in  general,  or  to  ourfelves  in  particular.  And  it 
is  ablolutely  impoifible  we  can  be  alTured'  of  this.  For 
our  ignorance  of  thefe  reafons  proves  nothing  in  the 
cafe,  lince  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  (hews,  what  is 
indeed  in  itfelf  evident,  that  there  may  be  infinite  rea- 
fons for  things,  with  which  we  are  not  acquainted. 

But  the  importance  of  Chriftianity  will  more  dif- 
tinftly  appear,  by  confidering  it  more  diftin6tly. — 
Firji,  as  a  republication  and  external  inftitution  of  nat- 
ural or  elTential  religion,  adapted  to  the  prefent  cir- 
cumftances  of  mankind,  and  intended  to  promote  nat- 
ural piety  and 'virtue  :  And,  Secondly,  as  containing  an 
account  of  a  difpenfation  of  things,  not  difcoverable 
by  reafon,  in  confequence  of  which  feveral  diftinct  pre- 
cepts are  enjoined  us.  For  though  natural  religion  is 
the  foundation  and  principal  part  of  Chriftianity,  it  is 
not  in  any  fenfe  the  whole  of  it. 

I.  Chriftianity  is  a  republication  of  natural  religion. 
It  inftruccs  mankind  in  the  moral  fyftem  of  the  world  ; 
that  it  is  the  work  of  an  infinitely  perfed  Being,  and 

under 


194,  ^f  ^^^^  Importance  Part  II, 

under  his  government ;  that  virtue  is  his  law ;  and 
that  he  will  finally  judge  mankind  in  righteoufnefs, 
and  render  to  all  according  to  their  works,  in  a  future 
ftate.  And,  which  is  very  material,  it  teaches  natural 
religion  in  its  genuine  fimplicity,  free  from  thofe  fuper- 
ftitions  with  which  it  was  totally  corrupted,  and  un- 
der which  it  was  in  a  manner  loft. 

Revelation  is  farther  an  authoritative  publication 
of  natural  religion,  and  fo  affords  the  evidence  of  tefti- 
mony  for  the  truth  of  it.  Indeed  the  miracles  and 
prophecies  recorded  in  Scripture  were  intended  to 
prove  a  particular  difpenfation  of  Providence,  the  re- 
demption of  the  world  by  the  Mefliah  j  but  this  does 
not  hinder  but  that  they  may  alfo  prove  God's  general 
providence  over  the  Vv'orld,  as  our  moral  governor  and 
judge.  And  they  evidently  do  prove  it,  becaufe  this 
charafter  of  the  Author  of  nature  is  neceflarily  con- 
neifled  with  and  implied  in  that  particular  revealed 
difpenfation  of  things ;  it  is  likewife  continually  taught 
exprefsly,  and  infifted  upon,  by  thofe  perfons  who 
wrought  the  miracles  and  delivered  the  prophecies. 
So  that  indeed  natural  religion  feems  as  much  proved 
by  the  Scripture  revelation,  as  it  would  have  been  had 
the  defign  of  revelation  been  nothing  elfe  than  to 
prove  it. 

But  it  may  pofTibly  be  difputed,  how  far  miracles 
can  prove  natural  religion,  and  notable  objedions  may 
be  urged  againft  this  proof  of  it,  confidered  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fpeculation  j  but  confidered  as  a  pradical  thing, 
there  can  be  none.  For  fuppofe  a  perfon  to  teach 
natural  religion  to  a  nation,  who  had  lived  in  total  ig- 
norance or  forgetfulnefs  of  it,  and  to  declare  he  was 
commifTioned  by  God  lb  to  do, — fuppofe  him,  in  proof 
of  his  commiffion,  to  foretel  things  future  which  no 
human  forefight  could  have  guefTed  at,  to  divide  the 
fea  with  a  word,  feed  great  multitudes  with  bread  from 
heaven,  cure  all  manner  of  difeaies,  and  raife  the  dead, 

even 


Chap.  I.  of  Chrijlianity,  195 

even  himfelf,  to  life, — would  not  this  give  additional 
credibility  to  his  teaching,  a  credibility  beyond  what 
that  ot  a  common  man  would  have,  and  be  an  authori- 
tative publication  of  the  law  of  nature,  i.  e.  a  new  proof 
of  it  ?  It  would  be  a  pradical  one,  of  the  ftrongeft 
kind,  perhaps,  which  human  creatures  are  capable  of 
having  given  them.  The  Law  of  Mofes  then,  and 
the  Gofpel  of  Chrifl,  are  authoritative  publications  of 
the  religion  of  nature  ;  they  afford  a  proof  of  God's 
general  providence,  as  moral  governor  of  the  world,  as 
well  as  of  his  particular  difpenfations  of  providence  to- 
wards finful  creatures,  revealed  in  the  Law  and  the 
Gofpel.  As  they  are  the  only  evidence  of  the  latter, 
fo  they  are  an  additional  evidence  of  the  former. 

To  fhew  this  further,  let  us  fuppofe  a  man  of  the 
greateft  and  mofh  improved  capacity,  who  had  never 
heard  of  revelation,  convinced  upon  the  whole,  not- 
withftanding  the  diforders  of  the  world,  that  it  was  un- 
der the  direftion  and  moral  government  of  an  infinitely 
perfedt  Being,  but  ready  to  queftion  whether  he  were 
not  got  beyond  the  reach  of  his  faculties, — fuppole 
him  brought,  by  this  lui'picion,  into  great  danger  of 
being  carried  away  by  the  univerfal  bad  example  of  al- 
moft;  every  one  around  him,  who  appeared  to  have  no 
fenfe,  no  pradiical  fenfe  at  leaft,  of  thefe  things, — and 
this,  perhaps,  would  be  as  advantageous  a  fituation 
with  regard  to  religion,  as  nature  alone  ever  placed 
any  man  in.  What  a  confirmation  now  muft  it  be  to 
fuch  a  perfon,  all  at  once  to  find  that  this  moral  fyf- 
tem  of  things  was  revealed  to  mankind,  in  the  name 
of  that  infinite  Being,  whom  he  had  from  principles  of 
reafon  believed  in  ;  and  that  the  publKhers  of  the  rev- 
elation proved  their  com.raiffion  from  him,  by  making 
it  appear,  that  he  had  entrufted  them  with  a  power  of 
fufpending  and  changing  the  general  laws  of  nature. 

Nor  muft  it  by  any  means  be  omitted,  for  it  is  a 
thuig  of  the  utmoil  importance,  that  life  and  immor- 
tality 


196  Of  the  Importance  Part  II, 

tality  are  eminently  brought  to  light  by  the  Gofpel. 
The  great  doctrines  of  a  future  ftatc,  the  danger  of  a 
courfe  of  wickednefs,  and  the  efEcacy  of  repentance, 
are  not  only  confirmed  in  the  Gofpel,  but  are  taught, 
efpecially  the  laft  is,  with  a  degree  of  light  to  which 
that  of  nature  is  but  darknefs. 

Farther  :  As  Chriftianity  ferved  thefe  ends  and  pur- 
pofes  when  it  was  firft  publifhed,  by  the  miraculous 
publication  itfelf,  fo  it  was  intended  to  ferve  the  fame 
purpofes  in  future  ages,  by  means  of  the  fettlement  of 
a  vifible  church  ;  of  a  fociety  diftinguiflied  from  com- 
mon ones,  and  from  the  reft  of  the  world,  by  pecuiiajr 
religious  inftitutions,  by  an  inftituted  method  of  in^ 
ilrudlion,  and  an  inftituted  form  of  externa!  religion. 
Miraculous  powers  were  given  to  the  firft  preachers  of 
Chriftianity,  in  order  to  their  introducing  it  into  the 
world  ;  a  vifible  church  was  eftabliflied  in  order  to 
continue  it,  and  carry  it  on  fucceffively  throughout  all 
ages.  Had  Mofes  and  the  prophets,  Chrift  and  his 
apoftles,  only  taught,  and  by  miracles  proved,  religion 
to  their  cotemporaries,  the  benefits  of  their  inftru(!tions 
would  have  reached  but  to  a  fmall  part  of  mankind. 
Chriftianity  muft  have  been,  in  a  great  degree,  funk 
and  forgot  in  a  very  few  ages.  To  prevent  this,  ap- 
pears to  have  been  one  reafon  why  a  vifible  church  was 
inftituted ;  to  be  like  a  city  upon  a  hill,  a  ftanding 
memorial  to  the  world  of  the  duty  which  we  owe  our 
Maker ;  to  call  men  continually,  both  by  example  and 
inftruftion,  to  attend  to  it,  and  by  the  form  of  religion 
ever  before  their  eyes,  remind  them  of  the  reality  j  to 
be  the  repofitory  of  the  oracles  of  God  ;  to  hold  up 
the  light  of  revelation  in  aid  to  that  of  nature,  and 
propagate  it  throughout  all  generations  to  the  end  of 
the  world — the  light  of  revelation  conlidered  here  in 
no  other  view  than  as  defin-ned  to  enforce  natural  re- 
hgion.  And  in  proportion  as  Chriftianity  is  profelfed 
and  taught  in  the  world,  religion,  natural  or  effen- 

tial. 


Chap.  t.  of  Chrifianity,  197 

tial  religion,  Is  thus  difliindly  and  advantageoully  laid 
before  mankind,  and  brought  again  and  again  to 
their  thoughts,  as  a  matter  of  infinite  importance. 
A  vifible  church  has  alfo  a  farther  tendency  to  pro- 
mote natural  religion,  as  being  an  inftituted  method 
of  education,  originally  intended  to  be  of  more  pecu- 
liar advantage  to  thofe  who  would  conform  to  it.  For 
one  end  of  the  inftitution  was,  that  by  admonition  and 
reproof,  as  well  as  inftruction,  by  a  general  regular 
dlfcipline,  and  publick  exercifes  of  rehgion,  the  body  of 
CJiriJI,  as  the  Scripture  fpeaks,  ihould  be  edified,  i.  e, 
trained  up  in  piety  and  virtue,  for  a  higher  and  better 
itate.  This  fettlement  then  appearing  thus  beneficial, 
tending  in  the  nature  of  the  thing  to  anfwer,  and  in 
fome  degree  actually  aniwering,  thofe  ends,  it  is  to  be 
remembered  that  the  very  notion  of  it  implies  pofitive 
inflitutions  ;  for  the  vifibility  of  the  church  confifts  in 
thenii  Take  away  every  thing  of  this  kind,  and  yoxi 
iofe  the  very  notion  itfelf.  So  that  if  the  things  now 
mentioned  are  advantages,  the  reafon  and  importance 
of  pofitive  inflitutions  in  general  is  moft  obvious,  fince 
without  them  thefe  advantages  could  not  be  fecured  to 
the  world.  And  it  is  mere  idle  wantonnefs,  to  infifl: 
upon  knowing  the  reaions  why  fuch  particular  ones 
were  fixed  upon,  rather  than  others. 

The  benefit  arifing  from  this  fupcrnatural  afiifgmce 
which  Chriflianity  affords  to  natural  religion,  is  what 
fome  perfons  are  very  flow  in  apprehending.  And  yet 
it  is  a  thing  diflinct  in  itfelf,  and  a  very  plain  obvious 
one.  For  will  any  in  good  earrieft  really  fay,  that  the 
bulk  of  mankind  in  the  heathen  world  were  in  as  ad- 
vantageous a  fituation  with  regard  to  natural  religion 
as  they  are  now  amongfl  us ;  that  it  was  laid  befort; 
thani,  and  enforced  upon  them,  in  a  manner  as  dif- 
tin»5t,  and  as  much  tending  to  influence  their  pra^fJce  ? 

The  objedions  againfl  ail  this,  from  the  perverfioji 
of  Chriflianity,  and  from  the  fuppoiition  of  its  having 

had 


ipS  Of  the  Importance  .  Part  IL 

had  but  little  good  influence,  however  innocently  they 
may  be  propoled,  yet  cannot  be  infifted  upon  as  con- 
cluiive  upon  any  principles  but  fuch  as  lead  to  down- 
right atheifm  ;  becaufe  the  manifeftation  of  the  law 
of  nature  by  reafon,  which  upon  all  principles  of  theifni 
muft  have  been  from  God,  has  been  perverted  and  ren- 
dered ineffedtual  in  the  fame  manner.  It  may  indeed, 
I  tliink,  truly  be  faid,  that  the  good  effefts  of  Chrifti- 
anity  have  not  been  fmall  ;  nor  its  fuppofed  ill  effedts 
an'y  effeds  at  all  of  it,  properly  fpeaking.  Perhaps  too 
the  things  themfelves  done  have  been  aggravated  ;  and 
if  not,  Chriftianity  hath  been  often  only  a  pretence  • 
and  the  fame  evils  in  the  main  would  have  been  done 
upon  Ibme  other  pretence.  However,  great  and 
fhocking  as  the  corruptions  and  abufes  of  it  have  re- 
ally been,  they  cannot  be  infifted  upon  as  arguments 
againft  it  upon  principles  of  theifm.  For  one  cannot 
proceed  one  ftep  in  reafoning  upon  natural  religion, 
any  more  than  upon  Chriftianity,  without  laying  it 
down  as  a  firft  principle,  that  the  difpenfations  of  Prov- 
idence are  not  to  be  judged  of  by  their  perverfions,  but 
by  their  genuine  tendencies  ;  not  by  what  they  do  ac- 
tually feem  to  effe6t,  but  by  what  they  would  effed  if 
mankind  did  their  part,  that  part  which  is  juftly  put 
and  left  upon  them.  It  is  altogether  as  much  the 
language  of  one  as  of  the  other.  He  that  is  wijuji  let 
him  be  mijiift  Jiill ;  and  he  that  is  holy  let  him  be  holy  Ji  ill* 
The  light  of  reafon  does  not,  any  more  than  that  of 
revelation,  force  men  to  fubmit  to  its  authority  ;  both 
admonifli  them  of  what  they  ought  to  do  and  avoid, 
together  with  the  confequences  of  each,  and  after  this 
leave  them  at  full  liberty  to  aft  juft  as  they  pleafe,  till 
the  appointed  time  of  judgment.  Every  moment's 
experience  (hews,  that  this  is  God's  general  rule  of 
government. 

To  return  then  :  Chriftianity  being  a  promulgation 
of  the  law  of  nature,  being  moreover  an  authoritative 

promulgation 

Rev.  xxii.  ij> 


Chap.  I.  of  Chrijlianity.  ip^j 

promulgation  of  it,  with  new  light,  and  other  circum- 
ftances  of  peculiar  advantage  adapted  to  the  wants  of 
mankind, — thefe  things  fully  ihew  its  importance. 
And  it  is  to  be  obferved  farther,  that  as  the  nature  of 
the  cafe  requires,  fo  all  Chriftians  are  commanded  to 
contribute,  by  their  profeffion  of  Chriftianity,  to  pre- 
ferve  it  in  the  world,  and  render  it  fuch  a  promulga- 
tion and  enforcement  of  religion.  For  it  is  the  very 
fcheme  of  the  Gofpel  that  each  Chriftian  ihould,  in 
his  degree,  contribute  towards  continuing  and  carry- 
ing it  on  ;  all  by  uniting  in  the  publick  profeffion  and 
external  pradice  of  Chriftianity  ;  fome  by  inftrufting, 
by  having  the  overiight,  and  taking  care  of  this  religi- 
ous community,  the  church  of  God.  Now  this  far- 
ther fhews  the  importance  of  Chriftianity,  and,  which 
is  what  I  chiefly  intend,  its  importance  in  a  pra£lical 
fenfe  ;  or  the  high  obligations  we  are  under  to  take  it 
into  our  moft  ferious  conlideration,  and  the  danger 
there  muft  neceffarily  be,  not  only  in  treating  it  de- 
fpitefully,  which  I  am  not  now  fpeaking  of,  but  in 
difregardlng  and  neglecting  it.  For  this  is  negled:ing 
to  do  what  is  exprefsly  enjoined  us,  for  continuing 
thole  benefits  to  the  world,  and  tranfmitting  them 
down  to  future  times ;  and  all  this  holds,  even  though 
the  only  thing  to  be  coniidered  in  Chriftianity  were 
its  fubferviency  to  natural  religion.     But, 

II.  Chriftianity  is  to  be  confidered  in  a  further  view, 
as  containing  an  account  of  a  difpenfation  of  things 
not  at  all  difcoverable  by  reaion,  in  confequence  of 
which  feverai  diftindt  precepts  are  enjoined  us.  Chrift- 
ianity is  not  only  an  external  inftitiition  of  natural 
religion,  and  a  new  promulgation  of  God's  general 
providence,  as  righteous  governor  and  judge  of  the 
world,  but  it  contains  alfo  a  revelation  of  a  particular 
difpenfation  of  providence,  carrying  on  by  his  Son 
and  Spirit,  for  the  recovery  and  falvation  of  mankind, 
who  are  reprefented  in  Scripture  to  be  in  a  ftate  of  ruin. 

And 


200  The  Importance  Part  If. 

And  in  confequence  of  this  revelation  being  made,  we 
are  commanded  to  he  baptized^  not  only  in  the  name 
of  the  Father^  but  alfo  of  the  Son^  and  of  the  Holy  Ghoft ; 
and. other  obligations  of  duty,  unknown  before,  to 
the  Son  and  the  Holy  Ghoft,  are  revealed.  Now  the 
importance  of  thefe  duties  may  be  judged  of,  by  ob- 
ferving  that  they  arife,  not  from  pofitive  commstnd 
merely,  but  alfo  from  the  offices  which  appear  from 
Scripture,  to  belong  to  thofe  divine  perfons  in  the 
Golpel  difpcnfation  ;  or  from  the  relations  which  we 
are  there  informed  they  ftand  in  to  us.  By  reafon  is 
revealed  the  relation  which  God  the  Father  ftands  in 
to  us.  Hence  arifes  the  obligation  of  duty  which  we 
are  under  to  him.  In  Scripture  are  revealed  the  rela- 
tions which  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  ftand  in  to  us. 
Hence  arife  the  obligations  of  duty  which  we  are  un- 
der to  them.  The  truth  of  the  cafe,  as  one  may  fpeak, 
in  each  of  thefe  three  refpedls  being  admitted  ;  that 
God  is  the  governor  of  the  world,  upon  the  evidence 
of  reafon — that  Chrift  is  the  mediator  between  God 
and  man,  and  the  Holy  Ghoft  our  guide  and  fanclifier, 
upon  the  evidence  of  revelation  ;  the  truth  of  the  cafe, 
I  fay,  in  each  of  thefe  refpefts  being  admitted,  it  is  no 
more  a  queftion,  why  it  iliould  be  commanded  that 
we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy 
Ghoft,  than  that  we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the 
Father.  This  matter  feems  to  require  to  be  more 
fully  ftated.* 

Let  it  be  remembered  then  that  relig-ion  comes  un- 
der  the  twofold  confideration  of  internal  and  external  ; 
for  the  latter  is  as  real  a  part  of  religion,  of  true  relig- 
ion, as  the  former.  Now  when  rehgion  is  confidered 
under  the  firft  notion,  as  an  inward  principle,  to  be 
exerted  in  fuch  and  fuch  inward  a<5ls  of  the  mind  and 
heart,  the  effence  of  natural  religion  may  be  faid  to 
confift  in  religious  regards  to  God  the  Father  Almtghty  ; 

and 

*  See,  The  Nature,  Obligation,  and  Efficacy,  of  the  Chrifliati  Sacrannients, 
<£c.  and  CoUibcr  of  revealed  Religion,  as  there  quoted. 


Chap.  I.  of  Chrijiianity.  201 

and  the  effence  of  revealed  religion,  as  diftingulfhed 
from  natural,  to  confift  in  religious  regards  to  the  Son 
and  to  the  Holy  Ghojl.  And  the  obligation  we  are 
under,  of  paying  thefe  religious  regards  to  each  of 
the{e  divine  perfons  refpeclively,  arifes  from  the  refpec- 
tive  relations  v/hich  they  each  ftand  in  to  us.  How 
thefe  relations  are  made  known,  whether  by  reafou  or 
revelation,  makes  no  alteration  in  the  cafe  ;  becaufe 
the  duties  arife  out  of  the  relations  themfelves,  not 
out  of  the  manner  in  which  we  are  informed  of  them» 
The  Son  and  Spirit  have  each  his  proper  office,  in  that 
great  difpenfation  of  Providence,  the  redemption  of 
the  world  ;  the  one  our  mediator,  the  other  our  fanc- 
tifier.  Does  not  then  the  duty  of  religious  regards 
to  both  thefe  divine  perfons  as  immediately  arife,  to 
the  view  of  reafon,  out  of  the  very  nature  of  thefe  of- 
fices and  relations,  as  the  inward  good  will  and  kind 
intention,  which  we  owe  to  our  fellow  creatures,  arifes 
out  of  the  common  relations  between  us  and  them  ? 
But  it  will  be  afked,  *'  What  are  the  inward  religious 
regards,  appearing  thus  obvioufly  due  to  the  Son  and 
Holy  Spirit,  as  ariiing,  not  merely  from  command  in 
Scripture,  but  from  the  very  nature  of  the  revealed 
relations  which  they  ftand  in  to  us  ?"  I  anfwer — the 
religious  regards  of  reverence,  honour,  love,  truft,  grat- 
itude, fear,  hope.  In  what  external  manner  this  in- 
ward worfliip  is  to  be  exprefied,  is  a  matter  of  pure 
revealed  command,  as  perhaps  the  external  manner  in 
which  God  the  Father  is  to  be  worfhipped  m.ay  be 
more  io  than  we  are  ready  to  think  5  but  the  worfhip, 
the  internal  worfhip  itfelf,  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Ghofl, 
is  no  farther  matter  of  pure  revealed  command,  than 
us  the  relations  they  ftand  in  to  us  are  matter  of  pure 
revelation  ;  for  the  relations  being  known,  the  obliga- 
tions to  fuch  internal  worlhip  are  obligations  of  reafon, 
arifmg  out  of  thofe  relations  themfelves.  In  Ihort, 
the  hiitcry  of  the  Gofpel  as  immediately  Ihews  us  the 

O  reafon 


202  Of  the  Importance  Part  IL 

reafon  of  thefe  obligations,  as  it  fliews  us  the  meaning 
of  tlie  words,  Son  and  Holy  Ghoft. 

If  this  account  of  th-e  Chriftian  religion  be  juft,' 
thofe  perfons  who  can  fpeak  lightly  of  it,  as  of  little 
conGsquence,  provided  natural  religion  be  kept  tOy 
plainly  forget  that  Chriftianity,  even  what  is  peculiarly 
fo  called,  as  diftinguifhed  from  natural  religion,  has 
yet  fomewhat  very  important,  even  of  a  moral  nature.- 
For  the  office  of  our  Lord  being  made  known,  and  tlie 
relation  he  ftands  in  to  us,  the  obligation  of  religious 
regards  to  him,  is  plainly  moral,  as  much  as  charity  to 
mankind  is ;  fince  this  obligation  arifes,  before  ex- 
ternal comm.and,  immediately  out  of  that  his  office 
and  relation  itfelf.  Thiofe-  perfons  appear  to  forget, 
that  revelation  is  to  be  confidered  as  informing  us  of 
fomewhat  new  in  the  ftate  of  mankind,  and  in  the 
government  of  the  world  ;  as  acquainting  us  with 
fome  relations  we  ftand  in,  which  could  not  otherwife 
have  been  known.  And  thefe  relations  being  real, 
(though  before  revelation  we  could  be  under  no  obli- 
gations from  them,  yet  upon  their  being  revealed) 
there  is  no  reafon  to  think,  but  that  negle6t  of  behav- 
ing fuitably  to  them  will  be  attended  with  the  fame 
kind  of  confequences  under  God's  government,  as 
neglecting  to  behave  fuitably  to  any  other  relations 
made  known  to  us  by  reafon.  And  ignorance,  wheth- 
er unavoidable  or  voluntary,  fo  far  as  we  can  poffibly 
fee,  will,  juft  as  much,  and  juft  as  little,  excufe  in  one 
cafe  as  in  the  other  ;  the  ignorance  being  fuppofed 
equally  unavoidable,  or  equally  voluntary,  in  both 
cafes. 

If  therefore  Chrift  be  indeed  the  mediator  between 
God  and  man,  i.  e,  if  Chriftianity  be  true,  if  he  be  in- 
deed our  Lord,  our  Saviour,  and  our  God, — no  one 
can  fay  what  may  follow,  not  only  the  obftinate  but 
the  carelefs  difre2;ard  to  him  in  thofe  hi^h  relations. 
Nay,  no  one  can  fay  what  may  follow  fuch  difrcgard, 

even 


ChAp.  L  of  Chrijimnity.  203 

even  in  the  way  of  natural  confequence.  For,  as 
the  natural  confequences  of  vice  in  this  life  are  doubt- 
lefs  to  be  confidered  as  judicial  punifhments  inflidied 
by  God)  fo  likewife,  for  ought  we  know,  the  judicial 
puniihments  of  the  future  life  may  be,  in  a  like  way  or  a, 
like  fenfe,  the  natural  confequence  of  vice  -,  *  of  men's 
violating  or  difregarding  the  relations,  v.'hich  God 
has  placed  them  in  here^  and  made  known  to  them. 

Again  :  If  mankind  are  corrupted  and  depraved  in 
their  moral  chara<^ler,  and  fo  are  unfit  for  that  ftate 
which  Chrift  is  gone  to  jTrepare  for  his  difciples  ;  and 
if  the  aififlance  of  God's  Spirit  be  necelTary  to  renew 
their  nature,  in  the  degree  requiiite  to  their  being 
qualified  for  that  flate  ;  all  which  is  implied  in  the 
exprefs  though  figurative  declaration.  Except  a  man 
be  born  of  the  Spirit^  he  canvM  enter  into  the  kingdom  of 
God  -y-f  fuppofuig  this,  is  it  pcffible  any  ferious  perfon 
can  think  it  a  flight  matter,  whether  or  no  he  makei^ 
ufe  of  the  means  exprefsly  commanded  by  God  for 
obtaining  this  divine  afliflance  ?  efpccially  fince  the 
whole  analogy  of  nature  fhews,  that  we  are  not  to 
expeft  any  benefits  without  m.aking  ufe  of  the  appoint- 
ed means  for  obtaining  or  enjoying  them.  Now  rea- 
fon  ihev'js  us  nothing  of  the  particuiar  immediate 
means  of  obtaining  either  tempora,!  or  fpiritual  bene- 
fits. This  therefore  we  mull  learn,  either  from  expe- 
rience or  revelation.  And  experience  the  prefent  cafe 
does  not  admit  of* 

The  conclufion  from  all  this  evidently  is,  thatChrifl:-. 
ianity  being  fuppofed  either  true  or  credible,  it  is  un- 
ipeakable  irreverence,  and  really  the  mofh  prefump- 
tuous  rafhnefs,  to  treat  it  as  a  light  matter.  It  can 
never  juftly  be  efteemed  of  little  confequence,  till  it 
be  pofitively  fuppofed  falfe.  Nor  do  I  know  a  higher 
and  more  important  obligation  which  we  are  under, 
than  that  of  examining  mofc  ferioufly  into  the  evi- 
O  2  dence 

*  Ch.  V.  -f  John  iii.  5, 


204  Q/"  ^^^  Importance  Part  IL 

dence  of  it,  fuppofmg  its  credibilit}^  and  of  embracing 
it,  upon  fuppofition  of  its  truth. 

The  two  following  dcdudions  may  be  proper  to  be 
added,  in  order  to  illuftrate  the  foregoing  obfervations, 
aiid  to  prevent  their  being  miftaken. 

Firjl,  Hence  we  may  clearly  fee,  where  lies  the  dif- 
tindion  between  what  is  pofitive  and  what  is  moral  in 
religion.  Moral  precepts  arc  precepts  the  reafon  of 
which  we  fee  ;  pofitive  precepts  are  precepts  the  rea- 
fons  of  which  we  do  not  fee.*  Moral  duties  arife  out 
of  the  nature  of  the  cafe  itfelf,  prior  to  external  com- 
mand- Podtive  duties  do  not  arife  out  of  the  nature 
of  the  cafe,  but  from  external  command  ;  nor  would 
they  be  duties  at  all,  were  it  not  for  fuch  command, 
received  from  him  whole  creatures  and  fubjecfts  we 
are.  But  the  manner  in  which  the  nature  of  the  cafe 
or  the  fact  of  the  relation  is  made  known,  this  doth 
not  denominate  any  duty  either  pofitive  or  moral. 
That  we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Father,  is  as 
much  a  pofitive  duty,  as  that  we  be  baptized  in  the 
name  of  the  Son,  becaufe  both  arife  equally  from  re- 
vealed command  ;  though  the  relation  v^'hich  we 
ftand  in  to  God  the  Father  is  made  known  to  us  by 
reafon,  the  relation  we  ftand  in  to  Chrift  by  revelation 
only.  On  the  other  hand,  the  difpenfation  of  the 
Gofpel  admitted,  gratitude  as  immediately  becomes 
due  to  Chrift,  from  his  being  the  voluntary  minifter 
of  this  difpenfation,  as  it  is  due  to  God  the  Father, 
from  his  being  the  fountain  of  all  good  ;  though  the 
firil  is  made  known  to  us  by  revelation  only,  the  (qc- 
ond  by  reafon.  Hence  alfo  we  may  fee,  and,  for  dif- 
tinclnefs  fake,  it  may  be  worth  mentioning,  that  pofi- 
tive inftitutions  come  under  a  twofold  confideration. 

They 

*  Thi";  is  the  diftinftion  between  moral  and  pofitive  precepts,  confidered 
refpectively  as  fuch.  But  yet,  fince  the  latter  have  fomewhat  ot  a  moral  na- 
ture, we  may  fee  the  realon  of  them,  confidered  in  tliis  view.  Moral  and 
pofitive  precepts  are  in  fome  refpe<fts  ahke,  in  other  refpecSts  different.  So 
far  as  they  arc  aUke,  we  difcern  the  reafous  of  both  ;  fo  far  as  they  ar?  dif- 
terent,  ws  difcern  the  reafoas  of  the  former,  but  not  of  the  latter. 


Chap.  I.  of  Chrijiianity.  205 

They  are  either  inftltutions  founded  on  natural  relig- 
ion, as  baptifm  in  the  name  of  the  Father,  though  this 
has  alfo  a  particular  reference  to  the  Gofpel  difpenfa- 
tion,  for  it  is  in  the  name  of  God,  as  the  Father  of 
our  Lord  Jefus  Chrifb ;  or  they  are  external  inflitu- 
tions  founded  on  revealed  religion,  as  baptifm  in  the 
name  of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy  Ghoft. 

Secondly,  From  the  diftinftion  between  what  is 
moral  and  what  is  pofitive  in  religion,  appears  the 
ground  of  that  peculiar  preference  which  the  Scripture 
teaches  us  to  be  due  to  the  former. 

The  reafon  of  pofitive  inflitutions  in  general  is  very 
obvious,  though  we  fhould  not  fee  the  reafon  why  fuch 
particular  ones  are  pitched  upon  rather  than  others. 
Whoever  therefore,  inftead  of  cavilling  at  words,  will 
attend  to  the  thing  itfelf,  may  clearly  fee  that  pofitive 
inftltutions  in  general,  as  diftinguillied  from  this  or 
that  particular  one,  have  the  nature  of  moral  com- 
mands, fince  the  reafons  of  them  appear.  Thus,  for 
inftance,  the  external  v/orfhip  of  God  is  a  moral  duty, 
though  no  particular  mode  of  it  be  fo.  Care  then  is 
to  be  taken,  when  a  comparifon  is  made  between  pofi- 
tive and  moral  duties,  that  they  be  compared  no  far- 
ther than  as  they  are  different ;  no  farther  than  as  the 
former  are  pofitive,  or  arife  out  of  mere  external  com- 
jiiand,  the  reaibns  of  which  we  are  not  acquainted 
with  ;  and  as  the  latter  are  moral,  or  arife  out  of  the 
apparent  reafon  of  the  caffe,  without  fuch  external 
command.  Unlefs  this  caution  be  obferved,  we  fhall 
ran  into  endlefs  confufion. 

Now,  this  being  premifed,  fuppofe  tvv^o  {landing 
precepts  enjoined  by  the  fame  authority  ;  that,  in  cer- 
tain conjunftures,  it  is  impofTible  to  obey  both  ;  that 
the  form.er  is  moral,  i.  e.  a  precept  of  which  we  fee 
the  reafons,  and  that  they  hold  in  the  particular  cafe 
before  us ;  but  that  the  latter  is  pofitive,  i.  e.  a  pre- 
cept of  which  we  do  not  fee  the  reafons  ; — it  is  indif- 

putable 


20 6  Of  the  Importance  Part  II. 

putable  that  our  obligations  are  to  obey  the  former  ; 
becaufe  there  is  an  apparent  reafon  for  this  preference, 
and  none  againft  it.  Farther,  pofitive  inilitutions,  I 
fuppofe  all  thofe  which  Chriftianity  enjoins,  are  means 
to  a  moral  end  ;  and  the  end  muft  be  acknowledged 
more  excellent  than  the  means.  Nor  is  obfervance  of 
thefe  inftltutions  any  religious  obedience  at  all,  or  of 
any  value,  otherwife  than  as  it  proceeds  from  a  moral 
principle.  This  feems  to  be  the  ftricl  logical  way  of 
ilating  and  determining  this  matter  ;  but  will,  per- 
haps, be  found  lefs  applicable  to  practice  than  may  be 
thought  at  firfl  fight. 

And  therefore,  in  a  more  pradlical  though  more  lax 
way  of  confideration,  and  taking  the  words,  moral  law 
and  pofitive  vijiitutions ^  in  the  popular  fenfe, — I  add, 
that  the  whole  moral  law  is  as  much  matter  of  reveal- 
ed command,  as  pofitive  inftltutions  are  ;  for  the 
Scripture  enjoins  every  moral  virtue.  In  this  refpedt 
then  they  are  both  upon  a  level.  But  the  moral  law 
is,  moreover,  written  upon  our  hearts — interwoven  in- 
to our  very  nature.  And  this  is  a  plain  intimation  of 
the  Author  of  it,  which  is  to  be  preferred,  when  they 
interfere. 

But  there  is  not  altogether  fo  much  neceffity  for  the 
determination  of  this  queftion  as  fome  perfons  feem  to 
think.  Nor  are  we  left  to  reafon  alone  to  determine 
it.  For,  Firfi^  Though  mankind  have,  in  all  ages, 
been  greatly  prone  to  place  their  religion  in  peculiar 
pofitive  rites,  by  way  of  equivalent  for  obedience  to 
moral  precepts, — yet,  without  making  any  compari- 
fon  at  all  between  them,  and  confequently  without  de- 
termining which  is  to  have  the  preference,  the  nature 
of  the  thmg  abundantly  ibews  all  notions  of  that  kind 
to  be  utterly  fubverfive  of  true  religion  ;  as  they  are, 
moreover,  contrary  to  the  whole  general  tenor  of  Scrip- 
ture, and  likewife  to  the  moft  exprefs  particular  decla^ 
rations  of  it,  that  nothing  can  render  us  accepted  of 
/  Go4 


Chap.  I,  of  Chriftianity.  toy 

God  without  moral  virtue.  Secondly ,  Upon  the  oc- 
cafion  of  mentioning  together  pofitive  and  moral  du- 
ties, the  Scripture  always  puts  the  ftrefs  of  religion 
upon  the  latter,  and  never  upon  the  former  ;  which, 
though  GO  fort  of  allowance  to  negleft  the  former, 
when  they  do  not  interfere  with  the  ktter,  yet  is  a 
plain  intimation  that  when  they  do,  the  latter  are  to 
be  preferred.  And  farther,  as  mankind  are  for  plac- 
ing the  ftrefs  of  their  religion  any  where  rather  than 
upon  virtue — left  both  the  reafon  of  the  thing,  and 
the  general  fpirit  of  Chriftianity,  appearing  in  the  inti- 
mation now  mentioned,  Ihould  be  inefFedual  againft 
this  prevalent  folly, — our  Lord  himielf,  from  whole 
command  alone  ihe  obligation  of  politive  inftitutions 
arifes,  has  taken  occaiion  to  make  the  comparifon  be- 
tween them  and  moral  precepts,  when  the  Pharifees 
cenfured  him,  for  eating  with  publicans  andfinners  ; 
and  alfo  when  they  cenfured  his  difciples  for  plucking 
the  ears  of  corn  on  the  Sabbath  day.  Upon  this  com- 
parifon, he  has  determined  exprefsly,  and  in  form, 
Vvr'hich  fliall  have  the  preference  when  they  interfere. 
And  by  delivering  his  authoritative  determination  in 
^.  proverbial  manner  of  expreffion,  he  has  made  it  gen- 
eral :  Ivjill  have  mercy ^  and  not  facrifice.*"  The  pro-? 
priety  of  the  word  proverbial  is  not  the  thing  infiftcd 
upon,  though  I  think  the  manner  of  fi.eaking  is  to  be 
called  fo.  But  that  the  manner  of  fpeaking  very  re- 
markably renders  the  determination  general,  is  iurely 
indifputable.  For,  had  it,  in  the  latter  cafe,  been  laid 
only,  that  God  preferred  mercy  to  the  rigid  obiervance 
of  the  Sabbath, — even  then,  by  parity  of  reafon,  moft 
juftly  might  we  have  argued,  that  he  preferred  mercy 
likewife  to  the  obfervance  of  other  ritual  inftitutions, 
and  in  general,  moral  duties  to  pofitive  ones.  And 
thus  the  determination  would  have  been  genera], 
though  its  being  fo  were  inferred  and  not  exprelfed. 

But 

*  Matth.  ix.  13.  and  xii.  7. 


2o8  Of  the  Importance  of  Chrifiianity.      Part  II, 

But  as  the  paffage  really  ftands  in  the  Gofpel,  it  is 
much  ftronger.  For  the  fenfe,  and  the  very  literal 
ivords  of  our  Lord's  anfwer,  are  as  applicable  to  any 
other  inftance  of  a  comparifon,  between  pofitive  and 
moral  duties,  as  to  this  upon  which  they  were  fpoken. 

And  if,  in  cafe  of  competition,  mercy  is  to  be  pre- 
ferred to  pofitive  inftitutions,  it  will  fcarce  be  thought 
that  juftice  is  to  give  place  to  them..  It  is  remarkable 
too,  that,  as  the  words  are  a  quotation  from  the  Old 
Teflament,  they  are  introduced,  on  both  the  foremen- 
tioned  occafions,  with  a  declaration  that  the  Pharifees 
did  not  underftand  the  meaning  of  them.  This,  I 
fay,  is  very  remarkable.  For,  fmce  it  is  fcarce  pofiTi- 
ble  for  the  moft  ignorant  perfon  not  to  underftand  the 
literal  fenfe  of  the  palTage  in  the  prophet,*  and  fincc 
underftanding  the  literal  fenfe  would  not  have  pre- 
vented their  condemning  the  guUtlefs,-\-  it  can  hardly  be 
doubted  that  the  thing  which  our  Lord  really  intend- 
ed in  that  declaration  was,  that  the  Pharifees  had  not 
learnt  from  it,  as  they  might,  wherein  \.\-\^ general  fpirit 
of  rehgion  conlifts  ;  that  it  confifts  in  moral  piety  and 
virtue,  as  diftinguifhed  from  forms  and  ritual  obferv- 
ances.  However,  it  is  certain  we  may  learn  this  from 
his  divine  application  of  the  paffage  in  the  Gofpel. 

But,  as  it  is  one  of  the  peculiar  weakneiies  of  human 
nature,  when,  upon  a  comparifon  of  two  things,  one  is 
found  to  be  of  greater  importance  than  the  other,  to 
confidcr  this  other  as  of  fcarce  any  importance  at  all, — 
it  is  highly  necelTary  that  we  remind  ourfelves  how 
great  prefumption  it  is,  to  make  light  of  any  inftitu- 
tions of  divine  appointment ;  that  our  obligations  to 
obey  all  God's  commands  whatever  are  ablblute  and 
indifpenlible  ;  and  that  commands  merely  pofitive, 
admitted  to  be  from  him,  lay  us  under  a  moral  obli- 
gation to  obey  them — an  obligation  m.oral  in  the 
Itrifteft  and  mofh  proper  fenfe. 

To 

*  Hof.  vi.  f  Sec  Matth.  xii.  7. 


Chap.  II.      OfthefiippofedPrefuinptlon,i^c.         2,09 

To  thefe  things  I  cannot  forbear  adding,  that  the 
account  now  given  of  Chriftianity  mofl:  ftrongly  fhews 
and  enforces  upon  us  tiie  obligation  of  fearching  the 
Scriptures,  in  order  to  fee  what  the  fcheme  of  reveia" 
tion  really  is,  inflead  of  determining  beforehand  from 
reafon  what  the  fcheme  of  it  mud  be.*  Indeed  if  in 
revelation  there  be  found  any  pafiages,  the  feeming 
meaning  of  which  is  contrary  to  natural  religion,  we 
may  moft  certainly  conclude  fuch  feeming  meaning 
not  to  be  the  real  one.  But  it  is  not  any  degree  of  a 
prefumption  againfl  an  interpretation  of  Scripture,  that 
fuch  interpretation  contains  a  doctrine  which  the  light 
of  nature  cannot  difcover,  -f-  or  a  precept  which  the  Jaw 
of  nature  does  not  oblige  to. 


CHAP.     II. 

Of  the  fuppofed  Prefumption  agahijl  a  Revelation^  con- 
fidered  as  miraculous. 

JlTAVING  fliewn  the  importance  of  the 
Chriftian  revelation,  and  the  obligations  which  we  are 
under  ferioufly  to  attend  to  it,  upon  fuppofition  of  its 
truth,  or  its  credibility, — the  next  thing  in  order  is,  to 
conlider  the  fuppofed  prefumptions  againft  revelation 
in  general,  which  (hall  be  the  fubjedt  of  this  chapter ; 
and  the  obje-ftions  againft  the  Chriftian  in  particular^ 
which  Ihall  be  the  fubiect  of  fome  following  ones,  t 
For  It  feems  the  moft  natural  method  to  remove  the 
prejudices  againft  Chriftianity,  before  we  proceed  to 
the  confideration  of  the  pofitive  evidence  for  it,  and 
the  objeftions  againft  that  evidence.  § 

It  is,  I  think,  commonly  fuppofed,  that  there  is  fome 
peculiar  prelumption,   from  the   analogy  of  nature, 

againft 

*Sec  Ch.  iii.  f  V.  no,  2ir. 

J  Ch.  iii,  IV,  y,  vi.  §  Ch.  vii. 


210  Of  tie  fuppofed  Prefiimption        Par  t  II. 

againfl  the  Chriftian  fcheme  of  tilings,  at  leaft  againft 
miracles ;  fo  as  that  flrong-er  evidence  is  neceffarv  to 
prove  the  truth  and  reahty  of  them  than  would  be  fuf- 
ficient  to  convince  us  of  other  events,  or  matters  of 
fa(5t-  Indeed  the  confideration  of  this  fuppofed  pre- 
fumption  cannot  but  be  thought  very  infignificant,  by 
many  perfons  ;  yet,  as  it  belongs  to  the  fubjecl  of  this 
treatiie,  fo  it  may  tend  to  open  the  mind,  and  remove 
fome  prejudices,  however  needieis  the  confideration  of 
it  be  upon  its  own  account. 

I.  I  find  no  appearance  of  a  prefumption,  from  the 
analogy  of  nature,  againft  the  general  Icheme  of  Chrift- 
ianity,  that  God  created  and  invifibly  governs  the 
world  by  Jefus  Chrift,  and  by  him  alfo  will  hereafter 
judge  it  in  righteoufnefs,  i.  e.  render  to  every  one  ac- 
cording to  his  works  ;  and  that  good  men  are  under 
the  fe^jret  influence  of  his  Spirit.  Whether  thefe 
things  are  or  are  not  to  be  called  miraculous,  is  |)er- 
haps  only  a  queftion  about  words,  or  however,  is  of  no 
moment  in  the  cafe.  If  the  analogy  of  nature  raifes 
any  prefumption  againft  this  general  fcheme  of  Chrift- 
ianity,  it  muft  be  either  becaufe  it  is  not  difcoverable 
by  reafon  or  experience,  or  elfe  becaufe  it  is  unlike  that 
courie  of  nature  which  is.  But  analogy  raifes  no  pre- 
fumption againft  the  truth  of  this  icheme,  upon  either 
of  thefe  accounts. 

Firjl,  There  is  no  prefumption,  from  analogy,  againft 
the  truth  of  it  upon  account  of  its  not  being  difcover- 
able by  reafon  or  experience.  For  fuppofe  one  who 
never  heard  of  revelation,  of  the  moft  improved  un- 
derftanding,  and  acquainted  with  our  whole  fyftem  of 
natural  philoiophy  and  natural  religion, — fuch  an  one 
could  not  but  be  fenfible  that  it  was  but  a  very  fmali 
part  of  the  natural  and  moral  fyftem  of  the  univerie, 
which  he  was  acquainted  with.  He  could  not  but  be 
fenfible  that  there  muft  be  innumerable  things,  in  the 
diipenfations  of  Providence  paft,  in  the  invifible  gov- 
ernment 


Chap.  II,  ^gainjl  Miracles.  21 1 

ernment  over  the  world  at  prefent  carrying  on,  and  in 
what  is  to  come,  of  which  he  was  wholly  ignorant,* 
and  which  could  not  be  difcovered  without  revelation. 
Whether  the  rcheme  of  nature  be,  in  the  llridteft  fenfe, 
infinite  or  not,  it  is  evidently  vail,  even  beyond  all  pof- 
iible  imagination  ;  and  doubtlefs  that  part  of  it  which 
is  opened  to  our  view  is  but  as  a  point,  in  coniparifon 
of  the  whole  plan  of  Providence,  reaching  throughout 
eternity  paft  and  future  ;  in  comparilbn  or  what  is  even 
now  going  on  in  the  remote  parts  of  the  boundiefs  uni- 
verfe  ;  nay,  in  comparifon  of  the  whole  fcheme  of  this 
world.  And  therefore,  that  things  Ite  beyond  the  nat- 
ural reach  of  our  faculties,  is  no  fort  of  prelumption 
againffc  the  truth  and  reality  of  them  ;  becaufe  it  is 
certain  there  are  innumerable  things,  in  the  conftitu- 
tion  and  government  of  the  uaiverfe,  which  are  thus 
beyond  the  natural  reach  of  our  faculties.  Secondi-Vy 
Analogy  raifes  no  prefumption  againil  any  of  the 
things  contained  in  this  general  do6lrine  of  Scripture 
noiv  mentioned,  upon  account  of  their  being  unlike 
the  known  courfe  of  nature.  For  there  is  no  pre- 
fiimption  at  all  from  analogy,  that  the  zvJiole  courfe  of 
things,  or  divine  government,  naturally  unknown  to 
us,  and  every  thing  in  it,  is  like  to  any  thing  in  that 
which  is  known,  and  therefore  no  peculiar  prefump- 
tion againft  any  thing  in  the  former,  upon  account  of 
its  being  unlike  to  any  thing  in  the  latter.  And  in 
the  conititution  and  natural  government  of  the  world, 
as  well  as  in  the  moral  government  of  it,  we  fee  things 
in  a  great  degree  unlike  one  another,  and  therefore 
ought  not  to  wonder  at  fuch  unlikeneis  between  things 
vifible  and  invifible.  However,  the  fcheme  of  Chnlt- 
ianity  is  by  no  means  entirely  unlike  the  fcheme  of  na- 
ture, as  will  appear  in  the  foiiov/ing  parr  of  this  treatifj. 
The  notion  ot  a  miracle,  confidered  as  a  proof  of  a 
divine  miffion,  has  been  ftated  with  great  exadnefs  by 

divines, 
*p.  174,  175, 


'^ 


c  1 2  Of  ike  fiippofed  Prefumption        P  a  R  t  II, 

divines,  and  is,  I  think,  fufficiently  underftood  by 
every  cne.  There  are  alfo  invifible  miracles,  the  in- 
carnation of  Chrift,  for  inftance,  which  being  fecret 
cannot  be  alleged  as  a  proof  of  fuch  a  miflion,  but  re- 
quire themfelves  to  be  proved  by  vifible  miracles. 
Revelation  itfelf  too  is  miraculous,  and  miracles  are 
the  proof  of  it ;  and  the  (uppofed  prefumption  againft 
thefe,  fhall  prefently  be  confidered.  All  which  I  have 
been  obferving  here  is,  that,  whether  we  choofe  to  caU 
every  thing  in  the  difpenfations  of  Providence,  not 
difcoverable  without  revelation,  nor  like  the  known 
courfe  of  things,  miraculous,  and  whether  the  o-eneral 
Chriflian  diipenfation  now  mentioned,  is  to  be  called 
fo  or  not,  the  foregoing  obfervations  feem  certainly  to 
ihew,  that  there  is  no  prefumption  againil  it,  from 
the  analogy  of  nature. 

II.  There  is  no  prefumption  from  analogy  againft 
fome  operations,  which  we  fhould  now  call  mracu- 
lous,  particularly  none  againft  a  revelation  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  work!  ;  nothing  of  fuch  prefuni'tion 
againft  it,  as  is  fuppofed  to  be  implied  or  expreii-d  in 
the  word  miraculous.  For  a  miracle,  in  its  very  no- 
tion,  is  relative  to  a  courfe  of  nature,  and  implies 
fomewhat  different  from  it,  confidered  as  being  fo. 
Now,  either  there  was  no  courfe  of  nature  at  the  time 
which  v\^e  are  fpeaking  of,  or  if  there  were,  we  are  not 
acquainted  what  the  courfe  of  nature  is,  upon  the 
firft  peopling  of  worlds.  And  therefore  the  queftion, 
whether  mankind  had  a  revelation  made  to  them  at 
that  time,  is  to  be  confidered,  not  as  a  queftion  con- 
cerning a  miracle,  but  as  a  common  quefticn  of  fact. 
And  we  have  the  like  reafon,  be  it  more  or  lefs,  to 
admit  the  report  of  tradition  concerning  this  queftion, 
and  concerning  common  matters  offa61:  of  the  fame 
antiquity  ;  for  inftance,  what  part  of  the  earth  was 
firft  peopled. 

Or 


Chap.  IL  ^g^injl  Miracles,  215 

Or  thus  :  When  mankind  was  firft  placed  In  this 
ftate,  there  was  a  power  exerted  totally  different  from 
the  prefent  courfe  of  nature.  Noxv,  whether  this  pow- 
er, thus  wholly  different  from  the  prefent  courfe  of  na- 
ture, for  we  cannot  properly  apply  to  it  the  word  w/- 
raciilons^—\v\\ti\\tr  this  power  flopped  immediately 
after  it  had  made  man,  or  went  on,  and  exerted  itfelf 
farther  in  giving  him  a  revelation,  is  a  queftlon  of  the 
fame  kind,  as  whether  an  ordinary  power  exerted  it- 
felf in  fuch  a  particular  degree  and  manner  or  not. 

Or  fuppole  the  power  exerted  in  the  formation  of 
the  world  be  confidered  as  miraculous,  or  rather  be 
called  by  that  name,  the  cafe  will  not  be  different ; 
fmce  It  mufl  be  acknowledged,  that  fuch  a  power  was 
exerted.  For  fuppofing  it  acknowledged,  that  our 
Saviour  fpent  fome  years  in  a  courfe  of  working  mira- 
cles, there  is  no  more  prefumption,  worth  mentioning, 
againfl  his  having  exerted  this  mxiraculous  power  in  a 
certain  degree  greater,  than  in  a  certain  degree  lefs  ; 
in  one  or  two  more  inftances,  than  In  one  or  two  few- 
er ;  in  this,  than  in  another  manner. 

It  is  evident  then,  that  there  can  be  no  peculiar 
prefumption,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  againfl  fup- 
pofing a  revelation  when  man  was  firft  placed  upon 
the  earth. 

Add,  that  there  does  not  appear  the  leaft  intima- 
tion in  hiftory  or  tradition,  that  religion  was  firfb  rea- 
foned  out  ;  but  the  whole  of  hiftory  and  tradition 
makes  for  the  other  fide,  that  it  came  into  the  world 
by  revelation.  Indeed  the  flate  of  religion  in  the  firfl 
ages,  cf  which  we  have  any  account,  feems  to  fuppofe 
and  imply  that  this  was  the  original  of  it  amongfl 
mankind.  And  thefe  reflexions  together,  without 
taking  in  the  pecuHar  authority  of  Scripture,  amount 
to  real  and  a  very  material  degree  of  evidence,  that 
there  was  a  revelation  at  the  beginning  of  the  world. 
Now  this,  as  it  is  a  confirmation  of  natural  religion, 

and 


214  Of  the  fuppofed  Prefumptwn        P  a  il  t  IL 

and  therefore  mentioned  in  the  former  part  of  this 
treatiie,*  fo  likewife  it  has  a  tendency  to  remove  any 
prejudices  againft  a  fubfequent  revelation. 

III.  But  (lill  it  may  be  objeded,  that  there  is  fome 
peculiar  preuimption,  from  analogy,  againft  miracles, 
particularly  againft  revelation,  after  the  fettlement  and 
during  the  continuance  of  a  courfe  of  nature. 

Now  with  regard  to  this  fuppofed  prefumption  it  is 
to  be  obferved  in  general,  that  before  we  can  have 
ground  for  railing  what  can,  with  any  propriety,  be 
called  an  armment  from  analoq;v,  for  or  againfl  revela- 
tion,  conlidered  as  fomewhat  miraculous,  we  muft  be 
acquainted  with  a  fimilar  or  parallel  caie.  But  the 
hiftory  of  fome  other  world,  feemingly  in  like  circum- 
ftances  wdth  our  own,  is  no  more  than  a  parallel  cafe, 
and  therefore  nothing  fhort  of  this  can  be  fo.  Yet, 
could  w^e  come  at  a  prefumptive  proof  for  or  againft  a 
revelation,  from  being  informed  whether  fuch  world 
had  one  or  not,  fuch  a  proof,  being  drawn  from  one 
fingle  inftance  only,  muft  be  infinitely  precarious. 
More  particularly  ;  Firjl  of  all.  There  is  a  very  ftrong 
prefumption  againft  common  fpeculative  truths,  and 
againft  the  moft  ordinary  fadis,  before  the  proof  of 
them,  which  yet  is  overcome  by  almoft  any  proof. 
There  is  a  prefumption  of  millions  to  one  againft  the 
ftory  of  Cafar,  or  of  any  other  man.  For  fuppofe  a 
number  of  common  fafts  fo  and  fo  circumftanced,  of 
which  one  had  no  kind  of  proof,  ihouid  happen  to 
come  into  one's  thoughts,  every  one  would,  without 
any  pofTible  doubr,  conclude  them  to  be  falfe  ;  and 
the  like  may  be  faid  of  a  fmgle  common  fadL  And 
from  hence  it  appears,  that  the  queftion  of  importance 
as  to  the  matter  before  us,  is,  concerning  the  degree  of 
the  peculiar  prefumption  fuppofed  againft  miracles ; 
not  v.'hether  there  be  anv  peculiar  prefumption  at  all 
againft  them.     For,  if  there  be  the  prefumption  of 

miUioiis 


Chap.  II.  ~    againji  Miracles.  213 

millions  to  one  againft  the  mod  common  fads,  what 
can  a  fmall  prefumption  additional  to  this  amount  to, 
though  it  be  peculiar  ?  It  cannot  be  ellimated,and  is  as 
nothing.  The  only  material  queftion  is,  whether  there 
be  any  fuch  prefumption  againft  miracles,  as  to  render 
them  in  any  fort  incredible.  Secondly^  If  we  leave  out 
the  confideration  of  religion,  we  are  in  fuch  total  dark- 
nefs  upon  what  caufes,  occafions,  reafons,  or  circum- 
{lances,theprefent  courfe  of  nature  depends,  that  there- 
does  not  appear  any  improbability  for  or  againft  fuppof- 
ing,that  five  or  (ix  thoufand  years  may  have  given  fcope 
for  caufes,  occafions,  reaforis,  or  circumftances,  from 
whence  miraculous  interpofitions  may  have  arifen. 
And  from  this,  joined  with  the  foregoing  obfervation, 
it  will  follow,  that  there  muft  be  a  prel'umption  be- 
yond all  comjDarifon  greater,  againft  the  particular 
common  fads  juft  now  inftanced  in,  than  againft  mir- 
acles in  general^  before  any  evidence  of  either.  But, 
Thirdly^  Take  in  the  confideration  of  religion,  or  the 
moral  fyftem  of  the  world,  and  then  we  fee  diftind: 
particular  reafons  for  miracles — to  afford  mankind  in- 
ftrudion  additional  to  that  of  nature,  and  to  atteft 
the  truth  of  it.  And  this  gives  a  real  credibility  to 
the  fuppofition,  that  it  might  be  part  of  the  original 
plan  of  things,  that  there  Ihould  be  miraculous  inter- 
pofitions. Then,  LaJiJy,  Miracles  muft  not  be  com- 
pared to  common  natural  events,  or  to  events  which, 
though  uncommon,  are  fimilar  to  what  we  daily  expe- 
rience ;  but  to  the  extraordinary  phenomena  of  na- 
ture- And  then  the  comparifon  will  be  between  the 
prefumption  againft  miracles,  and  the  prefumption 
againft  luch  uncommon  appearances,  fuppofe,  as  com- 
ets, and  againft  there  being  any  fuch  powers  in  nature 
as  magnetifm  and  eledricity,  fo  contrary  to  the  prop- 
erties of  other  bodies  not  endued  with  thefe  powers. 
And  before  any  one  can  determine  whether  there  be 
any  peculiar  preiumption  againft  miracles,  more  than 

againft 


£i6  The  CrediaiBty  cf  Rnelation      Part  H. 

againll  other  extraordinary  things,  he  muft  confider 
v.har,  upon  hrft  hearing,  would  be  the  prefumption 
againit  the  iaft  mentioned  appearances  and  powers,  to 
a  perlon  acquainted  only  with  the  daily,  monthly,  and 
annual  coune  of  nature  refpeftir^  this  earth,  and  with 
thole  common  powers  ot  matier  which  we  even-  day 
fee. 

Upon  all  this  I  conclude,  that  there  certainly  is  no 
fuch  Drefumption  agamit  miracles  as  to  render  them  in 
any  wife  incredible  ;  that  on  the  contrary,  our  b^ng 
able  to  dilcem  reafons  for  them  gives  a  pofitive  credi- 
bility to  the  hiftory  of  them,  in  cafes  where  thofe  rea- 
loas  hold ;  and  that  it  is  by  no  means  certain,  that 
there  is  any  particular  prefomption  at  all,  from  analo- 
gr,  even  in  the  lowell  degree,  againil  miracles,  as  dif- 
tinguiiLed  from  other  extraordinar)'^  phenomena — 
though  it  is  not  wonh  while  to  perplex  the  reader 
WiXh.  inquiries  into  the  abltrad  nature  of  evidence,  in 
order  to  determine  a  quefbon,  w  hich  without  fuch  in- 
quiries we  fee*  is  of  no  importance. 

=^>io?«o»tQtiti)fnii  i^«=^^ 

CHAP.     III. 

Of  our  I     -    ■  '■■:  ofj\tdpn%  zdieit  ivere  to  he  expefted  /« 

a  Re  I.    ,  and  the  Credibility,  from  A?m!og^;,  that 

it  mufi  contain.  Things  appearing  iicble  to  Obje^ions. 

XSeSIDES  the  objeclions  againil:  the  evi- 
dence for  Chriitianity,  many  are  alleged  againil  the 
fcheme  of  it,  againil  the  whole  manner  in  which  it  is 
pjt  and  left  with  the  world,  as  well  as  againfl  feveral 
partic-iiar  relations  in  Scripture ;  obieftions  drawn 
firom  the  deficiencies  of  revelation  ;  from  things  in  it 
appearing  to  men  foollOinefs ;  -f  from  its  conraining 

matters 

'?.;:?.  -MCor.L;?. 


Chap.  III.  liahJe  io  Op/cBhns.  ±ij 

matters  of  offence,  which  have  kd,  and  it  muil  have 

been  toreleen  would  lead,  into  ftrange  enthuiiai'in  and 
Tuperftition,  and  be  made  to  ien"e  the  purpoies  of  r\-- 
rannv  and  wickedneis  ;  from  its  not  being  iiniverial ; 
and,  which  is  a  thing  ot  the  iame  kind,  u:on\  its  evi- 
dence not  being  io  convincing  and  fatisfaitory  as  it 
might  have  been ;  for  this  kit  is  fometimes  turned 
into  apoiitive  argument  againii  its  trath.*  It  would 
be  tedious,  indeed  impollibie,  to  enumerate  the  leveral 
particulars  comprehended  under  the  objetftions  here 
referred  to  ;  thev  being  fo  various,  according  to  the 
diiferent  fancies  of  men.  There  are  perfons  who  think 
it  a  ftrong  objection  againit  the  authoRty  of  Scripture, 
that  it  is  not  comp>oied  by  rules  of  art,  agreed  upon 
by  criticks,  for  polite  and  correct  wTitings.  And  the 
fcom  is  inexprellible,  with  which  fome  of  the  prophet- 
ick  parts  of  Scripture  are  treated  ;  partly  through  the 
raihnefs  of  interpreters,  but  very  much  alfo  on  account 
of  the  hierogiyphical  and  fiarurative  language  in  which 
they  are  left  us.  Some  of  the  principal  tilings  of  this 
fort  Ihall  be  particularly  conlidered  in  the  foilowing 
chapters.  But  my  deign  at  preient  is  to  obierve  ia 
genera],  with  refpe>ft  to  this  whole  way  of  arguing, 
that,  upon  fuppofiticn  of  a  revelation,  it  is  highly  cred- 
&le  betorehand,  we  {hould  be  incomp)etent  judges  of 
it,  to  a  great  degree ;  and  that  it  would  contain  ma- 
ny things  app-eanng  to  us  liable  to  great  objecnons, 
in  cafe  we  judge  of  it  otherwife  than  by  the  anaic^y 
of  nature.  And  therefore  though  objections  againit 
the  evidence  of  Chriilianity  are  moil  fericinh'  to  be 
conlidered,  yet obje<5tions agsinil  Chrifdanity  itfehare, 
in  a  great  meaiure,  frivolous .;  almoft  all  oV  - 

againit  it,  excepting  thofe  which  are  allegec    _, z 

the  particular  proofs  cf  its  ctHnin^  from  God.     I  ex- 

prefs  myfeh'with  caution,  lelt  I  ilioulJ  be  miitakeii  to 

viiifv  reafon,  which  i?  indeed  the  or/iv  facnlty  we  have 

r  wberewkk 

^  SecCh-vi. 


1 1 8  The  Credibility  of  Revelation       ]P  ar t  Tf * 

wherewith  to  jyidge  concerning  any  thing,  even  reve- 
lation itfelf ;  or  be  mirundcrflood  to  affert,  that  a  fiip- 
pofed  revelation  cannot  be  proved  falfe  from  internal 
charaders.  For,  it  may  contain  clear  immoralities  or 
contradictions,  and  either  of  thefe  would  prove  it  falfe. 
Nor  will  I  take  upon  me  to  affirm,  that  nothing  elfe 
can  poffibly  render  any  fuppofed  revelation  incredible* 
Yet  ftill  the  obfervation  above  is,  I  think,  true  beyond 
doubt,  that  objec^Lions  againft  Chriftianky,  as  diftin- 
guillied  from  objeftions  againft  its  evidence,  are  friv- 
olous. To  make  out  this,  is  the  general  defign  of  the 
prefent  chapter.  And  with  regard  to  the  whole  of 
it,  I  cannot  but  particularly  wifh  that  the  proofs 
might  be  attended  to,  rather  than  the  affertiotis  cavil- 
led at,  upon  account  of  any  unacceptable  confequenc- 
es,  whether  real  or  fuppofed,  which  may  be  drawn 
from  them.  For,  after  all,  that  which  is  true  muft 
be  admitted,  though  it  fhould  Ihew  us  the  fhortnefs 
of  our  faculties,  and  that  we  are  in  no  wife  judges  of 
many  things,  of  which  we  are  apt  to  think  ourfelves 
very  competent  ones.  Nor  will  this  be  any  objection 
with  reafonable  men,  at  leaft  upon  fecbnd  thought  it 
will  not  be  any  objedlion  with  fuch,  againft  the  juft-» 
nefs  of  the  following  obfervations. 

As  God  governs  the  world,  and  inftruds  his  crea- 
tures, according  to  certain  laws  or  rules,  in  the  known' 
courfe  of  nature,  known  by  reafon  together  with  ex- 
perience,— fo  the  Scripture  informs  us  of  a  fcheme  of 
divine  Providence  additional  to  this.  It  relates,  that 
God  has,  by  revelation,  inftrudied  men  in  things  con- 
cerning his  government  which  they  could  not  oth- 
erwife  have  known,  and  reminded  them  of  things 
which  they  might  otherwife  know,  and  attefted  the 
truth  of  the  whole  by  miracles.  Now  if  the  natural 
and  the  revealed  difpenfation  of  things  are  both  from 
God,  if  they  coincide  with  each  other,  and  together 
make  up  one  fcheme  of  Providence, — our  being  in- 
competent 


Chap.  III.  liahlc  to  OhjeBions.  219 

competent  judges  of  one,  mufl  render  it  credible  that 
we  may  be  incompetent  judges  alfo^  of  the  other. 
Since,  upon  experience,  the  acknowledged  conftitution 
and  courfe  of  nature  is  found  to  be  greatly  different 
from  what,  before  experience,  would  have  been  expeft- 
ed,  and  fuch  as  men  fancy  there  lie  great  objediions 
againft, — this  renders  it  beforehand  highly  credible, 
that  they  may  find  the  revealed  difpenfation  likewife, 
if  they  judge  of  it  as  they  do  of  the  conftitution  of  na- 
ture, very  different  from  expedations  formed  before- 
hand, and  liable,  in  appearance,  to  great  objections  ; 
objections  againft  the  fcheme  itfelf,  and  againft  the  de- 
grees and  manners  of  the  miraculous  interpofitions  by 
which  it  was  attefted  and  carried  on.  Thus,  fuppofe 
a  prince  to  govern  his  dominions  in  the  wifeft  manner 
poffible,  by  common  known  laws,  and  that  upon  fome 
exigencies  he  fhould  fufpend  thefe  laws,  and  govern, 
in  feveral  inftances,  in  a  different  manner  ;  if  one  of 
his  fubjedts  w^re  not  a  competent  judge  beforehand, 
by  what  common  rules  the  government  ftiould  or 
would  be  carried  on,  it  could  not  be  expefted  that 
the  fame  perfon  would  be  a  competent  judge,  in  what 
exigencies,  or  in  what  manner,  or  to  what  degree,  thofe 
laws  commonly  obferved  would  be  fufpended  or  devi- 
ated from.  If  he  were  not  a  judge  of  the  wifdom  of 
the  ordinary  adminiftration,  there  is  no  reafon  to  think 
he  would  be  a  judge  of  the  wifdom  of  the  extraordi- 
nary. If  he  thought  he  had  objeftions  againft  the 
former,  doubtlefs  it  is  highly  fuppofable  he  might 
think  alfo  that  he  had  objeftions  againft  the  latter. 
And  thus  as  we  fall  into  infinite  follies  and  miftakes, 
whenever  we  pretend,  otherwife  than  from  experience 
and  analogy,  to  judge  of  the  conftitution  and  courfe 
of  nature, — it  is  evidently  fuppofable  beforehand  that 
we  fliould  fail  into  as  great  in  pretending  to  judge,  in 
the  like  manner,  concerning  revelation.  Nor  is  there 
any  more  ground  to  exped  that  this  latter  ihould  ap- 
P  %  pear 


220  The  Credibility  of  Revelation       Part  If, 

pear  to  us  clear  of  objedions,  than  that  the  former 
fliould. 

Thefe  obfervations,  relating  to  the  whole  of  Chrift'^ 
ianitjs  are  applicable  to  infpiration  m  particular.  As 
we  are  in  no,  fort  judges  beforehand,  by  what  laws  or 
rules,  in  what  degree,  or  by  what  means,  it  were  to 
have  been  expeded,  that  God  would  naturally  inftruft 
us, — {o  upon  fuppofition  of  his  affording  us  light  and 
inftruftlori  by  revelation,  additional  to  what  he  has  af- 
forded us  by  reafon  and  experience,  we  are  in  no  fort 
judges  by  what  methods,  and  in  what  proportion,  it 
were  to  be  expected  that  this  fupernatural  light  and 
inflruftion  would  be  afforded  us.  We  know  not  be- 
forehand, what  degree  or  kind  of  natural  information 
it  were  to  be  expeded  God  would  afford  men,  each  by 
his  own  reafon  and  experience  ;  nor  how  far  he  would 
enable  and'  effe6lually  dilpofe  them  to  communicate 
it,  whatever  it  Ihould  be,  to  eacn  other  ;  nor  whether 
the  evidence  of  it  would  be  certain,  highly  probable^ 
or  doubtful ;  nor  whether  it  would  be  given  with  equal 
clearnefs  and  convi6lion  to  all.  Nor  could  we  guefs, 
upon  any  good  ground  I  mean,  whether  natural  knowl- 
edge, or  even  the  faculty  itfelf  by  which  we  are  capa- 
ble of  attaining  it,  reafon,  would  be  given  us  at  once, 
or  gradually.  In  like  manner  we  are  wholly  ignorant,, 
what  degree  of  new  knowledge  it  were  to  be  expedied 
God  would  give  mankind  by  revelation,  upon  fuppo- 
iition  of  his  afTording  one  ;  or  how  far,  or  in  what  way, 
he  would  interpofe  miraculoully  to  qualify  them,  to- 
whom  he  fhould  originally  make  the  revelation,  for 
communicating  the  knowledge  given  by  it,  and  to  fe- 
cure  their  doing  it'  to  the  age  in  which  they  fhould 
live,  and  to  fecure  its  being  tranfmitted  to  pofterity. 
We  are  equally  ignorant  whether  the  evidence  of  it 
would  be  certain,  or  highly  probable,  or  doubtful  ;* 
or  whether  all  who  fhould  have  any  degree  of  inflruc-' 

tioiii 

*  See  Cb.  vi. 


Chap.  III.  liable  to  ■ObjeSlions.  221 

tion  from  it,  and  any  degree  of  evidence  of  its  truth, 
would  have  the  fame  ;  or  whether  the  fcheme  would 
be  revealed  at  once,  or  unfolded  gradually.  Nay,  we 
are  not  in  any  fort  able  .to  judge,  whether  it  were  to 
have  been  expefted  that  the  revelation  fhould  have 
been  committed  to  writing,  or  left  to  be  handed  down, 
and  confequently  corrupted  by  verbal  tradition,  and  at 
length  funk  under  it,  if  mankind  lb  pleafed,  and  dur- 
ing fuch  time  as  they  are  permitted^  in  the  degree  they 
evidently  are,  to  acl  as  they  will. 

But  it  may  be  faid,  "  that  a  revelation  in  fome  of 
the  above  mentioned  circumllances,  one,  for  inftance, 
which  was  not  committed  to  writing,  and  thus  fecured 
againft  danger  of  corruption,  would  not  have  aniiwered 
its  purpofe,"  I  afk,  what  purpofe  ?  It  v/ould  not  have 
anfwered  all  the  purpofes  which  it  has  now  anfwered, 
and  in  the  fame  degree  ;  but  it  would  have  anfwered 
others,  or  the  fame  in  different  degrees.  And  which 
of  thefe  were  the  purpofes  of  God,  and  befl  fell  in  with 
his  general  government,  we  could  not  at  all  have  de^ 
termined  beforehand. 

Now  fince  it  has  been  lliewn,  that  we  have  no  prin- 
ciples of  reafon,  upon  which  to  judge  beforehand  how 
it  were  to  be  expefted  revelation  fhould  have  been  left, 
or  what  was  mofl  fuitable  to  the  divine  plan  of  gov- 
ernment in  any  of  the  forementioned  refpe<9:s, — it 
muft  be  quite  frivolous  to  objeA  afterwards  as  to  any 
of  them,  againft  its  being  left  in  one  way  rather  than 
another ;  for  this  would  be  to  objed:  againft  things, 
upon  account  of  their  being  different  from  expefta- 
tions,  which  have  been  fhewn  to  be  without  reafon. 
And  thus  we  fee  that  the  only  queftion  concerning  the 
truth  of  Chriftianity  is,  whether  it  be  a  real  revelation  , 
not  whether  it  be  attended  with  every  circumlfance 
which  we  fliould  have  looked  for — and  concerning  the 
.authority  of  Scripture,  whether  it  be  what  it  claims  to 
be  J  not  whether  it  be  a  bo'ok  of  fuch  fort,  and  (o  pro- 

;nulged, 


222  The  Credibility  of  Revelation        Part  II. 

mulged,  as  weak  men  are  apt  to  fanc}^  a  book  con- 
taining a  divine  revelation  fhouid.  And  therefore  nei- 
ther obfcurity,  nor  Teeming  inaccuracy  of  ftyle,  nor 
various  readings,  nor  early  difputes  about  the  authors 
of  particular  parts,  nor  any  other  things  of  the  like 
!kind,  though  they  had  been  much  more  confiderable 
in  degree  than  they  are,  could  overthrow  the  authority 
of  the  Scripture  ;  unlefs  the  prophets,  apoftles,  or  our 
Lord,  had  promifed  that  the  book  containing  the  cJi- 
vine  revelation  fliould  be  fecure  from  thofe  things. 
Nor  indeed  can  any  objeftions  overthrow  fuch  a  kind 
of  revelation  as  the  Chriftian  claims  to  be,  iince  there 
are  no  objections  againfl  the  morality  of  it,*  but  fuch 
as  can  fhev/  that  there  is  no  proof  of  miracles  wrought 
originally  in  atteflation  of  it,  no  appearance  of  any 
thing  miraculous  in  its  obtaining  in  the  world,  nor  any 
of  prophecy,  that  is,  of  events  foretold  which  hu- 
man fagacity  could  not  forefee.  If  it  can  be  Ibewn, 
that  the  proof  alleged  for  all  thefe  is  abfolutely  none 
at  ail,  then  is  revelation  overturned.  But  were  it  al- 
lowed that  the  proof  of  any  one  or  all  of  them  is  lower 
than  is  allowed,  yet,  whilft  any  proof  of  them  remains, 
revelation  will  ftand  upon  much  the  fame  foot  it  does 
at  prefent,  as  to  all  the  purpofes  of  life  and  praftice, 
and  ought  to  have  the  like  influence  upon  our  be- 
haviour. 

From  the  foregoing  obfervatlons  too  it  will  follow, 
and  thofe  who  will  thoroughly  examine  into  revelation 
will  find  it  worth  remarking,  that  there  are  feveral 
wa5^s  of  arguing,  which,  though  juft  with  regard  to 
other  writings,  are  not  applicable  to  Scripture  ;  at  leafb 
not  to  the  prophetic  parts  of  it.  We  cannot  argue, 
for  inftance,  that  this  cannot  be  the  fenfc  or  intent  of 
fuch  a  paflage  of  Scripture,  for  if  it  had  it  would  have 
been  exprelTed  more  plainly,  or  have  been  reprefented 
under  a  more  apt  figure  or  hieroglyphick ;  yet  we  may 

juflly 
*  p.  229, 


Chap.  III.  liable  to  ObjeElions.  223 

juftly  argue  thus  with  refped;  to  common  books.  And 
the  realbn  of  this  difference  is  very  evident,  that  in 
Scripture  we  are  not  competent  judges,  as  we  are  in 
common  books,  how  plainly  it  were  to  have  been  ex-- 
peeled,  what  is  the  true  fenfe  fhould  have  been  ex-, 
prefled,  or  under  how  apt  an  image  figured.  The 
only  queftion  is,  what  appearance  there  is  that  this  is 
the  fenfe,  and  fcarce  at  all  how  much  more  determi- 
•nately  or  accurately  it  might  have  been  exprefled  or 
iigured. 

*'  But  is  ist  not  felfevident,  that  internal  improba- 
bilities of  all  kinds  v^^eaken  external  probable  proof  ?'* 
Doubtlefs.  But  to  v/hat  praftical  purpofe  can  this  be 
alleged  here,  when  it  has  been  proved  before,*  that 
real  internal  improbabilities,  which  rife  even  to  moral 
certainty,  are  overcome  by  the  moft  ordinary  teftimo^. 
jiy,  and  when  it  now  has  been  made  appear,  that  we 
•fcarce  know  what  are  improbabilities  as  to  the  matter 
we  are  here  confidering — as  it  will  farther  appear  from 
what  follows. 

For  though  from  the  obfervations  above  made,  it  is 
manifefh  that  we  are  not  in  any  fort  competent  judges 
what  fupernatural  inftrudtion  were  to  have  been  expedt^ 
ed,and  though  it  is  felfevident  that  the  objections  of  an 
incompetent  judgment  muft  be  frivolous, — yet  it  may 
be  proper  to  go  one  ftep  farther,  and  obferve,  that  if 
men  will  be  regardlefs  of  thefe  things,  and  pretend  to 
judge  of  the  Scripture  by  preconceived  expedlations, 
the  analogy  of  nature  lliews  beforehand,  not  only  that 
it  is  highly  credible  they  may,  but  aifo  probable  that 
they  will,  imagine  they  have  ftrong  obje(5tions  againft 
it,  however  really  unexceptionable  ;  for  fo,  prior  to  exr 
perience,  they  would  think  they  had,  againft  the  cirr 
cumftances  and  degrees,  and  the  whole  manner  of  that 
inftruclion  which  is  afforded  by  the  ordinary  courfe  of 
nature.     Were  the  inllrudion  which  God  affords  to 

brute 
*p.  214. 


424  The  Credibility  of  Revelation        Fart  11, 

brute  creatures  by  inftinds  and  mere  propenfions,  and 
to  mankind  by  thefe  together  with  reafon,  matter  of 
probable  proof,  and  not  of  certain  obfervation, — it 
would  be  rejected  as  incredible  in  many  inftances  of  it, 
only  upon  account  of  the  means  by  which  this  inftruc- 
tion  is  given,  the  feeming  difproportions,  the  limita- 
tions, necefTary  conditions  and  circumftances  of  it. 
For  inftance — would  it  not  have  been  thought  highly 
improbable,  that  men  (hould  have  been  fo  much  more 
capable  of  difcovering,  even  to  certainty,  the  general 
laws  of  matter,  and  the  magnitudes,  paths  and  revo- 
lutions of  the  heavenly  bodies,  than  the  occafions  and 
cures  of  diftempers,  and  many  other  things  in  which 
human  life  feems  fo  much  more  nearly  concerned  than 
in  aftronomy  ?  How  capricious  and  irregular  a  way 
of  information,  would  it  be  faid,  is  that  of  invention, 
by  means  of  which  nature  inftruds  us  in  matters  of 
fcience,  and  in  many  things  upon  which  the  ajffairs  of 
the  world  greatly  depend  ;  that  a  man  fliould  by  this 
faculty  be  made  acquainted  with  a  thing  in  an  inftant, 
when  perhaps  he  is  thinking  of  fomewhat  elfe  which  he 
has  in  vain  been  fearching  after,  it  may  be,  for  )'ears. 
So  likewife  the  imperfedions  attending  the  only  meth- 
od by  which  nature  enables  and  directs  us  to  communi- 
cate our  thoughts  to  each  other,  are  innumerable.  Lan- 
guage is  in  its  very  nature  inadequate,  ambiguous,  ha- 
ble  to  infinite  abufe  even  frorn  negligence,  and  fo  liable 
to  it  from  defign,  that  every  man  can  deceive  and  betray 
by  it.  And  to  mention  but  one  inftance  more,  that 
brutes  without  reafon  fhould  aft,  in  many  refpefts, 
with  a  fagacity  and  forefight  vaftly  greater  than  what 
men  have  in  thofe  refpecls,  would  be  thought  impof- 
fibie  ;  yet  it  is  certain  they  do  acl  with  fuch  fuperior 
forefight — whether  it  be  their  own  indeed  is  another 
queftion.  From  thefe  things  it  is  highly  credible  be- 
forehand, that  upon  fuppofition  God  fliould  afford  men 
fome  additional  inftrudion  by  revelation,  it  would  be 

with 


Chap.  III.  liable  to  ObjeBions,  225 

with  circumllances,  in  manners,  degrees  and  refpecls, 
which  we  fhould  be  apt  to  fancy  we  had  great  objec- 
tions againft  the  credibihty  of.  Nor  are  the  objedtions 
againft  the  Scripture,  nor  againft  Chriftianity  in  gene- 
ral, at  all  more  or  greater  than  the  analogy  of  nature 
would  beforehand — not  perhaps  give  ground  to  ex- 
pedt,  for  this  analogy  may  not  be  fufficient  in  fome  cafe 
to  ground  an  expedation  upon,  but  no  more  nor 
greater  than  analogy  would  iliew  it,  beforehand,  to  be 
fuppofable  and  credible  that  ther^  might  feem  to  lie 
againft  revelation. 

By  applying  thefe  general  obfervations  to  a  particu- 
lar objedion,  it  will  be  more  diftinftly  ^ztn  how  they 
are  applicable  to  others  of  the  like  kind,  and  indeed 
to  almoft  all  objedions  againft  Chriftianity,  as  diftin- 
guilhed  from  objediions  againft  its  evidence.  It  ap- 
pears from  Scripture,  that  as  it  was  not  unufual  in  the 
apoftolick  age  for  perfons,  upon  their  converfion  to 
Chriftianity,  to  be  endued  with  miraculous  gifts,  fo 
fome  of  thofe  perfons  exercifed  thefe  gifts  in  a  ftrange- 
ly  irregular  and  diforderly  manner ;  and  this  is  made 
an  objection  againft  their  being  really  miraculous. 
Now  the  foregoing  obfervations  quite  remove  this  ob- 
jedion,  how  confiderable  foever  it  may  appear  at  firft 
fight.  For  confider  a  perfon  endued  with  any  of 
thefe  gifts,  for  inftance,  that  of  tongues,  it  is  to  be  fup- 
pofed  that  he  had  the  fame  power  over  this  miracu- 
lous gift,  as  he  would  have  had  over  it  had  it  been 
the  etFed  of  habit,  of  ftudy  and  ufe,  as  it  ordinarily  is, 
or  the  fame  power  over  it  as  he  had  over  any  other 
natural  endowment.  Confequently  he  would  ufe  it 
in  the  fame  manner  he  did  any  other,  either  regularly 
and  upon  proper  occafions  only,  or  irregularly  and  up- 
on improper  ones,  according  to  his  fenfe  of  decency, 
and  his  character  of  prudence.  Where  then  is  the 
objeftion  ?  Why,  if  this  miraculous  power  was  indeed 
given  to  the  world  to  propagate  Chriftianity  and  atteft 

the 


226  The  Credibility  of  Revelation        Part  TI. 

the  truth  of  it,  we  might,  it  feems,  have  expeded 
that  other  fort  of  perfons  fhould  have  been  chofen  to 
be  invefted  with  it  ;  or  that  thefe  fhould,  at  the  fame 
time,  have  been  endued  with  prudence  ;  or  that  they 
fhould  have  been  continually  reftrained  and  direded 
in  the  exercife  of  it  ;  i.  e.  that  God  fhould  have  mi- 
raculoully  interpofed,  if  at  all,  in  a  different  manner  or 
higher  degree.  But  from  the  obfervations  made 
above,  it  is  undeniably  evident  that  we  are  not  judges 
in  what  degrees  and  manners  it  were  to  have  been  ex- 
pected he  fhould  miraculoufly  interpofe,  upon  fuppOf 
iition  of  his  doing  it  in  fome  degree  and  manner. 
Nor,  in  the  natural  courfe  of  Providence,  are  fuperior 
gifts  of  memory,  eloquence,  knowledge,  and  other  tair  '^ 
ents  of  great  influence,  conferred  only  on  perfons  of 
prudence  and  decency,  or  fuch  as  are  difpofed  to  make 
the  propereft  ufe  of  them.  Nor  is  the  inftruftion  and 
admonition  naturally  afforded  us  for  the  conduct  of 
life,  particularly  in  our  education,  commonly  given  in 
a  manner  the  moft  fuited  to  recommend  it,  but  often 
with  circumfbances  apt  to  prejudice  us  againft  fucU 
inftruftion. 

One  might  go  on  to  add,  that  there  is  a  great  re- 
femblance  between  the  light  of  nature  and  of  revela- 
tion in  feveral  other  refpefts.  Practical  Chriftianity, 
or  that  faith  and  behaviour  which  renders  a  man  a 
Chriftian,  is  a  plain  and  obvious  thing,  like  the  com- 
mon rules  of  conduct  with  refpedl  to  our  ordinary 
temporal  affairs.  The  more  diftincl  and  particular 
knowledge  of  thofe  things,  the  ftudy  of  which  the 
Apoftle  calls  going  on  unto  perfetlion^*  and  of  the  pro- 
phetick  parts  of  revelation,  like  many  parts  of  natural 
and  even  civil  knowledge,  may  require  very  exadl 
thought,  and  careful  confideration.  The  hindrances 
too,  of  natural  and  of  fupernatural  light  and  know- 
ledge, have  been  of  the  fame  kind.    And  as,  it  is  owned, 

the 

*  Heb.  vi.  I, 


Chap.  III.  liable  to  ObjeSiions.      "  azy 

the  whole  fcheme  of  Scripture  is  not  yet  underflood, 
fo,  if  it  ever  comes  to  be  underftood,  before  the  rejli- 
tution  of  all  things^*  and  without  miraculous  interpofi- 
tions,  it  mufl  be  in  the  fame  way  as  natural  knowledge 
is  come  at,  by  the  continuance  and  progrefs  of  learn- 
ing and  of  liberty,  and  by  particular  perfons  attending 
tOy  comparing  and  purfiiing  intimations  fcattered  up 
and  down  it,  which  are  overlooked  and  difregarded  by 
the  generality  of  the  world.     For  this  is  the  way  in 
which  ail  improvements  are  made,  by  thoughtful  men's 
tracing  on  obfcure  hints,  as  it  were,  dropped  us  by 
nature  accidentally,  or  which  feem  to  come  into  our 
minds  by  chance.     Nor  is  it  at  all  incredible,  that  a 
book  which  has  been  fo  long  in  the  poffeffion  of  man- 
kind ihould  contain  many  truths  as  yet  undifcovered. 
For,  all  the  fame  phenomena  and  the  fame  faculties 
of  inveftigation,  from  which  fuch  great  difcoveries  in 
natural  knowledge  have  been  made  in  the  prefent  and 
iaft  age,  were  equally  in  the  poffeffion  of  mankind  feve- 
ral  thoufand  years  before.    And  poffibly  it  might  be  in- 
tended, that  events,  as  they  come  to  pafs,  fhould  open 
and  afcertaii'i  the  meaning  of  feveral  parts  of  Scripture. 
It  may  be  objected,  that  this  analogy  fails  in  a  mate- 
rial refpecl ;  for  that  natural  knowledge  is  of  little  or  no 
confequence.     But  I  have  been  fpeaking  of  the  gene- 
ral inftruftion  which  nature  does  or  does  not  afford  us. 
And  be  fides,  fome  parts  of  natural  knowledge,  in  the 
more  common  reftrained  fenfe  of  the  words,  are  of  the 
greatefh  confequence  to  the  eafe  and  convenience  of 
life.     But  fuppofe  the  analogy  did,  as  it  does  not,  fail 
in  this  refped,  yet  it  might  be  abundantly  fupplied 
from  the  whole   conftitution  and   courfe  of  nature, 
which  fliews  that  God  does  not  difpenfe  his  gifts  ac- 
cording to  our  notions  of  the  advantage  and  confe- 
quence they  would  be  of  to  us.     And  this  in  general, 
with  his  method  of  difpenfing  knowledge  in  particu- 
lar, 

*  Ai5ts  iii.  2  r. 


428  The  Credibility  of  Revelation        Part  II, 

lar,  would  together  make  out  an  analogy  full  to  the 
point  before  us. 

But  it  may  be  objeded  ftill  farther  and  more  gen- 
erally, *'  The  Scripture  reprefents  the  world  as  in  a 
ftate  of  ruin,  and  Chriftianity  as  an  expedient  to  re- 
cover it,  to  help  in  thefe  refpeds  v/here  nature  fails ; 
in  particular,  to  fupply  the  deficiencies  of  natural  light. 
Is  it  credible  then,  that  fo  many  ages  iliould  have 
been  \tt  pafs,  before  a  matter  of  fuch  a  fort,  of  fo  great 
and  fo  general  importance,  was  made  known  to  man- 
kind ;  and  then  that  it  fhould  be  made  known  to  fo 
fmall  a  part  of  them  ?  Is  it  conceivable,  that  this  fup- 
ply fhould  be  fo  very  deficient,  fhould  have  the  like 
obfcurity  and  doubtfulnefs,  be  liable  to  the  like  per- 
verfions,  in  fhort,  lie  open  to  all  the  like  objeftions, 
as  the  light  of  nature  itfelf  ?"  *  Without  determin- 
ing how  far  this  in  fa£l  is  fo,  I  anfwer, — it  is  by  no 
means  incredible  that  it  might  be  fo,  if  the  light  of  na- 
ture and  of  revelation  be  from  the  fame  hand,  Men 
are  naturally  liable  to  dileafes,  for  which  God,  in  his 
good  providence,  has  provided  natural  remedies. -f- 
But  remedies  exifting  in  nature  have  been  unknown 
to  mankind  for  many  ages,  are  known  but  to  few  now, 
probably  many  valuable  ones  are  not  known  yet. 
Great  has  been  and  is  the  obfcurity  and  difficulty  in 
the  nature  and  application  of  them.  Circumflances 
feem  often  to  make  them  very  improper,  where  they 
are  abfolutely  neceffary.  It  is  after  long  labour  and 
fbudy,  and  many  unfuccefsful  endeavours,  that  they  are 
brought  to  be  as  ufeful  as  they  are  ;  after  high  con- 
tempt and  abfolute  rejedion  of  the  mofl  ufeful  we 
have  ;  and  after  difputes  and  doubts  which  have  feem- 
ed  to  be  endlefs.  The  bell  remedies  too,  when  un- 
ikilfuUy,  much  more  if  dlflioneftJy  applied,  may  pro- 
duce new  difeafes  ;  and  with  the  righteft  appHcation, 
the  fuccefs  of  them  is  often  doubtful.     In  m*any  cafes 

they 

*  Ch.  vi.  f  See  Ch,  v. 


Chap.  HI.  liable  to  OhjeBims.  229 

they  are  not  at  all  effeftual ;  where  they  are,  it  is  oft- 
en  very  {lowly  ;  and  the  appHcation  of  them,  and  the 
necelTary  regimen  accompanying  it,  is,  not  uncom- 
monly, fo  difagreeable,  that  forne  will  not  fubmit  to 
them,  and  fatisfy  themfelves  with  the  excufe,  that  if 
they  would,  it  is  not  certain  whether  it  would  be  fuc- 
cefsful.  And  many  perfons  who  labour  under  difeafes 
for  which  there  are  known  natural  remedies,  are  not 
fo  happy  as  to  be  always,  if  ever,  in  the  way  of  them. 
In  a  word,  the  rem.edies  which  nature  has  provided  for 
difeafes  are  neither  certain,  perfect,  nor  univerfal. 
And  indeed  the  fame  principles  of  arguing  v/hicli 
would  lead  us  to  conclude  that  they  muft  be  fo,  would 
lead  us  likewife  to  conclude  that  there  could  be  no 
occafion  for  them,  i.  e.  that  there  could  be  no  difeafes 
at  all.  And  therefore,  our  experience  that  there  are 
difeafes,  fhews  that  it  is  credible  beforehand,  upon 
fuppofition  nature  has  provided  remedies  for  them, 
that  thefe  remedies  may  be,  as  by  experience  we  find 
they  are,  not  certain,  nor  perfeft,  nor  univerfal ;  be- 
caufe  it  fhews,  that  the  principles  upon  which  we 
ihould  expeift  the  contrary  are  fallacious. 

And  now,  what  is  the  juft  confequence  from  all 
thefe  things  ?  Not  that  reafon  is  no  judge  of  what  is 
offered  to  us  as  being  of  divine  revelation.  For  this 
would  be  to  infer  that  we  are  unable  to  judge  of  any 
thing,  becaufe  we  are  unable  to  judge  of  all  things. 
Reafon  can  and  it  ought  to  judge,  not  only  of  the 
meaning,  but  alfo  of  the  morality  and  the  evidence 
of  revelation.  Firji,  It  is  the  province  of  reafon  to 
judge  of  the  morality  of  the  Scripture ;  i.  e.  not 
whether  it  contains  things  different  from  what  we 
fhould  have  expetfled  from  a  wife,  juft,  and  good  Be- 
ing, for  objedtions  from  hence  have  been  now  obviat- 
ed ;  but  whether  it  contains  things  plainly  contradic- 
tory to  wifdom,  juftice  or  goodnefs  ;  to  what  the  light 
of  nature  teaches  us  of  God.     And  I  knov/  nothing  of 

this 


230  The  Credibility  of  Revelation        Part  IL 

this  fort  objeded  againft  Scripture,  excepting  fuch  ob- 
jeftions  as  are  formed  upon  fuppofitions,  which  would 
equally  conclude  that  the  conftitution  of  nature  is  con- 
tradiftor}^  to  wifdom,  juftice,  or  goodnefs,  which  moil 
certainly  it  is  not.  Indeed  there  are  fome  particular 
precepts  in  Scripture,  given  to  particular  perfons,  re- 
quiring aftions  which  would  be  immoral  and  vicious 
were  it  not  for  fuch  precepts.  But  it  is  eafy  to  fee 
that  all  thefe  are  of  fuch  a  kind,  as  that  the  precept 
changes  the  whole  nature  of  the  cafe  and  of  the  ac- 
tion, and  both  conftitutes  and  fhews  that  not  to  be 
unjuft  or  immoral,  which,  prior  to  the  precept,  m^uft 
have  appeared  and  really  have  been  fo  ;  which  may- 
well  be,  lince  none  of  thefe  precepts  are  contrary  to 
immutable  morality.  If  it  were  commanded  to  culti- 
vate the  principles,  and  aft  from  the  fpirit  of  treach- 
ery, ingratitude,  cruelty,  the  command  would  not  al- 
ter the  nature  of  the  cafe  or  of  the  action  in  any  of 
thefe  inftances.  But  it  is  quite  otherwife  in  precepts, 
which  require  only  the  doing  an  external  a6lion  j  for 
inftance,  taking  away  the  property  or  life  of  any.  For 
men  have  no  right  to  either  life  or  property,  but  what 
arifes  folely  from  the  grant  of  God  ;  when  this  grant 
is  revoked,  they  ceafe  to  have  any  right  at  all  in  ei- 
ther ;  and  when  this  revocation  is  made  known,  as 
furely  it  is  poflible  it  may  be,  it  mud  ceafe  to  be  un- 
juft to  deprive  them  of  either.  And  though  a  courfe 
of  external  adts,  which  without  command  would  be 
immoral,  muft  make  an  immoral  habit,  yet  a  few  de- 
tached commands  have  no  fuch  natural  tendency.  I 
thought  proper  to  fay  thus  much  of  the  few  Scripture 
precepts,  which  require,  not  vicious  aftions,  but  ac- 
tions which  would  have  been  vicious  had  it  not  been, 
for  fuch  precepts ;  becaufe  they  are  fometimes  weakly 
urged  as  immoral,  and  great  weight  is  laid  upon  ob- 
jeclions  drawn  from  them.  But  to  m.e  there  feems  no 
difficulty  at  all  in  thefe  precepts,  but  what  ariibs  from 

their 


Chap.  III.  liahle  to  ObjeSiions.  231 

their  being  offences,  i.  e.  from  their  being  liable  to 
be  perverted,  as  indeed  they  are,  by  wicked  defigning 
men,  to  ferve  the  moft  horrid  purpoies  ;  and,  perhaps, 
to  miflead  the  weak  and  enthufiaflick.  And  objec- 
tions from  this  head  are  not  objeftions  againfl  revela- 
tion, but  againft  the  whole  notion  of  religion  as  a  trial, 
and  againft  the  general  conftitution  of  nature.  Second- 
ly^  Reafon  is  able  to  judge,  and  muft,  of  the  evidence 
of  revelation,  and  of  the  objedions  urged  againft  that 
evidence  ;  which  fliall  be  the  fubjeA  of  a  following 
chapter.* 

But  the  conlequence  of  the  foregoing  obfervation  is, 
that  the  queftion  upon  which  the  truth  of  Chriftiani- 
ty  depends  is  fcarce  at  all  what  objections  there  arc 
againft  its  fcheme,  (ince  there  are  none  againft  the 
morality  of  it ;  but  zvhat  objeElions  there  are  againfi  its 
evidence,  or  what  proof  there  remains  of  it^  after  due  al- 
lowances made  for  the  objections  againfi  that  proof  -,  be- 
caufe  it  has  been  (hewn,  that  the  obje^ions  againfl 
Chriflianity\  as  difiingniflied  from  objeElions  againfl  its 
evidence y  are  frivolous.  For  iurely  very  little  weight, 
if  any  at  all,  is  to  be  laid  upon  a  way  of  arguing  and 
objefting,  which,  when  applied  to  the  general  confti- 
tution of  nature,  experience  fliews  not  to  be  conclu- 
five  ;  and  fuch,  I  think,  is  the  whole  way  of  objecting 
treated  of  throughout  this  chapter.  It  is  refolvabic 
into  principles,  and  goes  upon  fuppofitions  which 
miflead  us  to  think  that  the  Author  of  nature  would 
not  act  as  we  experience  he  does,  or  would  aft,  in  fuch 
and  fuch  cafes,  as  we  experience  he  does  not,  in  like 
cafes.  But  the  unreafonablenefs  of  this  way  of  ob- 
jecting will  appear  yet  more  evidently  from  hence, 
that  the  chief  things  thus  objected  againft  are  juftifi- 
ed,  as  fliall  be  farther  Ihown,-!-  by  diftinft,  particular 
and  full  analogies,  in  the  conftitution  and  courfe  of 
nature. 

But 

*  Ch.  vii.  f  Ch.  iv,  latter  part.     And  v,  vi. 


Z^z  Cliri/fianity  a  Scheme^  Part  IL 

But  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that,  as  frivolous  as 
objections  of  the  foregoing  fort  againfl  revelation  are, 
yet,  when  a  fuppofed  revelation  is  more  confiftent  with 
kfelf,  and  has  a  more  general  and  uniform  tendency 
to  promote  virtue,  than,  all  circumftances  confidered, 
could  have  been  expefted  from  enthuliafm  and  polit- 
ical views, — this  is  a  prefumptive  proof  of  its  not  pro- 
ceeding from  them,  and  fo  of  its  truth  ;  becaufe  we 
are  competent  judges  what  might  have  been  expedted 
from  enthufiafm  and  political  views. 

— — -^rsr^)@^(|'i@^>@i^c— ^- — 

C  H  A  P.     IV. 

Of  Chrijiianity,  conjidered  as  a  Scheme  or  Conftitutio'fti 
imperfedly  comprehended. 

XT  hath  been  now  fhewn*  that  the  anal- 
ogy of  nature  renders  it  highly  credible  beforehand, 
that  fuppofing  a  revelation  to  be  made,  it  muft  con- 
tain many  things  very  different  from  what  we  fhould 
have  expefted,  and  fuch  as  appear  open  to  great  ob- 
jedions,  and  that  this  obfervation,  in  good  meafure, 
takes  oiF  the  force  of  thofe  objeftions,  or  rather  pre- 
cludes them.  But  it  may  be  alleged,  that  this  is  a 
very  partial  anfwer  to  fuch  objeftions,  or  a  very  un- 
fatisfadtory  way  of  obviating  them,  becaufe  it  doth 
not  fliew  at  all  that  the  things  objefted  againft  can  be 
wife,  juft  and  good,  much  lefs  that  it  is  credible  they 
are  fo.  It  will  therefore  be  proper  to  fhew  this  dif- 
tin6tly,  by  applying  to  thefe  objeftions  againft  the 
wifdom,  juftice  and  goodnefs  of  Chriftianity,  the  an- 
fwer above -f-  given  to  the  like  objections  againft  the 
conftitution  of  nature,  before  we  coniider  the  particu- 
lar analogies  in  the  latter  to  the  particular  things  ob- 

jefSted 

*  In  the  foregoing  chapter. 

f  Part  I.  Ch.  vii.  to  which  this  all  along  refers. 


Chap.  IV.       imperfeBly  comprehended.  233 

je6i:ed  againfh  in  the  former.  Now  that  which  affords 
a  fufficient  anfwer  to  objedtions  againft  the  wifdom, 
juftice  and  gcodnefs  of  the  conflltucion  of  nature,  is 
its  being  a  confcitution,  a  fyftem  or  fcheme  imperfe£lly 
comprehended  ;  a  fcheme  in  which  means  are  made 
ufe  of  to  accomphfh  ends,  and  which  is  carried  on  by 
general  laws.  For  from  thefe  things  it  has  been  prov- 
ed, not  only  to  be  poffible,  but  aifo  to  be  credible, 
that  thofe  things  which  are  obje£led  againft  may  be 
coniiftent  with  wifdom,  juftice  and  goodnefs,  nay 
may  be  inftances  of  them  ;  and  even  that  the  confti- 
tution  and  government  of  nature  may  be  perfeft  in 
the  higheft  pofnble  degree.  If  Chriftianity  then  be  a 
fcheme,  and  of  the  like  kind,  it  is  evident  the  like  ob- 
jedlions  againft  it  muft  admit  of  the  like  anfwer. 
And, 

I.  Chriftianity  is  a  fcheme,  quite  beyond  our  com- 
prehenlion.  The  moral  government  of  God  is  exercif- 
ed,  by  gradually  conducing  things  fo  in  the  courfe  of 
his  providence,  that  every  one,  at  length  and  upon  the 
whole,  ftiali  receive  according  to  his  deferts  ;  and  nei- 
ther fraud  nor  violence,  but  truth  and  right, ftiall  finally 
prevail.  Chriftianity  is  a  particular  fcheme  under  this 
general  plan  of  Providence,  and  a  part  of  it,  conducive 
to  its  completion,  with  regard  to  mankind  ;  coniift- 
ing  itfelf  alfo  of  various  parts,  and  a  myfterious  econ- 
omy, which  has  been  carrying  en  from  the  time  the 
world  came  into  its  prefent  wretched  ftate,  and  is  ftill 
carrying  on  for  its  recovery,  by  a  divine  perfon,  the 
Mefiiah,  who  is  to  gather  together  hi  one,  the  children 
of  God  that  are  fcattered  abroad,"^  and  eftabliih  an  ever- 
lafiing  kingdom,  wherein  dwelleth  righteoufneJs.\  And 
in  order  to  it,  after  various  m.anifeftations  of  things, 
relating  to  this  great  and  general  fcheme  of  Providence, 
through  a  fucceffion  of  m^any  ages  :  (For  the  Spirit  of 
Chrift  which  was  in  the  prophets,  tejUfied  beforehand  his 
Q^  fuferingSy 

-  Joh.  xi.  52.  t  i.  Pet.  iii,  13. 


234  ChrtjViantty  a  Scheme^  Part  IL 

fufferings,  and  the  glory  that  Jliould  follow  ;  unto  whom  it 
was  revealed^  that  not  unto  themfelves^  but  unto  us  the-^ 
didmimjier  the  things  zvhich  are  now  reported  unto  us  by 
them  that  have  preached  the  Gofpel ;  which  things  the  an- 
gels dejire  to  look  into*) — after  various  difpenfations, 
looking  forward  and  prq)aratory  to  this  final  faivation, 
in  the fullnefs  of  time^vjhen  i-nfinite  wifdom  thought  fit. 
He,  being  in  the  form  of  God ^ — made  himfelf  of  no  repu- 
tation^ and  took  upon  him  the  form  of  a  fervant^  and  was 
made  in  the  likenefs  of  men  ;  and  being  found  infaJJiion  as 
a  man,  he  humbled  himfelf,  and  became  obedient  to  death, 
even  the  death  of  the  crofs  ;  wherefore  God  alfo  hath  high- 
ly exalted  him,  and  given  him  a  name  which  is  above  every 
name  ;  that  at  the  name  ofjefus  every  knee fJiould  bow,  of 
things  in  heaven,  and.  things  in  the  earth,  and  things  un- 
der the  earth  ;  and  that  every  tongue  Jliould  confefs,  that 
Jefus  Chrifl  is  Lord,  to  the  glory  of  God  the  Father.  -\- 
Parts  hkewife  of  this  economy,  are  the  miraculous  mif- 
fion  of  theHolyGhoft,and  his  ordinary  alTiftance  given 
to  good  men,  the  invifible  government  which  Chrift  at 
prefent  exercifes  over  his  church  ;  that  which  he  him- 
lelf  refers  to  in  thefe  words,  \  In  my  father  s  houfe  are 
many  manfions — I  go  to  prepare  a  place  for  you  ;  and  his 
future  itfturn  to  judge  the  world  in  right eoufnefs,  and 
completely  reeftabiifh  the  kingdom  of  God.  For  the 
Father  judgeth  no  man  ,  but  hath  committed  all  judgment 
wvo  the  Son,  that  all  men  (Imuld  honour  the  Son,  even  as  they 
honour  the  Father.  §  All  power  is  given  unto  him  in  heav- 
en and  in  earth.  \\  And  he  mufi  reign  till  he  hath  put 
all  enemies  under  his  feet.  Then  comet h  the  aid,  when  he 
fliall  have  delivered  up  the  kingdom  to  God,  even  the  Fa- 
ther ;  when  he  JJiall  have  put  down  all  rule,  and  all  au- 
thority and  power.  And  zvhen  all  things  ffiall  be  fubdued 
unto  him,  then  fliall  the  Son  alfo  himfelf  be  fubje5l  unto  him 
that  put  all  things  under  him,  that  God  may  be  all  in  all.  ** 
Now  Httle,  furely,  need  be  faid  to  Ihew  that  this  fyftem. 

or 

*  I  Pet.  i.  II,  12.  f  Phil,  ih  %  Joh.  xiv.  a. 

§  Joh.  V.  22,  23.  II  Mattli.  xxviii.  18.  **  i  C6r.  xv. 


Chap.  IV.       imperfeSily  comprehended.  235 

or  fcheme  of  things  is  but  imperfeftly  comprehended 
by  us.  The  Scripture  exprefsly  afferts  it  to  be  fo. 
And  indeed  one  cannot  read  a  paflage  relating  to  this 
great  myjiery  of  Godlinefsy*"  but  what  immediately  runs 
up  into  fomething  which  (hews  us  our  ignorance  in  it  ; 
as  every  thing  in  nature  fhews  us  our  ignorance  in 
the  conftitution  of  nature.  And  whoever  will  feri- 
cully  confider  that  part  of  the  Chriftian  fcheme  which 
is  revealed  in  Scripture,  will  find  fo  much  rnore  unre- 
vealed,  as  wlh  convince  him,  that,  to  all  the  purpofes  of 
judging  and  objecting,  we  know  as  little  of  it  as  of  the 
conftitution  of  nature.  Our  ignorance,  therefore,  is 
as  much  an  anfwer  to  our  objeftions  agalnfb  the  per- 
fection of  one  as  againfl  the  perfeftion  of  the  other. -j' 

II.  It  is  obvious  too,  that  in  the  Chrif!:ian  difpen- 
fation,  as  much  as  in  the  natural  fcheme  of  things, 
means  are  made  ufe  of  to  accomplifli  ends.  And  the 
obfervation  of  this  furniihes  us  with  the  fame  anfwer 
to  objeftions  againft  the  perfedion  of  Chriftianity,  as 
to  objections  of  the  like  kind  againft  the  conftitution 
of  nature.  It  fliews  the  credibility,  that  the  things 
objected  againft,  how  fooliJJi  %  foever  they  appear  to 
men,  may  be  the  very  beft  means  of  accomplifhing 
the  very  beft  ends  ;  and  their  appearing ybo/r/Zv?^/}  is  no 
prefumption  againft  this,  in  a  fcheme  fo  greatly  beyond 
our  comprehenlion.§ 

III.  The  credibility  that  the  Chriftian  difpenfation 
may  have  been,  all  along,  carried  on  by  general  laws,  |j 
no  lefs  than  the  courfe  of  nature,  may  require  to  be 
more  diftindly  made  out.  Confider  then  upon  what 
ground  it  is  we  fay,  that  the  whole  common  courfe  of 
nature  is  carried  on  according  to  general  foreordained 
laws.  We  know  indeed  feveral  of  the  general  laws  of 
matter,  and  a  great  part  of  the  natural  behaviour  of 
living  agents  is  reducible  to  general  laws.  But  we 
know  in  a  manner  nothing  by  what  laws,  iiorms  and 

0^2  tempefts, 

■^  iTira.  iii,  i6.  f  P.  174,  &c.  +  i  Cor.  i. 

)  P.  177,  17S.  ii?.  179,  180. 


236  Chrijlianity  a  Scheme,  Part  If. 

tempefts,  earthquakes,  famine,  peftilence,  become  the 
inftruments  of  deflrudion  to  mankind.  And  the 
laws  by  which  perfons  born  into  the  world  at  fuch  a 
time  and  place  are  of  fuch  capacities,  geniufes,  tem- 
pers ;  the  laws  by  which  thoughts  come  into  our 
mind  in  a  multitude  of  cafes,  and  by  which  innume- 
rable things  happen,  of  the  greateft  influence  upon  the 
affairs  and  ftate  of  the  world  ;  thefe  laws  are  fo  wholly 
unknown  to  us,  that  we  call  the  events  which  come  to 
pafs  by  them  accidental,  though  all  reafonable  men 
know  certainly  that  there  cannot,  in  reality,  be  any 
fuch  thing  as  chance,  and  conclude  that  the  things 
which  have  this  appearance  are  the  refult  of  general 
laws,  and  may  be  reduced  into  them.  It  is  then  but 
an  exceeding  little  way,  and  in  but  a  very  few  refpefts, 
that  we  can  trace  up  the  natural  courfe  of  things  be- 
fore us  to  general  laws.  And  it  is  only  from  analogy 
that  we  conclude  the  whole  of  it  to  be  capable  of  be- 
ing reduced  into  them — only  from  our  feeing  that 
part  is  fo.  It  is  from  our  finding  that  the  courfe  of 
nature,  in  fome  refpe6ts  and  fo  far,  goes  on  by  general 
laws,  that  we  conclude  this  of  the  reft.  And  if  that 
be  a  juft  ground  for  fuch  a  conclufion,  it  is  a  juit 
ground  alfo,  if  not  to  conclude,  yet  to  apprehend,  to- 
render  it  fuppofable  and  credible,  which  is  fufficient 
for  anfwering  objections,  that  God's  miraculous  inter-* 
pofitions  may  have  been,  all  along  in  like  manner,  by 
general  laws  of  wifdom.  Thus,  that  miraculous  pow- 
ers lliould  be  exerted  at  fuch  times,  upon  fuch  occa- 
fions,  in  fuch  degrees  and  manners,  and  with  regard  to- 
fuch  perfons,  rather  than  others — that  the  affairs  of - 
the  world,  being  permitted  to  go  on  in  their  natural 
courfe  fo  far,  (hould,  juft  at  fuch  a  point,  have  a  new 
direction  given  them  by  miraculous  interpofitions — • 
that  thefe  interpofitions  ftiould  be  exactly  in  fuch  de- 
grees and  refpeds  only, — all  this  may  have  been  by 
general  laws.     Thefe  laws  are  unknown  indeed  to  us, 

but 


Chap.  IV.        imperfeElly  comprehended.  237 

but  no  more  unknown  than  the  laws  from  whence  it 
is,  that  fome  die  as  foon  as  they  are  born,  and  others 
live  to  extreme  old  age — that  one  man  is  fo  fuperior 
to  another  in  underftanding — with  innumerable  more 
things,  which,  as  was  before  obferved,  we  cannot  re- 
duce to  any  laws  or  rules  at  all,  though  it  is  taken  for 
granted  they  are  as  much  reducible  to  general  ones  as 
gravitation.  Now,  if  the  revealed  difpenfations  of 
Providence,  and  miraculous  interpofitions,  be  by  gen- 
eral laws,  as  well  as  God's  ordinar)^  government  in  the 
courfe  of  nature,  made  known  by  reafon  and  expe- 
rience,— there  is  no  more  reafon  to  expect  that  every 
exigence,  as  it  arifes,  fhould  be  provided  for  by  thefe 
general  laws  or  miraculous  interpofitions,  than  that 
every  exigence  in  nature  fliould  by  the  general  laws  of 
nature  ;  yet  there  might  be  wife  and  good  reafons  that 
miraculous  interpofitions  fhould  be  by  general  laws, 
and  that  thefe  laws  fhould  not  be  broken  in  upon,  or 
deviated  from,  by  other  miracles. 

Upon  the  whole  then,  the  appearance  of  deficiencies 
and  irregularities  in  nature  is  owing  to  its  being  a 
fcheme  but  in  part  made  know^n,  and  of  fuch  a  cer- 
tain particular  kind  in  other  refpedts.  Now  we  fee  no 
more  reafon  why  the  frame  and  courfe  of  nature  fliould 
be  fuch  a  fcheme,  than  why  Chriftianity  fliould.  And 
that  the  former  is  fuch  a  fcheme,  renders  it  credible 
that  the  latter,  upon  fuppofition  of  its  truth,  may  be 
fo  too.  And  as  it  is  manifeft  that  Chriftianity  is  a 
fcheme  revealed  but  in  part,  and  a  fcheme  in  which 
means  are  made  ufe  of  to  accomplifli  ends,  like  to 
that  of  nature,— -fo  the  credibility  that  it  may  have 
been  all  along  carried  on  by  general  laws,  no  leis  than 
the  courfe  of  nature,  has  been  diflindly  proved.  And 
from  all  this  it  is  beforehand  credible  that  there  might, 
I  think  probable  that  there  would,  be  the  like  appear- 
ance of  deficiencies  and  irregularities  in  Chriftianity  as 
in  nature  i  i.  e.  that  Chriftianity  would  be  liable  to 

the 


238  Chriftianity  a  Scheme,  Part  II, 

the  like  obje^ions  as  the  frame  of  nature.  And  thefe 
objefliions  are  anfwered  by  thefe  obfervations  concern- 
ing Chriftianity,  as  the  Hke  objections  againft  the 
frame  of  nature  are  anfwered  by  the  Uke  obfervations 
concerning  the  frarr^e  of  nature. 

THE  objedions  againft  Chriftianity,  confidered  as 
a  matter  of  fa6t,*  having  in  general  been  obviated  in 
the  preceding  chapter,  and  the  fame,  confidered  as 
made  againft  the  wifdom  and  goodnefs  of  it,  having 
been  obviated  in  this,  the  next  thing,  according  to  the 
method  propofed,  is  to  fhew  that  the  principal  objec- 
tions, in  particular,  againft  Chriftianity  may  be  an- 
fwered by  particular  and  full  analogies  in  nature. 
And  as  one  of  them  is  made  againft  the  whole  fcheme 
of  it  together,  as  juft  now  defcribed,  I  choofe  to  con- 
fider  it  here,  rather  than  in  a  diftinft  chapter  by  itfelf. 
The  thing  objedted  againft  this  fcheme  of  the  Gofpel 
is,  "  that  it  feems  to  luppofe  God  v«'as  reduced  to  the 
neceffity  of  a  long  feries  of  intricate  means,  in  order  to 
j^ccomplifh  his  ends,  the  recovery  and  falvation  of  the 
world  ;  in  like  fort  as  men,  for  want  of  underftanding 
or  power,  not  being  able  to  come  at  their  ends  direcl- 
ly,  are  forced  to  go  roundabout  ways,  and  make  ufe 
of  many  perplexed  contrivances  to  arrive  at  them." 
Now  every  thing  which  we  fee  fliews  the  folly  of  this, 
confidered  as  an  objeftion  againft  the  truth  of  Chrift- 
ianity. For,  according  to  our  manner  of  conception, 
■God  makes  ufe  of  variety  of  means,  what  we  often 
think  tedious  ones,  in  the  natural  courfe  of  providence, 
for  the  accomplifiiment  of  all  his  ends.  Indeed  it  is 
certain  there  is  fomewhat  in  this  matter  quite  beyond 
our  comprehenlion  j  but  the  myftery  is  as  great  in  na- 
ture as  in  Chriftianity.  We  know  what  we  ourfelves 
aim  at,  as  final  ends,  and  what  courfes  we  take,  mere- 
ly as  means  conducing  to  thofe  ends.     But  we  are 

greatly 

*P.   I7». 


Chap.  IV.        imperfeBly  comprehended,  239 

greatly  ignorant  how  far  things  are  confidered  by  the 
Author  of  nature,  under  the  fingle  notion  of  means 
and  ends ;  fo  as  that  it  may  be  faid,  this  is  merely  an 
end,  and  that  merely  means,  in  his  regard-  And 
whether  there  be  not  fome  peculiar  abfiirdity  in  our 
very  manner  of  conception,  concerning  this  matter, 
fomewhat  contradictory  arifing  from  our  extremely 
imperfect  views  of  things,  it  is  impoiTible  to  fay. 
However,  thus  much  is  rnanifeft,  that  the  whole  nat- 
ural world  and  government  of  it  is  a  fcheme  or  fyf- 
tem  ;  not  a  fixed,  but  a  progreflive  one  ;  a  fcheme, 
in  which  the  operation  of  various  means  takes  up  a 
great  length  of  time,  before  the  ends  they  tend  to  can 
be  attained.  The  change  of  feafons,  the  ripening  of 
the  fruits  of  the  earth,  the  very  hiftory  of  a  flower,  is 
an  inftance  of  this,  and  fo  is  human  life.  Thus  vege- 
table bodies,  and  thofe  of  animals,  though  poflibly 
formed  at  once,  yet  grow  up  by  degrees  to  a  mature 
(late.  And  thus  rational  agents,  who  animate  thefe 
latter  bodies,  are  naturally  dire<fted  to  form  each  his 
own  manners  and  charafter,  by  the  gradual  gaining  of 
knowledge  and  experience,  and  by  a  long  courfe  of 
action.  Our  exiflence  is  not  only  fucceflive,  as  it 
mufl  be  of  neceffity,  but  one  ftate  of  our  life  and  be- 
ing is  appointed  by  God  to  be  a  preparation  for  an- 
other, and  that  to  be  the  means  of  attaining  to  anoth- 
er fucceeding  one  ;  infancy  to  childhood,  childhood 
to  youth,  youth  to  mature  age.  Men  are  impatient, 
and  for  precipitating  things ;  but  the  Author  of  na- 
ture appears  dehberate  throughout  his  operations,  ac- 
complilbing  his  natural  ends  by  flow  fuccefiive  fteps. 
And  there  is  a  plan  of  things  beforehand  laid  out, 
which,  from  the  nature  of  it,  requires  various  fyitems 
of  means,  as  well  as  length  of  time,  in  order  to  the 
carrying  on  its  feveral  parts  into  execution.  Thus,  in 
the  daily  courfe  of  natural  providence,  God  operates.' 
\n  the  very  fame  manner  as  in  the  difpenfation  of 

Chriftianity, 


Z4-0  The  Appointment  of  Part  11. 

Chriftianity,  making  one  thing  fubfervient  to  another^ 
this  to  fomewhat  farther,  and  fo  on,  through  a  pro- 
greflive  feries  of  means,  which  extend,  both  backward 
and  forward,  beyond  our  utmoft  view.  Of  this  man- 
ner of  operation,  every  thing  we  fee  in  the  courfe  of 
nature  is  as  much  an  inftance,  as  any  part  of  the 
Chriftian  difpenfation. 

— '-=^»^i'^-&nwMM^iou^^^~^ — 

C  H  A  P.     V.  ' 

Of  the  particular  Syjiem  of  Chrijiinnity  ;  the  Appoint- 
ment of  a  Mediatory  and  the  Redemption  of  the  World 
by  him. 

JL  HERE  is  not,  I  think,  any  thing  re- 
lating to  Chriftianity  which  has  been  more  objected 
againft  than  the  mediation  of  Chrift,  in  fome  or  other 
of  its  parts.  Yet,  upon  thorough  confideration,  there 
feems  nothing  lefs  juftly  liable  to  it.     For, 

I.  The  whole  analogy  of  nature  removes  all  imag- 
ined prefumption  againft  the  general  notion  of  a  Me- 
diator between  God  and  man.^  For  we  find  all  living 
creatures  are  brought  into  the  world,  and  their  life  in 
infancy  is  pre-ferved,  by  the  inftrumentality  of  others ; 
and  every  fatisfadtion  of  it,  fome  way  or  other,  is  be- 
ftowed  by  the  like  means.  So  that  the  vifible  govern>- 
ment  which  God  exercifes  over  the  world  is  by  the  in- 
ftrumentality and  mediation  of  others.  And  how  far 
his  invifil:)le  governm.ent  be  or  be  not  fo,  it  is  impofli- 
ble  to  determine  at  all  by  reafon.  And  the  fuppofition 
that  part  of  it  is  fo,  appears,  to  fay  the  leaft,  altogeth- 
er as  credible  as  the  contrary.  There  is  then  no  fort 
of  objc<flion,  from  the  light  of  nature,  againft  the  gen- 
eral notion  of  a  mediator  between  God  and  man,  con- 

fidered 

*  I  Tim,  ii.  5, 


Chap.  V.        a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.  241 

fidered  as  a  do6trine  of  Chriftianity,  or  as  an  appoint- 
ment in  this  difpenfation  ;  fince  we  find  by  experience 
that  God  does  appoint  mediators  to  be  the  inftru- 
ments  of  good  and  evil  to  us,  the  inilruments  of  his 
juftice  and  his  mercy.  And  the  objedion  here  re- 
ferred to  is  urged,  not  againft  mediation  in  that  high, 
eminent  and  peculiar  fenfe  in  which  Chrift  is  our  me- 
diator, but  abfolutely  againft  the  whole  notion  itfelf 
of  a  mediator  at  all. 

II.  As  we  muft  fuppofe  that  the  world  Is  under  the 
proper  moral  government  of  God,  or  in  a  ftate  of  re- 
ligion, before  we  can  enter  into  coniideration  of  the 
revealed  doctrine  concerning  the  redemption  of  it  by 
Chrift,  fo  that  fuppofition  is  here  to  be  diftinftly  tak- 
en notice  of.  Now  the  divine  moral  government 
which  religion  teaches  us,  implies  that  the  confequence 
of  vice  fliali  be  mifery,  in  fome  future  ftate,  by  the 
righteous  judgment  of  God.  That  fuch  confequent 
puniilTiment  fliall  take  effed  by  his  appointment,  is 
neceflarily  implied.  But,  as  it  is  not  in  any  fort  to  be 
fuppofed,  that  we  are  made  acquainted  witli  all  the 
ends  or  reafons  for  which  it  is  fit  future  punilhments 
fhould  be  inflided,  or  why  God  has  appointed  fuch 
and  fuch  confequent  mifery  fhould  follow  vice,  ^nd  as 
we  are  altogether  in  the  dark  how  or  in  what  manner 
it  lliould  follow,  by  what  immediate  occafions,  or  by 
the  inftrumcntality  of  what  means,  there  is  no  abfurd ■■ 
ity  in  fuppofing  it  may  follow  in  a  way  analogous  to 
that,  in  which  many  miferies  follow  fuch  and  fuch 
courfes  of  adion  at  prefent  •  poverty,  ficknefs,  infamy, 
untimely  death  by  difeafes,  death  from  the  hands  of 
civil  juftice.  There  is  no  abfurdity  in  fupponng  fu- 
ture punifliment  may  follow  wickednefs  of  courfe,  as 
Vv-e  fpeak,  or  in  the  way  of  natural  confequence  from 
God's  original  conftitution  of  the  Vv'orld,  from  the  na- 
ture he  has  given  us,  and  from  the  condition  in  which 
he  places  us  i  or  in  a  like  manner,  as  a  perfon  radily  tri- 
fling 


£4^  ^^^^  Appointme^it  of  Part  IL 

fling  upon  a  precipice,  in  the  way  of  natural  confe- 
quence,  falls  down  ;  in  the  way  of  natural  conl'equence, 
breaks  his  limbs,  fuppofe  ;  in  the  way  of  natural  con- 
fequence  of  this,  without  help,  perifhes. 

Some  good  men  may  perhaps  be  oifended,  with 
hearing  it  fpoken  of  as  a  fuppofable  thing,  that  the 
future  puniihments  of  wickednefs  may  be  in  the  way 
of  natural  confequence  ;  as  if  this  were  taking  the  ex- 
ecution of  juflice  out  of  the  hands  of  God,  and  giv- 
ing it  to  nature.  But  they  fhould  remember,  that 
when  things  come  to  pafs  according  to  the  courfe  of 
nature,  this  does  not  hinder  them  from  being  his  do- 
ing, who  is  the  God  of  nature  ;  and  that  the  Scrip- 
ture afcribes  thofe  punifbments  to  divine  juflice  which 
are  known  to  be  natural,  and  which  muft  be  called  fo, 
when  diftin9"uilhed  from  fuch  as  are  miraculous.  But 
after  all,  this  fuppofition,  or  rather  this  way  of  fpeak- 
ing,  is  here  made  ufe  of  only  by  way  of  illuflration  of 
the  fubjedl  before  us.  For  lince  it  muft  be  admitted, 
that  the  future  punifhment  of  wickednefs  is  not  a  mat- 
ter of  arbitrary  appointment,  but  of  reafon,  equity 
and  juftice,  it  comes,  for  aught  I  fee,  to  the  fame  thing, 
whether  it  is  fuppofcd  to  be  inflicted  in  a  way  analo- 
gous to  that  in  which  the  temporal  puniihments  of 
vice  and  folly  are  inflicted,  or  in  any  other  way.  And 
though  there  were  a  difference,  it  is  allowable,  in  the 
prefent  cafe,  to  make  this  fuppofition,  plainly  not  an 
incredible  one,  that  future  puniihment  may  follow 
wickednefs  in  the  way  of  natural  confcvquence,  or  ac- 
cording to  ibme  general  laws  of  government  already 
eflabliihed  in  the  univerfe. 

HI.  Upon  this  fuppofition,  or  even  without  it,  we 
may  obferve  fomewhat  much  to  the  prefent  purpofe 
in  the  conftitution  of  nature  or  appointments  of  Prov- 
idence ;  the  provilion  which  is  made  that  all  the  bad 
natural  confequences  of  mxcn's  adions  fiiould  not  al- 
ways aftuaily  follov/  j  or  that  fuch  had  confequences 

as, 


Ckap.  V.        a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.  z^^ 

as,  according  to  the  fettled  courfe  of  things,  would  in- 
evitably have  followed  if  not  prevented,  fhould  in 
certain  degrees  be  prevented.  We  are  apt  prefump- 
tuoufly  to  imagine,  that  the  world  might  have  been  fo 
conftituted,  as  that  there  would  not  have  been  any  fuch 
thing  as  mifery  or  evil.  On  the  contrary  we  find  the 
Author  of  nature  permits  it ;  but  then  he  has  provid- 
ed reliefs,  and,  in  many  cafes,  perfed:  remedies  for  it, 
after  fome  pains  and  difficulties  ;  rehefs  and  remedies 
even  for  that  evil,  which  is  the  fruit  of  our  own  mif- 
condu£l ;  and  which,  in  the  courfe  of  nature,  would 
have  continued  and  ended  in  our  deilru6tion,  but  for 
fuch  remedies.  And  this  is  an  inftance  both  of  fever^ 
ity  and  of  indulgence,  in  the  conilitution  of  nature. 
Thus  all  the  bad  confequences  now  mentioned,  of  a 
man's  trifling  upon  a  precipice,  might  be  prevented. 
And  though  all  were  not,  yet  fome  of  them  might,  by 
proper  interpofition,  if  not  rejeded  ;  by  another's 
coming  to  the  rafh  man's  relief,  with  his  own  laying 
hold  on  that  relief,  in  fuch  fort  as  the  cafe  required. 
Perfons  may  do  a  great  deal  themfelves  towards  pre- 
venting the  bad  confequences  of  their  follies  ;  and 
more  may  be  done  by  themfelves,  together  with  the 
affifbance  of  others  their  fellow  creatures ;  which  af- 
liftaace  nature  requires  and  prom.pts  us  to.  This  is 
the  general  conftitution  of  the  world.  Now  fuppofe 
it  had  been  fo  conftituted,  that  after  llich  aflions  were 
done  as  were  forefeen  naturally  to  draw  after  them 
mifery  to  the  doer,  it  fliould  have  been  no  more  in 
human  power  to  have  prevented  that  naturally  confe- 
quent  mifery,  in  any  inftance,  than  it  is  in  all, — no 
one  can  fay  whether  fuch  a  more  fevere  conftitution 
of  things  might  not  yet  have  been  really  good.  But 
that,  on  the  contrary,  provifion  is  made  by  nature,  that 
we  may  and  do  to  Co  great  degree  prevent  the  bad 
natural  effeds  of  our  follies, — this  may  be  called 
Hiercy  or  compaifica  in  the  original  conftitution  of  the 

world  i 


244  ^^^  Appointment  of  Part  II. 

worH  ;  compaffion  as  diftinguiflied  from  goodnefs  in 
general.  And,  the  whole  known  conftitution  and 
courfe  of  things  affording  us  inftances  of  fuch  com- 
paffion,  it  would  be  according  to  the  analogy  of  na- 
ture to  hope,  that,  however  ruinous  the  natural  con- 
fequences  of  vice  might  be,  from  the  general  laws  of 
God's  government  over  the  univerfe, — yet  provifion 
might  be  made,  pofiibly  might  have  been  originally 
made,  for  preventing  thofe  ruinous  confequences  from 
inevitably  following  j  at  leaft  from  following  univer- 
fally,  and  in  all  cafes. 

Many,  I  am  fenfible,  will  wonder  at  finding  this 
made  a  queftion,  or  fpoken  of  as  in  any  degree  doubt' 
ful.  The  generality  of  mankind  are  fo  far  from  hav- 
ing that  awful  fenfe  of  things,  which  the  prefent  ftate 
of  vice  and  mifery  and  darknefs  feems  to  make  but 
reafonable,  that  they  have  fcarce  any  apprehenfion  or 
thought  at  ail  about  this  matter  any  way  ;  and  fome 
ferious  perfons  may  have  fpoken  unadvifedly  concern- 
ing it.  But  let  us  obferve  what  we  experience  to  be, 
and  what  from  the  very  conftitution  of  nature  cannot 
but  be,  the  confequences  of  irregular  and  diforderly 
behaviour  ;  even  of  fuch  rafhnefs,  wilfulnefs,  neglefts, 
as  we  fcarce  call  vicious.  Now  it  is  natural  to  appre- 
hend, that  the  bad  confequences  of  irregularity  wilt  be 
greater,  in  proportion  as  the  irregularity  is  fo.  And 
there  is  no  comparifon  between  thefe  irregularities,  and 
the  greater  inftances  of  vice,  or  a  diffolute  profligate 
dilregard  to  all  religion,  if  there  be  any  thing  at  all  in 
religion.  For  conlider  what  it  is  for  creatures,  moral 
agents, prefumptuoufiy  to  introduce  that  confufion  and 
mifery  into  the  kingdom  of  God,  which  mankind  have 
in  fact  introduced — to  blafpheme  the  fovereign  Lord 
of  all — to  contemn  his  authority — to  be  injurious  to 
the  degree  they  are,  to  their  fellow  creatures,  the  crea- 
tures of  God.  Add  that  the  eifeds  of  vice  in  the 
prefent  world  are  often  extreme  mifery,  irretrievable 

ruin. 


Chap.  V.        a  Mediator  and  B.edeemeir.  245 

ruin,  and  even  death  ;  and  upon  putting  all  this  to- 
gether it  will  appear,  that  as  no  one  can  fay  in  what 
degree  fatal  the  unprevented  confequences  of  vice  may 
be,  according  to  the  general  rule  of  divine  govern- 
ment, fo  it  IS  by  no  means  intuitively  certain  how  far 
thefe  confequences  could  po/hbly,  in  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  be  prevented,  confidently  with  the  eternal  rule 
of  right,  or  with  what  is  in  faft  the  moral  confcitution 
of  nature.  However,  there  would  be  large  ground  to 
hope  that  the  univerfal  government  was  not  fo  feverely 
flrid  but  that  there  was  room  for  pardon,  or  for  hav- 
ing thole  penal  confequences  prevented.     Yet, 

IV.  There  feems  no  probability  that  any  thing  we 
could  do  would  alone  and  of  itfelf  prevent  them  ;  pre- 
vent their  following  or  being  infiicled.  But  one  would 
think,  at  leaft,  it  were  impoffible  that  the  contrary 
fhould  be  thought  certain.  For  v/e  are  not  acquaint- 
ed with  the  whole  of  the  cafe.  We  are  not  informed 
of  all  the  reafons  which  render  it  lit  that  future  pun- 
iihments  iliould  be  inflided,  and  therefore  cannot 
know  w^hether  any  thing  we  could  do  would  make 
fuch  an  alteration  as  to  render  it  fit  that  they  fhould 
be  remitted.  We  do  not  know  what  the  whole  nat- 
ural or  appointed  confequences  of  vice  are,  nor  in  what 
way  they  would  follow,  if  not  prevented  ;  and  there- 
fore can  in  no  fort  fay,  whether  we  could  do  any  thing 
which  would  be  fufficient  to  prevent  them.  Our  ig- 
norance being  thus  manifeft,  let  us  recoiled:  the  analo- 
gy of  nature  or  Providence.  For,  though  this  may  be 
but  a  flight  ground  to  raife  a  pofitive  opinion  upon  in 
this  matter,  yet  it  is  fufficient  to  anfwer  a  mere  arbi- 
trary ailertion,  without  any  kind  of  evidence,  urged  by 
way  of  objeftion  againft  a  doctrine,  the  proof  of  which 
is  not  reafon  but  revelation.  Confider  then — Deonle 
rum  their  fortunes  by  extravagance  i  they  bring  dif- 
eafes  upon  themfelves  by  excels  ;  they  incur  the  pen- 
alties of  civil  laws,  and  furely  civil  government  is  nat- 
ural y 


246  The  Appointment  of  Part  If. 

ura! ;  will  forrow  for  thefe  follies  pad,  and  behaving 
well  for  the  future,  alone  and  of  itfelf  prevent  the  nat- 
ural confequences  of  them  ?  On  the  contrary,  men's 
natural  abilities  of  helping  themfelves  are  often  im- 
paired ;  or  if  not,  yet  they  are  forced  to  be  beholden 
to  the  affiftance  of  others,  upon  feveral  accounts  and 
in  different  ways  ;  afliftance  which  they  would  have 
had  no  occafion  for  had  it  not  been  for  their  mifcon- 
duft,  but  which,  in  the  difadvantageous  condition 
they  have  reduced  themfelves  to,  is  abfolutely  necef- 
fary  to  their  recovery,  and  retrieving  their  affairs. 
Now  fmce  this  is  our  cafe,  coniidering  ourfelves  mere- 
ly as  inhaJDitants  of  this  world,  and  as  having  a  tem- 
poral intereft  here,  under  the  natural  government  of 
God,  which  however  has  a  great  deal  moral  in  it, — 
why  is  it  not  fuppofable  that  this  may  be  our  caie  alfo 
in  our  more  important  capacity,  as  under  his  perfe(ft 
moral  government,  and  having  a  more  general  and  fu- 
ture intereft  depending  ?  If  we  have  mifbehaved  in 
this  higher  capacity,  and  rendered  ourfelves  obnoxious 
to  the  future  puniflinient  which  God  has  annexed  to 
vice,  it  is  plainly  credible,  that  behaving  well  for  the 

time  to  come,   may  be — not  ufelefs,  God  forbid 

but  wholly  infufficient,  alone  and  of  itfelf,  to  prevent 
that  punifhment,  or  to  put  us  in  the  condition  which 
v/e  fhould  have  been  in  had  we  preferved  our  inno- 
cence. 

And  though  we  ought  to  reafon  with  all  reverence, 
whenever  we  reafon  concerning  the  divine  conduft,  yet 
it  may  be  added,  that  it  is  clearly  contrary  to  all  our 
notions  of  government,  as  well  as  to  what  is  in  fa6t  the 
general  conftitution  of  nature,  to  fuppofe  that  doing 
well  for  the  future  (liould,  in  all  cafes,  prevent  all  the 
judicial  bad  confequences  of  having  done  evil,  or  all 
the  punifhment  annexed  to  difobedience.  And  we 
have  manifeftly  nothing  from  whence  to  determine,  in 
what  degree  and  in  what  cafes  reformation  would  pre- 
vent 


Chap.  V.        a  Mediator  and  F^edeimer.  247 

vent  this  punlfhmelit,  even  fuppoiing  that  it  would  in 
fome.  And  though  the  efficacy  of  repentance  itielf 
alone,  to  prevent  what  mankind  had  rendered  them- 
feives  obnoxious  to,  and  recover  what  they  had  for- 
feited, is  now  iniifled  upon  in  oppofition  to  Chriftian-  . 
ity, — yet,  by  the  general  prevalence  of  propitiatory 
facrifices  over  the  heathen  world,  this  notion  of  re- 
pentance alone  being  fufficient  to  expiate  guilt,  ap- 
pears to  be  contrary  to  the  general  {^^{^  of  mankind. 

Upon  the  whole  then,  had  the  laws,  the  general 
laws  of  God's  government  been  permitted  to  operate, 
without  any  interpofition  in  our  behalf,  the  future 
puniihment,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary,  or 
have  any  reafon  to  think,  muft  inevitably  have  follow- 
ed, notwithftanding  ajiy  thing  we  could  have  done  to 
prevent  it.     Now, 

V.  In  this  darknefs,  or  this  light  of  nature,  call  it 
which  you  pleafe,  revelation  comes  in — confirms  every 
doubting  fear,  which  could  enter  into  the  heart  of 
man,  concerning  the  future  unprevented  confequence 
of  wickednefs — fuppofes  the  world  to  be  in  a  ftate  of 
ruin — (a  fuppofition  which  feems  the  Very  ground  of 
the  Chriftian  difpenfation,  and  which,  if  not  proveable 
by  reafon,  yet  it  is  in  no  wife  contrary  to  it)  teaches 
us  too,  that  the  rules  of  divine  government  are  fuchas 
not  to  admit  of  pardon  immediately  and  direftly  upon 
repentance,  or  by  the  fole  efficacy  of  it ;  but  then 
teaches  at  the  fame  time  what  nature  might  juftly  have 
hoped,  that  the  moral  government  of  the  univerfe  was 
not  lb  rigid,  but  that  there  was  room  for  an  interpo- 
fition to  avert  »the  fatal  confequences  of  vice,  which 
therefore  by  this  means  does  admit  of  pardon.  Rev- 
elation teaches  us,  that  the  unknown  laws  of  God's 
more  general  government,  no  lefs  than  the  particular 
laws  by  which  we  experience  he  governs  us  at  prefent^ 
are  compaffionate,*  as  well  as  good  in  the  more  gene- 
ral 

♦  p.  242,  lac. 


24S  The  Appoinfmeni  of  Part  IL 

ral  notion  of  goodnefs ;  and  that  he  hath  mercifully 
provided  that  there  Ihould  be  an  interpofition  to  pre- 
\'ent  the  deftruftion  of  human  kind,  whatever  that 
deftruftion  unprevented  would  have  been.  God  fa 
loved  the  world,  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten  Son,  that 
vjhcfcever  believeth,  not  to  be  fure  in  a  fpeculative, 
but  in  a  praftical  fenfe,  that  whofoever  believeth  in  him 
fliould  not  periJJi  ;*  gave  his  Son  in  the  fame  way  of 
goodnefs  to  the  world  as  he  affords  particular  perlbns 
the  friendly  affiflance  of  their  fellov/  creatures,  when 
v;ithout  it  their  temporal  ruin  would  be  the  certain 
conlequence  of  their  follies ;  in  the  fam-e  way  of  good- 
nefs, I  fay,  though  in  a  tranfcendent  and  infinitely 
higher  degree.  And  the  Son  of  God  loved  us  and  gave 
himfelf  for  lis,  with  a  love  which  he  himfelf  compares 
to  that  of  human  friendfhip,  though  in  this  cafe  all 
comparifons  mud  fall  infinitely  Ihort  of  the  thing  in- 
tended to  be  illuftrated  by  them.  He  interpofed  in 
fuch  a  manner,  as  was  necelfary  and  effe6tual  to  pre- 
vent that  execution  of  juftice  upon  finners,  which 
God  had  appointed  ihould  othervvife  have  been  exe- 
cuted upon  them  ;  or  in  fuch  a  manner  as  to  pre- 
vent that  puniihment  from  adiually  following,  which, 
according  to  the  general  laws  of  divine  government, 
mull  have  followed  the  lins  of  the  world,  had  it  not 
been  for  fuch  interpofition. -j-  If 

*  Joh.  iii.  16. 
•f  It  cannot,  I  fuppofe,  be  imagined,  even  by  the  moft  curfory  reader,  that 
it  is  in  any  fort  affirmed  or  implied  in  any  thing  faid  in  tliis  chapter,  that 
none  can  have  the  benefit  of  the  general  Redemption  but  fuch  as  have  the 
advantage  of  being  made  acquainted  with  it  iu  the  prefent  life.  But  it  may 
be  needful  to  mention,  that  feveral  quellions  which  have  been  brought  into 
the  fubjeii  before  us,  and  determined,  are  not  in  the  leail  entered  into  here  ; 
quellions  which  have  been,  I  fear,  ralhly  determined,  and  perhaps  with  equal 
raflmefs  contrary  ways.  For  inftance,  whether  God  could  have  faved  the 
world  by  other  means  than  the  deatii  of  Chrirt,  9onfiItently  with  the  general 
lavvs  ot  his  government.  And  had  not  Chrirt  come  into  the  world,  what 
would  have  been  tlie  future  condition  of  the  better  fort  of  men,  thofe  jufl  per- 
■fons  over  the  face  of  tiie  earth,  for  ^vhom  Manaffei  in  his  prayer  alfertb,  re- 
pentance was  not  appointed.  The  meaning  of  the  firfl  of  thsfe  quellions  is 
greatly  ambiguous ;  and  neither  of  them  can  properly  be  anfwered,  without, 
going  upon  that  infinitely  abfurd  I'uppofition,  that  we  know  the  whole  of  the 
cafe.  And  perhaps  the  very  inquiry,  vjhat  ivould  have  fil/oiueJ  if  Ga!  had  mt 
do/iL-  as  he'  has,  may  have  in  it  foine  very  great  impropriety,  and  ought  not  to 
be  carried  on  any  farther  than  is  neceffai'y  to  help  our  partial  and  inade- 
quate conceptions  of  tilings. 


Chap.  V.        a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.  1j\<^ 

If  any  thing  here  faid  (hould  appear,  upon  firfl 
thought,  inconfiftent  with  divine  goodnefs,  a  fecond, 
I  am  perfuaded,  will  entirely  remove  that  appearance. 
For  were  we  to  fuppofe  the  conftitutlon  of  things  to 
be  fuch  as  that  the  whole  creation  muft  have  perifhed, 
had  it  not  been  for  fomewhat,  which  God  had  ap- 
pointed fhould  be,  in  order  to  prevent  that  ruin, — 
even  this  fuppofition  would  not  be  inconfiftent  in  any 
degree  with  the  moft  abfolutely  perfeft  goodnefs.  But 
flill  it  may  be  thought,  that  this  whole  manner  of 
treating  the  fubjedb  before  us  fuppofes  mankind  to  be 
naturally  in  a  very  ftrange  ftate.  And  truly  fo  it  does. 
But  it  is  not  Chriftianity  which  has  put  us  into  this 
ftate.  Whoever  will  confider  the  manifold  miferles, 
and  the  extreme  wickednefs  of  the  world,  that  the  befh 
have  great  wrongnefTes  within  themfelves,  which  they 
complain  of  and  endeavour  to  amend,  but  that  the 
generality  grow  more  profligate  and  corrupt  with  age  ; 
that  heathen  moralifts  thought  the  prefent  ftate  to  be 
a  ftate  of  punilhment ;  and  what  might  be  added,  that 
the  earth  our  habitation  has  the  appearances  of  being 
a  ruin  ; — ^whoever,  I  fay,  will  confider  all  thefe,  and 
fome  other  obvious  things,  will  tliink  he  has  little  rea- 
fon  to  object  againft  the  fcripture  account,  that  man- 
kind is  in  a  ftate  of  degradation  ;  againft  this  being  the 
fa£t,  how  difficult  foever  he  may  think  it  to  account 
for,  or  even  to  form  a  diftinct  conception  of  the  occa- 
lions  and  circumftances  of  it.  But  that  the  crime  of 
our  firft  parents  was  the  occafion  of  our  being  placed 
in  a  more  difadvantageous  condition,  is  a  thing 
throughout  and  particularly  analogous  to  what  we  fee 
in  the  daily  courfe  of  natural  providence  ;  as  the  re- 
covery of  the  v/orld  by  the  interpofition  of  Chrift  has 
been  fhewn  to  be  fo  in  general. 

VI .  The  particular  manner  in  v/hich  Chrift  inter- 
pofed  in  the  redemption  of  the  v;orld,  or  his  office  as 
mediatory  in  the  iargeft  fenfe,  between  God  and  man,  is 

R  thus 


250  The  Appointment  of  Part  IL 

thus  reprefented  to  us  in  the  Scripture.  He  is  the 
light  of  the  world  -*  the  revealer  of  the  will  of  God  in- 
the  moft  eminent  fenfe.  He  is  a  propitiatory  facri- 
fice  ;  -f  The  Lamb  of  God ;  %  and,  as  he  voluntarily  of- 
fered hi  mfelf  up,  he  is  ftiled  our  high  prieft.§  And, 
which  feems  of  peculiar  weight,  he  is  defcribed  be- 
forehand in  the  Old  Tefbment,  under  the  fame  char- 
aders  of  a  priefl,  and  an  expiatory  vi6lim.  |j  And 
whereas  it  is  objecfted,  that  all  this  is  merely  by  way  of 
allufion  to  the  facritices  of  the  Mofaick  law,  the  apof- 
tle  on  the  contrary  affirms,  that  the  law  was  a  Jliad- 
ozv  of  good  things  to  come^  and  not  the  very  image  of  the 
things-,**  and  t\\2Li  the  priefis  that  offer  gifts  according 
to  the  law — ferve  unto  the  example  andfliadow  of  heaven- 
ly things^  as  Mojes  was  admonijlied  of  God  when  he  was 
about  to  make  the  tabernacle.  For  fee,  faith  he,  that  thou 
■make  all  things  according  to  the  pattern  (liewed  to  thee  hi 
the  mount  j  ■f -f-  i.  e.  the  Levitical  priefthood  was  a  fhad- 
ow  of  the  priefLhood  of  Chrifl,  in  like  manner  as  the 
tabernacle  made  by  Mofes,  was  according  to  that  fhew- 
ed  him  in  the  mount.  The  priefthood  of  Chrifh,  and 
the  tabernacle  in  the  mount,  were  the  originals  ;  of 
the  former  of  which  the  Levitical  priefthood  was  a 
type,  and  of  the  latter  the  tabernacle  made  by  Mofes 
was  a  copy.  The  doftrine  of  this  epiftle  then  plainly 
is,  that  the  legal  facritices  were  allufions  to  the  great 
and  final  atonement,  to  be  made  by  the  blood  of 
Chrifl: ;  and  not  that  this  was  an  allufion  to  thofe. 
Nor  can  any  thing  be  more  exprefs  or  determinate^ 
than  the  following  paflage.  //  is  not  pojjible  that  the 
blood  of  bulls  and  of  goats  fiould  take  aivavftn.  Where- 
fore when  he  cometh  into  the  world,  he  faith.  Sacrifice  and 
offering,  i,  e.  of  bulls  and  of  goats,  thou  wouldefi  not,  but 

a  body 

*  Joh.  i.  and  viii.  12.  f  Rom.  iii.  25.  and  v.  11.     1  Cor.  v.  7.     Eph. 

V.  z.     I  Joh.  ii.  2.     Matth.  x.\vi.  28.  +  Joh.  i.  29,  36.  and  through- 

out the  Book,  of  Revelation.  §  Throughout  the  Epiftle  to  the  He- 

brews. II  Ifai,  liii.    Dan.  ix.  24.     Ff.  ex.  4.  **  Heb.  x.  i. 

ff  Heb,  viii.  4,  5. 


Chap.  V.        a  MeMator  and  Redeemer.  2^1 

a  body  hafl  thou  prepared  me — Lo  I  come  to  do  thy  tvill 
O  God — By  which  will  we  are  JanEtified,  through  the 
offering  of  the  body  of  Jefus  Chrijl  once  for  all*  And  to 
add  one  paflage  more  of  the  like  kind — Chrifi  was  once 
offered  to  bear  the  Jins  of  many,  and  unto  them  that  look 
for  him  fliall  he  appear  the  Jecond  time y  without  fin ^  i.  e. 
without  bearing  fin  as  he  did  at  his  firft  coming,  by 
being  an  offering  for  it,  without  having  our  iniquities 
again  laid  upon  him,  without  being  any  more  a  fm  of- 
fering ; — unto  them  that  look  for  him  fJiall  he  appear  the 
fecond  time,  without  Jin,  unto  falvation.-\-  Nor  do  the 
infpired  writers  at  all  confine  themfelves  to  this  man- 
ner of  fpeaking  concerning  the  fatisfaftion  of  Chrift, 
but  declare  an  efficacy  in  what  he  did  and  fuffered  for 
us,  additional  to  and  beyond  mere  inftruflion,  exam- 
ple and  government,  in  great  variety  of  expreffion  : 
That  Jefus  Jliould  die  for  that  nation  the  Jews  ;  and  not 
for  that  nation  only,  but  that  alfo,  plainly  by  the  efficacy 
of  his  death,  he Jlioidd gather  together  in  one,  the  children, 
of  God  that  were  fcattered  abroad ;  |  that  he  fuffered  for 
fins,  thejufifor  the  unjufl  j  §  that  ^^  gave  his  life,  himfelf 
a  ranfom  ;  \\  that  we  are  bought,  bought  with  a  price  ;** 
that  he  redeemed  us  with  his  blood ;  redeemed  us  from  the 
curfe  of  the  law  being  made  a  cUrJe  for  us  ;  •f'f  that  he 
is  our  advocate,  inter ceffor  and  propitiation  ;  j;];  that  he 
was  made  perfe5i,  or  confummate,  through  Jufferings  ; 
and  being  thus  made  perfeti,  he  became  the  author  of  fal- 
vation  ;  §§  that  God  was  in  Chrifi  reconciling  the  world 
to  himfelf,  by  the  death  of  his  Jon,  by  the  crofs,  not  imputing 
their  trefpaffes  unto  them;\\\\  and  laflly,  that  through  death 
he  dejlroyed  him  that  had  the  power  of  death.  ^  Chrift; 
then  having  thus  humbled  himfelf,  and  become  obedient 
to  death,  even  the  death  of  the  crofs,  God  alfo  hath  highly 

exalted 

*  Heb.  X.  4,  5,  7,  9,  10.  f  Heb.  ix.  i8.  J  Joh.  xi.  51,  52. 

§  I  Pet.  hi.  1 3.  II  Matth.  xx.  28.     Mark  x.  45.     i  Tim.  ii.  6* 

♦*  2  Pet.  ii.  I.     Rev.  xiv.  4.     i  Cor.  vi.  2.0.  ff  1  Pet.  i.  ig.     Rev. 

V.  9.     Gal.  iii.  13.  XX  Heb.  vii.  25.     i  Joh.  ii.  i,  2.  §§  Heb. 

ii.  10.  and  v.  9.  ||[1  2  Cor.  v.  19.     Rom.  v.  10.     Eph.  ii.  16. 

^  Heb.  ii.  14.     See  alfo  a  remarkable  palfage  ia  the  Book  of  Job,  x.\xiii.  24. 


1^2  The  Appointment  of  Part  II. 

exalted  him,  and  given  him  a  name  which  is  above  every 
name  ;  hath  given  all  things  into  his  hands  ;  hath  com- 
mitted all  judgment  unto  him  ;  that  all  menJJiould  honour 
the  Son  even  as  they  honour  the  Father.^  For,  worthy 
is  the  lamb  that  zvas  /Iain,  to  receive  power,  and  richeSy 
and  wifdom,  and  Jlrength,  and  honoiir,  and  glory,  and 
blejjing.  And  every  creature  which  is  in  heaven,  and  at 
the  earth,  heard  L  faying,  Blejfrng,  and  honour,  and  glory, 
and  power,  be  unto  him  thatjitteth  upon  the  throne,  andim- 
to  the  Lamb  for  ever  and  ever,  -f- 

Thefe  paffages  of  Scripture  feem  to  comprehend 
andexprefs  the  chief  parts  of  Chrift's  office,  as  media- 
tor between  God  and  man,  fo  far,  I  mean,  as  the  na- 
ture of  this  his  office  is  revealed  ;  and  it  is  ufuallv  treat- 
ed of  by  divines  under  three  heads. 

Firjl,  He  was,  by  way  of  eminence,  the  prophet  ; 
that  prophet  that  f mild  come  i?ito  the  world,  %  to  declare 
the  divine  will.  He  publifhed  anew  the  law  of  nature 
which  men  had  corrupted,  and  the  very  knowledge  of 
which,  to  fome  degree,  was  loft  among  them.  He 
taught  mankind,  taught  us  authoritatively,  to  live  fi- 
ber ly,  righteoufly  and  godly  in  this  prefent  world,  in  ex- 
pectation of  the  future  judgment  of  God.  He  con- 
firmed the  truth  of  this  moral  fyftem  of  nature,  and 
gave  us  additional  evidence  of  it,  the  evidence  of  tef- 
timony.  §  He  diftindly  revealed  the  manner  in  which 
God  would  be  worfliipped,  the  efficacy  of  repentance, 
and  the  rewards  and  punifhments  of  a  future  life. 
Thus  he  was  a  prophet  in  a  fenfe  in  which  no  other 
ever  was.  To  which  is  to  be  added,  that  he  fet  us 
a  perfeft  example,  that  we  Jliould follow  his  Jieps. 

Secondly,  He  has  a  kingdom,  zvliich  is  not  of  this  worlds 
He  founded  a  church,  to  be  to  mankind  a  ftanding 
memorial  of  religion,  and  invitation  to  it,  which  he 
promifed  to  be  with  always  even  to  the  end.  He  ex- 
ercifes  an  invlfible  government  over  it  himfelf,  and  by 

his 

*  Phil.  ii.  8,  9.    Joh.  iii.  35,  and  v.  zz,  23.  •[-  Rev.  v.  12,  13. 

X  Joh.  vi.  14.  §  P.  1 94,  &c. 


Chap.  V.        a  Mediator  and  Redeemer,  255 

fiis  Spirit ;  over  that  part  of  it  which  is  militant  here 
on  earth,  a  government  of  dircipHne,/or  the  perfeEiing 
cf  the  faints^  for  the  edifying  his  body,  till  we  all  come^ 
in  the  unity  of  the  faith^  and  of  the  knowledge  of  the  Son 
ofGody  unto  a  perfeB  man^  unto  the  meafiire  of  the  Jiature 
cf  the  fulnefs  of  Chriji*  Of  this  church,  all  perfons 
fcattered  over  the  world,  who  live'in  obedience  to  his 
laws,  are  members.  For  thefe  he  is  gone  to  prepare  a 
place,  and  will  come  again  to  receive  them  unto  himfelfy 
that  where  he  is  there  they  may  be  alfo — and_  reign  with 
him  forever  and  ever  ;  -{~  and  likewife  to  take  vengeance 
on  them  that  know  not  God,  and  obey  not  his  Gofpel.  X 

Againil  thefe  parts  of  Chrift's  office,  I  find  no  ob- 
jections but  what  are  fully  obviated  in  the  beginning 
of  this  chapter. 

Lajily,  Chrifl  offered  himfelf  a  propitiatory  facrifice, 
and  made  atonement  for  the  fins  of  the  world  ;  which 
is  mentioned  lafb  in  regard  to  what  is  objected  againft 
it.  Sacrifices  of  expiation  were  commanded  the  Jews, 
and  obtained  amongft  mofl  other  nations  from  tradi- 
tion, whofe  original  probably  was  revelation.  And 
they  were  continually  repeated,  both  occafionally,  and 
at  the  returns  of  ftated  times,  and^made  up  great  part 
of  the  external  religion  of  mankind.  But  now  once  in 
the  end  of  the  zvorld  Chriji  appeared  to  put  away  fin  by 
the  facrifice  of  himfef.^  And  this  facrifice  was,  in  the 
higheft  degree  and  with  the  moft  extenfive  influence, 
of  that  efficacy  for  obtaining  pardon  of  fm,  which  the 
heathens  may  be  fuppofed  to  have  thought  their  fac- 
rifices  to  have  been,  and  which  the  Jewilh  facrifices 
really  were  in  fome  degree,  and  with  regard  to  fome 
perfons. 

How  and  in  what  particular  way  it  had  this  efficacy, 
there  are  not  wanting  perfons  who  have  endeavoured 
t6  explain  ;  but  1  do  not  find  that  the  Scripture  has 
explained  it.     We  fcem  to  be  very  much  in  the  dark 

concerning 

*  Eph.  iv.  12,  13.  f  Joh.  xiv.  2,  3.    Rev.  iii.  21.  and  xi.  i  j. 

+  2Thsir.  i.  8.  §Heb.  is,  a6. 


S54  ^^^  appointment  of  Part  II. 

concerning  the  manner  in  which  the  ancients  under- 
flood  atonement  to  be  made,  i.  e.  pardon  to  be  ob- 
tained by  facrifices.  And  if  the  Scripture  has,  as 
furely  it  has,  left  this  matter  of  the  fatisfadion  of 
Chrift  myfterious,  left  fomewhat  in  it  unrevealed,  all 
conjedures  about  it  mufl  be,  if  not  evidently  abiurd, 
yet  at  lead  uncertain. .  Nor  has  any  one  reafon  to 
complain  for  want  of  farther  inforpiatipn,  unlefs  he 
can  fhew  his  claim  to  it, 

'  Some  having  endeavoured  to  explain  the  efficacy  of 
what  Chrift  has  done  and  fuffered  for  us,  beyond  what 
the  Scripture  has  authorized,  others,  probably  becaufq 
they  could  not  explain  it,  have  been  for  taking  it  away, 
and  confining  his  office  as  redeemer  of  the  world  to  his 
inftruftion,  example  and  government  of  the  church. 
Whereas  the  doftrine  of  the  Gofpel  appears  to  be,  not 
only  that  he  taught  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  but 
rendered  it  of  the  efficacy  which  it  js  by  what  he  dic^ 
and  fuffered  for  us ;  that  he  obtained  for  us  the  ben- 
efit of  having  our  repentance  accepted  unto  eternal 
life ;  not  only  that  he  revealed  to  linners  that  they 
were  in  a  capacity  of  falvation,  and  how  they  might 
obtain  it,  but  moreover  that  he  put  them  into  this 
capacity  of  falvation  by  what  he  did  and  fuffered  for 
them  ;  put  us  into  a  capacity  of  efcaping  future  pun^. 
ifhment,  and  obtaining  future  happinefs.  And  it  is 
our  wifdom  thankfully  to  accept  the  benefit,  by  per- 
forming the  conditions  upon  which  it  is  offered  on  our 
part,  without  difputing  how  it  was  procured  on  his. 
For, 

VII.  Since  we  neither  know  by  v;hat  means  punifhr 
ment  in  a  future  ftate  would  have  followed  wickednefs 
in  this ;  nor  in  v;hat  manner  it  would  have  been  in- 
fiidled  had  it  not  been  prevented  ;  nor  all  the  reafon^ 
yvhy  its  inflidion  would  have  been  needful ;  nor  the 
particular  nature  of  that  ftate  of  happinefs  which 
Chrift  is  gone  to  prepare  for  his  difciples  j  and  fince 

we 


Chap.  V.        a  Mediator  and  Redsffmer.  25^ 

we  are  ignorant  how  far  any  thing  which  we  could  do 
would,  alone  and  of  itfelf,  have  been  effedtual  to  pre- 
vent that  punifhment  to  which  we  were  obnoxious, 
and  recover  that  happinefs  which  we  had  forfeited, — 
it  is  mod  evident  we  are  not  judges  antecedently  to 
revelation,  whether  a  mediator  was  or  was  not  necef- 
fary  to  obtain  thofe  ends,  to  prevent  that  future  pun- 
iihment,  and  bring  mankind  to  the  final  happinefs  of 
their  nature.  And  for  the  very  fame  reafons,  upon 
fuppofition  of  the  necefllty  of  a  mediator,  we  are  no 
more  judges,  antecedently  to  revelation,  of  the  whole 
nature  of  his  office,  or  the  feveral  parts  of  which  it  con- 
fifts,  of  what  was  fit  and  requifite  to  be  affigned  him, 
in  order  to  accomplifh  the  ends  of  divine  Providence 
in  the  appointment.  And  from  hence  it  follows,  that 
to  objed:  againft  the  expediency  or  ufefulnefs  of  par- 
ticular things,  revealed  to  have  been  done  or  fuffered 
by  him,  becaufe  we  do  not  fee  how  they  were  condu- 
cive to  thofe  ends,  is  highly  abfurd.  Yet  nothing  is 
more  common  to  be  met  with  than  this  abfurdity. 
But  if  it  be  acknowledged  beforehand  that  we  are  not 
judges  in  the  cafe,  it  is  evident  that  no  objeftion  can, 
with  any  iliadow  of  reafon,  be  urged  againfl  any  par- 
ticular part  of  Chrift's  mediatorial  office  revealed  in 
Scripture,  till  it  can  be  (hewn  pofitively  not  to  be  req- 
uifite or  conducive  to  the  ends  propofed  to  be  accom- 
phfhed,  or  that  it  is  in  itfelf  unreafonabie. 

And  there  is  one  objeclion  made  againft  the  fatis- 
fadion  of  Chrift,  which  looks  to  be  of  this  pofitive 
kind,  that  the  dodrine  of  his  being  appointed  to  fuf- 
fer  for  the  fins  of  the  world,  repreients  God  as  being 
indifferent  whether  he  puniilied  the  innocent  or  the 
guilty.  Now  from  the  foregoing  obfervations  we  may 
lee  the  extreme  flightnefs  of  all  fuch  objedlions ;  and 
(though  it  is  mofl  certain  all  who  make  them  do  not 
fee  the  confequence)  that  they  conclude  altogether  as 
much  againft  God's  whole  original  conftitution  of  na?- 

ture, 


^^6  The  Appointment  of  Part  II, 

ture,  and  the  whole  daily  courfe  of  divine  Providence 
in  the  government  of  the  world,  i.  e.  againft  the  whole 
fcheme  of  theifm  and  the  whole  notion  of  religion,  as 
•againft  Chriftianity.  For  the  world  is  a  conftitution 
■or  fyftem,  whofe  parts  have  a  mutual  reference  to  each 
other  ;  and  there  is  a  fcheme  of  things  gradually  car- 
rying on,  called  the  courfe  of  nature,  to  the  carrying 
on  of  which  God  has  appointed  us,  in  various  ways, 
to  contribute.  And  when,  in  the  daily  courfe  of  nat- 
ural providence,  it  is  appointed  that  innocent  people 
fhould  fuffer  for  the  faults  of  the  guilty,  this  is  liable 
to  the  very  fame  objedlion  as  the  inftance  we  are  now 
confidering.  The  infinitely  greater  importance  of  that 
appointment  of  Chriftianity  which  is  objected  againft, 
does  not  hinder  but  it  m.ay  be,  as  it  plainly  is,  an  ap- 
pointment of  the  very  fame  kind  with  what  the  world 
affords  us  daily  examples  of.  Nay,  if  there  were  any 
force  at  all  in  the  objedlion,  it  would  be  ftronger  in 
one  refpe£t  againft  natural  providence  than  againft 
Chriftianity  5  becaufe  under  the  former  we  are  in 
many  cafes  commanded,  and  even  necellitated  wheth- 
er we  will  or  not,  to  fuffer  for  the  faults  of  others — • 
whereas  the  fufFerings  of  Chrift  were  voluntary.  The 
world's  being  under  the  righteous  government  of  God 
does  indeed  imply  that,  finally  and  upon  the  whole, 
every  one  fliall  receive  according  to  his  perfonal  de- 
ferts  ;  and  the  general  doftrine  of  the  whole  Scripture 
is,  that  this  fhali  be  the  completion  of  the  divine  gov- 
ernm.ent.  But  during  the  progrefs,  and  for  aught  we 
know  even  in  order  to  the  completion  of  this  moral 
fcheme,  vicarious  punifiiments  may  be  fit,  and  abfo- 
lutely  necelTary.  Men  by  their  follies  run  themfelves 
into  extreme  diftrefs,  into  difficulties  which  would  be 
abfolutely  fatal  to  them,  were  it  not  for  the  interpo- 
fition  and  afiiftance  of  others.  God  commands  by 
the  law  of  nature,  that  we  afford  them  this  afTiftance, 
in  many  cafes  where  we  cannot  do  it  without  very 

great 


Chap.  V.        a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.  25^ 

great  pains,  and  labour,  and  fufferings  to  ourfelves. 
And  we  fee  in  what  variety  of  ways  one  perfon's  fuf- 
ferings contribute  to  the  relief  of  another  ;  and  how, 
or  by  what  particular  means,  this  comes  to  pafs  or  fol- 
lows, from  the  conflitution  and  laws  of  nature  which 
come  under  our  notice  ;  and  being  familiarized  to  it 
men  are  not  fhocked  with  it.  So  that  the  reafon  of 
their  infifting  upon  objeftions  of  the  foregoing  kind 
againft  the  fatisfadion  of  Chrift,  is,  either  that  they 
do  not  confider  God's  fettled  and  uniform  appoint- 
ments as  his  appointments  at  all,  or  elfe  they  forget 
that  vicarious  punilliment  is  a  providential  appoint- 
ment of  every  day's  experience  ;  and  then,  from  their 
being  unacquainted  with  the  more  general  laws  of  na- 
ture or  divine  government  over  the  world,  and  not  fee- 
ing how  the  fufferings  of  Chrift  could  contribute  to 
the  redemption  of  it,  uniefs  by  arbitrary  and  tyranni- 
cal will, — they  conclude  his  fufferings  could  not  con- 
tribute to  it  any  other  way.  And  yet,  what  has  been 
often  alleged  in  juftification  of  this  doftrine,  even  from 
the  apparent  natural  tendency  of  this  method  of  our 
redemption  ;  its  tendency  to  vindicate  the  authority 
of  God's  laws,  and  deter  his  creatures  from  fin, — this 
has  never  yet  been  anfwered,  and  is  I  think  plainly  un- 
anfwerable,  though  I  am  far  from  thinking  it  an  ac- 
count of  the  whole  of  the  cafe.  But  without  taking 
this  into  confideration,  it  abundantly  appears  from  the 
obfervations  above  made,  that  this  objection  is  not  an 
objedtion  againft  Chriftianity,  but  againft  the  whole 
general  conftitution  of  nature.  And  if  it  were  to  be 
confidered  as  an  objeftion  againft  Chriftianity,  or  con- 
fidering  it  as  it  is,  an  objeftion  againft  the  conftitu- 
tion of  nature, — it  amounts  to  no  more  in  conclufion 
than  this,  that  a  divine  appointment  cannot  be  necef- 
■fary  or  expedient.,  becauie  the  objeftor  does  not  dif- 
cern  it  to  be  fo,  though  he  muft  own  that  the  nature 
of  the  cafe  is  fuch,  as  renders  him  uncapable  of  judging 

whether 


258  The  Appointment  of  Part  II. 

whether  It  be  fo  or  not,  or  of  feeing  it  to  be  neceflary, 
though  it  were  fo. 

It  is  indeed  a  matter  of  great  patience  to  reafonable 
men,  to  find  people  arguing  in  this  manner,  objeding 
againfl  the  credibility  of  fuch  particular  things  revealed 
in  Scripture,  that  they  do  not  fee  the  neceffity  or  expe^ 
diency  of  them.  For  though  it  is  highly  right,  and 
the  mofl  pious  exercife  of  our  underftanding,  to  ni^ 
quire  with  due  reverence  into  the  ends  and  reafons  of 
God's  difpenfations, — yet  when  thofe  reafons  are  con- 
'cealed,  to  argue  from  our  ignorance  that  fuch  difpen- 
fations cannot  be  from  God,  is  infinitely  abfurd,  The 
prefumption  of  this  kind  of  objeftions  feems  almoft 
loft  in  the  folly  of  them.  And  the  folly  of  them  is 
yet  greater,  when  they  are  urged,  as  ufually  they  are, 
againft  things  in  Chriflianity  analogous  or  like  to  thofe 
natural  difpenfations  of  Providence  which  are  matter 
of  experience.  Let  reafon  be  kept  to  ;  and  if  any 
part  of  the  fcripture  account  of  the  redemption  of  the 
world  by  Chrift  can  be  fhewn  to  be  really  contrary  to 
it,  let  the  Scripture,  in  the  name  of  God,  be  given  up  ; 
but  let  not  fuch  poor  creatures  as  we,  go  on  objecting 
againft  an  infinite  fcheme,  that  we  do  not  fee  the  ner 
ceffity  or  ufefulnefs  of  all  its  parts,  and  call  this  rear 
Ibning  ;  and,  which  ftill  farther  heightens  the  abfurd- 
ity  in  the  prefent  cafe,  parts  which  we  are  not  adively 
concerned  in.     For  it  may  be  worth  mentioning, 

Lafily^  That  not  only  the  reafon  of  the  thing,  but 
the  whole  analogy  of  nature,  fliould  teach  us  not  to 
expert  to  have  the  like  information  concerning  the 
divine  conduQ:  as  concerning  our  own  duty.  God 
inftruds  us  by  experience,  (for  it  is  not  reafon,  but 
experience  which  inftructs  us)  what  good  or  bad  con^ 
fequences  will  follow  from  our  ading  in  fuch  and  fuch 
manners  ;  and  by  this  he  direds  us  how  we  are  to  be- 
have ourfelves.  But,  though  we  are  fufficiently  in- 
ftruded  for  the  common  purpofes  of  hfe,  yet  it  is  but 

aa 


Chap.  V.        a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.  259 

an  almoft  infinitely  fmall  part  of  natural  providence 
which  we  are  at  all  let  into.  The  cafe  is  the  fame 
with  regard  to  revelation.  The  do<5trine  of  a  mediator 
between  God  and  man,  againft  which  it  is  obje6ted 
that  the  expediency  of  fome  things  in  it  is  not  under- 
flood,  relates  only  to  what  was  done  on  God's  part  in 
the  appointment,  and  on  the  Mediator's  in  the  exe- 
cution of  it.  For  what  is  required  of  us,  in  confe- 
quence  of  this  gracious  difpeniation,  is  another  fub- 
je6t  in  which  none  can  complain  for  want  of  informa- 
tion. The  conftitution  of  the  world,  and  God's  nat- 
ural government  over  it,  is  all  myftery,  as  much  as  the 
Chriftian  difpenfation.  Yet  under  the  firft  he  has 
given  men  all  things  pertaining  to  life,  and  under  the 
other  all  things  pertaining  unto  godlinefs.  And  it 
may  be  added,  that  there  is  nothing  hard  to  be  ac- 
counted for  in  any  of  the  common  precepts  of  Chrift- 
ianity  ;  though  if  there  were,  furely  a  divine  command 
is  abundantly  fufHcient  to  lay  us  under  the  ftrongeft 
obligations  to  obedience.  But  the  faft  is,  that  the 
reafons  of  all  the  Chriftian  precepts  are  evident.  Poli- 
tive  inftitutions  are  manifeftly  necelTary  to  keep  up 
and  propagate  religion  amongft  mankind.-  And  our 
duty  to  Chrift,  the  internal  and  external  worfhip  of 
)iim  J  this  part  of  the  religion  of  the  Gofpel  manifeft- 
ly arifes  out  of  what  he  has  done  and  fuffered,  his  au- 
thority and  dominion,  and  the  relation  which  he  is 
fevealed  to  ftand  in  to  us.* 

*  P,  zoo,  &c. 


CHAP. 


[      i^o      ] 


CHAP.     VI. 


OfthetVant  of  UniverfaUty  in  Re^u elation -,  and  of  the 
ftippofed  Deficiency  in  the  Proof  of  it. 


.T  has  been  thought  by  fome  perfohs, 
that  if  the  evidence  of  revelation  appears  doubtful, 
this  itfelf  turns  into  a  pofitive  argument  againft  it,  be- 
caufe  it  cannot  be  fuppofed  that  if  it  were  true  it 
would  be  left  to  fubfifi  upon  doubtful  evidence.  And 
the  objedtion  againft  revelation  from  its  not  being 
univerfai  is  often  infifted  upon  as  of  great  weight. 

Now  the  VvTeaknefs  of  thefe  opinions  may  ht  fliewn, 
by  obferving  the  fuppofitions  on  which  they  are  found- 
ed, which  are  really  fuch  as  thefe, — that  it  cannot  be 
thought  God  would  have  beftowed  any  favour  at  all 
upon  us,  unlefs  in  the  degree  which  we  think  he  might, 
and  which  we  imagine  would  be  moft  to  our  particu^ 
lar  advantage  j  and  alfo  that  it  cannot  be  thought  he 
would  beftow  a  favour  upon  any  unlefs  he  beftowed 
the  fame  upon  all ;  fuppofitions  which  we  find  contra- 
dided  not  by  a  few  inftances  in  God's  natural  govern- 
ment of  the  world,  but  by  the  general  analogy  of  na-t 
ture  together. 

Perfons  who  fpeak  of  the  evidence  of  religion  as 
doubtful,  and  of  this  fuppofed  doubtfulnefs  as  a  pofi- 
tive argument  againft  it,  fhould  be  put  upon  confid- 
ering  what  that  evidence  indeed  is,  which  they  aft  up- 
on with  regard  to  their  temporal  interefts.  For,  it  is 
not  only  extremely  difHcult,  but,  in  many  cafes,  abfo- 
lutely  irnpofTible,  to  balance  pleafure  and  pain,  fatif- 
faftion  and  uneafmefs,  {o  as  to  be  able  to  fay  on  which 
fide  the  overplus  is.  There  are  the  like  difficulties  and 
impoffibilities  in  making  the  due  allowances  for  a 
change  of  temper  and  tafte,  for  fatiety,  difgufts,  ill 
health  ;  any  of  which  render  men  incapable  of  enjoy- 
ing* 


Chap.  VI.      Revelation  not  tmiverfal,  &c.  26% 

ing,  after  they  have  obtained,  what  they  moft  eagerly 
defired.  Numberlefs  too  are  the  accidents,  befides 
that  one  of  untimely  death,  which  may  even  probably 
difappoint  the  beft  concerted  fchemes ;  and  ftrong  ob- 
jedlions  are  often  feen  to  lie  againft  them,  not  to  be  re- 
moved or  anfwered,  but  which  feem  overbalanced  by 
reafons  on  the  other  fide  ;  fo  as  that  the  certain  difr 
ficulties  and  dangers  of  the  purfuit  are,  by  every  one, 
thought  juflly  difregarded,  upon  account  of  the  ap- 
pearing greater  advantages  in  cafe  of  fuccefs,  though 
there  be  but  little  probability  of  it.  LafUy,  every  one 
obferves  our  liablenefs,  if  we  be  not  upon  our  guard, 
to  be  deceived  by  the  falfehood  of  men,  and  the  falie 
appearances  of  things ;  and  this  danger  mufl  be  great- 
ly increafed,  if  there  be  a  ftrong  bias  within,  fuppofe 
from  indulged  paffion,  to  favour  the  deceit.  Hence 
arlfes  that  great  uncertainty  and  doubtfulnefs  of  proof, 
wherein  our  temporal  intereft  really  confifts,  what  are 
the  moft  probable  means  of  attaining  it,  and  whether 
thofe  means  will  eventually  be  fuccefsful.  And  num- 
berlefs inftances  there  are,  in  the  daily  courfe  of  hfe, 
in  which  all  men  think  it  reafonable  to  engage  in  pur- 
fuits,  though  the  probability  is  greatly  againft  fuc- 
ceeding,  and  to  make  fuch  provifion  for  themfelves, 
as  it  is  fuppofable  they  may  have  occafion  for,  though 
the  plain  acknowledged  probability  is  that  they  never 
(hall.  Then  thofe  who  think  the  objeftion  againft 
revelation,  from  its  light  not  being  univerfal,  to  be  of 
weight,  ibould  obferve,  that  the  Author  of  nature,  in 
numberlefs  inftances,  beftows  f/iat  upon  fome  which 
he  does  not  upon  others  who  feem  equally  to  ftand  in 
need  of  it.  Indeed  he  appears  to  beftow  all  his  gifts 
with  the  moft  promifcuous  variety  among  creatures 
of  the  fame  fpecies ;  health  and  ftrength,  capacities 
of  prudence  and  of  knowledge,  means  of  improvement, 
riches,  and  all  external  advantages.  And  as  there  are 
not  any  tv/o  men  found  of  exadly  like  Ihape  and  fea- 
tures. 


zSz  Revelation  not  univerfai :  Part  IL 

tures,  fo  it  is  probable  there  are  not  any  two  of  an  ex- 
aftly  like  conftitution,  temper  and  fituation,  with  re- 
gard to  the  goods  and  evils  of  life.  Yet,  notwithftand- 
ing  thefe  uncertainties  and  varieties,  God  does  exercife 
a  natural  government  over  the  world,  and  there  is  fuch- 
a  thing  as  a  prudent  and  imprudent  infbitution  of  life, 
with  regard  to  our  health  and  our  affairs,  tinder  that 
his  natural  government. 

As  neither  the  Jewifli  nor  Chriftian  revelation  have 
been  univerfai,  and  as  they  have  been  afforded  to  a 
gi'eater  or  lefs  part  of  the  world,  at  different  times, 
fo  likewife  at  different  times  both  revelations  have  had 
different  degrees  of  evidence.  The  Jews  who  lived 
during  the  fuccelRon  of  prophets,  that  is,  from  Mofes 
till  after  the  captivity,  had  higher  evidence  of  the 
truth  of  their  religion,  than  thofe  had,  who  lived  in 
the  interval  between  the  laft  mentioned  period  and 
the  coming  of  Chrift.  And  the  firft  Chriftians  had 
higher  evidence  of  the  miracles  wrought  in  atteftation 
of  Chridianity  than  what  we  have  now.  They  had 
alfo  a  ftrong  prefumptive  proof  of  the  truth  of  it,  per- 
haps of  much  greater  force,  in  way  of  argument,  than 
many  think,  of  which  we  have  very  little  remaining ; 
I  mean  the  prefumptive  proof  of  its  truth,  from  the 
influence  which  it  had  upon  the  lives  of  the  generality 
of  its  profeffors.  And  we,  or  future  ages,  may  poffi- 
bly  have  a  proof  of  it,  which  they  could  not  have, 
from  the  conformity  between  the  prophet ick  hiftory 
and  the  ftate  of  the  world  and  of  Chriftianity.  And 
farther,  if  we  were  to  fiippofe  the  evidence  which  fome 
have  of  religion  to  amount  to  little  more  than  feeing 
that  it  may  be  true,  but  that  they  rerhain  in  great 
doubts  and  uncertainties  about  both  its  evidence  and 
its  nature,  and  great  perplexities  concerning  the  rule 
of  life  ;  others  to  have  a  full  conviction  of  the  truth 
of  religion,  with  a  diftinct  knowledge  of  their  duty  ; 
and  others  feverally  to  have  all  the  intermediate  de- 
grees 


Chap.  VI.      Suppofed  deficiency  in  its  Proof.  263 

grees  of  religious- light  and  evidence,  which  lie  be- 
tween thefe  two, — if  we  put  the  cafe,  that  for  the  pref- 
ent  it  was  intended  revelation  Ihould  be  no  more  than 
a  fmall  light,  in  the  midft  of  a  world  greatly  over- 
fpread,  notwithftanding  it,  with  ignorance  and  dark- 
nefs  ;  that  certain  glimmerings  of  this  light  iliould  ex- 
tend and  be  direded  to  remote  diftances,  in  fuch  a 
manner  as  that  thofe  who  really  partook  of  it  fhould 
not  difcern  from  whence  it  originally  came  j  that  fome 
in  a  nearer  fituation  to  it  fhould  have  its  lisiht  obfcur- 
ed,  and  in  different  ways  and  degrees  intercepted  ; 
and  that  others  fhould  be  placed  within  its  clearer  in- 
fluence, and  be  much  more  enlivened,  cheered  and  di- 
rected by  it ;  but  yet  that  even  to  thefe  it  fhould  be 
no  more  than  a  light  JJiining  in  a  dark  place  ; — all  this 
would  be  perfeftly  uniform  and  of  a  piece  with  the 
condud  of  Providence  in  the  diflribution  of  its  other 
bleffings.  If  the  fad  of  the  cafe  really  were,  that  fome 
have  received  no  light  at  all  from  the  Scripture,  as 
many  ages  and  countries  in  the  heathen  world  -,  that 
others,  though  they  have  by  means  of  it  had  elTentiai 
or  natural  religion  enforced  upon  their  confciences, 
yet  have  never  had  the  genuine  fcripture  revelation 
with  its  real  evidence  propofed  to  their  confideration, 
and  the  ancient  Perjians  and  modern  Mahometans  may 
pofTibly  be  inftances  of  people  in  a  fituation  Ibmewhat 
like  to  this  ;  that  others,  though  they  have  had  the 
Scripture  laid  before  them  as  of  divine  revelation,  yet 
have  had  it  with  the  fyftem  and  evidence  ofChriftianity 
fo  interpolated,  the  fyftem  fo  corrupted,  the  evidence 
fo  blended  with  falfe  miracles,  as  to  leave  the  mind  in 
the  utmoft  doubtfulnefs  and  uncertainty  about  the 
w^hole ;  which  may  be  the  ftate  of  fome  thoughtful 
men,  in  moft  of  thofe  nations  who  call  themlelves 
Chriftian.  And  laftly,  that  others  have  had  Chrifl- 
ianity  offered  to  them  in  its  genuine  fimplicity,  and 
with  its  proper  evidence,  as  perfons  in  countries  and 

churches 


5564  Revelation  net  unherfal:  Part  IT* 

churches  of  civil  and  of  Chriftian  liberty  ;  but  how- 
ever that  even  thefe  perfons  are  left  in  great  ignorance 
in  many  refpefts,  and  have  by  no  means  light  afforded 
them  enough  to  fatisfy  their  curiofity,  but  only  to 
regulate  their  Hfe,  to  teach  them  their  duty,  and  en- 
courage them  in  the  careful  difcharge  of  it :  I  fay,  if 
we  were  to  fuppoie  this  fomewhat  of  a  general  true 
account  of  the  degrees  of  moral  and  religious  light 
and  evidence,  which  were  intended  to  be  afforded 
mankind,  and  of  what  has  adually  been  and  is  theif 
£tuation,  in  their  moral  and  religious  capacity,  there 
would  be  nothing  in  all  this  ignorance,  doubtfulnefs 
and  uncertainty,  in  all  thefe  varieties,  and  fuppofed 
difadvantages  of  fome  in  comparifon  of  others,  refpeQ:- 
ing  religion,  but  may  be  paralleled  by  manifeft  anal- 
ogies in  the  natural  difpenfations  of  Providence  at 
prefent,  and  confidering  ourfelves  merely  in  our  tem- 
poral capacity. 

Nor  is  there  any  thing  (hocking  in  all  this,  or  which 
v/ould  (eem  to  bear  hard  upon  the  moral  adminiftra- 
tion  in  nature,  if  we  would  really  keep  in  mind  that 
€very  one  fliall  be  dealt  equitably  with,  inftead  of  for- 
getting this,  or  explaining  it  away,  after  it  is  acknowl- 
edged in  words.  Ail  fliadow  of  injuftice,  and  indeed 
all  harfh  appearances,  in  this  various  economy  of 
Providence,  would  be  loft,  if  we  would  keep  in  mind 
that  every  merciful  allowance  fhall  be  made,  and  no 
more  be  required  of  any  one  than  what  might  have  been 
equitably  expeded  of  him,  from  the  circumftances  in 
which  he  was  placed,  and  not  what  might  have  been 
expected  had  he  been  placed  in  other  circumftances  ; 
i.  e.  in  Scripture  language,  that  every  man  fliall  be 
accepted  according  to  what  he  had,  not  according  to  what 
he  had  not*  This  however  doth  not  by  any  means 
imply  that  all  perfons'  condition  here  is  equally  ad- 
vantageous with  refped  to  futurity.  And  Provi- 
dence's 

*  2  Cor.  viii.  12= 


Chap.  VI.      Suppofed  Deficiency  in  its  Troof.         zSjj 

dence*s  defigning  to  place  fome  in  greater  darknefs 
with  refpedt  to  religious  knowledge,  is  no  more  a  rea- 
fon  wh}^  they  fliould  not  endeavour  to  get  out  of  that 
darknefs,  and  others  to  bring  them  out  of  it,  than 
why  ignorant  and  flow  people  in  matters  of  other 
knowledge  fhould  not  endeavour  to  learn,  or  fliould 
not  be  inftructed. 

It  is  not  unreafonable  to  fuppofe  that  the  fame  wife 
and  good  principle,  whatever  it  was,  which  difpofed 
the  Author  of  nature  to  make  different  kinds  and  or- 
ders of  creatures,  difpofed  him  alfo  to  place  creatures 
of  like  kinds  in  different  fituations ;  and  that  the  fame 
principle  which  difpofed  him  to  make  creatures  of  dif- 
ferent moral  capacities,  difpofed  him  alfo  to  place 
creatures  of  like  moral  capacities  in  different  religious 
fituations,  and  even  the  fame  creatures  in  different  pe- 
riods of  their  being.  And  the  account  or  reafon  of 
this  is  alfo  moll  probably  the  account,  Vv^hy  the  con- 
flitution  of  things  is  fuch,  as  that  creatures  of  moral 
natures  or  capacities,  for  a  confiderable  part  of  that  du- 
ration in  which  they  are  living  agents,  are  not  at  all 
fubjeds  of  moraUty  and  religion,  but  grow  up  to  be 
fo,  and  grow  up  to  be  fo  more  and  more,  gradually 
from  childhood  to  mature  age. 

What,  in  particular,  is  the  account  or  reafon  of 
thefe  things,  we  mull  be  greatly  in  the  dark,  were  it 
only  that  we  know  fo  very  httle  even  of  our  own  cafe. 
Our  prefent  flate  may  poffibly  be  the  confequence  of 
fomewhat  pafl  which  we  are  wholly  ignorant  of,  as  it 
has  a  reference  to  fomewhat  to  come,  of  which  we 
know  fcarce  any  more  than  is  neceffary  for  pradice. 
A  fyftem  or  conftitution,  in  its  notion,  implies  varie- 
ty ;  and  fo  complicated  an  one  as  this  world,  very 
great  variety.  So  that  were  revelation  univerfal,  yet 
from  men's  different  capacities  of  underftanding,  from 
the  different  lengths  of  their  lives,  their  different  edu- 
cations and  other  external  circumflances,  and  from 

S  their 


i66  Revelation  not  univerfah  Pakt  IL 

their  difference  of  temper  and  bodily  conftitution, — 
their  religious  fituations  would  be  widely  different, 
and  the  difadvantage  of  fome  in  comparifon  of  others, 
perhaps,  altogether  as  much  as  at  prefent.  And  the 
true  account,  whatever  it  be,  why  mankind,  or  fuch  a 
part  of  mankind,  are  placed  in  this  condition  of  igno- 
rance, muft  be  fuppofed  alfo  the  true  account  of  our 
farther  ignorance,  in  not  knowing  the  reafons  v/hy  or 
whence  it  is  that  they  are  placed  in  this  condition. 
But  the  following  praftlcal  refleftions  may  deferve  the 
ferious  confideration  of  thofe  perfons  who  think  the 
circumftances  of  mankind  or  their  own,  in  the  fore- 
mentioned  refpefts,  a  ground  of  complaint. 

Firji^  The  evidence  of  religion  not  appearing  ob- 
vious, may  conftitute  one  particular  part  of  fome  men's 
trial  in  the  religious  fenfe,  as  it  gives  fcope  for  a  virtu- 
ous exercife  or  vicious  negleft  of  their  underftanding, 
in  examining  or  not  examining  into  that  evidence. 
There  feems  no  poffible  reafon  to  be  given,  why  we 
may  not  be  in  a  ftate  of  moral  probation,  with  regard 
to  the  exercife  of  our  underftanding  upon  the  fubjeft' 
of  religion,  as  we  are  with  regard  to  our  behaviour  in 
common  affairs.  The  former  is  as  much  a  thing 
within  our  power  and  choice  as  the  latter.  And  t 
fuppofe  it  is  to  be  laid  down  for  certain,  that  the  fame 
charader,  the  fame  inward  principle,  which,  after  a 
man  is  convinced  of  the  truth  of  religion,  renders  him 
obedient  to  the  precepts  of  it,  would,  were  he  not  thus 
convinced,  fet  him  about  an  examination  of  it,  upon 
its  fyftem  and  evidence  being  offered  to  his  thoughts ; 
and  that  in  the  latter  ftate  his  examination  would  be 
with  an  impartiality,  ferioufneis  and  foHcitude  pro- 
portionable to  what  his  obedience  is  in  the  former. 
And  as  inattention,  negligence,  want  of  all  ferious 
concern  about  a  matter  of  fuch  a  nature  and  fuch  im- 
portance, when  offered  to  men's  confideration,  is,  be- 
fore a  diftin^t  convidion  cf  its  truth,  as  real  immoral 

depravity 


C H  A  P .  VI.      Suppofed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.         267 

depravitv  and  diflblutenefs,  as  negle£t  of  religious  prac- 
tice after  fuch  convidlion,— fo  aftive  folicitude  about 
it,  and  fair  impartial  confideration  of  its  evidence  be- 
fore fijch  convidtion,  is  as  really  an  exercife  of  a  morally 
right  temperas  is  religious  praftice  after.  Thus,  that 
religion  is  not  intuitively  true,  but  a  matter  of  deduc- 
tion and  inference  ;  that  a  conviction  of  its  truth  is 
not  forced  upon  every  one,  but  left  to  be,  by  fome, 
colle(5ted  with  heedful  attention  to  premifes ;  this  as 
much  conllitutes  religious  probation,  as  much  affords 
fphere,  fcope,  opportunity,  for  right  and  wrong  beha- 
viour, as  any  thing  whatever  does.  And  their  man- 
ner of  treating  this  fubjed  when  laid  before  them, 
(hews  what  is  in  their  heart,  and  is  an  exertion  of  it. 
Secondly,  It  appears  to  be  a  thing  as  evident,  though 
it  is  not  fo  much  attended  to,  that  if  upon  confidera- 
tion of  religion  the  evidence  of  it  (hould  feem  to  any 
perfons  doubtful,  in  the  higheft  fuppofable  degree, 
even  this  doubtful  evidence  will,  however,  put  them 
into  a  general  fiate  of  probation  in  the  moral  and  relig- 
ious fenfe.  For,  fuppoie  a  man  to  be  really  in  doubt 
whether  filch  a  perfon  had  not  done  him  the  greatefb 
favour,  or  whether  his  whole  temporal  intereft  did  not 
depend  upon  that  perfon, — no  one,  who  had  any  fenfe 
of  gratitude  and  of  prudence,  could  poffibly  confider 
himfelf  in  the  fame  fituation  with  regard  to  fuch  per- 
fon, as  if  he  had  no  fuch  doubt.  In  truth,  it  is  as  jufb 
to  fay  that  certainty  and  doubt  are  the  fame,  as  to  fay, 
the  iituations  now  mentioned  would  leave  a  man  as  en- 
tirely at  liberty  in  point  of  gratitude  or  prudence,  as 
he  would  be  were  he  certain  he  had  received  no  favour 
from  fuch  perfon,  or  that  he  no  w^y  depended  upon 
him.  And  thus,  though  the  evidence  of  religion 
which  is  afforded  to  fome  men  fhould  be  little  more 
than  that  they  are  given  to  fee  the  fyltem  of  Chriftian- 
ity,  or  religion  in  general,  to  be  fuppofable  and  cred- 
ible,— this  ought  in  all  reafon  to  beget  a  ferious  prac- 
S  2  tical 


168  Revelation  not  tmh  erf  at :  J*  art  IK 

tical  apprehenrion  that  it  may  be  true.     And  even  this 
will  afford  matter  of  exercife  for  religious  fufpenfe  and 
deliberation,  for  moral  refolution  and  felf  government, 
becaufe  the  apprehenfion  that  religion  may  be  true, 
does  as  really  lay  men  under  obligations  as  a  full  con- 
vidlion  that  it  is  true.     It  gives  occafion  and  motives 
to  confider  farther  the  important  fubjeft,  to  preferve 
attentively  upon  their  minds  a  general  imphcit  fenfe 
that  they  may  be  under  divine  moral  government,  an 
awful  folicitude  about  religion,  whether  natural  or  re- 
vealed.    Such  apprehenfion  ought  to  turn  men's  eyes 
to  every  degree  of  new  light  which  may  be  had,  from 
whatever  fide  it  comes,  and  induce  them  to  refrain  in 
the  mean  time  from  all  immoralities,  and  live  in  the 
confcientious  praftice  of  every  common  virtue.     Ef- 
pecially  are  they  bound  to  keep  at  the  greateft  diftance 
from  all  diflblute  profanenefs  ;  for  this  the  very  nature 
of  the  cafe  forbids ;  and  to  treat  with  higheft  rever- 
ence a  matter,  upon  which  their  own  whole  intereft 
and  being,  and  the  fate  of  nature  depends.     This  be- 
haviour, and  an  adive  endeavour  to  maintain  withint 
themfelves  this  temper,  is  the  bufinefs,  the  duty,  and 
the  wifdom  of  tlwfe  perfons,  who  complain  of  th^ 
doubtfulnefs  of  religion  ;  is  what  they  are  under  th^ 
mod  proper  obligations  to.     And  fuch  behaviour  i§ 
an  exertion  of,  and  has  a  tendency  to  improve  in 
them  that  chara6ter,  which  the  practice  of  all  the  fev^ 
eral  duties  of  religion,  from  a  full  convidtion  of  its 
truth,  is  an  exertion  of,  and  has  a  tendency  to  improve 
in  others ;  others,  I  fay,  to  whom  God  has  afforded 
fuch  convidion.     Nay,  confidering  the  infinite  im- 
portance of  rehgion,  revealed  as  well  as  natural,  I  think 
it  may  be  faid  in  general,  that  whoever  will  weigh  the 
matter  thoroughly  may  fee  there  is  not  near  fo  much 
difference  as  is  commonly  imagined,  between  what 
ought  in  reafon  to  be  the  rule  of  life,  to  thofe  perfons 
who  are  fully  convinced  of  its  truth,  and  to  thofe 

who 


Ghap.  VI.      Suppofed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.         269 

who  have  only  a  ferlous  doubting  apprehenfion  that 
it  may  be  true.  Their  hopes,  and  fears,  and  obliga- 
tions will  be  in  various  degrees ;  but,  as  the  fubjecft 
matter  of  their  hopes  and  fears  is  the  fame,  fo  the 
fubjecl  matter  of  their  obligations,  what  they  are 
bound  to  do  and  to  refrain  from,  is  not  fo  very  unlike. 

It  is  to  be  obferved  farther,  that  from  a  character 
of  underftanding,  or  a  lituation  of  influence  in  the 
world,  fome  perfons  have  it  in  their  power  to  do  infi- 
nitely more  harm  or  good,  by  fetting  an  example  of 
profanenefs  and  avowed  difregard  to  all  religion,  or, 
on  the  contrary,  of  a  ferious,  though  perhaps  doubt- 
ing apprehenfion  of  its  truth,  and  of  a  reverend  re- 
gard to  it  under  this  dbubtfulnefs,  than  they  can  do, 
by  ading  well  or  ill  in  all  the  common  intercourfes 
amongft  mankind.  And  eonfequently  they  are  moil 
highly  accountable  for  a  behaviour,  which  they  may 
eafily  forefee  is  of  fuch  importance,  and  in  which 
there  is  moil  plainly  a  right  and  a  wrong,  even  ad- 
mitting the  evidence  of  religion  to  be  as  doubtful  as 
is  pretended. 

The  ground  of  thefe  obfervations,  and  that  which 
renders  them  juft  and  true,  is,  that  doubting  neceffa- 
rily  implies  fome  degree  of  evidence  for  that  of  which 
we  doubt.  For  no  perfon  would  be  in  doubt  con- 
cerning the  truth  of  a  number  of  fa6ls  fo  and  fo  cir- 
cumftanced,  which  ihould  accidentally  come  into  his 
thoughts,  and  of  which  he  had  no  evidence  at  all. 
And  though  in  the  cafe  of  an  even  chance,  and  where 
eonfequently  we  were  in  doubt,  we  fhould  in  common 
language  fay  that  we  had  no  evidence  at  all  for  either 
iide, — yet  that  fituation  of  things,  which  renders  it 
an  even  chance  and  no  more,  that  fuch  an  event  will 
happen,  renders  this  cafe  equivalent  to  all  others, 
where  there  is  fuch  evidence  on  both  fides  of  a  quef- 
tion,*  as  leaves  the  mind  in  doubt  concerning  the 

truth. 

*  Introdudlioiu 


2, 7  o  Revelation  not  univerjal :  P  A  R  t  11. 

truth.  Indeed  in  all  thefe  cafes,  there  is  no  more  ev- 
idence on  one  fide  than  on  the  other ;  but  there  is. 
(what  is  equivalent  to)  much  more  for  either  than 
for  the  truth  of  a  number  of  fa£ls  which  come  into 
one's  thoughts  at  random.  And  thus  in  all  thefe 
cafes  doubt  as  much  prefuppofes  evidence,  lower  de- 
grees of  evidence,  as  belief  prel'uppofes  higher,  and 
certainty  higher  ftilL  Any  one  who  will  a  little  at- 
tend to  the  nature  of  evidence,  will  eafily  carry  this 
obfervation  on,  and  fee  that  between  no  evidence  at 
all,  and  that  degree  of  it  which  affords  ground  of 
doubt,  there  are  as  many  intermediate  degrees,  as  there 
are  between  that  degree  which  is  the  ground  of  doubt, 
and  demonflration.  And  though  we  have  not  facul- 
ties to  diftinguifli  thefe  degrees  of  evidence  with  any 
fort  of  exadnefs,  yet  in  proportion  as  they  are  difcern- 
ed  they  ought  to  influence  our  practice.  For  it  is  as 
real  an  imperfection  in  the  moral  charader,  not  to  be 
influenced  in  practice  by  a  lower  degree  of  evidence 
when  difcerned,  as  it  is  in  the  underftanding  not  to 
difcern  it.  And  as  in  all  fubjecls  which  men  confider, 
they  difcern  the  lower  as  well  as  higher  degrees  of  evi- 
dence, proportionably  to  their  capacity  of  underftand- 
ing,— fo  in  pradical  fubjeds  they  are  influenced  in 
practice,  by  the  lower  as  well  as  higher  degrees  of  it, 
proportionably  to  their  fairnefs  and  honefly.  And  as, 
in  proportion  to  defeats  in  the  underftanding,  men 
are  unapt  to  fee  lower  degrees  of  evidence,  ^re  in  dan- 
ger of  overlooking  evidence  when  it  is  not  glaring, 
and  are  eafily  impofed  upon  in  fuch  cafes, — fo  in  pro- 
portion to  the  corruption  of  the  heart,  they  feem  ca- 
pable of  fatisfying  themfelves  v/ith  having  no  regard 
in  practice  to  evidence  acknowledged  real,  if  it  be  not 
overbearing.  From  thefe  ihings  it  muft  follow,  that 
doubting  concerning  religion  implies  fuch  a  degree  of 
evidence  for  it  as,  joined  with  the  confideration  of  its 
importance,  unqueftionably  la)fs  men  under  the  obli- 
gations 


Chap.  VI.      Suppofed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.         271 

gations  before  mentioned  to  have  a  dutiful  regard  to 
it  in  all  their  behaviour. 

Thirdhy  The  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence  of 
religion  is  involved,  which  fome  complain  of,  is  no 
more  a  juft  ground  of  complaint,  than  the  external 
circumftances  of  temptation  which  others  are  placed 
in,  or  than  difficulties  in  the  pradice  of  it  after  a 
full  convidion  of  its  truth.  Temptations  render  our 
Hate  a  more  improving  ftate  of  difcipline  *  than  it 
would  be  otherwife,  as  they  give  occafion  for  a  more 
attentive  exercife  of  the  virtuous  principle,  which 
confirms  and  ftrengthens  it  more  than  an  eafier  or  lefs 
attentive  exercife  of  it  could.  Now  fpeculative  diffi- 
culties are,  in  this  refped,  of  the  very  fame  nature  v/ith 
thefe  external  temptations.  For  the  evidence  of  relig- 
ion not  appearing  obvious,  is  to  fome  perfons  a  temp- 
tation to  rejed  it,  without  any  confideration  at  all ;  and 
therefore  requires  fuch  an  attentive  exercife  of  the  vir- 
tuous principle,  ferioufly  to  confider  that  evidence,  as 
there  would  be  no  occafion  for  but  for  fuch  temptation. 
And  the  fuppofed  doubtfulnefs  of  its  evidence,  after 
it  has  been  in  fome  fort  confidered,  affords  opportu- 
nity to  an  unfair  mind  of  explaining  away,  and  deceit- 
fully hiding  from  itfelf,  that  evidence  which  it  might 
fee,  and  alfo  ^or  men's  encouraging  themfelves  in  vice 
from  hopes  of  impunity,  though  they  do  clearly  fee 
thus  much  at  leaft  that  thefe  hopes  are  uncertain  ;  in 
like  manner  as  the  common  temptation  to  many  in- 
ftances  of  folly,  which  end  in  temporal  infamy  and 
ruin,  is  the  ground  for  hope  of  not  being  deteded, 
and  of  efcaping  with  impunity  ;  i.  e.  the  doubt- 
fulnefs of  the  proof  beforehand,  that  fuch  foolilh  be- 
haviour will  thus  end  in  infamy  and  ruin.  On  the 
contrary,  fuppofed  doubtfulnefs  in  the  evidence  of  re- 
ligion calls  for  a  more  careful  and  attentive  exercife  of 
the  virtuous  principle,  in  fairly  yielding  themfelves  up 

to 

*  Part  I.  Chap.  y. 


272  Revelation  not  unlverfal :  Part  11, 

to  the  proper  influence  of  any  real  evidence,  though 
doubtful,  and  in  praftifing  confcientioufly  all  virtue, 
though  under  fome  uncertainty  whether  the  govern- 
ment in  the  univerfe  may  not  poffibly  be  fuch,  as 
that  vice  may  efcape  with  impunity.  And  in  general, 
temptation,  meaning  by  this  word  the  leffer  allure- 
ments to  wron^;  and  difficulties  in  the  difcharsje  of 
our  duty,  as  well  as  the  greater  ones — temptation,  I 
fay,  as  fuch,  and  of  every  kind  and  degree,  as  it  calls 
forth  fome  virtuous  efforts,  additional  to  what  would 
otherwife  have  been  wanting,  cannot  but  be  an  ad- 
ditional difcipline  and  improvement  of  virtue,  as  well 
as  probation  of  it  in  the  other  fenfes  of  that  word.* 
So  that  the  very  fame  account  is  to  be  given  why  the 
evidence  of  religion  fhould  be  left  in  fuch  a  manner, 
as  to  require  in  fome  an  attentive,  folicitous,  perhaps 
painful  exercife  of  their  underftanding  about  it,  as  why 
others  fhould  be  placed  in  fuch  circumftances  as  that 
the  praftice  of  its  common  duties,  after  a  full  convic- 
tion of  the  truth  of  it,  fliould  require  attention,  folic- 
itude  and  pains  ;  or,  why  appearing  doubtfulnefs 
fhould  be  permitted  to  afford  matter  of  temptation  to 
fome,  as  why  external  difficulties  and  allurements 
jQiould  be  permitted  to  afford  matter  of  temptation  to 
others.  The  fame  account  alfo  is  to  1-3  given  why 
fome  fhould  be  exercifed  with  temptations  ot  both 
thefe  kinds,  as  why  others  fhould  be  exercifed  with 
the  latter  in  fuch  very  high  degrees  as  fome  have  been, 
particularly  as  the  primitive  Chriftians  were. 

Nor  does  there  appear  any  abfurdity  in  fuppofing, 
that  the  fpeculative  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence 
of  religion  is  involved,  rnay  make  even  the  principal 
part  of  fom.e  perfons'  trial.  For,  as  the  chief  tempta- 
tions of  the  generality  of  the  world  are,  the  ordinary 
m.otives  to  injuftice  or  unreft rained  pleafure,  or  to  live 
in  the  negleft  of  religion,  from  that  frame  of  mind 

which 

*  Part  I.  Chap,  v,  and  p.  155- 


Cha?.  VI,      Siippofed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof .         275 

which  renders  many  perfons  almofl;  without  feeling  as 
to  any  thing  diftant,  or  which  is  not  the  objeft  of  their 
fenfes, — fo  there  are  other  perfons  without  this  fhal- 
lownefs  of  temper,  perfons  of  a  deeper  fenfe  as  to  what 
is  invifible  and  future  ;  who  not  only  fee,  but  have  a 
general  prad:ical  feeling,  that  what  is  to  come  will  be 
prefent,  and  that  things  are  not  lefs  real  for  their  not 
being  the  objedls  of  fenfe  ;  and  who,  from  their  nat- 
ural conftitution  of  body  and  of  temper,  and  from 
their  external  condition,  may  have  fmall  temptations 
to  behave  ill,  fmall  difficulty  in  behaving  well  in  the 
common  courfe  of  life.  Now  when  theie  latter  per- 
fons have  a  diftind:  full  conviftion  of  the  truth  of  re- 
ligion, without  any  poflible  doubts  or  difficulties,  the 
praftice  of  it  is  to  them  unavoidable,  unlefs  they  v>'ili 
do  a  conftant  violence  to  their  ov^m  minds ;  and  re^ 
ligion  is  fcarce  any  more  a  difcipline  to  them  than  it 
is  to  creatures  in  a  ftate  of  perfeftion.  Yet  thefe  per- 
fons may  poffibly  Hand  in  need  of  moral  difcipline  and 
exercife  in  a  higher  degree,  than  they  would  have  by 
fuch  an  eafy  pradice  of  religion.  Or  it  may  be  requi- 
{ite  for  reafons  unknown  to  us,  that  they  ihould  give 
fome  farther  manifeftation*  what  is  their  moral  char- 
after,  to  the  creation  of  God,  than  luch  a  praftice  of 
it  would  be.  Thus  in  the  great  variety  of  religious 
fituations  in  which  men  are  placed,  what  conftitutes, 
what  chiefly  and  peculiarly  conftitutes  the  probation, 
in  all  fenfes,  of  fome  perfons,  may  be  the  difficulties  in 
which  the  evidence  of  religion  is  involved  ;  and  their 
principal  and  diftinguiilied  trial  may  be,  how  they  will 
behave  under  and  with  refpeft  to  thefe  difficulties. 
Circumftances  in  men's  fituation  in  their  temporal  ca- 
pacity, analogous  in  good  meafure  to  this  refneding 
religion,  are  to  be  obferved.  We  find  fome  peribns  are 
placed  in  fuch  a  fituation  in  the  world,  as  that  their 
chief  difficulty  with  regard  to  condud:,  is  not  the  do- 
ing 
*p.  155. 


12  7  4  Revelation  not  univerfal :  P  A  R  t  IL 

ing  what  is  prudent  when  it  is  known,  for  this  in  num- 
bcrlefs  cafes  is  as  eafy  as  the  contrary,  but  to  fome  the 
principal  exercife  is,  recolledion  and  being  upon  their 
guard  againft  deceits,  the  deceits  fuppofe  of  thofe  about 
them,  againft  falfe  appearances  of  reafon  and  prudence. 
To  perfons  in  fome  fituations  the  principal  exercife 
with  refped  to  condud  is,  attention  in  order  to  inform 
themfeives  what  is  proper,  what  is  really  the  reafona^ 
ble  and  prudent  part  to  ac5l. 

But  as  I  have  hitherto  gone  upon  fuppofition,  that 
men's  diffatisfadion  with  the  evidence  of  religion  is  not 
owing  to  their  neglefts  or  prejudices,  it  muft  be  added 
on  the  other  hand,  in  all  common  reafon,  and  as  what 
the  truth  of  the  cafe  plainly  requires  fliould  be  added, 
that  fuch  diffatisfadion  pofTibly  may  be  owing  to  thofe, 
poffibly  may  be  men's  own  fault.     For, 

If  there  are  any  perfons  who  never  fet  themfeives 
heartily  and  in  earned  to  be  informed  in  religion  ;  if 
there  are  any  who  fecretly  wifli  it  may  not  prove  true, 
and  are  lefs  attentive  to  evidence  than  to  difficulties, 
and  more  to  objedions  than  to  what  is  faid  in  anfwer 
to  them, — thefe  perfons  will  fcarce  be  thought  in  a 
likely  way  of  feeing  the  evidence  of  religion,  though  it 
were  moft  certainly  true,  and  capable  of  being  ever  fo 
fully  proved.  If  any  accuftom  themfeives  to  confider ' 
this  fubjed:  ufually  in  the  way  of  mirth  and  fport  ;  if 
they  attend  to  forms  and  reprefentations,  and  inade- 
quate manners  of  expreffion,  inftead  of  the  real  things 
intended  by  them  ;  (for  figns  often  can  be  no  more 
than  inadequately  cxpreffive  of  the  things  fignified)  or 
if  they  fubftitute  human  errors  in  the  room  of  divine 
truth, — why  may  not  all,  or  any  of  thefe  things,  hin- 
der fome  men  from  feeing  that  evidence  which  really 
is  feen  by  others,  as  a  like  turn  of  mind  with  refped 
to  m.atters  of  common  fpeculation  and  practice,  does, 
we  find  by  experience,  hinder  them  from  attaining  that, 
knowledge  and  right  underftanding,  in  matters  of  com- 
mon 


Chap.  VI.      Suppofed Deficiency  in  its  Proof .         27^ 

nion  fpeculation  and  pradice,  which  more  fair  and  at« 
tentive  minds  attain  to  ?  And  the  effed  will  be  the 
fame,  whether  their  negled  of  ferioully  confidering  the 
evidence  of  religion,  and  their  indiredt  behaviour  with 
regard  to  it,  proceed  from  mere  careleflheis,  or  i  .  r.i 
from  the  groffer  vices ;  or  whether  it  be  owing  to  this, 
that  forms  and  figurative  manners  of  expreffion,  as 
well  as  errors,  adminifter  occafions  of  ridicule,  when 
the  things  intended  and  the  truth  itfelf  would  not. 
Men  may  indulge  a  ludicrous  turn  fo  far  as  to  lofe  all 
fenfe  of  condud  and  prudence  in  worldly  affairs,  and 
even  as  it  feems  to  impair  their  faculty  of  reafon. 
And  in  general,  levity,  careleffnefs,  paflion  and  preju^ 
dice  do  hinder  us  from  being  rightly  informed  with 
refpe.£l  to  common  things  j  and  they  may  in  like  man- 
ner, and  perhaps  in  fome  farther  providential  manner, 
with  refpefl  to  moral  and  religious  fubjeds ;  may  hin- 
der evidence  from  being  laid  before  us,  and  from  be- 
ing feen  when  it  is.  The  Scripture*  does  declare  that 
every  ontJJiall  not  underjiand.  And  it  makes  no  dif- 
ference by  what  providential  condud  this  comes  to 
pafs  i  whether  the  evidence  of  Chriftianity  was,  orig- 
inally and  with  defign,  put  and  left  fo  as  that  thole 
who  are  defirous  of  evading  moral  obligations  fliould 
not  fee  it,  and  that  honefl  minded  perfons  lliould  ;  or 
whether  it  comes  to  pafs  by  any  other  means. 

Farther,  The  general  proof  of  natural  religion  and 
of  Chriftianity,  does,  I  think,  lie  level  to  common 
men ;  even  thofe,  the  greateft  part  of  whofe  time, 
from  childhood  to  old  age,  is  taken  up  with  providing 
for  themfelves  and  their  families  the  com^mon  conve- 
niences, 

*  Dan.  xii.  lo.  See  alfo  Ifai.  xxix.  13,  14.  Matth.  vi.  23.  and  xi.  25. 
and  xiii.  11,  12.  Joh.  iii.  19.  joh.  v.  44.  i  Cor.  ii.  14.  and  2  Cor.  iv.  4. 
2  Tim.  iii.  13.  and  that  affeftionate,  as  well  as  authoritative  admonition,  fo 
Veiy  many  times  inculcated,  He  that  katk  can  to  hear,  let  him  hear,  Grotius 
faw  fo  flrongly  the  thing  intended  in  thefe  and  other  paffages  of  Scripture 
ef  the  like  fenfe,  as  to  fay  that  the  proof  given  us  of  Chriftianity  was  lefs  than 
it  might  have  been,  for  this  very  purpofe  ;  Ut  ita  Jemio  E'vangelii  tanquum 
lapis  ejjct  Lydius  ad  (juem  ingtrtia  Janubilia  tx^lorartntur,     De  Ver,  R,  C,  h.  Z, 

towards  :he  snd. 


Z']S  Revelation  not  univerfal :  P a r t  II. 

niences,  perhaps  neceffaries  of  life  ;  thofe  I  mean  of 
this  rank,  who  ever  think  at  all  of  afking  after  proof  or 
attending  to  it.  Common  men,  were  they  as  much 
in  earneft  about  religion  as  about  their  temporal  af» 
fairs,  are  capable  of  being  convinced  upon  real  evi^ 
dence,  that  there  is  a  God  who  governs  the  world  ; 
and  they  feel  themfelves  to  be  of  a  moral  nature,  and 
accountable  creatures.  And  as  Chriftianity  entirely 
falls  in  with  this  their  natural  fenfe  of  things,  fo  they 
are  capable,  not  only  of  being  perfuaded,  but  of  being 
made  to  fee,  that  there  is  evidence  of  miracles  wrought 
in  atteftation  of  it,  and  many  appearing  completions 
of  prophecy.  But  though  this  proof  is  real  and  con* 
clufive,  yet  it  is  liable  to  objections,  and  may  be  run 
up  into  difficulties  ;  which,  however,  perfons  who  are 
capable  not  only  of  talking  of,  but  of  really  feeing,  are 
capable  alfo  of  feeing  through  ;  i,  e.  not  of  clearing  up 
and  anfwering  them  fo  as  to  fatisfy  their  curiofity,  for 
of  fuch  knowledge  we  are  not  capable  v/ith  refpeft  to 
any  one  thing  in  nature,  but  capable  of  feeing  that  the 
proof  is  not  loft  in  thefe  difficulties,  or  deftroyed  by 
thefe  objeftions.  But  then  a  thorough  examination 
into  religion  with  regard  to  thefe  objections,  which 
cannot  be  the  bufinefs  of  every  man,  is  a  matter  of 
pretty  large  compafs,  and  from  the  nature  of  it  requires 
lomxe  knowledge,  as  well  as  time  and  attention,  to  fee 
how  the  evidence  comes  out  upon  balancing  one  thing 
with  another,  and  what  upon  the  whole  is  the  amount 
of  it.  Now  if  perfons  who  have  picked  up  thefe  ob- 
jections .from  others,  and  take  for  granted  they  are 
of  weight,  upon  the  Vv'ord  of  thofe  from  whom  they 
received  them,  or  by  often  retailing  of  them  come  to 
fee  or  fancy  they  fee  them  to  be  of  weight,  will  not 
prepare  themfelves  for  fuch  an  examination  with  a 
competent  degree  of  knowledge,  or  will  not  give  that 
time  and  attention  to  the  fubject,  which  from  the  na- 
ture of  it  is  neceflary  for  attaining  fuch  information, — 

ia 


Chap.  VI.      Suppofed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.         I'jj 

in  this  cafe  they  muft  remain  in  doubtfulnefs,  igno- 
rance or  error,  in  the  fame  way  as  they  muft  with  re- 
gard to  common  fciences,  and  matters  of  common  Hfe, 
if  they  negledt  the  neceffary  means  of  being  informed 
in  them. 

But  ftill  perhaps  it  will  be  obje£led,  that  if  a  prince 
or  common  mafter  were  to  fend  directions  to  a  fer- 
vant,  he  would  take  care  that  they  fliould  always  bear 
the  certain  marks  who  they  came  from,  and  that  their 
fenfe  (hould  be  always  plain,  fo  as  that  there  fliould  be 
no  poffible  doubt,  if  he  could  help  it,  concerning  the 
authority  or  meaning  of  them.  Now  the  proper  an- 
fwer  to  all  this  kind  of  objeftions  is,  that,  wher  ever 
the  fallacy  lies,  it  is  even  certain  we  cannot  argue  thus 
with  refpeft  to  Him  who  is  the  governor  of  the  world  ; 
and  particularly  that  he  does  not  afford  us  fuch  in- 
formation with  refpe6t  to  our  temporal  affairs  and  in- 
terefts,  as  experience  abundantly  fhews.  However, 
there  is  a  full  anfwer  to  this  objedion  from  the  very 
pature  of  religion.  For,  the  reafon  why  a  prince 
would  give  his  direftions  in  this  plain  manner,  is, 
that  he  abfolutely  defires  fuch  an  external  aftioii 
fliould  be  done,  without  concerning  himfelf  with  the 
tnotive  or  principle  upon  which  it  is  done  ;  i.  e.  he 
regards  only  the  external  event,  or  the  thing's  being 
done,  and  not  at  all,  properly  fpeaking,  the  doing  of 
it,  or  the  a6lion.  Whereas  the  whole  of  morality  and 
religion  confifting  merely  in  action  itfelf,  there  is  no 
fort  of  parallel  between  the  cafes.  But  if  the  prince 
be  fuppofed  to  regard  only  the  aftion,  i.  e.  only  to  de- 
fire  to  exercife  or  in  any  fenfe  prove  the  underftanding 
or  loyalty  of  a  fervant,  he  would  not  always  give  his 
orders  in  fuch  a  plain  manner.  It  may  be  proper  to 
add,  that  the  will  of  God  refpecling  morality  and  re- 
ligion may  be  confidered  either  as  abfolute  or  as  only 
conditional.  If  it  be  abfolute,  it  can  only  be  thus, 
that  we  fliould  a6t  virtuouily  in  fuch  given  circum- 

ftances ; 


27S  Rev  elation  mot  tmiv  erf  a!  i         Part  IL 

ftances ;  not  tliat  we  fliould  be  brought  to  ad  fo  by 
his  changing  of  cur  circumflances.  And  if  God's 
will  be  thus  abfolute,  then  it  is  in  our  power,  in  the 
highefl  and  flrifteft  fenfe,  to  do  or  to  contradid  his 
will,  which  is  a  moft  weighty  confideration.  Or  his 
will  may  be  confidered  only  as  conditional,  that  if  we 
adl  fo  and  fo  we  fhall  be  rewarded  ;  if  otherwife,  pun- 
idled  ;  of  which  conditional  will  of  the  Author  of  na- 
ture the  whole  conftitution  of  it  affords  moft  certain 
inftances. 

Upon  the  whole — that  we  are  in  a  ftate  of  religion 
neceflarily  implies  that  we  are  in  a  ftate  of  probation  ; 
and  the  credibiHty  of  our  being  at  all  in  fuch  a  ftate 
being  admitted,  there  feems  no  peculiar  difficulty  in 
kippofing  our  probation  to  be  juft  as  it  is  in'thofe  re- 
fpefts  which  are  above  objefted  againft.  There  feems 
no  pretence,  from  the  reafan  of  the  thing,  to  fay,  that  the 
trial  cannot  equitably  be  any  thing,  but  whether  per- 
fons  will  ad:  fuitably  to  certain  information,  or  fuch  as 
admits  no  room  for  doubt ;  fo  as  that  there  can  be  no 
danger  of  mifcarriage,  but  either  from  their  not  at- 
tending to  what  they  certainly  know,  or  from  over- 
bearing paffion  hurrying  them  on  to  a6t  contrary  to 
it.  For,  fince  ignorance  and  doubt  aiford  fcope  for 
probation  in  all  fenfes,  as  really  as  intuitive  conviftion 
or  certainty,  and  fince  the  two  former  are  to  be  put 
to  the  fame  account  as  difficulties  in  praftice, — men's 
moral  probation  may  alfo  be,  whether  they  will  take 
due  care  to  inform  themfelves  by  impartial  confidera- 
tion, and  afterwards  whether  they  will  a6t  as  the  cafe 
requires,  upon  the  evidence  which  they  have,  however 
doubtful.  And  this,  we  find  by  experience,  is  fre- 
quently our  probation,*  in  our  temporal  capacity. 
For,  the  information  which  we  want  with  regard  to 
our  worldly  interefts  is  by  no  means  always  given  us 
of  courfe,  without  any  care  of  our  own.     And  we  are 

greatly 

*  p.  93:.  271*  273>  274^. 


Chap.  VI.      Suppofed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.         279 

greatly  liable  to  felf  deceit  from  Inward  fecret  preju- 
dices, and  alio  to  the  deceits  of  others.  So  that  to  be 
able  to  judge  what  is  the  prudent  part,  often  requires 
much  and  difficult  confideration.  Then  after  we 
have  judged  the  very  beft  we  can,  the  evidence  upon 
which  we  muft  ad,  if  we  will  live  and  ad  at  all,  is  per- 
petually doubtful  to  a  very  high  degree.  And  the 
conftitution  and  courfe  of  the  world  in  fad  Is  fuch,  as 
that  want  of  impartial  confideration  what  we  have  to 
do,  and  venturing  upon  extravagant  courfes  becaufe 
it  is  doubtfal  what  will  be  the  confequence,  are  often 
naturally,  i.  e.  providentially,  altogether  as  fatal  as 
mifcondud  occafioned  by  heedlefs  inattention  to 
what  w^e  certainly  know,  or  difregarding  it  from  over- 
bearing paffion. 

Several  of  the  obfervations  here  made  may  well 
feem  ftrange,  perhaps  unintelligible,  to  many  good 
men.  But  if  the  perfons  for  whofe  fake  they  are  made 
think  fo — perfons  who  objed  as  above,  and  throw  off 
all  regard  to  religion  under  pretence  of  want  of  evi- 
dence,— I  defire  them  to  confider  again  whether  their 
thinking  fo  be  owing  to  any  thing  unintelligible  in 
thefc  obfervations,  or  to  their  own  not  having  fuch  a 
(enfe  of  religion  and  ferious  folicitude  about  it  as  even 
their  ftate  of  fcepticifm  does  in  all  reafon  require.  It 
ought  to  be  forced  upon  the  refledion  of  thefe  per- 
fons, that  our  nature  and  condition  necelfarily  require 
us,  in  the  daily  courfe  of  life,  to  ad  upon  evidence 
much  lower  than  what  is  commonly  called  probable  ; 
to  guard  not  only  againft  what  we  fully  believe  will, 
but  alfo  againft  what  we  think  it  fuppofable  may, 
happen  ;  and  to  engage  in  purfuits  when  the  proba- 
bility is  greatly  againft  fuccefs,  if  it  be  credible  that 
pofiibly  we  may  lucceed  in  them. 


CHAP. 


■^-Ji 

[    ^^o 

3 

CHAP. 

VII. 

Of  the  particular  Evidence  for  Ckrijlianity. 


JL  HE  prefumptlons  agalnft  revelation,  and 
objections  againfl  the  general  fcheme  of  Chriftianity 
and  particular  things  relating  to  it,  being  removed, 
there  remains  to  be  conlidered  what  pofitive  evidence 
we  have  for  the  truth  of  it,  chiefly  in  order  to  fee  what 
the  analogy  of  nature  fuggefts  with  regard  to  that  ev- 
idence and  the  objections  againfh  it,  or  to  fee  what  is, 
and  is  allowed  to  be,  the  plain  natural  rule  of  judg- 
ment and  of  ad.ion,  in  our  temporal  concerns,  in  cafes 
where  we  have  the  fame  kind  of  evidence  and  the 
fame  kind  of  objections  againft  it  that  we  have  in  the 
cafe  before  us. 

Now  in  the  evidence  of  Chriftianity  there  feem  to 
be  feveral  things  of  great  weight,  not  reducible  to  the 
head  either  of  miracles  or  the  completion  of  prophecy, 
in  the  common  acceptation  of  the  words.  But  thefe 
two  are  its  direft  and  fundamental  proofs,  and  thofe 
other  things,  however  confiderable  they  are,  yet  ought 
never  to  be  urged  apart  from  its  dired  proofs,  but  al- 
ways to  be  joined  with  them.  Thus  the  evidence  of 
Chriftianity  will  be  a  long  feries  of  things,  reaching, 
as  it  feems,  from  the  beginning  of  the  world  to  the 
prefent  time,  of  great  variety  and  compafs,  taking  in 
both  the  dired  and  alfo  the  collateral  proofs,  and 
making  up,  all  of  them  together,  one  argument ;  the 
convidtion  arifing  from  which  kind  of  proof  may  be 
compared  to  what  we  call  the  ejfe^  in  architecture  or 
other  works  of  art,  a  refult  from  a  great  number  of 
things  fo  and  fo  difpofed,  and  taken  into  one  view. 
I  fliall  therefore,  First,  make  fome  obfervations  re- 
lating to  miracles  and  the  appearing  completions  of 

prophecy. 


Gh  A  p .  VII.      Of  the  particular  Evidence^  ^c.         281 

prophecy,  and  confider  what  analogy  fuggefts  in  anfwer 
to  the  obje£tions  brought  againft  this  evidence.  And, 
Secondly,  I  fhall  endeavour  to  give  fome  account 
of  the  general  argument  now  mentioned,  confifting 
both  of  the  dired  and  collateral  evidence,  confidered 
as  making  up  one  argument ;  this  being  the  kind  of 
proof  upon  which  we  determine  moft  queftions  of  dif- 
ficulty, concerning  common  fads,  alleged  to  have  hap- 
pened or  feeming  likely  to  happen,  eipecially  queftions 
relating  to  condu6t: 

First,  I  fliall  make  fome  obfervations  upon  the 
direft  proof  of  Chriftianity  from  miracles  and  prophe- 
cy, and  upon  the  objections  alleged  againft  it. 

I.  Now  the  following  obfervations  relating  to  the 
hiftorical  evidence  of  riiiracles  wrought  in  atteftatioil 
of  Chriftianity  appear  to  be  of  great  weight. 

I .  The  Old  Teftament  affords  us  the  fame  hiftoric- 
al evidence  of  the  miracles  pf  Mofes  and  of  the  proph- 
ets, as  of  the  common  civil  hiftory  of  Mofes  and  the 
kings  of  Ifrael,  or  as  of  the  affairs  of  the  Jewiih  nation. 
And  the  Gofpels  and  the  Atls  afford  us  the  fame  hif- 
torical evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Chrift  and  the  apof- 
tles,  as  of  the  common  matters  related  in  them.  This 
indeed  could  not  have  been  affirmed  by  any  reafonable 
man,  if  the  authors  of  thefe  books,  like  many  other 
hiftorians,  had  appeared  to  make  an  entertaining  man- 
ner of  writing  their  aim,  though  they  had  interfperfed 
miracles  in  their  works,  at  proper  diftances  and  upon 
proper  occaiions.  Thefe  might  have  animated  a  dull 
relation,  amufed  the  reader,  and  engaged  his  atten- 
tion. And  the  fame  account  would  naturally  have 
been  given  of  them  as  of  the  ipeeches  and  defcriptions 
of  iuch  authors ;  the  fame  account,  in  a  manner,  as  is 
to  be  given  why  the  poef  s  make  ufe  of  wonders  and 
prodigies.  But  the  facts,  both  miraculous  and  natu-' 
ral,  in  Scripture,  are  related  in  plain  unadorned  narra- 
tives, and  both  of  them  appear,  in  all  refpeds,  to  ftand 
T  upon 


282  Of  the  particular  Evidence        P  a  R  t  II. 

upon  the  fame  foot  of  hifloricd  evidence.  Farther — 
fome  parts  of  Scripture,  containing  an  account  of  mir- 
acles fully  fufficient  to  prove  the  truth  of  Chriflianity, 
are  quoted  as  genuine,  from  the  age  in  which  they 
are  faid  to  be  written,  down  to  the  prefent  ;  and  no 
other  parts  of  them,  material  in  the  prefent  queftion, 
are  omitted  to  be  quoted  in  fuch  manner  as  to  afford 
any  fort  of  proof  of  their  not  being  genuine.  And  as 
common  hiftory,  when  called  in  queftion  in  any  in- 
ftance,  may  often  be  greatly  confirmed  by  cotempo- 
rary  or  fubfequent  events  more  known  and  acknowl- 
edged, and  as  the  common  fcripture  hiftory,  like  man)^ 
others,  is  thus  confirmed, — fo  likewife  is  the  miracu- 
lous hiftory  of  it,  not  only  in  particular  inftances,  but 
in  general.  For  the  eftablilhment  of  the  Jewifh  and 
Chriftian  religions,  which  were  events  cotemporary 
with  the  miracles  related  to  be  wrought  in  attefta- 
tion  of  both,  or  fubfequent  to  them,  thefe  events 
are  juft  what  we  fhould  have  expected,  upon  fuppofi- 
tion  fuch  miracles  were  really  wrought  to  atteft  the 
truth  of  thofe  religions.  Thefe  miracles  are  a  fatif- 
faclory  account  of  thofe  events  ;  of  which  no  other 
fatisfa6lory  account  can  be  given,  nor  any  account  at 
all  but  what  is  imaginary  merely  and  invented.  It 
is  to  be  added,  that  the  moft  obvious,  the  moft  eafy 
and  dire<fl  account  of  this  hiftory,  how  it  came  to  be 
written  and  to  be  received  in  the  world,  as  a  true  hif- 
tory, is,  that  it  really  is  fo  ;  nor  can  any  other  account 
of  it  be  eafy  and  direct.  Now,  though  an  account 
not  at  all  obvious,  but  very  far  fetched  and  indireft, 
may  indeed  be,  and  often  is,  the  true  account  of  a  mat- 
ter,— 3'et  it  cannot  be  admitted  on  the  authority  of  its 
being  afferted.  Mere  guefs,  fuppofition,  and  poffibil- 
ity,  when  op|)ofed  to  hiftorical  evidence,  prove  nothing 
but  that  hiftorical  evidence  is  not  demonftrative. 

Now  the  juft  confequence  from  all  this,  I  think,  is, 
that  the  fcripture  hiftory  in  general  is  to  be  admitted 

-  as 


Chap.  VII.  for  Chrijlianity.  283 

as  an  authentick  genuine  hiftory,  till  fomewhat  pofi- 
tive  be  alleged  fufficient  to  invalidate  it.  But  no 
man  will  deny  the  contequence  to  be,  that  it  cannot 
be  rejeded,  or  thrown  by  as  of  no  authority,  till  it  can 
be  proved  to  be  of  none  ;  even  though  the  evidence 
now  mentioned  for  its  authority  were  doubtful.  This 
evidence  may  be  confronted  by  hidorical  evidence  on 
the  other  fide,  if  there  be  any  ^  or  general  incredibility 
in  the  things  related,  or  inconfiftence  in  the  general 
t\irn  of  the  hiftory,  would  prove  it  to  be  of  no  author- 
ity. But  lince,  upon  the  face  of  the  matter,  upon  a 
firft  and  genei'al  vievvr,  the  appearance  is  that  it  is  an 
authentick  hiftory,  it  cannot  be  determined  to  be  fic- 
titious without  fome  proof  that  it  is  fo.  And  the  fol* 
lowing  obiervations,  in  fupport  of  thefe  and  coincident 
w^ith  them,  will  greatly  confirm  the  hiftorical  evidence 
for  the  truth  of  Chrifiianity. 

2.  .  The  epiftles  of  St.  Vatil^  from  the  nature  of. 
epiftolary  writing,  and  moreover  from  feveral  of  them 
being  written,  not  to  particular  perfons,  but  to  church- 
es, carry  in  them  evidences  of  their  being  genuine, 
beyond  what  can  be  in  a  mere  hiftorical  narrative,  left 
to  the  world  at  large.  This  evidence,  joined  v/ith  that 
which  they  have  in  common  with  the  reft  of  the  New 
Teftament,  feems  not  to  leave  fo  much  as  any  partic- 
ular pretence  for  denying  their  genuinenefs,  conlidered 
as  an  ordinary  matter  of  fact,  or  of  criticifm ;  I  fay 
■particular  pretence  for  denying  it,  becaufe  any  fmgle 
fad,  of  fuch  a  kind  andfuch  antiquity,  may  have^.?;/- 
eral  doubts  raifed  concerning  it,  from  the  very  nature- 
of  human  aflairs  and  human  teftimony.  There  is  alfo 
to  be  mentioned,  a  diftinct  and  particular  evidence  of 
the  genuinenefs  of  the  epiftle  chiefly  referred  to  here, 
the  firft  to  the  Corinthians,  from  the  manner  in  which 
it  is  quoted  by  Clemens  Komanv.s,  in  an  epiftle  of  his 
own  to  that  church.*     Now  thefe  epiftles  afford  a 

T  2  proof 

*  Clem.  Rom.  Ep.  I.  c.  a-. 


284  Of  the  partkular  Evidence        Part  II, 

proof  of  Chriftianity,  detached  from  all  others,  which 
is,  I  think,  a  thing  of  weight,  and  alfo  a  proof  of  a 
nature  and  kind  peculiar  to  itfelf.     For, 

In  them  the  author  declares,  that  he  received  the 
Gofpel  in  general,  and  the  inflitution  of  the  Commu- 
nion in  particular,  not  from  the  reft  of  the  apoftles,  or 
jointl)^  together  with  them,  but  alone,  from  Chrift 
himfelf,  whom  he  declares  likewife,  conformably  to 
the  hiftory  in  the  Atls^  that  he  faw  after  his  afcen- 
fion.*  So  that  the  teftimony  of  St.  Paul  is  to  be 
confidered  as  detached  from  that  of  the  reft  of  the 
apoftles. 

And  he  declares  farther,  that  he  was  endued  with  a 
power  of  working  miracles,  as  what  was  publickly 
known  to  thofe  very  people — fpeaks  of  frequent  and 
great  variety  of  miraculous  gifts,  as  then  fublifting  in 
thofe  very  churches  to  which  he  was  writing,  which  he 
was  reproving  for  feveral  irregularities,  and  where  he 
had  perfonal  oppofers ;  he  mentions  thefe  gifts  inci- 
dentally, in  the  moft  eafy  manner  and  without  effort, 
by  way  of  reproof  to  thofe  who  had  them,  for  their 
indecent  ufe  of  them,  and  by  way  of  depreciating 
Iherri,  in  comparifon  of  moral  virtues  ;  in  Ihort,  he 
fpeaks  to  thefe  churches,  of  thefe  miraculous  powers, 
in  the  manner  any  one  would  fpeak  to  another  of  a 
thing,  which  was  as  familiar  and  as  much  known  in 
common  to  tliem  both,  as  any  thing  in  the  world.-j* 
And  this,  as  hath  been  obferved  by  feveral  perfons,  is 
furely  a  very  confiderable  thing. 

3.  It  is  an  acknowledged  hiftorical  fad,  that 
Chriftianity  offered  itfelf  to  the  world,  and  demanded 
to  be  received,  upon  the  allegation,  i.  e.  as  unbeliev- 
ers would  fpeak,  upon  the  pretence  of  miracles,  pub- 
lickly wrought  to  atteft  the  truth  of  it  in  fuch  an  age, 
and  that  it  was  adually  received  by  great  numbers  in 

that 

*  Gal.  i.     I  Cor.  xi.  23,  &c.     i  Cor.  xv.  8. 

f  Rom.  XV.  19.     I  Cor.  xii.  8,  9,  lo — i8,  &c.  ami  ch.  xiii.  i,  z,  8,  and  the 
■whole  xivth  ch,      2  Cor.  xii.  is,  13.     Gal.  iii.  a,  5. 


Chap.  VII.  for  Chrijiianity.  285 

that  very  age,  and  upon  the  profelTed  belief  of  the  re- 
ahty  of  thefe  miracles.  And  Chrlftianity,  including 
the  difpenfation  of  the  Old  Teftament,  feems  difhin- 
guiflied  by  this  from  all  other  religions.  I  mean,  that 
this  does  not  appear  to  be  the  cafe  with  regard  to  any 
other ;  for  furely  it  will  not  be  fuppofed  to  lie  upon 
any  perfon,  to  prove  by  pofitive  hiftorical  evidence  that 
it  was  not.  It  does  in  no  fort  appear  that  Mahomet- 
anifm  was  firft  received  in  the  world  upon  the  foot  of 
fuppofed  miracles,*  i.  e.  publick  ones ;  for,  as  revela- 
tion is  itfelf  miraculous,  all  pretence  to  it  muft  necef- 
farily  imply  fome  pretence  of  miracles.  And  it  is  a 
known  fa6t  that  it  was  iramediatdly,  at  the  very  firft, 
propagated  by  other  means.  And  as  particular  infti- 
tutions,  whether  in  paganifm  or  popery,  faid  to  be 
confirmed  by  miracles  after  thofe  inftitutions  had  ob- 
tained, are  not  to  the  purpole, — fo  were  there  >\'hat 
might  be  called  hiftorical  proof,  that  any  of  them  were 
introduced  by  a  fuppofed  divine  command,  believed 
to  be  attefted  by  miracles, — thefe  would  not  be  in  any 
wife  parallel.  Foi'  fingle  things  of  this  fort  are  eafy  to 
be  accounted  for,  after  parties  are  formed  and  have 
power  in  their  hands,  and  the  leaders  of  them  are  in 
veneration  with  the  multitude,  and  political  interefts 
are  blended  with  reHgious  claims  and  religious  diftinc- 
tions.  But  before  any  thing  of  this  kind,  for  a  few 
perfons,  and  thofe  of  the  loweft  rank,  all  at  once  to 
bring  oyer  fuch  great  numbers  to  a  new  religion,  and 
get  it  to  be  received  upon  the  particular  evidence  of 
miracles, — this  is  quite  another  thing.  And  I  think 
it  will  be  allowed  by  anv  fair  adver/ary,  that  the  fa6t 
now  mentioned,  taking  in  all  the  circumftances  of  it, 
is  peculiar  to  the  Chriftian  religion.  However,  the 
fad  itfelf  is  allowed  that  Chriftianity  obtained,  i.  e. 
was  profefled  to  be  received  in  the  world,  upon  the  be- 
lief of  miracles,  immediately  in  the  age  in  which  it  is 

faid 

-*  See  the  Koran,  c.  xiii,  and  c.  xvii. 


286  Of  the  particular  Eiiidence        Part  II. 

faid  thofe  miracles  were  wrought ;  or  that  this  is  what 
its  firft  converts  would  have  alleged,  as  the  reafon  for 
their  embracing  it.  Now  certainly  it  is  not  to  be  fup- 
pofed,  that  fuch  numbers  of  men,  in  the  moft  diftant 
parts  of  the  world,  Ihould  forfake  the  religion  of  their 
country  in  which  they  had  been  educated,  feparate 
themfelves  from  their  friends,  particularly  in  their  fef- 
tival  fhows  and  folemni.ties,  to  which  the  common 
people  are  fo  greatly  addidled,  and  which  were  of  a  na- 
ture to  engage  them  much  move  than  any  thing  of 
that  fort  amongft  us,  and  embrace  a  religion  which 
could  not  but  expofe  them  to  many  inconveniences, 
and  indeed  muft  have  been  a  giving  up  the  world  in  a 
great  degree,  even  from  the  very  firft,  and  before  the 
empire  engaged  in  form  againft  them, — it  cannot  be 
fuppofed  that  fuch  numbers  fhould  make  fo  great, 
and,  to  fay  the  leaft,  fo  inconvenient  a  change  in  their 
•whole  inftitution  of  life,  unlefs  they  were  really  con- 
vinced of  the  truth  of  thofe  miracles,  upon  the  knowlr 
edge  or  belief  of  which  they  profefTed  to  make  jt. 
And  it  will,  I  fuppofe,  readily  be  acknowledged,  that 
the  generality  of  the  firfl  converts  to  Chriftianity  muft 
have  believed  them  ;  that  as  by  becoming  Chriftians 
they  declared  to  the  world  they  were  fatisf^ed  of  the 
truth  of  thofe  miracles, — fo  this  declaration  was  to  be 
credited.  And  this  their  teftimony  is  the  fame  kind 
of  evidence  for  thofe  miracles  as  if  they  had  put  it  in 
writing,  and  thefe  writings  had  com.e  down  to  us. 
And  it  is  real  evidence,  bccaufe  it  is  of  fa£ts  which 
they  had  capacity  and  full  opportunity  to  inforrn 
themfelves  of.  It  is  alfo  diftinft  from  the  dire<it  or 
exprefs  hiftorical  evidence,  though  it  is  of  the  fame 
kind  i  and  it  would  be  allowed  to  be  diftincl  in  all 
cafes.  For  were  a  fad  cxprefsly  related  by  one  or 
more  ancient  hiftorians,  and  difputed  in  after  ages ; 
that  this  faft  is  acknowledged  to  have  been  believed 
by  great  numbers  of  the  age  in  which  the  hiftorian 

fays 


Ghap.  VII.  for  Chrijlianliy.  287 

fays  it  was  done,  would  be  allowed  an  additional  proof 
of  fuch  fa6t,  quite  diftindl  from  the  exprefs  teflimony 
of  the  hiftorian.  The  credulity  of  mankind  is  ac- 
knowledged, and  the  fiifpicions  of  mankind  ought  to 
be  acknowledged  ioo^  and  their  backwardnefs  even  to 
believe,  and  greater  iiili  to  pradiife,  what  makes  againll 
their  intereft.  And  it  muft  particularly  be  remember- 
ed, that  education,  and  prejudice,  and  authority,  were 
againfb  Chriftianity,  in  the  age  I  am  fpeaking  of.  So 
that  the  immediate  converfion  of  fuch  numbers,  is  a 
real  prefumption  of  fomewhat  more  than  human  in 
this  matter  ;  I  fay  prefumption,  for  it  is  not  alleged  as 
a  proof  alone  and  by  itfelf.  Nor  need  any  one  of  the 
things  mentioned  in  this  chapter  be  confidered  as  a 
proof  by  itfelf;  and  yet  all  of  them  together  may  be 
one  of  the  ftrongeft. 

Upon  the  whole — as  there  is  large  hiftorical  evi- 
dence, both  direft  and  circumftantial,  of  miracles 
wrought  in  atteflation  of  Chridianity,  collefted  by 
thofe  who  have  writ  upon  the  fubjeft, — it  lies  upon 
unbelievers  to  fliew,  why  this  evidence  is  not  to  be 
credited.  This  way  of  fpeaking  is,  I  think,  juft,  and 
what  perfons  who  write  in  defence  of  religion  naturally 
fall  into.  Yet,  in  a  matter  of  fuch  unfpeakable  im- 
portance, the  proper  queftion  is,  not  whom  it  lies  up- 
on, according  to  the  rules  of  argument,  to  maintain 
or  confute  objedions,  but  whether  there  really  are  anv 
againft  this  evidence,  fufficient  in  reafon  to  deftroy  thq 
credit  of  it.  However,  unbelievers  fcem  to  take  upon 
them  the  part  of  fliewing  that  there  arc. 

They  allege,  that  numberiefs  enthufiaftick  people, 
in  different  ages  and  countries,  expofe  themlelvcs  to 
the  fame  difficulties  wiiich  the  primitive  Chriftians 
did,  and  are  ready  to  give  up  their  lives  for  the  moft 
idle  follies  imaginable.  But  it  is  not  very  clear  to  what 
purpofe  this  objection  is  brought.  For  every  one 
iurely,  in  every  cale,  mufl  difLinguifn  between  opinions 

and 


288  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  II. 

and  fads.  And  though  teftin^ony  is  no  proof  of  en- 
thufiaftick  opinions,  or  of  any  opinions  at  all,  yet  it  is 
allowed  in  all  other  cafes  to  be  a  proof  of  fafts.  And 
a  perfon's  laying  down  his  life  in  atteflation  of  fads  or 
of  opinions,  is  the  ftrongeft  proof  of  his  believing  them. 
And  if  the  apoflles  and  their  cotemporaries  did  believe 
the  fads,  in  atteftation  of  wiiich  they  expofed  them- 
felves  to  fufferings  and  death,  this  their  belief,  or  rather 
knowledge,  muil  be  a  proof  of  thofe  fads  ;  for  they 
were  fuch  as  came  under  the  obfervation  of  their  fenfes. 
And  though  it  is  not  of  equal  weight,  yet  it  is  of  weight 
that  the  martyrs  of  the  next  age,  notwithftanding  they 
Were  not  eye  witnefles  of  thofe  fads,  as  were  the  apoi- 
tles  and  their  cotemporaries,  had,  however,  full  op- 
portunity to  inform  themfelves  whether  they  were  true 
or  not,  and  gave  equal  proof  of  their  believing  them 
to  be  true. 

But  enthuiiafm,  it  is  faid,  greatly  weakens  the  evi- 
dence of  teftimony  eyen  for  fads,  in  matters  relating 
to  religion  ;  fome  feem  to  think  it  totally  and  abfo- 
lutely  deftroys  the  evidence  of  teftimony  upon  this 
fubjed.  And  indeed  the  powers  of  enthuiiafm,  and 
of  difeafes  too  which  operate  in  a  like  manner,  are  very 
wonderful  in  particular  inftances.  But  if  great  num- 
bers of  men,  not  appearing  in  any  peculiar  degree  weak, 
nor  under  any  peculiar  fufpicion  of  negligence,  affirm 
that  they  faw  and  heard  fuch  things  plainly  with  their 
eyes  and  their  ears,  and  are  admitted  to  be  in  earnefl, — 
fuch  teftimony  is  evidence  of  the  ftrongeft  kind  we  can 
have  for  any  matter  of  fad^  Yet  poffibly  it  may  be 
overcome,  ftrong  as  it  is,  by  incredibility  in  the  things 
thus  attefted,  or  by  contrary  teftimony.  And  in  an 
inftance  where  one  thought  it  was  (o  overcome,  it 
might  be  juft  to  confider,  how  far  fuch  evidence  could 
be  accounted  for  by  enthuiiafm  ;  for  it  feems  as  if 
no  other  imaginable  account  Vv-ere  to  be  given  of  it. 
But  until  fuch  incredibility  be  fhewn,  Or  contrary  tefti- 
mony 


Ghap.VII.  for  Chrijiianity.  289 

mony  produced,  it  cannot  furely  be  expected,  that  To 
far  fetched,  fo  indireft  and  wonderful  an  account  of 
fuch  teftimony  as  that  of  enthufiafm  muft  be  ;  an  ac- 
count fo  flrange,  that  the  generality  of  mankind  can 
fcarce  be  made  to  underftand  what  is  meant  by  it  j  it 
cannot,  I  fay,  be  expected  that  fuch  account  will  be 
adrnitted  of  fuch  evidence,  when  there  is  this  diredt, 
eafy  and  obvious  account  of  i-t,  that  people  really  faw 
and  heard  a  thing  not  incredible,  which  they  affirm 
lincerely  and  with  full  affurance  they  did  fee  and  hear. 
Granting  then  that  enthufiafm  is  not  (ftriftly  fpeak- 
ing)  an  abfurd  but  a  polii-ble  account  of  fuch  tefti- 
mony, it  is  manifeft  that  the  very  mention  of  it  goes 
upon  the  previous  fuppofition  that  the  things  fo  at- 
tefted  are  incredible,  and  therefore  need  cot  be  confid- 
ered  until  they  are  fhewn  to  be  fo.  Much  let's  ^need  it 
be  confidered  after  the  contrary  has  been  proved. 
And  I  think  it  has  been  proved  to  full  fatisfadlion, 
that  there  is  no  incredibility  in  a. revelation  in  general, 
or  in  fuch  an  one  as  the  Chriftian  in  particular. 
However,  as  religion  is  fuppofed  peculiarly  liable  to 
enthufiafm,  it  may  juft  be  obferved,  that  prejudices 
almoft  without  number  and  without  name,  romance, 
affeftation,  humour,  a  defire  to  engage  attention  or 
to  furprize,  the  party  fpirit,  cuftom,  Httle  competi- 
tions, unaccountable  likings  and  dillikings, — thefe  in- 
fluence men  ftrongly  in  common  matters.  And  as 
thefe  prejudices  are  often  (carce  known  or  reflefted 
upon  by  the  perfons  themfelves  who  are  influenced  by 
them,  they  are  to  be  confidered  as  influences  of  a  like 
kind  to  enthuliatrn.  Yet  human  teftimony  in  com- 
mon matters  is  naturally  and  jufcly  believed  notwith- 
itanding. 

It  is  intimated  farther,  in  a  more  refined  way  of  ob- 
fervation,  that  though  it  fliould  be  proved  that  the 
apoftles  and  firft  Chriftian.s  could  not,  in  fomc  re- 
ipedts,  be  deceived  themfelves,  and  in  other  refpefts 

cannot 


Z()o  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  II, 

cannot  be  thought  to  liave  intended  to  Impofe  upon 
the  world, — j^et  it  will  not  follow  that  their  general 
teftimony  is  to  be  believed,  though  truly  handed  down 
to  us  ;  becaufe  they  might  ftill  in  part,  i.  e.  in  other  re- 
fpefts,  be  deceived  themfelves,  and  in  part  alio  defign- 
edly  impoie  upon  others  ;  which,  it  is  added,  is  a  thing 
yery  credible,  from  that  mixture  of  real  enthufiafm 
and  real  knavery  to  be  met  with  in  the  fame  charaders. 
And  I  muft  confefs  I  think  the  matter  of  faft,  con- 
tained in  this  obfervation  upon  m»ankind,  is  not  to  be 
denied  ;  and  that  fom.ewhat  very  much  a-kin  to  it,  is 
often  fuppofed  in  Scripture  as  a  very  common  cafe, 
and  moft  feverely  reproved.  But  it  \vere  to  have  been 
expeded,  that  perfons  capable  of  applying  this  obfer^ 
vation  as  applied  in  the  objeclion,  might  alfo  fre- 
quently have  met  with  the  hke  mixed  charafter,  in  in- 
ftances  where  reHgion  was  quite  out  of  the  cafe.  The 
thing  plainly  is,  that  mankind  are  naturally  endued 
with  reafon,  or  a  capacity  of  diftinguiihing  between 
truth  and  falfehood  >  and  as  naturally  they  are  endued 
with  veracity,  or  a  regard  to  truth  in  what  they  fay ; 
but  from  many  occafions,  they  are  liable  to  be  preju- 
diced and  biaffed  and  deceived  themfelves,  and  capa- 
ble of  intending  to  deceive  others,  in  every  different 
degree — infomuch  that  as  we  are  all  liable  to  be  de- 
ceived by  prejudice,  fo  likewife  it  feems  to  be  not  an 
uncommon  thing  for  perfons,  who  from  their  regard 
to  truth  would  not  invent  a  lie  entirely  without  any 
foundation  at  all,  to  propagate  it  with  heightening 
circumftances,  after  it  is  once  invented  and  fet  agoing. 
And  others,  though  they  would  not  propagate  a  lie, 
yet,  which  is  a  lower  degree  of  falfehood,  will  let  it  pafs 
without  contradiftion.  But  notwithftanding  all  this, 
human  teftimony  remains  fiill  a  natural  ground  of  af- 
fent,  and  this  aflent  a  natural  principle  of  adion. 

It  is  objeded  farther,  that  however  it  has  happened, 
the/tf^  is,  that  mankind  have,  in  different  ages,  been 

ilrangely 


Cii^P.  VII.     .        for  ChriJlianUy,  291 

ftrangely  deluded  .with  pretences  to  miracles  and  woa- 
ders.  But  it  is  by  no  means  to  be  admitted  that  they 
have  beejLi  oftener,  or  4re  at  all  more  liable  to  be  de- 
ceived by  thefe  pretences  than  by  otl^ers.. 

It  is  added,  that  t]iene  is  a  very  confiderabje  degree 
of  hiftorical  evidence  for  miracles,  which  are  on  all 
hands  acknowledged  to  be  fabulous.  But  fupppie 
there  were  even  the  like  hiftoricai  evidpjnce  for  thele, 
to  what  there,  is  for  thofe  alleged  in  proof  of  ChriiU- 
a,nity,  whicli  yet  is  in  no  wife  allowed,  but  fuppofe 
this,— the  confequence  would  not  be,  that  the  evi- 
dence of  the  latter  is  not  ,to  be  admitted.  Nor  is 
there  a  m.an  in  the  world  who,  in  common  cafes,  would 
conclude  thus.  For  what  vvould  fuch  a  conclufion 
really  amount  to  but  this,  that  evidence  confuted  by 
contrary  evidence,  or  any  way  overbalanced,  deftroys 
the  credibihty  of  other  evidence,  neither  cqnfuted  nor 
overbalanced  ?  To  argue  that  becaufe  there  isj  if  there 
were,  like  evidence  frorn  teftimony  for  miracles  ac- 
knowledged falfe,  iis  for  thofe  in  atteftation  of  Chrift- 
ianity,  therefore  the  evidence  in  the  latter  cafe  is  not 
to  be  credited, — ^this  is  the  fame  as  to  argue,  that  if 
two  mqn  of  equally  good  reputation  had  given  evi-^ 
dence  in  different  cafes  no  way  connected,  and  one  of 
them  had  been  convided  of  perjury,  this  confuted  the 
teilimony  of  the  ether. 

Upon  the  whole  then,  the  general  obfervation  that 
hum.an  creatvires  are  fo  liable  to  be  dcjceived,  from  ea- 
thufiafm  in  religion,  and  principles  equivalent  to  en- 
thufia&i  in  common  matters,  and  in  both  from  neg- 
ligence ;  and  that  they  are  fo  capable  of  diihoneflly 
endeavouring  to  dect?ive  others,— r-this  does  indeed 
weaken  the  evidence  of  teflimony  in  aU  cafes,  but  does 
not  deftroy  it  in  any.  And  thcie  things  will  appear, 
to  different  men,  to  weaken  the  evidence  of  tefliraony 
in  different  degrees  ;  in  degrees  proportionable  to  the 
obfervations  they  have  made,  or  the  notions  they  have 

any 


igz  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  IT. 

any  way  taken  up,  concerning  the  weaknefs  and  neg^ 
ligence  and  difhonefty  of  mankind,  or  concerning  th^ 
powers  of  enthufiafm,  and  prejudices  equivalent  to  it. 
But  it  feems  to  me  that  people  do  not  know  what  they 
fay,  who  afErm  thefe  things  to  deflroy  the  evidence 
from  teftimony,  which  we  have  of  the  truth  of  Chrift- 
ianity.  Nothing  can  deftroy  the  evidence  of  teftimony 
in  any  cafe,  but  a  proof  or  probabiHty  that  perfons 
are  not  competent  judges  of  the  fafts  to  which  they 
give  teftimony,  or  that  they  are  actually  under  fome 
indire«Sl  influence  in  giving  it  in  fuch  particular  cafe. 
Until  this  be  made  out,  the  natural  laws  of  human 
actions  require  that  teftimony  be  admitted.  It  can 
never  be  fufficient  to  overthrow  direct  hiftorical  evi- 
dence, indolently  to  fay,  that  there  are  fo  many  princi- 
ples from  v«^hence  men  are  liable  to  be  deceived  them- 
felves,  and  difpofed  to  deceive  others,  efpecially  in 
matters  of  religion,  that  one  knows  not  what  to  believe. 
And  it  is  furprizing  perfons  can  help  reflefting,  that 
this  very  manner  of  fpeaking  fuppofes  they  are  not 
fatisfied  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  evidence  of  which 
they  fpeak  thus  ;  or  that  they  can  avoid  obferving,  if 
they  do  m.ake  this  refledion,  that  it  is  on  fuch  a  fub- 
je6t  a  very  material  one.* 

And  over  againft  all  thefe  objections  is  to  be  fet  the 
importance  of  Chriftianity,  as  what  muft  have  engaged 
the  attention  of  its  firft  converts,  fo  as  to  have  render- 
ed them  lefs  liable  to  be  deceived  from  careleifnefs  than 
they  would  in  common  matters ;  and  likewife  the 
ftrong  obligations  to  veracity  which  their  religion  laid 
them  under  ;  fo  that  the  firft  and  mod  obvious  pre- 
fumption  is,  that  they  could  not  be  deceived  them- 
felves,  nor  would  deceive  others.  And  this  prefump- 
tion  in  this  degree  is  peculiar  to  the  teftimony  we  have 
been  confidering. 

In 

*  See  the  foregoing  chapter. 


Ghap.  VII.  for  Chrijlianhy.  293 

In  argument,  aflertions  are  nothing  in  themfelves, 
and  have  an  air  of  pofitivenefs  which  fometimes  is 
not  very  eafy ;  yet  they  are  neceffary,  and  neceffary 
to  be  repeated,  in  order  to  conned  a  difcourfe,  and 
diftinftly  to  lay  before  the  view  of  the  reader  what  is 
propofed  to  be  proved,  and  what  is  left  as  proved. 
Now  the  conclufion  from  the  foregoing  obfervations 
is,  I  think,  beyond  all  doubt,  this — that  unbelievers 
mull  be  forced  to  admit  the  external  evidence  for 
Chriftianity,  i.  e.  the  proof  of  miracles  wrought  to  at- 
tefb  it,  to  be-  of  real  weight  and  very  confiderable, 
though  they  cannot  allow  it  to  be  fufficient  to  con- 
vince them  of  the  reality  of  thofe  miracles.  And  as 
they  muft  in  all  reaibn  admit  this,  fo  it  feems  to  me, 
that  upon  confideration  they  would  in  fa£t;  admit  it  y 
thofe  of  them,  1  mean,  who  know  any  thing  at  all  of 
the  matter  ;  in  like  manner  as  perfons,  in  many  cafes, 
own  they  fee  ftrong  evidence  from  teftimony  for  the 
truth  of  things,  which  yet  they  cannot  be  convinced 
are  true — cafes,  fuppofe,  where  there  is  contrary  tefti- 
mony, or  things  which  they  think,  whether  with  or 
without  reafon,  to  be  incredible.  But  there  is  no  tef- 
timony contrary  to  that  which  we  have  been  confider- 
ing  ;  and  it  has  been  fully  proved  that  there  is  no  in- 
credibility in  Chri/tianity  in  general,  or  in  any  part 
of  it. 

II.  As  to  the  evidence  for  Chriftianity  from  proph- 
ecy, I  (hall  only  make  fome  few  general  obfervations 
which  are  fuggefted  by  the  analogy  of  nature,  i.  e.  by 
the  acknowledged  natural  rules  of  judging  in  com- 
mon matters,  concerning:  evidence  of  a  hke  kind  to 
this  from  prophecy. 

I.  The  obfcurity  or  unintelllgiblenefs  of  one  part 
of  a  prophecy  docs  not,  in  any  degree,  invalidate  the 
proof  of  forefight,  arifmg  from  the  appearing  comple- 
tion of  thofe  other  parts  which  are  underftood.  For 
£he  cafe  is  evidently  the  fame  as  if  thofe  parts,  which 

arc 


294  Of  the  farttctifdir  Evidence        PAH't  IL 

are  not  underftood,  were  loft  or  not  written  at  all,  or 
written  in  an  unknown  tongue.  Whether  this  obferva- 
tion  be  commonly  attended  to  or  not,  it  is  fo  evident, 
that  one  can  Icarce  bring  one's  lelf  to  fet  down  an  in- 
ftancc  in  common  matters  to  exemplify  it.  How- 
ever, fuppofe  a  writing,  partly  in  cypher,  and  partly  in- 
plain  words  at  length,  and  that  in  the  part  one  un- 
derftood  there  appeared  mention  of  feveral  known" 
fa<fl5,  it  would  never  come  into  any  man's  thoughts  to 
imagine,  that  if  he  underftood  the  whole,  perhaps  he 
might  find  that  thole  fafts  w^tVQ  not  in  reality  known 
by  the  writer.  Indeed,  both  in  this  example  andf 
the  thing  intended  to  be  exemplified  by  it,  our  not 
nnderflanding  the  whole  (the  whole  fuppofe  of  a 
fentence  or  a  paragraph)  might  fometimes  occafion 
a  doubt,  whether  one  underilood  the  literal  meaning 
of  fuch  a  part  j  but  this  comes  under  another  con- 
lideration. 

For  the  fame  reafon,  though  a  man  fhould  be  in- 
capable, for  want  of  learning  or  opportunities  of  in- 
quiry, or  from  not  having  turned  his  ftudies  this  way, 
even  fo  much  as  to  judge,  whether  particular  prophe- 
cies have  been  throughout  completely  fulfilled, — yet 
he  may  fee  in  general,  that  they  have  been  fulfilled  to 
fuch  a  degree  as,  upon  very  good  ground,  to  be  con- 
vinced of  forefight  more  than  human  in  fuch  prophe- 
cies, and  of  fach  events  being  intended  by  them.  For 
the  fame  reafon  alfo,  though  by  means  of  the  deficien- 
cies in  civil  hifiiory,  and  the  different  accounts  of  hif- 
torians,  the  moll  learned  Ihould  not  be  able  to  make 
out  to  fatisfaction,  that  fuch  parts  of  the  prophetick 
hifl-ory  have  been  minutely  and  throughout  fulfilled, — 
yet  a  very  ftrong  proof  of  forefight  may  arife  from  that 
general  completion  of  them  which  is  made  out  j  as 
much  proof  of  forefight,  perhaps,  as  the  Giver  of 
propliecy  intended  fhould  ever  be  afforded  by  fuch 
parts  of  prophecv. 

2.    A 


Chap.  VII.  for  Chrijlianity.  29^ 

2.  A  long  ferles  of  prophecy  being  applicable  to 
fuch  and  fuch  events,  is  itielf  a  proof  that  it  was  in- 
tended of  them  ;  as  the  rules  by  which  we  naturally 
judge  and  determine  in  common  cafes  parallel  to  this 
will  fhew.  This  obfervation  I  make  in  anfwer  to  the 
common  objection  againft  the  application  of  the 
prophecies,  that  confidering  each  of  them  diftindly  by 
itfelf,  it  does  not  at  all  appear,  that  they  were  intend- 
ed of  thofe  particular  events  to  which  they  are  appli- 
ed by  Chrillians ;  and  therefore  it  is  to  be  fuppofed 
that,  if  they  meant  any  thing,  they  were  intended  of 
other  events  unknown  to  us,  and  not  of  thefe  at  all. 

Now  there  are  two  kinds  of  writing  which  bear  a 
great  refemblance  to  prophecy,  with  refpe£t  to  the 
matter  before  us  ;  the  mythological,  and  the  fatirical, 
where  the  fatire  is  to  a  certain  degree  concealed.  And 
a  man  might  be  aflured,  that  he  underflood  what  an 
author  intended  by  a  fable  or  parable,  related  without 
any  application  or  moral,  merely  from  feeing  it  to  be 
eafily  capable  of  fuch  application,  and  that  fuch  a 
moral  might  naturally  be  deduced  from  it.  And  he 
might  be  fully  aflured,  that  fuch  perfons  and  events 
were  intended  in  a  fatirical  writing,  merely  from  its  be- 
ing applicable  to  them.  And,  agreeably  to  the  lall 
obfervation,  he  might  be  in  a  good  meafure  fatisfied 
of  it,  though  he  were  not  enough  informed  in  affairs, 
or  in  the  ftory  of  fuch  perfons,  to  underfland  half  the 
fatire.  For,  his  fatisfliclion  that  he  underftood  the 
meaning,  the  intended  meaning  of  thefe .  writings, 
would  be  greater  or  lefs,  in  proportion  as  he  faw  the 
general  turn  of  them  to  be  capable  of  fuch  application, 
and  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  particular  things 
capable  of  it.  And  thus,  if  a  long  feries  of  prophecy 
is  applicable  to  the  prefent  ftate  of  the  church,  and  to 
the  political  fituations  of  the  kingdoms  of  the  world, 
lome  thoufand  years  after  thefe  prophecies  were  deliv- 
ered, and  a  long  feries  of  prophecy  delivered  before 

the 


29^  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  If.- 

the  coming  of  Chrift  is  applicable  to  him, — thefe 
things  are  in  themfelves  a  proof,  that  the' prophetick 
hiftory  was  intended  of  him,  and  of  thofe  events ;  in 
proportion  as  the  general  turn  of  it  is  capable  of  fucli 
application,  and  to  the  number  and  variety  of  partic- 
ular prophecies  capable  of  it.  And,  though  in  all  juffc 
way  of  eonfideration,  the  appearing  completion  of 
prophecies  is  to  be  allowed  to  be  thus  explanatory  of, 
and  to  determine  their  meaning, — yet  it  is  to  be  re- 
membered farther,  that  the  ancient  Jews  applied  the 
prophecies  to  a  Meffiah  before  his  coming,  in  much 
the  fame  manner  as  Chriftians  do  now  ;  and  that  the 
primitive  Chriftians  interpreted  the  prophecies  refpedt- 
ing  the  ftate  of  the  church  and  of  the  world  in  the  laffc 
ages,  in  the  fenfe  which  the  event  feems  to  confirm 
and  verify.  And  from  thefe  things  it  may  be  made 
appear, 

3.  That  the  (hewing  even  to  a  high  probability,  if 
that  could  be,  that  the  prophets  thought  of  fome 
other  events  in  fuch  and  fuch  predictions,  and  not 
thofe  at  all  which  Chriftians  allege  to  be  completions 
of  thofe  predications  j  or  that  fuch  and  fuch  prophecies 
are  capable  of  being  applied  to  other  events,  than  thofe 
to  which  Chriftians  apply  them, — that  this  would  not 
confute  or  deftroy  the  force  of  the  argument  from 
prophecy,  even  with  regard  to  thofe  very  inftances. 
For,  obferve  how  this  matter  really  is.  If  one  knew 
fuch  a  perfon  to  be  the  fole  author  of  fuch  a  book,, 
and  was  certainly  aftured,  or  fatisfied  to  any  degree, 
that  one  knew  the  whole  of  what  he  intended  in  it, — ■ 
one  fliould  be  aftured  or  fatisfied  to  fuch  degree,  that 
one  knew  the  whole  meaning  of  that  book  ;  for  the 
meaning  of  a  book  is  nothing  but  the  meaning  of  the 
author.  But  if  one  knew  a  perfon  to  have  compiled 
a  book  out  of  memoirs,  which  he  received  from  anoth- 
er of  vaftly  fuperior  knowledge  in  the  fubject  of  it, 
efpecially  if  it  were  a  book  full  of  great  intricacies  and 

difficulties,—" 


Cii  A p .  V II .  for  ChriJIianky.  Q.gy 

difficulties, — It  would  in  no  wife  follow  that  one  knew 
the  whole  meaning  of  the  book,  from  knowing  the 
whole  meaning  of  the  compiler ;  for  the  original  mem- 
oirs, i.  e.  the  author  ot  them,  might  have,  and  there 
would  be  no  degree  of  prefumpticn  in  many  cafes 
againft  fuppofing  him  to  have,  fome  farther  meaning 
than  the  compiler  law.  To  fay  then  that  the  Scrip- 
tures, and  the  things  contained  in  them,  can  have  no 
other  or  farther  meaning  than  thofe  perfons  thought 
or  had,  who  firft  recited  or  wrote  them,  is  evidently 
faying  that  thofe  perfons  were  the  original,  proper,  and 
fole  authors  of  thofe  books,  i.  e.  that  they  are  not  in- 
fpired  ;  which  is  abfurd,  whilft  the  authority  of  thefe 
books  is  under  examination,  i.  e.  until  you  have  de- 
termined they  are  of  no  divine  authority  at  all.  Un- 
til this  be  determined,  it  m.uft  in  all  reafon  be  fuppof- 
ed,  not  indeed  that  they  have,  for  this  is  taking  for 
granted  that  they  are  infpired,  but  that  they  may 
have  fome  farther  meaning  than  what  the  compilers 
faw  or  undcrftood.  And  upon  this  fuppoiition  it  is 
fuppofable  alfo,  that  this  farther  meaning  may  be  ful- 
filled. Now  events  correfponding  to  prophecies,  in-^ 
ternreted  in  a  different  mAcaniny;  from  that  in  which 
the  prophets  are  iuppofed  to  have  underftood  them, 
-^s- affords  in  a  manner  the  fame  proof,  that  this  dif- 
ferent fenfe  was  originally  intended,  as  it  would  have 
afforded  if  the  prophets  had  not  underilood  their  pre- 
diftions  in  the  fenfe  it  is  fuppofed  they  did  ;  becaufe 
there  is  no  prefumption  of  their  fenfe  of  them  being 
the  whole  fenfe  of  them.  And  it  has  been  already 
fhewn,  that  the  apparent  completions  of  prophecy 
muft  be  allowed  to  be  explanatory  of  its  meaning. 
So  that  the  queftion  is,  whether  a  feries  of  prophecy 
has  been  fuinlled,  in  a  natural  or  proper,  i.  e.  in  any 
real  fenfe  of  the  words  of  it.  For  fuch  completion  is 
equally  a  proof  of  forefight  more  than  human,  wheth- 
er the  prophets  are  or  are  not  fuppofed  to  have  under- 

U  flood 


2,93  Of  the  particular  EvidencS        Part  1  J, 

ftood  it  in  a  different  fenfe.  I  fay,  fuppofed  ;  for,' 
though  I  think  it  clear  that  the  prophets  did  not  un- 
derftand  the  full  meaning  of  their  predi6dons,  it  is 
another  queftion  how  far  they  thought  they  did,  and 
in  what  fenfe  they  underftood  them. 

Hence  may  be  feen  to  how  little  purpofe  thofe  per- 
fons  bufy  themfelves,  who"  endeavour  to  prove  that  the 
prophetick  hiflory  is  applicable  to  events  of  the  age 
in  which  it  was  written,  or  of  ages  before  it.  Indeed 
to  have  proved  this  before  there  was  any  appearance 
of  a  farther  completion  of  it,  might  have  anfwered 
fome  purpofe  ;  for  it  might  have  prevented  the  ex- 
pectation of  any  fuch  farther  completion .  Thus,  could 
Porphyry  have  (hewn  that  fome  principal ^parts  of  the 
book  of  Daniel^  for  inftance,  the  feventh  verfe  of  the 
feventh  chapter,  which  the  Chriftians  interpreted  of 
the  latter  ages,  was  applicable  to  events  which  hap- 
pened before  or  about  the  age  oi  Antiochus  Epiphanes, — > 
this  might  have  prevented  them  from  expeding  any 
farther  completion  of  it.  And,  unlefs  there  was  then^ 
as  I  think  there  muft  have  been,  external  evidence  con- 
cerning that  book  more  than  is  come  down  to  us, 
fuch  a  difcovery  might  have  been  a  ftumbling  block 
in  the  way  of  Chriftianity  itfelf ;  confidering  the  au- 
thority which  our  Saviour  has  given  to  the  book  of 
Daniel,  and  how  much  the  general  fcheme  of  Chrift- 
ianity prefuppofes  the  truth  of  it.  But  even  this 
difcovery,  had  there  been  any  fuch,*  would  be  of  ve- 
ry little  weight  v*'ith  reafonable  men.  Now,  this  paf- 
fage,  thus  applicable  to  events  before  the  age  of  Por- 
phyry, appears  to  be  applicable  alfo  to  events  which 
fucceeded  the  diffolution  of  the  Roman  empire.  I 
mention  this,  not  at  all  as  intending  to  infmuate,  that 

the 

*  It  appears  that  Pcr-phvry  did  nothing  worth  mentioning  in  this  v/ay. 
For  Jerom  on  the  place  fays,  Di4as  pojleriora  lefiiai — in  um  ISlacedonum  regn9 
fonit.  And  as  to  the  ten  kings,  Decent  regcs  cnumerat,  qui  fuerunt  faviffimi  i 
ipfofnue  reges  non  unius  fonit  regni,  ■verbi  gratia,  Macedonia:.,  Syriie,  Afia  et 
jEzvptia  ;  fed  dc  di-verfu  regnis  imum  cfficit  rcgnunt  orditum.  And  in  this  Way  of 
interpretation  any  thing  may  be  made  of  any  thing. 


G!  HA  p. -VII.  for  Clmjlianity.  299 

the  divifion  of  this  empire  into  ten  parts,  for  it  plainly 
was  divided  into  about  that  number,  were,  alone  and 
by  itfelf,  of  any  moment  in  verifying  the  prophetick 
hiftory  ;  but  only  as  an  example  of  the  thing  I  am. 
fpeaking  of.  And  thus  upon  the  whole,  the  matter 
of  inquiry  evidently  mud  be,  as  above  put.  Whether 
the  prophecies .  are  applicable  to  Chrift,  and  to  the 
prefent  ftate  of  the  world  and  of  the  church,  appli- 
cable in  fuch  a  degree  as  to  imply  forefight  ;  not 
whether  they  are  capable  of  any  other  application, 
though  I  know  no  pretence  for  faying  the  general  turn 
of  them  is  capable  of  any  other. 
•.  Thefe  obfervations  are,  I  think,  juft,  and  the  evi- 
dence referred  to  in  them  real,  though  there  may  be 
people  who  will  not  accept  of  fuch  imperfeft  informa- 
tion from  Scripture.  Soiije  too  have  not  integrity  and 
regard  enough  to  truth,  to  attend  to  evidence  which 
keeps  the  mind  in  doubt,  perhaps  perplexity,  and 
which  is  much  of  a  different  fort  from  what  they  ex- 
pefted.  And  it  plainly  requires  a  degree  of  modefty 
and  fairnels,  beyond  what  every  one  has,  for  a  man  to 
lay,  not  to  the  world,  but  to  himfeif,  that  there  is  a 
real  appearance  of  fomewhat  of  great  weight  in  this 
matter,  though  he  is  not  able  thoroughly  to  fatisfy 
himfeif  about  it ;  but  it  (hall  have  its  influence  upon 
him,  in  proportion  to  its  appearing  reality  and  weight. 
It  is  much  more  eafy,  and  more  falls  in  with  the  neg- 
ligence, prefumption  and  wjlfulnefs  of  the  generality^ 
to  determine  at  once,  with  a  decifive  air.  There  is 
nothing  in  it.  The  prejudices  arifmg  from  that  abfo- 
lute  contempt  and  fcorn  with  which  this  evidence  is 
treated  in  the  world,  I  do  not  mention.  For  what 
indeed  can  be  faid  to  perfons,  Vv^ho  are  weak  enough 
in  their  underftanding  to  think  this  any  prefumption 
againft  it,  or  if  they  do  not,  are  yet  weak  enough  in 
their  temper  to  be  influenced  by  fuch  prejudices,  up- 
on &ch  a  fubject  ? 

U  ?.  I  Hiall 


300  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Par  t  11. 

I  (hall  now,  Secondly,  endeavour  to  give  fome 
account  of  the  general  argument  for  the  truth  of 
Chriftianity,  confiding  both  of  the  direct  and  circum- 
ftantial  evidence,  confidered  as  making  up  one  argu- 
ment. Indeed  to  ftate  and  examine  this  argument 
fully,  would  be  a  work  much  beyond  the  compafs  of 
this  whole  treatife  ;  nor  is  fo  much  as  a  proper  abridg- 
ment of  it  to  be  expefted  here.  Yet  the  prefent  fub- 
jeft  requires  to  have  fome  brief  account  of  it  given. 
For  it  is  the  kind  of  evidence,  upon  which  moft  quef- 
tions  of  difficulty  in  common  practice  are  determined  ; 
evidence  arifing  from  various  coincidences  which  fup- 
port  and  confirm  each  other,  and  in  this  manner  prove, 
with  more  or  lefs  certainty,  the  point  under  confider- 
ation.-  And  I  choofe  to  do  it  alfo  :  Firft,  becaufe  it 
ieems  to  be  of  the  greatell  importance,  and  not  duly 
attended  to  by  every  one,  that  the  proof  of  revel9,tion 
is,  not  fome  dired  and  exprefs  things  only,  but  a  great 
vairiety  of  circumfhantial  things  alfo  ;  and  that  though 
each  of  thefe  direfl  and  circumftantial  things  is  in- 
deed to  be  confidered  feparately,  yet  they  are  after- 
wards to  be  joined  together  ;  for  that  the  proper  force 
of  the  evidence  confifts  in  the  refult  of  thofe  feveral 
things,  confidered  in  their  refpe6ls  to  each  other,  and 
united  into  one  view.  And  in  the  next  place,  becaufe 
it  feems  to  me,  that  the  matters  of  faft  here  fet  down, 
which  are  acknowledged  by  unbelievers,  muft  be  ac-- 
knowledged  by  them  alfo  to  contain  together  a  de- 
gree of  evidence  of  great  weight,  if  they  could  be 
brought  to  lay  thefe  feveral  things  before  themfelves 
difbindly,  and  then  with  attention  confider  them  to- 
gether, inftead  of  that  curfory  thought  of  them  to 
which  we  are  familiarized.  For  being  familiarized 
to  the  curfory  thought  of  things,  as  really  hinders 
the  weight  of  them  from  being  ieen,  as  from  having 
its  due  influence  upon  pradice. 

The 


Chap.VIL  for  Clirijlianity.  301 

The  thing  afTerted,  and  the  truth  of  which  is  to  be 
inquired  into,  is  this,  that  over  and  above  our  reafon 
and  affeftions,  which  God  has  given  us  for  the  infor- 
mation of  our  judgment  and  the  condud  of  our  Hves, 
he  has  alfo,  by  external  revelation,  given  us  an  ac- 
count of  himfelf  and  his  moral  government  over  the 
world,  implying  a  future  Hate  of  rewards  and  punifh- 
ments ;  i.  e.  hath  revealed  the  fyftem.  of  natural  relig- 
ion ;  for  natural  religion  may  be  externally*  revealed, 
by  God,  as  the  ignorant  may  be  taught  it  by  mankind, 
their  fellow  creatures — that  God,  I  fay,  has  given 
us  the  evidence  of  revelation,  as  well  as  the  evidence 
of  reafon,  to  afcertain  this  moral  fyftem  ,  together 
with  an  account  of  a  particular  difpenfation  of  Provi- 
dence, which  reafon  could  no  way  have  difcovercd,  and 
a  particular  inftitution  of  religion  founded  on  it,  for 
the  recovery  of  mankind  out  of  their  prefent  wretch- 
ed condition,  and  raifmg  them  to  the  perfedion  and 
iinal  happinefs  of  their  nature. 

This  revelation,  whether  real  or  fuppofed,  may  be 
confidered  as  wholly  hiftorical.  For  prophecy  is  noth- 
ing but  the  hiftory  of  events  before  they  come 'to  pafs  ; 
dodrines  alfo  are  matters  of  faSt ;  and  precepts  come 
under  the  fame  notion.  And  the  general  defign  of 
Scripture,  which  contains  in  it  this  revelation,  thus 
confidered  as  hiftorical,  may  be  faid  to  be  to  give  us 
an  account  of  the  world,  in  this  one  iingie  view,  as 
God's  world  ;  by  which  it  appears  eflentially  diftin- 
guilhed  from  all  other  books,  fo  far  as  I  have  found, 
except  fuch  as  are  copied  from  it.  It  begins  with  an 
account  of  God's  creation  of  the  world,  in  order  to  af- 
certain and  diftinguifh  from  all  others  who  is  the  ob- 
jeft  of  our  worfhip,  by  what  he  has  done  j  in  order  to 
afcertain  who  he  is,  concerning  whofe  providence, 
commands,  promifes  and  threatenings,  this  facred  book 
all  along  treats  j  the  Maker  and  Proprietor  of  the 

world, 

*  p.  193,  &c. 


302  Of  the  particular  Evidence     "    Part  IL 

world,  he  whofe  creatures  we  are,  the  God  of  nature ; 
in  order  Ukewife  to  diftinguifli  him  from  the  idols  of 
the  nations,  which  are  either  imaginary  beings,  i.  e.  no 
beings  at  all,  or  elfe  part  of  that  creation,  the  hiftor- 
ical  relation  of  which  is  here  given.  And  St.  Johuy 
not  improbably  with  an  eye  to  this  Mofaick  account 
of  the  creation,  begins  his  Gofpel  with  an  account  of 
our  Saviour's  preexiftence,  and  that  all  things  zverc 
made  by  him^  and  without  him  was  not  any  thing  made 
that  was  made  ;*  agreeably  to  the  doftrine  of  St.  Vaul^ 
that  God  created  all  things  bv  Jefus  Chrijl.^  This  be- 
ing premifed,  the  Scripture,  taken  together,  feems  to 
profefs  to  contain  a  kind  of  an  abridgment  of  the  hif- 
tory  of  the  v/orId,in  the  view  juft  now  mentioned;  that 
is,  a  general  account  of  the  condition  of  relig;ion  and 
its  profeflbrs,  during  the  continuance  of  that  apoftacy 
from  God,  and  ftate  of  wickednefs,  which  it  every 
where  fuppofes  the  world  to  lie  in.  And  this  account 
of  the  ftate  of  religion  carries  with  it  fome  brief  ac- 
count of  the  political  ftate  of  things,  as  religion  is  af- 
fected by  it.  Revelation  indeed  confiders  the  com- 
mon affairs  of  this  world,  and  what  is  going  on  in  it, 
as  a  mere  fcene  of  diftradtion,  and  cannot  be  fuppofed 
to  concern  itfelf  with  foretelling  at  what  time  Rome 
or  Babylon  or  Gre'ece,  or  any  particular  place,  ihould 
be  the  moft  confpicuous  feat  of  that  tyranny  and  dif- 
folutenefs,  which  all  places  equally  afpire  to  be  ;  can- 
not, I  fay,  be  fuppofed  to  give  any  account  of  this  wild 
fcene  for  its  own  fake.  But  it  feems  to  contain  fome 
very  general  account  of  the  chief  governments  of  the 
world,  as  the  general  ftate  of  religion  has  been,  is,  or 
fliall  be,  affected  by  them,  from  the  firft  tranfgrelTion, 
and  durino"  the  whole  interval  of  the  world's  continu-* 
ing  in  its  prefent  ftate,  to  a  certain  future  period,  fpok- 
en  of  both  in  the  Old  and  New  Teftament,  very  dif- 
tin(5tly  and  in  great  variety  of  expreflion  :   The  times  of 

ih^ 

*  Job.  i.  3.  -)•  Eph.  iii.  9. 


Chap.  VII.  for  ChriJIianity.  303 

the  reftitution  of  all  things  :  *  when  the  myjiery  of  God 
fliall  he  finijiiedy  as  he  hath  declared  to  his  fervants  the 
prophets  .--f-  when  the  God  of  heaven  JJiall  fet  up  a  king- 
dom^  which  JJiall  never  he  defrayed :  and  the  kingdom 
fliall  not  he  left  to  other  people,  %  as  it  is  reprefented  to  be 
during  this  apoftacy,  hut  judgment  fiall  he  given  to  the 
faint s^^  and  they  f mil  reign  :  \\  and  the  kingdom  and  do- 
minion, and  the  greatnejs  of  the  kingdom  under  the  zvhole 
heaven,  fiall  he  given  to  the  people  of  the  faints  of  the 
Moft  High.% 

Upon  this  general  view  of  the  Scripture,  I  would  re- 
mark how  great  a  length  of  time  the  whole  relation 
takes  up,  near  lix  thoufand  years  of  which  are  pafl  -, 
and  how  great  a  variety  of  things  it  treats  of;  the  nat- 
ural and  moral  fyflem  or  hiflory  of  the  world,  in- 
cluding the  time  when  it  was  formed,  all  contained 
in  the  very  firft  book,  and  evidently  written  in  a  rude 
and  unlearned  age  ;  and  in  fubfequent  books,  the  va- 
rious common  and  prophetick  hiflory,  and  the  partic- 
ular difpenfation  of  Chrillianity.  Now  all  this  tor 
gether  gives  the  largeft  fcope  for  criticilm ;  and  for 
confutation  of  what  is  capable  of  being  confuted,  ei- 
ther from  reafon,  or  from  common  hiftory,  or  from 
any  inconiiftence  in  its  feveral  parts.  And  it  is  a  thing 
which  deferves,  I  think,  to  be  mentioned,  that  where- 
as fome  imagine  the  fuppofed  doubtfuinefs  of  the  evi- 
dence for  revelation  implies  a  politive  argument  that 
it  is  not  true,  it  appears,  on  the  contrary,  to  imply  a 
politive  argument  that  it  is  true.  For,  could  any 
common  relation,  of  fuch  antiquity, extent  and  variety 
{for  in  thefe  things  the  ftrefs  of  what  I  am  now  obferv- 
ing  lies)  be  propofed  to  the  examination  of  the  world  ; 
that  it  could  not,  in  an  age  of  knowledge  and  liberty, 
be  confuted,  or  fhewn  to  have  nothing  in  it,  to  the  fat- 
isfadion  of  re^fonable  men,  this  would  be  thought  a 
fljong  preiumptive  proof  of  its  truth.     And  indeed  it 

mull 

*  A6ts  iii.  21.  \  Rev.  X.  7. 

+  Dan.  ii,  §  Dan.  vii.  22.  1|  Rev.  f[  Dan.  vii, 


304  Of  the  particular  Evidence         Part  ip 

muft  be  a  proof  of  it,  juft  in  proportion  to  the  proba- 
bility, that  if  it  were  falfe,  it  might  be  Ihewn  to  be  fo  ; 
and  this,  I  think,  is  fcarce  pretended  to  be  lliewn  but 
tipon  principles  and  in  ways  of  arguing,  w^hich  have 
been  clearly  obviated.*  Nor  does  it  at  all  appear, that 
any  fet  of  men  who  believe  natural  religion,  are  of  the 
opinion  that  Chriftia,nity  has  been  thus  confuted.  Byt 
to  proceed  : 

Together  with  the  moral  fyftem  of  the  world,  the 
Old  Tefhament  contains  a  chronolosical  account  of 
the  beginning  of  it,  and  from  thence  an  unbrokei-^ 
genealogy  of  mankind  for  many  ages  before  common 
hifhory  begins ;  and  carried  on  as  much  farther,  as  to. 
make  up  a  continued  thread  of  hiftory  of  the  length 
of  between  three  and  four  thoufand  j^ears.  It  cont- 
tains  an  account  of  God's  making  a  covenant  with  a 
particular  nation,  that  they  Ihould  be  his  people,  an4 
he  would  be  their  God,  in  a  peculiar  fenfe  ;  of  his  often 
interpofmg  miraculoufly  in  their  affairs  ;  giving  them 
the  promiie,  and  long  after  the  polTeilion,  of  a  partic- 
ular country  ;  alluring  them  of  the  greateft  national 
profperity  in  it,  if  they  would  worfliip  him,  in  oppo- 
lition  to  the  idols  which  the  reft  of  the  world  worlhip- 
ped,  and  obey  his  commands  ;  and  threatening  them 
with  unexampled  punifhments,  if  they  difobeyed  him, 
and  fell  into  the  general  idolatry  ;  inibmuch  that  this 
one  nation  Ihould  continue  to  be  the  obfervation  and 
the  wonder  of  all  the  world.  It  declares  particularly, 
that  God  would  fcatter  them  among  all  people,  from  one  end 
of  the  earth  unto,  the  other  ;  but  that  when  they  fliould 
return  unto  the  Lord  their  God,  he  would  have  compaf- 
Jion  upon  them,  and  gather  them  from  all  the  nations 
whither  he  had  fcatter ed  them  ;  that  Ifraeljhould  be  faved 
in  the  Lord  zvith  an  everlafiing  falvation,  and  not  be 
aftiamed  or  confounded  world  without  end.  And  as  fome 
of  thefe  promifes  are  conditional,  others  are  as  abfo- 

lute 

*  Ch.  ii,  iiij  &c. 


CtlAP.  VII.  fo^  Chrijiianity.  305 

lute  as  any  thing  can  be  exprefled  5  that  the  time 
Ihould  come,  when  the  people  JJmdd  be  all  righteous^ 
cud  inherit  the  lan-d  for  ever  ;  that  though  God  would 
make  a  full  end  of  all  nations  xvhither  he  had  fcattered 
them^  yet  would  he  not  make  a  full  end  of  them  ;  that  he 
would  bring  again  the  captivity  of  his  people  Ifrael,  and 
plant  them  upon  their  landy  and  they  fhould  be  no  more 
pidled  up  out  of  their  land  ;  that  the  feed  of  Ifrael  JJioidd 
not  ceafe  from  being  a  nation  for  ever.^  It  foretells, 
that  God  would  raife  them  up  a  particular  perfon,  in 
whom  ail  his  promifes  fhould  finally  be  fulfilled  ;  the 
Mefiiah,  who  fhould  be  in  an  high  and  eminent  {o.n'i^i:^ 
their  anointed  Prince  and  Saviour.  This  was  fore- 
told in  fuch  a  manner,  as  raifed  a  general  expecftation 
of  fuch  a  perion  in  the  nation,  as  appears  from  the 
New  Tcfiament,  and  is  an  acknowledged  fact ;  an  ex- 
pe6lation  of  his  coming  at  fuch  a  particular  time,  be- 
fore any  one  appeared  claiming  to  be  that  perfon,  and 
when  there  was  no  ground  for  fuch  an  expeftation, 
but  from  the  prophecies ;  which  expectation  therefore 
mud  in  all  reafbn  be  prefumed  to  be  explanatory  of 
thole  prophecies,  if  there  were  any  doubt  about  their 
meaning,  It  feems  moreover  to  foretell,  that  this 
perfon  fhould  be  rejected  by  that  nation,  to  whom 
he  had  been  fo  long  promifed,  and  though  he  was  fo 
much  defired  by  them.-j~  And  it  exprefsly  foretells* 
that  he  Ihould  be  the  Saviour  of  the  Gentiles  ;  and 
even  that  the  completion  of  the  fcheme,  contained 
in  this  book,  and  then  begun,  and  in  its  progrefs, 
fhould  be  ioniewhat  fo  great,  that,  in  comparifon 
with  it,  the  reftoration  of  the  Jews  alone  would  be  but 
of  fmall  account.  It  is  a  light  thing  that  thou  JJioul deft 
be  my  fervant  to  raife  up  the  tribes  of  Jacobs  and  to  re- 
Jiore  the  preferjed  of  Ifrael :  I  will  alfo  give  thee  for  a 
light  to  the  Gentiles,  that  thou  mayefi  be  for  falvaticn  unto 

"^        •         "  the 

*  Deut.  xxviii.  64.    Ch.  xxx.  2,  3.      Ifai.  xlv.  17.    Ch.  Ix.  21.      Jer.  xxx. 
II.     Ch,  xlvi.  28.     Amos  ix.  15.     Jer.  xxxi.  36. 

f  Ifai..viii.  14,  15.    Ch.  xlix.  5,    Ch.  liii.     Mai.  i.  10,  ji.  and  Ch.  iii. 


2,0 6  0/ tkd  particular  Evidence        Part  IT, 

t/ie  end  of  the  earth.  And,  /;/  the  I  aft  days,  the  moun^ 
tain  of  the  Lord's  houfe  Jhall  be  ejiablijiied  in  the  top  of 
the  mountains^  and  fJiall  be  exalted  above  the  hills  ;  and 

all  nations  fJiall  flow  into  it for  out  of  Zion  fliall  go 

forth  the  law,  and  the  word  of  the  Lord  from  Jerufalem. 

And  he  fJiall  judge  among  the  nations and  the  Lord 

alone  fliall  he  exalted  in  that  day,  and  the  idols  he  fftall  ut- 
terly abolifh.^  The  Scripture  farther  contains  an  ac- 
count, that  at  the  '  ^  time  the  Meffiah  was  expected, 
a  perfon  rofe  up,  in  this  nation,  claiming  to  be  that 
Meffiah,  to  be  the  perfon  whom  all  the  propktcies  re- 
ferred to,  and  in  whom  they  fhouia  center ;  that  he 
fpent  fome  years  in  a  continued  courfe  of  miraculous 
works,  and  endued  his  immediate  dilciples  and  follow- 
ers with  a  power  of  doing  the  fame,  as  a  proof  of  the 
truth  of  that  relisiion  whixrh  he  commiffioned  them  to 
publiili ;  that,  invefted  with  this  authority  and  power, 
thev  m.ade  numerous  converts  in  the  remoteft  coun- 
tries, and  fettled  and  eftablifhed  his  religion  in  the 
world,  to  the  end  of  which  the  Scripture  profeiles  to 
give  a  prophetiek  account  of  the  ftate  of  this  religion 
amongft  mankind. 

Let  us  now  fuppofe  a  perfon  utterly  ignorant  of  hif- 
tor}',  to  have  all  this  related  to  him  out  of  the  Scrip- 
ture. Or  fuppofe  fuch  an  one,  having  the  Scripture 
put  into  his  hands,  to  remark  thefe  things  in  it,  not 
knowing  but  that  the  whole,  even  its  civil  hiftory,  as 
well  as  the  other  parts  of  it,  might  be  from  beginning 
to  end  an  entire  invention,  and  to  aik.  What  truth 
was  in  it,  and  whether  the  revelation  here  related  was 
real  or  a  fiction  ?  And  inilead  of  a  dired  anfwer,  fup- 
pofe him,  all  at  once,  to  be  told  the  following  confeft 
fads,  and  then  to  unite  them  into  one  view. 

Let 

*  Ifai.xllx.  6.  Ch.  ii.  Ch.  xi.  Ch.  Ivi. -.  Mai.  in.  To  which  muft 
be  added  the  other  prophecies  of  the  like  kind,  feveral  in  the  New  Tefta- 
jnent,  and  very  roany  in  che  Old  ;  which  delcribe  what  Ihali  be  the  comple- 
tion of  the  revealed  plan  of  Providence. 


Ghap.  VII.  for  Chrijiianity .  507 

Let  him  firft  be  told  in  how  great  a  degree  the  pro- 
feffion  and  eftabuHiment  of  natural  religion,  the  be- 
lief that  there  is  one  God  to  be  worlhipped,  that  virtue 
is  his  law,  and  that  mankind  fliall  be  rewarded  and  punr 
ithed  hereafter,  as  they  obey  and  difobey  it  here  ;  in 
how  ver}'  great  a  degree,  I  fay,  the  profeffion  and  eftabr 
iilhment  of  this  moral  fyftem  in  the  world  is  owing  to 
the  revelation,  whether  real  or  fuppofed,  contained  in 
this  book  ;  the  ellablifhment  of  this  moral  fyftem,  even 
in  thofe  countries  which  do  not  acknowledge  the  prop- 
er authority  of  the  Scripture.*  Let  him  be  told  alfo 
what  number  of  nations  do  acknowledge  its  proper 
authority.  Let  him  then  take  in  the  confideration  of 
what  importance  religion  is  to  mankind.  And  upon 
thefe  things  he  might,  I  think,  truly  obferve,  that  this 
fuppofed  revelation's  obtaining  and  being  received  in 
the  world,  with  all  the  circumftances  and  effeds  of  it, 
conlidered  together  as  one  event,  is  the  moft  confpicu- 
ous  and  important  event  in  the  ftory  of  mankind  ; 
that  a  book  of  this  nature,  and  thus  promulged  and 
recommended  to  our  confideration,  demands, -as  if  by  a 
voice  from  heaven,  to  have  its  claims  moft;  ferioufly  ex- 
amined into ;  and  that,  before  fuch  examination,  to 
treat  it  with  any  kind  of  Icoffing  and  ridicule,  is  an  of- 
fence againft  natural  piety.  But  it  is  to  be  remember- 
ed, that  how  much  foever  the  eftabliftiment  of  natural 
religion  in  the  world  is  owing  to  the  fcripture  reveia- 
tion,  this  does  not  deftroy  the  proof  of  religion  from 
reafon,  any  more  than  the  proof  of  Euclid's  Elemeiiis 
is  deftroyed  by  a  man's  knowing  or  thinking  that  he 
ftiould  never  have  iesn  the  truth  of  the  feveral  propoli- 
tions  contained  in  it,  nor  had  thofe  propolitions  come 
into  his  thou2;hts,  but  for  that  mathematician. 

Let  fuch  a  perfon  as  we  are  fpeaking  of  be,  in  the 
next  place^  informed  of  the  acknowledged  antiquity 
of  the  firft  parts  cf  this  book,  and  that  its  chror:ology, 

Its 
*p.  263. 


3o8  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  IT, 

its  account  of  the  time  when  the  earth  and  the  feveral 
parts  of  it  were  firfl  peopled  with  human  creatures  is 
no  way  contradifted,  but  is  really  confirmed,  by  the 
natural  and  civil  hiftory  of  the  world,  colleded  from 
common  hiftorians,  from  the  ftate  of  the  earth,  and 
from  the  late  invention  of  arts  and  fciences.  And  as 
the  Scripture  contains  an  unbroken  thread  of  common 
and  civil  hiftory,  from  the  creation  to  the  captivity,  for 
between  three  and  four  thoufandyears,  let  the  perfonwe 
are  fpeaking  of  be  told  in  the  next  place  that  this  gen- 
eral hiftory,  as  it  is  not  contradicted  but  is  confirmed 
by  profane  hiftory  as  much  as  there  would  be  reafon  to 
expe6l,upon  fuppofition  of  its  truth, — fo  there  is  noth- 
ing in  the  whole  hiftory  itfelf  to  give  any  reafonable 
ground  of  fufpicion  of  its  not  being,  in  the  general,  a 
faithful  and  literally  true  genealogy  of  men,  and  fe- 
ries  of  things.  I  fpeak  here  only  of  the  common 
fcripture  hiftory,  or  of  the  courfe  of  ordinary  events 
related  in  it,  as  diftinguifhed  from  miracles  and  from 
the  prophetick  hiftory.  In  all  the  fcripture  narrations 
of  this  kind,  following  events  arife  out  of  foregoing 
ones,  as  in  all  other  hiftories.  There  appears  nothing 
related  as  done  in  any  age,  not  conformable  to  the 
manners  of  that  age  ;  nothing  in  the  account  of  a  fuc- 
ceeding  age  which,  one  would  fay,  could  not  be  true, 
or  was  improbable,  from  the  account  of  things  in  the 
preceding  one.  There  is  nothing  in  the  characters 
which  would  raife  a  thought  of  their  being  feigned  ; 
but  all  the  internal  marks  imaginable  of  their  being 
real.  It  is  to  be  added  alfo,  that  mere  genealogies, 
Ijare  narratives  of  the  number  of  years  which  perfons 
called  by  fuch  and  fuch  names  lived,  do  not  carry  the 
face  of  fiftion,  perhaps  do  carry  fome  prefumption  of 
veracity  ;  and  all  unadorned  narratives,  which  have 
nothing  to  furprize,  may  be  thought  to  carry  fome- 
what  of  the  like  prefumption  too.  And  the  domef- 
tick    and  the  poHtical   hiftory   is  plainly    credible. 

There 


Chap.  VIL  for  Chijlianhy.  3(59 

There  may  be  incidents  in  Scripture,  which,  taken 
alone  in  the  naked  way  they  are  told,  may  appear 
ftrange,  efpecially  to  perfons  of  other  manners,  tern- 
per,  education  ;  but  there  are  alfo  incidents  of  un- 
doubted truth,  in  many  or  mofl  perfons'  lives,  which, 
in  the  fame  circumftances,  would  appear  to  the  full 
as  ftrange.  There  may  be  miftakes  of  tranfcribers, 
there  may  be  other  real  or  feeming  miftakes  not  ealy 
to  be  particularly  accounted  for ;  but  there  are  cer- 
tainly no  more  things  of  this  kind  in  the  Scripture,  than 
what  were  to  have  been  expedted  in  books  of  fuch  an- 
tiquity, and  nothing  in  any  wife  fufficient  to  difcredit 
the  general  narrative.  Now,  that  a  hiftory  claiming 
to  commence  from  the  creation,  and  extending  in  one 
continued  feries  through  fo  great  a  length  of  time  and 
variety  of  events,  ftiould  have  fuch  appearances  of  re- 
ality and  truth  in  its  whole  contexture,  is  furely  a  ve- 
ry remarkable  circumftance  in  its  favour.  And  as  all 
this  is  apphcable  to  the  common  hiftory  of  the  New 
Teftament,  fo  there  is  a  farther  credibility,  and  a  very 
high  one,  given  to  it  by  profane  authors  ;  many  of 
thefe  waiting  of  the  fame  times,  and  confirming  the 
truth  of  cuftoms  and  events  which  are  incidentally  as 
well  as  more  purpofely  mentioned  in  it.  And  this 
credibility  of  the  common  fcripture  hiftory,  gives  fome 
credibility  to  its  miraculous  hiftory;  efpecially  as  this  is 
interwoven  with  the  common,  fo  as  that  they  imply 
each  other,  and  both  together  make  up  one  relation. 
Let  it  then  be  more  particularly  obferved  to  this 
perfon,  that  it  is  an  acknowledged  matter  of 'faft,  which 
is  indeed  implied  in  the  foregoing  obfervation,  that 
there  was  fuch  a  nation  as  the  Jews^  of  the  greateft 
antiquity,  whofe  government  and  general  polity  was 
founded  on  the  law  here  related  to  be  given  them  by 
Mofes  as  from  heaven  ;  that  natural  religion,  though 
with  rites  additional,  yet  no  w^ay  contrary  to  ic,  was 
their  eftabliihed  religion,  which  cannot  be  faid  of  the 

Gentile 


^lo  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  Ih 

Gentile  world  ;  and  that  their  very  being  as  a  nation 
depended  upon  their  acknowledgment  of  one  God, 
the  God  of  the.univerfe.  For,  fuppofe  In  their  cap- 
tivity in  Babylon^  they  had  gone  over  to  the  religion 
of  their  conquerors,  there  would  have  remained  no 
bond  of  union  to  keep  them  a  diftinft  people.  And 
whilft  thev  were  under  their  own  kin2;s,  in  their  own 
country,  a  total  apoftacy  from  God  would  have  been 
the  difiblution  of  their  whole  government.  They,  in 
fuch  a  fenfe,  nationally  acknowledged  and  worfhipped 
the  Maker  of  heaven  and  earth,  when  the  reft  of  the 
world  were  funk  in  idolatry,  as  rendered  them,  in  fa6l, 
the  peculiar  pec^:)le  of  God.  And  this  fo  remarkable 
an  eftablifhment  and  prefervation  of  natural  religion 
amongft  them,  feems  to  add  fome  peculiar  credibility 
to  the  hiftorical  evidence  for  the  miracles  of  Mofes  and 
the  prophets ;  becaufe  thefe  miracles  are  a  full  fatisfac- 
tory  account  of  this  event,  which  plainly  wants  to  be 
accounted  for,  and  cannot  otherwife. 

Let  this  perfan,  fuppofed  wholly  ignorant  of  hiftory,- 
be  acquainted  farther,  that  one  claiming  to  be  the 
Meffiah,  of  JewiOi  extradion,  rofe  up  at  the  time 
when  this  nation,  from  the  prophecies  above  mention- 
ed, expefted  the  Meffiah  ;  that  he  was  rejefted,  as  it 
feemed  to  have  been  foretold  he  fhould,  by  the  body 
of  the  people,  under  the  direction  of  their  rulers  ; 
that  in  the  courfe  of  a  very  few  years  he  was  believed 
on  and  acknowledged  as  the  promifed  Meffiah,  by 
great  numbers  among  the  Gentiles,  agreeably  to  the 
prophecies  of  Scripture,  yet  not  upon  the  evidence  of 
prophecy,  but  of  miracles,*  of  which  miracles  we  have 
alfo  ftrong  hiftorical  evidence  ;  (by  which  I  mean  here 
no  more  than  muft  be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers, 
for  let  pious  frauds  and  foUies  be  admitted  to  v»'eaken, 
it  is  abfurd  to  fay  they  deftroy,  our  evidence  of  mira- 
cles wrought  in  proof  of  Cbriftianity-j^)  that  tliis  relig- 
ion, 

*  p.  284,  &:c.  t  p.  291,  &c. 


Chap.  VIL  for  Chrijiianity:  311 

ion,  approving  itfelf  to  the  reafon  of  mankind,  and  car- 
rying its  own  evidence  with  it.  To  far  as  reafon  is  a 
judge  of  its  fyftem,  and  being  no  way  contrary  to  rea- 
fon in  thofe  parts  of  it  which  require  to  be  beHeved 
upon  the  mere  authority  of  its  Author, — that  this  re- 
ligion, I  fay,  gradually  fp^ad  and  fupported  itfelf,  for 
fome  hundred  years,  not  only  without  any  affiftance 
from  temporal  power,  but  under  conftant  difcourage- 
ments,  and  often  the  bittereft  perfecutions  from  it,  and 
then  became  the  religion  of  the  world  ;  that  in  the 
mean  time  the  Jewifh  nation  and  government  were 
deftroyed,  in  a  very  remarkable  manner,  and  the  peo- 
ple carried  away  captive  and  difperfed  through  the 
mofh  diflant  countries,  in  which  ftate  of  difperfion 
they  have  remained  fifteen  hundred  years ;  and  that 
they  remain  a  numerous  people,  united  amongft  them- 
felves,  and  diftinguifhed  from  the  reft  of  the  world,  as 
they  were  in  the  days  of  Mofes,  by  the  profeffion  of 
his  law,  and  every  where  looked  upon  in  a  manner 
which  one  fcarce  knows  how  diftin6lly  to  exprefs,  but 
in  the  words  of  the  prophetick  account  of  it,  given  fo 
many  ages  before  it  came  to  pafs — ThouJJialt  become  an 
tiftonifliment^  a  proverb^  and  a  byword,  among  all  nations 
'whither  the  Lord  Jliall  lead  thee* 

The  appearance  of  a  ftanding  miracle,  in  the  Jews 
remaining  a  diftin6l  people  in  their  difperfion,  and  the 
confirmation  which  this  event  appears  to  give  to  the 
truth  of  revelation,  may  be  thought  to  be  anfwered  by 
their  rehgion's  forbidding  them  intermarriages  with 
thofe  of  any  other,  and  prefcribing  them  a  great  many 
peculiarities  in  their  food,  by  which  they  are  debarred 
from  the  means  of  incorporating  with  the  people  in 
whofe  countries  they  live.  This  is  not,  I  think,  a  fat- 
isfadory  account  of  that  which  it  pretends  to  account 
for.  But  what  does  it  pretend  to  account  for  }  The 
correfpondence  between  this  event  and  the  prophecies  ; 

or 

*  Deut.  xxviii.  37. 


3 1 2  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  It^ 

or  the  coincidence  of  both,  with  a  long  difpenfation 
of  Providence  of  a  peculiar  nature,  towards  that  peo- 
ple formerly?  No.  It  is  only  the  event  itfelf  which  is 
offered  to  be  thus  accounted  for,  which  {ino;Ie  event 
taken  alone,  abftra£ted  from  all  fuch  correfpondence 
and  coincidence,  perhaps  would  not  have  appeared 
miraculous  ;  but  that  correfpondence  and  coincidence 
may  be  fo,  though  the  event  itfelf  be  fuppofed  not. 
Thus  the  concurrence  of  our  Saviour's  being  born  at 
Bethlehem^  with  a  long  foregoing  feries  of  prophecy 
and  other  coincidences,  is  doubtlefs  miraculous,  the; 
feries  of  prophecy,  and  other  coincidences,  and  the 
event,  being  admitted  ;  though  the  event  itfelf,  his 
birth  at  that  place,  appears  to  have  been  brought 
about  in  a  natural  way  ^  of  which,  however,  no  ons 
can  be  certain. 

And  as  feveral  of  thefe  events  feenl  in  fome  degree: 
exprefsly  to  have  verified  the  prophetick  hiftory  alrea- 
dy, fo  likewife  they  may  be  confidered  farther  as 
having  a  peculiar  afpe6l  towards  the  full  completion 
of  it,  as  affording  fome  prefumption  that  the  whole  of 
it  (hall,  one  time  or  other,  be  fulfilled.  Thus,  that 
the  Jevjs  have  been  fo  wonderfully  preferved  in  their 
long  and  wide  difperfion,  which  is  indeed  the  direft 
fulfilling  of  fome  prophecies,  but  is  now  mentioned 
only  as  looking  forward  to  ibmewhat  yet  to  come  ; 
that  natural  religion  came  forth  from  Judea,  and 
fpread  in  the  degree  it  has  done  over  the  world,  before 
loft  in  idolatry,  which  together  with  fome  other  things 
have  diftinguifhed  that  very  place,  in  like  manner  as 
the  people  of  it  are  diftinguifhed  ;  that  this  great 
change  of  religion  over  the  earth,  was  brought  about 
under  the  profeflion  and  acknowledgment  that  Jefus 
was  the  promifed  Mefliah  j  things  of  this  kind  natu- 
rally turn  the  thoughts  of  ferious  men  towards  the  full 
completion  of  the  prophetick  hiftory,  concerning  the 
final  reftoration  of  that  people,  concerning  the  eftab- 

lilhment 


for  Chrijlianity.  31^ 

llfhrnent  of  the  everlafling  kingdom  among  them,  the 
kingdom  of  the  Meffiah,  and  the  future  ftate  of  the 
world  under  this  facred  government.  Such  circum- 
ftances  and  events  compared  with  thefe  prophecies, 
though  no  completions  of  them, yet  would  not,  I  think, 
be  fpoken  of  as  nothing  in  the  argument,  by  a  perfon 
upon  his  firil  being  informed  of  them.  They  fall  in 
with  the  prophetick  hiftory  of  things  ftill  further,  give 
it  fome  additional  credibility,  have  the  appearance  of 
being  fomewhat  in  order  to  the  full  completion  of  it. 

Indeed  it  requires  a  good  degree  of  knowledge,  and 
great  calmnefs  and  conlideration,  to  be  able  to  judge 
thoroughly  of  the  evidence  for  the  truth  of  Chrift- 
ianity,  from  that  part  of  the  prophetick  hiftory  which 
relates  to  the  fituation  of  the  kingdoms  of  the  world, 
and  to  the  ftate  of  the  church,  from  the  eftablifli- 
ment  of  Ghriftianity  to  the  prefent  time.  But  it  ap- 
pears, from  a  general  view  of  it,  to  be  very  material. 
And  thofe  perions  who  have  thoroughly  exam.ined  it, 
and  fome  of  them  were  men  of  the  cooleft  tempers, 
greateft  capacities,  and  leaft  liable  to  imputations  of 
prejudice,  inlift  upon  it  as  determinately  conclulive. 

Suppofe  now  a  perfon  quite  ignorant  of  hift.ory,  firfi; 
to  recoUetSt  the  paiTages  abovementioned  out  of  Scrip- 
ture, without  knowing  but  that  the  whole  was  a  late 
fidtion,  then  to  be  informed  of  the  correfpondent  facts 
now  mentioned,  and  to  unite  them  all  into  one  view  ; 
that  the  profeffion  and  eftablifliment  of  natural  relig- 
ion in  the  world  is  greatly  owing,  in  different  ways,  to 
this  book,  and  the  fuppofed  revelation  which  it  con- 
tains i  that  it  is  acknowledged  to  be  of  the  earlieft  an- 
tiquity ;  that  its  chronology  and  common  hiliory  are 
entirely  credible  ;  that  this  ancient  nation,  the y^wj-,  of 
whom  it  chiefiy  treats,  appear  to  have  been  in  fact  the 
people  of  God  in  a  diftinguiihed  fenfe  j  that,  as  there 
was  a  national  expeftation  amongll  them,  raifed  from 
the  prophecies,  of  aMeffiah  to  appear  at  fuch  a  time,  fo 
W  one 


5 14  Of  the  particular  EiJidenci        Fart  iL 

one  at  this  time  appeared  claiming  to  be  that  Mefliah  j 
that  he  was  rejeded  by  this  nation,  but  received  by  the 
Gentiles,  not  upon  the  evidence  of  prophecy,  but  of 
miracles ;  that  the  religion  he  taught  fupported  itfelf 
under  the  greatefb  difficulties,  gained  ground,  and  at 
length  became  the  religion  of  the  world  ;  that  in  the 
mean  time  the  Jewiih  polity  was  utterly  deftroyed,  and 
the  nation  difperfed  over  the  face  of  the  earth  ;  that 
notwithftanding  this,  they  have  remained  a  diftind  nu- 
merous people  for  fo  many  centuries,  even  to  this  day^ 
which  not  only  appears  to  be  the  exprefs  completion  of 
leveral  prophecies  concerning  them,  but  alfo  renders 
it,  as  one  may  fpeak,  a  vifible  and  eafy  poffibility  that 
the  promifes  made  to  them  as  a  nation  may  yet  be  ful- 
filled ;  and  to  thefe  acknowledged  truths,  let  the  per- 
fon  we  have  been  fuppoiing  add,  as  I  think  he  ought, 
whether  every  one  will  allow  it  or  not,  the  obvious  ap- 
pearances which  there  are,  of  the  flate  of  the  world,  in 
other  refpeds  befides  what  relates  to  the  Jezvs^  and  of 
the  Chriftian  Church,  having  fo  long  anfwered  and 
ftill  anfwering  to  the  prophetick  hiftory  ; — fuppofe, 
I  fay,  thefe  fadts  fet  over  againft  the  things  before  men- 
tioned out  of  the  Scripture,  and  ferioufly  compared 
with  them, — the  joint  view  of  both  together  muft, 
I  think,  appear  of  very  great  weight  to  a  confiderate 
reafonable  perfon  ;  of  much  greater  indeed,  upon  hav- 
ing them  firfl  laid  before  him,  than  is  eafy  for  us  who 
are  fo  familiarized  to  them  to  conceive,  without  fome 
particular  attention  for  that  purpofe. 

All  thefe  things,  and  the  feveral  particulars  contain- 
ed under  them,  require  to  be  diftinftly  and  mofl  thor- 
oughly examined  into,  that  the  weight  of  each  may  be 
judged  of  upon  fuch  examination,  and  fuch  conclufion 
drawn  as  reiults  from  their  united  force.  But  this  has 
not  been  attempted  here.  I  have  gone  no  farther  than 
to  fliow,  that  the  general  imperfect  view  of  them  now 
given,  the  confeft  hiftorical  evidence  for  miracles,  and 

the 


Chap.  VII.  for  Chrijlianity.  3i_^ 

the  many  obvious  appearing  completions  of  propliecy, 
together  with  the  collateral  things*  here  mentioned, 
and  there  are  feveral  others  of  the  like  fort ;  that  all 
this  together,  which  being  facl  muft  be  acknowledged 
by  unbelievers,  amounts  to  real  evidence  of  fomewhat 
more  than  human  in  this  matter ;  evidence  much 
more  important  than  carelefs  men,  who  have  been  ac- 
cuftomed  only  to  tranfient  and  partial  views  of  it,  can 
imagine,  and  indeed  abundantly  fufficient  to  aft  upon. 
And  thefe  things,  I  apprehend,  nmft  be  acknowledged 
by  unbelievers.  For  though  they  may  fay,  that  the 
hiftorical  evidence  of  miracles,  wrought  in  atteftation 
of  Chriftianity,  is  not  fufficient  to  convince  them  that 
fuch  miracles  were  really  wrought,  they  cannot  deny 
that  there  is  fuch  hidorical  evidence,  it  being  a  known 
matter, of  fadt  that  there  is.  They  may  fay,  the  con- 
formity between  the  prophecies  and  events  is  by  acci- 
dent ;  but  there  are  many  inftances  in  which  fuch  con- 
formity itfelf  cannot  be  denied.  They  may  fay,  with 
Regard  to  fuch  kind  of  collateral  things  as  thofe  above- 
mentioned,  that  any  odd  accidental  events,  without 
meaningjwill  have  a  meaning  found  in  them  by  fanciful 
people ;  and  that  fuch  as  are  fanciful  in  any  one  cer- 
tain way,  will  make  out  a  thoiifand  coincidences  which 
feem  to  favour  their  peculiar  follies.  Men,  I  fay,  m.ay 
talk  thus ;  but  no  one  who  is  ferious  can  poffibly 
think  thefe  things  to  be  nothing,  if  he  confiders  the 
importance  of  Collateral  things,  and  even  of  lelTer  cir- 
cumftances,  in  the  evidence  of  probability,  as  diftin- 
guiflied  in  nature  from  the  evidence  of  demonftration. 
In  many  cafes  indeed  it  feems  to  require  the  truefl 
judgment,  to  determine  with  exaftnefs  the  weight  of 
circumftantial  evidence  ;  but  it  is  very  often  altogeth- 
er as  convincing,  as  that  which  is  the  moft  exprefs  and 

direft.  ,_,,  . 

ihis 

*  All  the  particular  things  mentioned  in  this  chapter,  not  reducible  t3 
the  head  of  certain  miracles,  or  determinate  completions  of  prophecy. 
Seep.  280,  281. 

Wz 


« 1 6  Of  the  particular  "Evidence        Part  It. 

This  general  view  of  the  evidence  for  Chriftianity, 
confidered  as  making  one  argument,  may  alfo  ferve  to 
recommend  to  ferious  perfons,  to  fet  down  every  thing, 
which  they  think  may  be  of  any  real  weight  at  all  in 
proof  of  it,  and  particularly  the  many  feeming  com- 
pletions of  prophecy  ;  and  they  will  find  that,  judging 
by  the  natural  rules  by  which  we  judge  of  probable 
evidence  in  common  matters,  they  amount  to  a  much 
higher  degree  of  proof,  upon  fuch  a  joint  review,  than 
could  be  fuppofed  upon  confidering  them  feparately 
at  different  times,  how  fb-ong  foever  the  proof  might 
before  appear  to  them  upon  fuch  feparate  views  of  it* 
For  probable  proofs,  by  being  added,  not  only  in- 
creafe  the  evidence,  but  multiply  it.  Nor  fhould  I 
diffuade  any  one  from  letting  down  what  he  thought 
made  for  the  contrary  fide.  But  then  it  is  to  be  re- 
membered, not  in  order  to  influence  his  judgment, 
but  his  praftice,  that  a  miftake  on  one  fide  may  be, 
in  its  confequences,  much  more  dangerous  than  a  miP 
take  on  the  other.  And  what  courfe  is  moll  fafe,  and 
what  moft  dangerous,  is  a  confideration  thought  very 
material,  when  we  deliberate,  not  concerning  events, 
but  concerning  condud  in  our  temporal  affairs.  To 
be  influenced  by  this  confideration  in  our  judgment, 
to  believe  or  difbelieve  upon  it,  is  indeed  as  much  prej- 
udice as  any  thing  whatever.  And,  like  other  prej- 
udices, it  operates  contrary  ways,  in  different  men. 
For  fome  are  inclined  to  believe  what  they  hope,  and 
others  what  they  fear.  And  it  is  manifeft  unreafona- 
blenefs,  to  apply  to  men's  paflions  in  order  to  gain 
their  aifent.  But  in  deliberations  concerning  conduft, 
there  is  nothing  which  reafon  more  requires  to  be  tak- 
en into  the  account,  than  the  importance  of  it.  For, 
fuppofe  it  doubtful  what  would  be  the  confequence  of 
afting  in  this,  or  in  a  contrary  manner,  ftill  that  tak- 
ing one  fide  could  be  attended  with  little  or  no  bad 
confequence,  and  taking  the  other  might  be  attended 

with 


C  H A  P .  VII.  for  Chrijlianity ,  3 1 7 

with  the  greatefl,  muft  appear  to  unprejudiced  reafon 
of  the  highell  moment  towards  determining  how  we 
are  to  a£l.  But  the  truth  of  our  rehgion,  hke  the 
truth  of  common  matters,  is  to  be  judged  of  by  all 
the  evidence  taken  together.  And  unlefs  the  whole 
feries  of  things  which  may  be  alleged  in  this  argu- 
ment, and  every  particular  thing  in  it,  can  reafonably 
be  fuppofed  to  have  been  by  accident,  (for  here  the 
fhrefs  of  the  argument  for  Chriftianity  lies)  then  is  the 
truth  of  it  proved  ;  in  like  manner  as  if  in  any  cc-nmon 
cafe,  numerous  events  acknowledged,  were  to  be  alleg- 
ed in  proof  of  any  other  event  difputed,  the  truth  of 
the  difputed  event  would  be  proved,  not  only  if  any 
one  of  the  acknowledged  ones  did  of  itfelf  clearly  im- 
ply it,  but,  though  no  one  of  them  fmgly  did  fo,  if  the 
whole  of  the  acknowledged  events,  taken  together, 
could  not  in  reafon  be  fuppofed  to  have  happened,  un- 
lefs the  difputed  one  were  true. 

It  is  obvious  how  much  advantage  the  nature  bf 
this  evidence  gives  to  thofe  perfons  who  attack  Chrifb- 
ianity,  efpecially  in  converfation.  For  it  is  eafy  to 
fhew,  in  a  lliort  and  lively  manner,  that  fuch  and  fuch 
things  are  liable  to  objeftion,  that  this  and  another 
thing  is  of  little  weight  in  itfelf  ;  but  impoffible  to 
{hew,  in  like  manner,  the  united  force  of  the  whole  ar- 
gument in  one  view. 

However,  laftly,  as  it  has  been  made  appear  that 
there  is  no  preiumption  againft  a  revelation  as  mirac- 
ulous ;  that  the  general  fcheme  of  Chriftianity,  and 
the  principal  parts  of  it,  are  conformable  to  the  expe- 
rienced conftitution  of  things,  and  the  whole  perfectly 
credible, — fo  the  account  now  given  of  the  pofitive  ev- 
idence for  it,  fhews  that  this  evidence  is  fuch,  as  from 
the  nature  of  it  cannot  be  deftroyed,  though  it  fhould 
be  leflened. 


CHAP. 


[     3iS 


CHAP.     VIII. 


Of  the  OhjeSiions  which  mav  be  made  agahtjl  arguing 
from  the  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion. 


.F  every  one  would  confider,  with  fuch 
attention  as  they  are  bound  even  in  point  of  moraUty 
to  confider,  what  they  judge  and  give  characters  of, 
the  occafion  of  this  chapter  would  be,  in  fome  good 
meafure  at  leaft,  fuperfeded.  But  fince  this  is  not  to 
be  expected,  for  fome  we  find  do  not  concern  theni- 
felves  to  underftand  even  what  they  write  againft  j 
lince  this  treatife,  in  common  with  moft  others,  lies 
open  to  objections  which  may  appear  very  material  to 
thoughtful  men  at  firft  fight  ;  and,  befides  that,  feems 
peculiarly  hable  to  the  objections  of  fuch  as  can  judge 
without  thinking,  and  of  fuch  as  can  cenfure  without 
judgmg, — it  may  not  be  amifs  to  fet  dov/n  the  chief 
of  thele  objections  which  occur  to  me,  and  confider 
them  to  their  hands.     And  they  are  fuch  as  thefe  ; 

"  That  it  is  a  poor  thing  to  folve  difficulties  in  rev- 
elation, by  faying  that  there  are  the  fame  in  natural 
religion,  when  what  is  wanting  is  to  clear  both  of  them 
of  thefe  their  common,  as  well  as  other  their  refpec- 
tive,  difficulties ;  but  that  it  is.  a  ftrange  v/ay  indeed 
of  convincing  men  of  the  obligations  of  religion,  to 
ihew  them  that  they  have  as  little  reafon  for  their 
worldly  purfuits ;  and  a  ftrange  way  of  vindicating 
the  juftice  and  goodnefs  of  the  Author  of  nature,  and 
of  removing  the  objections  againft  both,  to  which  the 
fyftem  of  religion  lies  open,  to  fhew  that  the  hke  ob- 
jections lie  againft  natural  providence  ;  a  way  of  an-r 
fwering  objections  againft  religion,  without  fo  much 
as  pretending  to  make  out  that  the  fyftem  of  it,  or  the 
particular  things  in  it  objeCted  againft,  are  reafonable  ; 

efpecially. 


Chap,  VIII.    ObjeEiions  againji  the  Analogy^  ISc.     319 

efpecialjy,  perhaps  fome  may  be  inattentive  enough  to 
add,  Muft  this  be  thought  ftrange,  when  it  is  confef- 
fed  that  analogy  is  no  anfwer  to  Ilich  objedions ;  that 
when  this  fort  of  reafoning  is  carried  to  the  utmoft 
length  it  can  be  imagined  capable  of,  it  will  yet  leave 
the  mind  in  a  very  unfatisfied  ftate  ;  and  that  it  mufl 
be  unaccountable  ignorance  of  mankind,  to  imagine 
they  will  be  prevailed  with  to  forego  their  prefent  in- 
terefts  and  pleafures,  from  regard  to  religion,  upon 
doubtful  evidence." 

Now,  as  plaufible  as  this  way  of  talking  may  ap- 
pear, that  appearance  will  be  found  in  a  great  meafure 
owing  to  half  views,  which  fhew  but  part  of  an  objeft, 
yet  (hew  that  indiitindily,  and  to  undeterminate  lan- 
guage. By  thefe  means  weak  men  are  often  deceived 
by  others,  and  ludicrous  men  by  themfelves.  And 
even  thofe  who  are  ferious  and  conliderate,  cannot  al- 
ways readily  difentangle,and  at  once  clearly  fee  through 
the  perplexities  in.which  fubjefts  themfelves  are  involv- 
ed, and  which  are  heightened  by  the  deficiencies  and 
the  abufe  of  words.  To  this  latter  fort  of  perfons, 
the  following  reply  to  each  part  of  this  objection  fev- 
erally  may  be  of  fome  affiftance,  as  it  may  alfo  tend  a 
little  to  ftop  and  filence  others. 

Flrji^  The  thing  wanted,  i,  e.  what  men  require,  is 
to  have  all  difficulties  cleared.  And  this  is,  of  at  leaft 
for  any  thing  we  know  to  the  contrary  it  may  be,  the 
fame  as  requiring  to  comprehend  the  Divine  Nature, 
and  the  whole  plan  of  Providence,  from  everlafting  to 
everlafting.  But  it  hath  always  been  allowed  to  argue 
from  what  is  acknowledged  to  what  is  difputed  ,  and 
it  is  in  no  other  fenfe  a  poor  thing  to  argue  from  natu- 
ral religion  to  revealed,  in  the  manner  found  fault  with, 
than  it  is  to  argue  in  numberlefs  other  ways  of  prob- 
able dedudion  and  inference,  in  matters  of  conduct, 
which  v/e  are  continually  reduced  to  the  neceffity  of 
doing.     Indeed  the  epithet  poor^  may  be  applied,  I  fear 

as 


320  Objections  againjl  the  Analogy        Part  II, 

as  properly,  to  great  part  or  the  world  of  human  life, 
as  it  is  to  the  things  mentioned  in  the  objeftion.  Is 
it  not  a  poor  thing,  for  a  phyfician  to  have  fo  little 
knowledge  in  the  cure  of  difeafes  as  even  the  mod 
eminent  have  ?  To  adt:  upon  conjecture  and  guefs, 
where  the  life  of  man  is  concerned  ?  Undoubtedly  it 
is  ;  but  not  in  comparifon  of  having  no  fkill  at  all  in 
that  ufeful  art,  and  being  obliged  to  a6t  wholly  in  the 
dark. 

Further — fince  it  is  as  unreafonable  as  It  is  common, 
to  urge  obje6lions  againft  revelation  which  are  of  ecpal 
weight  againft  natural  religion  ;  and  thofe  who  do 
this,  if  they  are  not  confufed  themfelves,  deal  unfairly 
with  others,  in  making  it  feem  that  they  are  arguing 
only  againft  revelation,  or  particular  dodrines  of  it, 
when  in  reality  they  are  arguing  againft  moral  provi- 
dence,— it  is  a  thing  of  confequence  to  iliow  that  fuch 
objeftions  are  as  much  levelled  againft  natural  reHgion, 
as  againft  revealed.  And  objeftions-  which  are  equal- 
ly applicable  to  both,  are  properly  fpeaking  anfwered, 
by  its  being  iTiown  that  they  are  fo,  provided  the  form- 
er be  admitted  to  be  true.  And  without  taking  in 
the  confideration  how  diftindly  this  is  admitted,  it  is 
plainly  very  material  to  obferve,  that  as  the  things  ob- 
jedted  againft  in  natural  religion,  are  of  the  fame  kind 
with  what  is  certain  matter  of  experience  in  the  courfe 
of  Providence,  and  in  the  information  which  God  af- 
fords us  concerning  our  temj:oral  intereft  under  his 
government, — fo  the  objections  againft  the  fyftem  of 
Chriftianity  and  the  evidence  of  it,  are  of  the  very  fame 
kind  with  thofe  which  are  made  againft  the  fyftem  and 
evidence  of  natural  religion.  However,  the  reader 
upon  review  may  fee,  that  moft  of  the  analogies  inlift- 
ed  upon,  even  in  the  latter  part  of  this  treatife,  do  not 
neceffarily  require  to  have  more  taken  for  granted  than 
is  in  the  former ;  that  there  is  an  Autlior  of  nature,  or 
natural  Governor  of  the  world  ;  and  Chriftianity  is 

vindicated, 


Chap.  VIII.         of  Nature  to  Religion.  321 

vindicated,  not  from  its  analogy  to  natural  religion, 
but  chiefly  from  its  analogy  to  the  experienced  con- 
flitution  of  nature. 

Secondly^  Religion  is  a  praftical  thing,  and  confifts 
in  fuch  a  determinate  courfe  of  life,  as  being  what 
there  is  reafon  to  think  is  commanded  by  the  Author 
of  nature,  and  will  upon  the  whole  be  our  happinefs 
under  his  government.  Now  if  men  can  be  convinc- 
ed that  they  have  the  like  reafon  to  believe  this,  as  to 
believe  that  taking  care  of  their  temporal  affairs  will 
be  to  their  advantage, — fuch  convidiion  cannot  but 
be  an  argument  to  them  for  the  praftice  of  religion. 
And  if  there  be  really  any  reafon  for  believing  one  of 
thefe,  and  endeavouring  to  preferve  life,  and  fecure 
ourfelves  the  necefTaries  and  conveniences  of  it, — then 
there  is  reafon  alfo  for  believing  the  other,  and  endeav- 
ouring to  fecure  the  interefl  it  propofes  to  us.  And 
if  the  interefl  which  religion  propofes  to  us  be  infinite- 
ly greater  than  our  whole  temporal  intereft,  then  there 
muft  be  proportionably  greater  reafon  for  endeavour- 
ing to  fecure  one  than  the  other ;  fince  by  the  fuppo- 
iition,  the  probability  of  our  fecuring  one,  is  equal  to 
the  probability  of  our  fecuring  the  other.  This  feems 
plainly  unanfwerable,  and  has  a  tendency  to  influence 
fair  minds,  who  conlider  what  our  condition  really  is, 
or  upon  what  evidence  we  are  naturally  appointed  to 
acl  ;  and  who  are  difpofed  to  acquiefce  in  the  terms 
upon  which  we  live,  and  attend  to  and  follow  that 
practical  inftru6tion,  whatever  it  be,  which  is  afford- 
ed us. 

But  the  chief  and  proper  force  of  the  argument  re- 
ferred to  in  the  objeftion  lies  in  another  place.  For, 
it  is  faid  that  the  proof  of  religion  is  involved  in  fuch 
inextricable  difficulties  as  to  render  it  doubtful,  and 
that  it  cannot  be  fappofed  that  if  it  were  true  it  would 
be  left  upon  doubtful  evidence.  Here  then,  over  and 
above  the  force  of  each  particular  difficulty  or  objec- 
tion. 


322  Objeftions  againfi  the  Analogy       Part  II. 

■I 
tion,  thefe  difEculties  and  objeftions,  taken  together, 

are  turned  into  a  pofitive  argument  againft  the  truth 
of  religion  ;  which  argument  would  ftand  thus.  If 
religion  were  true  it  would  not  be  left  doubtful,  and 
open  to  objections  to  the  degree  in  which  it  is  ;  there- 
fore that  it  is  thus  left,  not  only  renders  the  evidence 
of  it  weak,  and  leflens  its  force  in  proportion  to  the 
v/eight  of  fuch  objedions,  but  alfo  fhews  it  to  be  falfe, 
or  is  a  general  prefumption  of  its  being  fo.  Now  the 
obfervation.,  that  from  the  natural  conftitution  and 
courfe  of  things,  we  muft  in  our  temporal  concerns, 
almoft  continually,  and  in  matters  of  great  confe- 
quence,  a6t  upon  evidence  of  a  like  kind  and  degree 
to  the  evidence  of  religion,  is  an  anfwer  to  this  argu- 
ment i  becaufe  it  fliews  that  it  is  according  to  the  con- 
duft  and  charafter  of  the  Author  of  nature  to  appoint 
we  fhould  act  upon  evidence  like  to  that  which  this  ar- 
gument prefumes  he  cannot  be  fuppofed  to  appoint  we 
fhould  a6t  upon  ;  it  is  an  inftance,  a  general  one  made 
lip  of  numerous  particular  ones,  of  fomewhat  in  his 
dealing  with  us  fimilar  to  what  is  faid  to  be  incredible. 
And  as  the  force  of  this  anfwer  lies  merely  in  the  par- 
allel which  there  is  between  the  evidence  for  religion 
and  for  our  temporal  conduft,  the  anfwer  is  equally 
juft  and  conclulive,  whether  the  parallel  be  made  out 
by  fhewing  the  evidence  of  the  former  to  be  higher, 
or  the  evidence  of  the  latter  to  be  lower. 

Thirdly,  The  defign  of  this  treatife  is  not  to  vindi- 
cate the  charafter  of  God,  but  to  (hew  the  obligations 
of  men  ;  it  is  not  to  juftify  his  providence,  but  to  fhew 
what  belongs  to  us  to  do.  Thefe  are  two  fubjeds, 
and  ought  not  to  be  confounded.  And  though  they 
may  at  length  run  up  into  each  other,  yet  obfervations 
may  immediately  tend  to  make  out  the  latter,  which 
do  not  appear  by  any  immediate  connexion  to  the 
purpofe  of  the  former  j  which  is  lefs  our  concern  than 
many  feem  to  think.     For,  ift,  It  is  not  neceflary  v/e 

fhould 


C H  A  p .  VIII .         of  Nature  to  Religion.  323 

fliould  juflify  the  difpenfations  of  Providence  againfi; 
objedions,  any  farther  than  to  fhew  that  the  things  ob- 
jected againft  may,  for  aught  we  know,  be  confiftent 
with  juftice  and  goodnefs.     Suppofe  then,  that  there 
are  things  in  the  fyflem  of  this  world,  and  plan  of  Prov- 
idence relating  to  it,  which  taken  alone  would  be  un- 
juft^ — yet  it  has  been  fhewn  unanfwerably,  that  if  we 
could  take  in  the  reference  which  thefe  things  may 
have  to  other  things  prefent,  paft  and  to  come,  to  the 
whole  fcheme  which  the  things  objeded  againft  are 
parts  of, — thefe  very  things  might,  for  aught  we  know, 
be  found  to  be  not  only  confiftent  with  juftice,  but  in- 
ftances  of  it.     Indeed  it  has  been  ihewn,  by  the  anal- 
ogy of  what  we  fee,  not  only  poffible  that  this  may  be 
the  cafe,  but  credible  that  it  's.      And  thus  objec- 
tions drawn  from  fiich  things  are  anfwered,  and  Prov- 
idence is  vindicated,  as  far  as  religion  makes  its  vindi- 
cation neceffary.    Hence  it  appears,  2dly,  That  objec- 
tions againft  the  divine  juftice  and  goodnefs  are  not 
endeavoured  to  be  removed,  by  lliewing  that  the  like 
objedions,  allowed  to  be  really  conclufive,  lie  againft 
natural  providence  ;  but  thofe  objedions  being  fup- 
pofed  and  fhewn  not  to  be  conclufive,  the  things  ob- 
jeded  againft,  confidered  as  matters  of  fad,  are  farther 
fhewn  to  be  credible  from  their  conformity  to  the  con- 
ftitution  of  nature  ;  for  inftance,  that  God  will  reward 
and  punifti  men  for  their  adions  hereafter,  from  the 
obfervation  that  he  does  reward  and  punifli  them  for 
their  adions  here.     And  this  I  apprehend  is  of  weight. 
And  I  add,  3dly,  It  would  be  of  weight,  even  though 
thofe  objedions  were  not  anfwered.     For,  there  being 
the  proof  of  religion  above  fet  down,  and  religion  im- 
plying feveral  fads,  for  inftance  again,  the  fad  laft 
mentioned,  that  God  will  reward  and  punifti  men  for 
their  adions  hereafter, — the  obfervation  that  his  pref- 
ent method  of  government  is  by  rewards  and  puniih- 
jnents,  lliews  that  future  fad  not  to  be  incredible ; 

whatever 


524  Ohjenions  againji  the  Analogy       Part  II, 

whatever  objedions  men  may  think  they  have  againft 
it,  as  unjuft  or  unmerciful,  according  to  their  notions 
of  juftice  and  mercy,  or  as  improbable  from  their  be- 
lief of  neceffity.  I  fay,  as  improbable  5  for  it  is  evident 
no  objecftion  againft  it,  as  unjiiji,  can  be  urged  from 
neceffity,  lince  this  notion  as  much  deftroys  injuftice 
as  it  does  juftice.  Then  4thly,  Though  objections 
againft  the  reafonablenefs  of  the  fyftem  of  reHgion,  can- 
not indeed  be  anfwered  without  entering  into  coniid- 
eration  of  its  reafonablenefs,  yet  objeftions  againft  the 
credibility  or  truth  of  it  may.  Becaufe  the  fyftem  of 
it  is  reducible  into  what  is  properly  matter  of  fad  ;  and 
the  truth  the  probable  truth  of  fa6ls,  may  be  fhewn 
without  confideration  of  their  reafonablenefs.  Nor  is 
it  neceffary,  though  in  fome  cafes  and  refpedls  it  is 
highly  ufetul  and  proper,  yet  it  is  not  neceffary,  to  give 
a  proof  of  the  reafonablenefs  of  every  precept  enjoined 
us,  and  of  every  particular  difpenfation  of  Providence 
which  comes  into  the  fyftem  of  religion.  Indeed  the 
more  thoroughly  a  perfon  of  a  right  difpofition  is  con- 
vinced of  the  perfe6:ion  of  the  divine  nature  and  con- 
duct, the  farther  he  will  advance  towards  that  perfec- 
tion of  religion  which  St.  John*'  fpeaks  of.  But  the 
general  obligations  of  religion  are  fully  made  out,  by 
proving  the  reafonablenefs  of  the  praftice  of  it.  And 
that  the  pradice  of  religion  is  reafonable  may  be  fliewn, 
though  no  more  could  be  proved  than  that  the  fyftegi 
of  it  may  befo^  for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary  ;  and 
even  without  entering  into  the  diftind  confideration 
of  this.  And  from  hence,  5thly,  It  is  eafy  to  fee,  that 
though  the  analogy  of  nature  is  not  an  immediate  an- 
Iwer  to  objedions  againft  the  wifdom,  the  juftice  or 
goodnefs  of  any  doftrine  or  precept  of  religion, — yet 
it  may  be,  as  it  is,  an  immediate  and  dired  anfwer  to 
what  is  really  intended  by  fuch  objeftions,  v/hich  is  to 
fliew  that  the  things  objected  againft  are  incredible. 

FouYthlyy 

*  I  Joh.  iv.  18. 


Ghap.  VIII.         of  Nature  to  Religion.  325 

Fourthly,  It  is  moft  readily  acknowledged  that  the 
foregoing  treatife  is  by  no  means  fatisfacflory,  very  far 
indeed  from  it ;  btit  fo  would  any  natural  inftitutioa 
of  life  appear,  if  reduced  into  a  fyftem,  together  with 
its  evidence.  Leaving  religion  out  of  the  cafe,  men 
are  divided  in  their  opinions  whether  our  pleafures 
overbalance  our  pains  ;  and  whether  it  be,  or  be  not, 
eligible  to  live  in  this  world.  And  were  all  fuch  con- 
troverfies  fettled,  which  perhaps  in  fpeculation  would 
be  found  involved  in  great  difficulties,  and  were  it  de- 
termined upon  the  evidence  of  reafon,  as  nature  has 
determined  it  to  our  hands,  that  life  is  to  be  preferv- 
ed, — yet  flill  the  iTiles  which  God  has  been  pleafed  to 
afford  us,  for  efcaping  the  miferies  of  it  and  obtaining 
its  fa'tisfa6tions,  the  rules,  for  iniiance,  of  preferving 
health,  and  recovering  it  when  loft,  are  not  only  falli- 
ble and  precarious,  but  very  far  from  being  exa6t. 
Nor  are  we  informed  by  nature  in  future  contingencies 
and  accidents,  fo  as  to  render  it  at  all  certain  what  is 
the  beft  method  of  managing  our  affairs.  What 
will  be  the  fuccefs  of  our  temporal  purfuits,  in  the 
common  fenfe  of  the  word  fuccefs,  is  highly  doubtful. 
And  what  will  be  the  fuccefs  of  them  in  the  proper 
fenfe  of  the  word,  i.  e.  what  happinefs  or  enjoyment 
we  fliall  obtain  by  them,  is  doubtful  in  a  much  higher 
degree.  Indeed  the  unfatisfadiory  nature  of  the  evi- 
dence with  which  we  are  obliged  to  take  up,  in  the 
daily  courfe  of  life,  is  fcarce  to  be  exprelTed.  Yet  men 
do  not  throw  away  life,  ordifregard  the  interefts  of  it, 
upon  account  of  this  doubtfulnefs.  The  evidence  of 
religion  then  being  admitted  real,  thofe  who  objed: 
againft  it  as  not  fatisfactory,  i.  e.  as  not  being  what 
they  wifli  it,  plainly  forget  the  very  condition  of  our 
being  ;  for  iatisfa£tion  in  this  fenfe  does  not  belong  to 
fuch  a  creature  as  man.  And,  which  is  more  mate- 
rial, they  forget  alfo  the  very  nature  of  religion.  For, 
religion  prefuppofes,  in  all  thofe  who  will  embrace  it, 

a  certain 


326  Ohje5li9ns  againji  the  Analogy       Part  IL 

a  certain  degree  of  integrity  and  honefty,  which  it  was 
intended  to  try  whether  men  have  or  not,  and  to  ex- 
ercife  in  fuch  as  have  it,  in  order  to  its  improvement. 
ReHgion  prefuppofes  this  as  much,  and  in  the  fame 
fenfe,  as  fpeaking  to  a  man  prefuppofes  he  underflands 
the  language  in  which  you  fpeak,  or  as  warning  a  man 
of  any  danger  prefuppofes  that  he  hath  fuch  a  regard 
to  himfelf  as  that  he  will  endeavour  to  avoid  it.  Ani 
therefore  the  queflion  is  not  at  all.  Whether  the  evi- 
dence of  religion  be  fatisfa6tory,  but.  Whether  it  be 
in  reafon  fufficient  to  prove  and  difcipline  that  virtue, 
which  it  prefuppofes.  Now  the  evidence  of  it  is  fully 
fufficient  for  all  thofe  purpofes  of  probation,  how  far 
foever  it  is  from  being  fatisfaftory  as  to  the  purpofes 
of  curiofity,  or  any  other  j  and  indeed  it  anfwers  the 
purpofes  of  the  former  in  feveral  refpecls,  which  it 
would  not  do  if  it  were  as  overbearing  as  is  required. 
One  might  add  farther,  that  whether  the  motives  or 
the  evidence  for  any  courfe  of  aftion  be  fatisfaftory, 
meaning  here  by  that  word,  what  fatisfies  a  man,  that 
fuch  a  courfe  of  aftion  will  in  event  be  for  his  good, — • 
this  need  never  be,  and  I  think  ftridly  fpeaking  never 
is,  the  praftical  queftion  in  common  matters.  But 
the  practical  queftion  in  all  cafes  is,  Whether  the  evi- 
dence for  a  courfe  of  adion  be  fuch  as,  taking  in  all 
circumftances,  makes  the  faculty  within  us  which  is 
the  guide  and  judge  of  conduct,*  determine  that 
courfe  of  action  to  be  prudent.  Indeed  fatisfadion 
that  it  will  be  for  our  intereft  or  happinefs,  abundant- 
ly determines  an  aftion  to  be  prudent  ;  but  evidence 
almoft  infinitely  lower  than  this  determines  actions  to 
be  fo  too,  even  in  the  conduft  of  every  day. 

Fifthly^  As  to  the  obje6tion  concerning  the  influ- 
ence which  this  argument,  or  any  part  of  it,  may  or 
may  not  be  expected  to  have  upon  men, — I  obferve  as 
above,  that  religion  being  intended  for  a  trial  and  ex- 

ercife 

*  See  Dijfertation  II. 


Chap.  VIII.         of  Nature  to  Religion.  327 

ercife  of  the  morality  of  every  perfon's  charadler  who 
is  a  fubjeft  of  it,  and  there  being,  as  I  have  fhevvn, 
fuch  evidence  for  it  as  is  fufficient  in  reafon  to  influ- 
ence men  to  embrace  itj, — to  objeft  that  it  is  not  to 
be  imagined  mankind  will  be  influenced  by  fuch  evi- 
dence, is  nothing  to  the  purpofe  of  the  foregoing  trea- 
tife.  For  the  purpofe  of  it  is  not  to  inquire  what  fort 
of  creatures  mankind  are,  but  what  the  light  and 
knowledge  which  is  aflbrded  them  requires  they  fhouid 
be  ;  to  Ihew  how  in  reafon  they  ought  to  behave,  not 
how  in  fa6t  they  will  behave.  This  depends  upon 
themfelves,  and  is  their  own  concern,  the  perfonal 
concern  of  each  man  in  particular.  And  how  little 
regard  the  generality  have  to  it,  experience  indeed  does 
too  fully  {hew.  But  religion,  confidered  as  a  proba- 
tion, has  had  its  end  upon  all  perfons,  to  whom  it  has 
been  propofed  with  evidence  fufficient  in  reafon  to  in- 
fluence their  practice ;  for  by  this  means  they  have 
been  put  into  a  ftate  of  probation,  let  them  behave  as 
they  will  in  it.  And  thus,  not  only  revelation,  but 
reafon  alfo,  teaches  us  that  by  the  evidence  of  religion 
being  laid  before  men,  the  defigns  of  Providence  are 
cariying  on,  not  only  with  regard  to  thofe  who  will, 
but  likevv'ife  with  regard  to  thofe  who  will  not,  be  in- 
fluenced by  it.  Hovv'ever,  iaflily,  the  objedion  here 
referred  to  allows  the  things  infifted  upon  in  this  trea- 
tife  to  be  of  fome  weight ;  and  if  fo,  it  may  be  hoped 
it  will  have  fome  influence.  And  if  there  be  a  proba- 
bility that  it  will  have  any  at  all,  there  is  the  fame  rea- 
fon in  kind,  though  not  in  degree,  to  lay  it  before  men, 
as  there  would  be  if  it  were  likely  to  have  a  greater  in- 
fluence. 

And  farther,  I  defire  it  may  be  confidered,  with  re- 
fpeA  to  the  whole  of  the  foregoing  objections,  that  in 
this  treatifelhave  argued  upon  the  principles  of  others,* 

not 

*  By  arguing  upon  the  principles  of  others,  the  reader  will  obferve  is  meant, 
not  proving  any  ttiing  f: ojn  tliole  principles,  but  nQtiuithfianding  them.  Thus 
religion  is  proved,  not  from  the  opinion  of  neceiiity,  which  is  abfurJ,  but 
notvjithjlunding  or  even  though  that  opinion  were  admitted  to  be  true, 


528  OhjeElions  againfi  the  Analogy       Part  II, 

not  my  own ;  and  have  omitted  what  I  thhik  true, 
and  of  the  utmofl  importance,  becaufe  by  others 
thought  unintelhgible,  or  not  true.  Thus  I  have  ar- 
gued upon  the  principles  of  the  fatahfts,  which  I  do 
not  beHeve  j  and  have  omitted  a  thing  of  the  utmofl 
importance  which  I  do  beHeve,  the  moral  jfitnefs  and 
unfitnefs  of  actions,  prior  to  all  will  whatever ;  which 
I  apprehend  as  certainly  to  determine  the  divine  con- 
dud,  as  Ipeculative  truth  and  falfehood  necelTarily  de- 
termine the  divine  judgment.  Indeed  the  principle 
of  hberty  and  that  of  moral  fitnefs  fo  force  themfeives 
upon  the  mind,  that  moralifts,  the  ancients  as  well  as 
moderns,  have  formed  their  language  upon  it.  And 
probably  it  may  appear  in  mine,  though  I  have  endeav- 
oured to  avoid  it,  and  in  order  to  avoid  it,  have  fome- 
times  been  obliged  to  exprefs  myfelf  in  a  manner  which 
will  appear  ftrange  to  fuch  as  do  not  obierve  the  reafon 
for  it  J  but  the  general  argument  here  purfued  does 
not  at  all  fuppofe  or  proceed  upon  thefe  principles. 
Now,  thefe  two  abftrad:  principles  of  liberty  and  mor- 
al fitnefs  being  omitted,  religion  can  be  conlidered  in 
no  other  view  than  merely  as  a  queftion  of  fa6t ,  and 
in  this  view  it  is  here  conlidered.  It  is  obvious  that 
Chriilianity,  and  the  proof  of  it,  are  both  hiftorical. 
And  even  natural  religion  is,  properly,  a  matter  of  fad: ; 
for,  that  there  is  a  righteous  Governor  of  the  world, 
is  fo  J  and  this  proportion  contains  the  general  fyftem 
of  natural  religion.  But  then,  feveral  abflrad  truths, 
and  in  particular  thofe  two  principles,  are  ufually  taken 
into  confideration  in  the  proof  of  it,  whereas  it  is  here 
treated  of  only  as  a  matter  of  faft.  To  explain  this ; 
that  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right 
ones,  is  an  abftrad  truth ,  but  that  they  appear  fo  to 
our  mind,  is  only  a  matter  of  fad.  And  this  laft  muft 
have  been  admitted,  if  any  thing  was,  by  thofe  ancient 
fcepticks  who  would  not  have  admitted  the  former  ; 
but  pretended  to  doubt.  Whether  there  were  any  fuch 

thing 


Ghap.  VIIL         of  Nature  to  Religion.  329 

thing  as  truth,  or,  Whether  we  could  certainly  depend 
upon  our  faculties  of  underflanding  for  the  knowledge 
of  it  in  any  cafe.  So  Hkewife  that  there  is,  in  the  nature 
of  things^  an  original  ftandard  of  right  and  wrong  in 
adions,  independent  Upon  all  will,  but  which  unalter- 
ably determines  the  will  of  God  to  exercife  that  moral 
government  over  the  world  which  religion  teaches, 
i.  e.  finally  and  upon  the  whole  to  reward  and  punifli 
men  refpediyely  as  they  aft  right  or  wrong, — this  af- 
fertion  contains  an  abftradl  truth,  as  well  as  matter  of 
fa6t.  But  fuppofe  in  the  prefent  .(late  every  man,  with- 
out exception,  was  rewarded  and  punifhed  in  exacl  pro- 
portion as  he  followed  or  tranfgreffed  that  fenfe  of  right 
and  wrong  which  God  has  implanted  in  the  nature  of 
every  man, — this  would  not  be  at  all  an  abftraO:  truth, 
but  only  a  matter  of  fadl.  And  though  this  fad  were 
acknowledged  by  every  one,  yet  the  very  fame  difficul- 
ties might  be  raifed  as  are  now,  concerning  the  abftrad 
queflions  of  liberty  and  nioral  fitnefs  5  and  we  fliould 
have  a  proof,  even  the  certain  one  of  experience,  that 
the  government  of  the  world  was  perfedly  moral,  with- 
out taking  in  the  conlideration  of  thofe  queflions  j 
and  this  proof  would  remain,  in  what  way  foever  they* 
were  determined.  And  thus,  God  having  given  man- 
kind a  moral  faculty,  the  objed  of  which  is  adions, 
and  which  naturally  approves  fome  adions  as  right  and 
of  good  defert,  and  condemns  others  as  wrong  and  of 
ill  defert ;  that  he  will,  finally  and  upon  the  whole, 
reward  the  former  and  punifli  the  latter,  is  not  an  af- 
fertion  of  an  abftrad  truth,  but  of  v;hat  is  as  mere  a 
fad  as  his  doing  fo  at  prefent  would  be.  This  future 
fad  I  have,  not  indeed  proved  with  the  force  with 
which  it  might  be  proved,  from  the  principles  of  lib- 
erty and  moral  fitnefs,  but  without  them  have  given 
a  really  conclufive  pradical  proof  of  it,  which  is  greatly 
ilrengthened  by  the  general  analogy  of  nature  ;  a  proof 
eafily  cavilled  at,  eafily  fhewn  not  to  be  demonftrative, 

X  for 


330         OhjeBions  againji  the  Analogy,  i^c.     Part  IT. 

for  it  Is  not  offered  as  fuch  ;  but  impoffible,  I  think, 
to  be  evaded  or  anfwered.  And  thus  the  obligations 
of  religion  are  made  out,  exclufively  of  the  queftions 
concerning  liberty  and  moral  fitnefs,  which  have  been 
perplexed  with  difficulties  and  abftrufe  reafonings,  as 
every  thing  may. 

Hence  therefore  may  be  obferved  diftindly  what  is 
the  force  of  this  treatife.  It  will  be,  to  fuch  as  are  con- 
vinced of  religion  upon  the  proof  arifing  out  of  the  two 
laft  mentioned  principles,  an  additional  proof  and  a 
confirmation  of  it;  to  fuch  as  do  not  admit  thofe 
principles,  an  original  proof  of  it,^  and  a  confirmation 
of  that  proof.  Thofe  who  believe,  will  here  find  the 
fcheme  of  Chrifcianity  cleared  of  objedions,  and  the 
evidence  of  it  in  a  peculiar  manner  ftrengthened  ;  thofe 
who  do  not  believe,  will  at  leaft  be  fliewn  the  abfurd- 
ity  of  all  attempts  to  prove  Chriftianity  falfe,  the  plain 
undoubted  credibility  of  it ;  and,  I  hope,  a  good  deal 
more. 

And  thus,  though  fome  perhaps  may  ferioufly  think 
that  analogy,  as  here  urged,  has  too  great  fl;refs  laid  up- 
on it;  and  ridicule, unanfwerable  ridicule, may  be  appli- 
ed, to  fhew  the  argument  from  it  in  a  difadvantageous 
light, — yet  there  can  be  no  queftion  but  that  it  is  a 
real  one.  For  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed,  im- 
plying in  it  numerous  fads,  analogy  being  a  confirma- 
tion of  all  fadts  to  which  it  can  be  applied,  as  it  is  the 
only  proof  of  moft,  cannot  but  be  admitted  by  every 
one  to  be  a  material  thing,  and  truly  of  weight  on  the 
fide  of  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed ;  and  it 
ought  to  be  particularly  regarded  by  fuch  as  profefs  to 
follow  nature,  and  to  be  lefs  fatisfied  with  abflraft 
reafonings. 

*  p.  165,  &c. 


CONCLUSION. 


[     331      ] 

CONCLUSION. 

W  HATEVER  account  may  be  given 
of  the  ftrange  inattention  and  difregard,  in  fome 
ages  and  countries,  to  a  matter  of  fuch  importance  as 
religion,  it  would,  before  experience,  be  incredible  that 
there  fhould  be  the  like  difregard  in  thofe  who  have 
had  the  moral  fyftem  of  the  world  laid  before  them,  as 
it  is  by  Chriftianity,  and  often  inculcated  upon  them  ; 
becaufe  this  moral  fyftem  carries  in  it  a  good  degree 
of  evidence  for  its  truth,  upon  its  being  barely  propofed 
to  our  thoughts.  There  is  no  need  of  abilrufe  rea- 
fonings  and  diftinftions,  to  convince  an  unprejudiced 
underftanding  that  there  is  a  God  who  made  and  gov- 
erns the  world,  and  will  judge  it  in  righteoufnefs, 
though  they  may  be  neceflary  to  anfwer  abflrufe  diffi- 
culties, when  once  fuch  are  raifed  ;  when  the  very 
meaning  of  thofe  words  which  exprefs  moft  intelligi- 
bly the  general  dodrine  of  religion,  is  pretended  to  be 
uncertain,  and  the  clear  truth  of  the  thing  itfelf  is  ob- 
fcured  by  the  intricacies  of  fpeculation.  But  to  tin 
unprejudiced  mind,  ten  thoufand  thoufand  inf};a?i<!es 
of  defign  cannot  but  prove  a  defigner.  And  it  is  in- 
tuitively manifeft,  that  creatures  ought  to  live  under 
a  dutiful  fenfe  of  their  Maker,  and  that  juftice  and 
charity  muft  be  his  laws,  to  creatures  whom  he  has 
made  focial  and  placed  in  fociety.  Indeed  the  truth 
of  revealed  religion,  peculiarly  fo  called,  is  not  feifevi- 
dent,  but  requires  external  proof  in  order  to  its  be- 
ing received.  Yet  inattention  among  us  to  revealed 
religion,  will  be  found  to  imply  the  fame  difTolute  im- 
moral temper  of  mind  as  inattention  to  natural  relig- 
ion y  becaufe,  when  both  are  laid  before  us  in  the  ' 
manner  they  are  in  Chriftian  countries  of  liberty,  our 
X  z  obligations 


332  CONCLUSION,       Part  It, 

obllgationr,  to  Inquire  into  both,  and  to  embrace  both 
upon  fuppofition  of  their  truth,  are  obligations  of  the 
fame  nature.  For,  revelation  claims  to  be  the  voice 
of  God  ;  and  our  obligation  to  attend  to  his  voice  Is 
furely  moral  in  ail  cafes.  And  as  it  is  infifled  that  its 
evidence  is  conclufive,  upon  thorough  confideration 
of"  it,  fo  it  offers  itfelf  to  us  with  manifeft  obvious  ap- 
pearances of  having  fomething  more  than  human  In 
it,  and  therefore  in  all  reafon  requires  to  have  its  claims 
moft  ferioufly  examined  into.  It  is  to  be  added,  that 
though  light  and  knowledge,  in  what  manner  foever 
afforded  us,  is  equally  from  God,  yet  a  miraculous  rev- 
elation has  a  peculiar  tendency,  from  the  firft  princi-? 
pies  of  our  nature,  to  awaken  mankind,  and  Infpire 
them  with  reverence  and  awe  ;  and  this  is  a  peculiar 
obhgation  to  attend  to  what  claims  to  be  fo  withfuch 
appearances  of  truth.  It  Is  therefore  mofl  certain  that 
our  obligations  to  inquire  ferioufly  into  the  evidence 
of  Chriftianity,  and  upon  fuppofition  of  its  truth  to 
embrace  it,  are  of  the  ut mofl  importance,  and  moral  in 
the  highefl  and  moil  proper  fenfe.  Let  us  then  fuppofe 
that  the  evidence  of  religion  in  general,  and  of  ChriilT. 
ianity,  has  been  ferioufly  inquired  into  by  all  reafona- 
ble  men  among  us.  Yet  we  find  many  profelledly  to 
reje<5l  both,  upon  fpeculative  principles  of  infidelity. 
And  all  of  them  do  not  content  themfelves  with  a  bare 
negled:  of  religion,  and  enjoying  their  imaginary  free- 
dom from  its  refbraints.  Some  go  much  beyond  this. 
They  deride  God's  moral  government  over  the  world. 
They  renounce  his  protection,  and  defy  his  juftice. 
They  ridicule  and  vilify  Chriftianity,  and  blafphemc 
the  Author  of  it ;  and  take  all  occaiions  to  manifefl  a 
fcorn  and  contempt  of  revelation.  This  amounts  to 
an  aftive  fetting  themfelves  againfb  rehgion,  to  what 
may  be  confidered  as  a  pofitive  principle  of  irreligion  ; 
which  they  cultivate  within  themfelves,  and,  whether 
they  intend  this  efTedt  or  not,  render  habitual,  as  a 

good 


I'art  II.        C  O  N  C  L  IT  S  I  O  N. 


333 


good  man  does  the  contrary  principle.  And  others, 
who  are  not  chargeable  with  all  this  profligatenefs,  yet 
are  in  avowed  oppofition  to  religion,  as  if  difcovered 
to  be  groundlefs.  Now  admitting,  which  is  the  fup- 
pofition  we  go  upon,  that  thefe  perfons  aft  upon  what 
they  think  principles  of  reafon,  and  otherwife  they  are 
not  to  be  argued  with,  it  is  really  inconceivable  that 
they  fhould  imagine  they  clearly  fee  the  whole  evidence 
of  it,  confidered  in  itfelf,  to  be  nothing  at  all ;  nor  do 
they  pretend  this.  They  are  far  indeed  from  having 
ajuft  notion  of  its  evidence  ;  but  they  would  not  fay 
its  evidence  was  nothing,  if  they  thought  the  0/ ftem 
of  it,  with  all  its  circumftances,were  credible,  like  other 
matters  of  fcience  or  hiftory.  So  that  their  rnanncr 
of  treating  it  muft  proceed,  either  from  fuch  kind  of 
obje6lions  againft  all  religion  as  have  been  anflvered  or 
obviated  in  the  formicr  part  of  this  treatife,  or  elfe  from 
objeftions  and  ditiiGulties  fuppofed  more  peculiar  to 
Chriftianity.  Thus,  they  entertain  prejudices  againft 
the  whole  notion  of  a  revelation  and  miraculous  in- 
terpofitibns.  They  find  things  in  Scripture,  whether 
in  incidental  pafTages  or  in  the  general  fcheme  of  it, 
which  appear  to  them  unreafonable.  They  take  for 
granted  that  if  Chriftianity  were  true,  the  light  of  it 
m.ufl  have  been  more  general,  and  the  evidence  of  it 
more  fatisfadlory,  or  rather  overbearing  ;  that  it  mufr 
and  would  have  been,  in  fome  way,  otherwife  put  and 
left  than  it  is.  Now  this  is  not  imagining  they  fee  the 
■evidence  itfelf  to  be  nothing  or  inc6nfiderable,  but 
quite  another  thing.  It  is  being  fortified  againft  the 
evidence  in  fome  degree  acknowleda;ed,  bv  thinkin?: 
*i:Rfey  fee  the  fyftem  of  Chriftianity,  or  fonie\!vhf^t 'which 
"Appears  to  them  neceffarily  connected  with  it',  to  be  in- 
credible orfalfe  ;  fortified  againft  that  evidence  which 
might  dtherwife  mai?:e  great  impreffioh  tipdn  therti. 
Or,  laftly,  if  any  of  thefe  perfons  are,  upon  the  whole, 
in  doubt  -concerning  the  truth  of  Chriftian'ty,  theh- 

behaviom' 


534  CON'CLUSION,       Part  II. 

behaviour  feems  owing  to  their  taking  for  granted, 
through  ftrange  inattention,  that  fuch  doubting  is, 
in  a  manner,  the  fame  thing  as  being  certain  againftit. 
To  thefe  perfons,  and  to  this  ftate  of  opinion  con- 
cerning religion,  the  foregoing  treatife  is  adapted. 
For,  all  the  general  objedions  againft  the  moral  fyfteni 
of  nature  having  been  obviated,  it  is  fliewn  that  there 
is  not  any  peculiar  prefumption  at  all  againft  Chrift- 
ianity,  either  confidered  as  not  difcoverable  by  reafon, 
or  as  unlike  to  what  is  fo  difcovered  j  nor  any  worth 
mentioning  againft  it  as  miraculous,  if  any  at  all ; 
none  certainly  which  can  render  it  in  the  leaft  incred- 
ible. It  is  (hewn  that  upon  fuppofition  of  a  divine 
revelation,  the  analogy  of  nature  renders  it  beforehand 
highly  credible,  I  think  probable,  that  many  things 
in  it  muft  appear  liable  to  great  objedlions ;  and  that 
we  muft  be  incompetent  judges  of  it  to  a  great  de- 
gree. This  obfervation  is,  I  think,  unqueftionably 
true,  and  of  the  very  utmoft  importance ;  but  it  is 
urged,  as  I  hope  it  will  be  underftood,  with  great  cau- 
tion of  not  vilifying  the  faculty  of  reafon,  which  is 
i/ie  candle  of  the  Lord  within  us  ;  *  though  it  can  af- 
ford no  light  where  it  does  not  Ihine,  nor  judge  where 
it  has  no  principles  to  judge  upon.  The  objections 
here  fpoken  of,  being  firft  anfwered  in  the  view  of  ob- 
jedions  againft  Chriftianity  as  a  matter  of  fadt,  are  in 
the  next  place  confidered  as  urged  more  immediately 
againft  the  wifdom,  juftice  and  goodnefs  of  the  Chrift- 
ian  difpenfation.  And  it  is  fully  made  out  that  they 
admiit  of  exadly  the  like  anfwer,  in  every  refpedt,  to 
what  the  like  objedions  againft  the  conftitution  of  na- 
ture admit  of;  that,  as  partial  views  give  the  appearance 
of  wrong  to  things,  which  upon  farther  confideration 
and  knowledge  of  their  relations  to  other  things  are 
found  juft  and  good,  fo  it  is  perfectly  credible  that  the 
things  objeded,  againft  the  wifdom  and  goodnefs  of  the 

Chriftiaii 

*  Prov.  XX.  27. 


Part  11.        CONCLUSION, 


135 


Chriftian  difpenfation,  may  be  rendered  inftances  of 
wifdom  and  goodnefs  by  their  reference  to  other  things 
beyond  our  view  ;  becauie  Chriftianity  is  a  fcheme  as 
much  above  our  comprehenlion,  as  that  of  nature,  and 
like  that,  a  fcheme  in  which  means  are  made  ufe  of  to 
accomphfli  ends,  and  which,  as  is  mod  credible,  may 
be  carried  on  by  general  laws.  And  it  ought  to  be 
attended  to,  that  this  is  not  an  anfwer  taken  merely 
or  chiefly  from  our  ignorance,  but  from  fomewhat 
pofitive  which  our  obfervation  Ihews  us.  For,  to  like 
objedions  the  like  anfwer  is  experienced  to  be  juft, 
in  numberlefs  parallel  cafes.  The  obje£lions  againft 
the  Chrifbian  difpenfation,  and  the  method  by  which 
it  is  carried  on,  having  been  thus  obviated  in  general 
and  together,  the  chief  of  them  are  confidered  diftinft- 
ly,  and  the  particular  things  objeded  to  are  iTiewn, 
credible,  by  their  perfedt  analogy,  each  apart,  to  the 
conftitution  of  nature.  Thus,  if  man  be  fallen  from 
his  primitive  ftate,  and  to  be  reftored,  and  infinite 
wifdom  and  power  engages  in  accomplifhing  our  re- 
covery, it  were  to  have  been  expedied,  it  is  faid,  that 
this  fliould  have  been  effcded  at  once,  and  not  by 
fuch  a  long  feries  of  means,  and  fuch  a  various  econ- 
omy of  perfons  and  things ;  one  difpenfation  prepar- 
atory to  another,  this  to  a  farther  one,  and  lb  on 
through  an  indefinite  number  of  ages,  before  the  end 
of  the  fcheme  propofed  can  be  completely  accom- 
plifhed  J  a  fcheme  conducted  by  infinite  wifdom,  and 
executed  by  almighty  power.  But  now  on  the  con- 
trary, our  finding  that  every  thing  in  the  conftitution 
and  courfe  of  nature  is  thus  carried  on,  fliews  fuch  ex- 
pectations concerning  revelation  to  be  highly  unrea-- 
fonable,  and  is  a  fatisfadory  anfwer  to  them,  when 
urged  as  objections  againft  the  credibility  that  the 
great  fcheme  of  Providence  in  the  redemption  of  the 
world  may  be  of  this  kind,  and  to  be  accomplifhed  in 
this  mann-^^r.  As  to  the  particular  method  of  our  re- 
demption. 


53^  CONCLUSION.       Part  IL 

demption,  the  appointment  of  a  Mediator  between 
God  and  man,  this  has  been  ftiewn  to  be  moft  obvi- 
oufly  analogous  to  the  general  condud  of  nature,  i.  e. 
the  God  of  nature  in  appointing  others  to  be  the  in - 
ftruments  of  his  mercy,  as  v/e  experience  in  the  daily 
courfe  of  Providence.  The  condition  of  this  world, 
which  the  doftrine  of  our  redemption  by  Chrift  pre- 
fuppofes,  fo  much  falls  in  with  natural  appearances, 
that  heathen  moralifls  inferred  it  from  thole  appear- 
ances ;  inferred  that  human  nature  was  fallen  from 
its  original  rediitude,  and  in  confequence  of  this  de- 
graded from  its  primitive  happinefs.  Or,  however 
this  opinion  came  into  the  world,  thefe  appearances 
muft  have  kept  up  the  tradition,  and  confirmed  the 
belief  of  it.  And  as  it  was  the  general  opinion  un- 
der the  light  of  nature  that  repentance  and  reforma- 
tion, alone  and  by  itfelf,  was  not  fufficient  to  do  away 
fin,  and  procure  a  full  remiffion  of  the  penalties  an- 
nexed to  it,  and  as  the  reafon  of  the  thing  does  not 
at  all  lead  to  any  fuch  conclufion, — fo  every  day's  ex- 
perience fliews  us  that  reformation  is  not,  in  any  fort, 
fufficient  to  prevent  the  prefent  difadvantages  and 
mileries  which,  in  the  natural  courfe  of  things,  God 
lias  annexed  to  folly  and  extravagance.  Yet  there 
may  be  ground  to  think  that  the  punifliments,  which 
by  the  general  lav/s  of  divine  government  are  annexed 
to  vice,  may  be  prevented  ;  that  provifion  may  have 
been  even  originally  made,  that  they  fhould  be  pre- 
vented by  fome  means  or  other,  though  they  could 
not  by  reformation  alone.  For  we  have  daily  inftances 
oifiich  mercy ^  in  the  general  conduft  of  nature  ;  com- 
paffion  provided  for  mifery,*  medicines  for  difeafes, 
friends  againii  enemies.  There  is  provifion  made,  in 
the  oriorinal  conftltution  of  the  world,  that  much  of 
the  natural  bad  confequences  of  our  follies,  which 
perfons  themfelves  alone  cannot  prevent,  may  be  pre- 
vented 

*  Serm.  at  the  Rolls,  p.  io6. 


Part  II.        CONCLUSION. 


337 


vented  by  the  affiftance  of  others ;  affiftance  which 
nature  enables,  and  dtfpofes,  and  appoints  them  toaf^ 
tord.  By  a  method  of  goodnefs  analogous  to  this, 
when  the  world  lay  in  wickednefs  and  confequently  irj 
ruin,  Godfo  loved  the  worlds  that  he  gave  his  only  begot- 
ten Son  to  fave  it  ;  and  he  being  made  perfeB:  bv  fuffer- 
xngy  became  the  author  of  eternal  Jalvation  to  all  them  that 
obey  kirn.*  Ifideed  neither  reaibn  nor  analogy  would 
lead  us  to  think,  in  particular,  that  the  interpolition 
of  Chrift,  in  the  manner  in  which  he  did  interpofe, 
would  be  of  that  efficacy  for  recovery  of  the  world 
which  the  Scripture  teaches  us  it  was ;  but  neither 
\vould  reafon  nor  analogy  lead  us  to  think,  that  other 
particular  means  would  be  of  the  efficacy  which  expe- 
rience lliews  they  are,  in  nuniberlefs  inftances.  And 
therefore,  as  the  cafe  before  us  does  not  admit  of  ex- 
perience, fo  that  neither  reafon  nor  analogy  can  (hew 
how,  or  in  what  particular  way,  the  interpolition  of 
Chrift,  as  revealed  in  Scripture,  is  of  that  efficacy  which 
it  is  there  reprefented  to  be, — this  is  no  kind  nor  de- 
gree of  prefumption  againfl:  its  being  really  of  that 
efficacy.  Farther — the  objections  againft  Chriftianity, 
from  the  light  of  it  not  being  univerfal,  nor  its  evi- 
dence fo  ftrong  as  might  poffibly  be  given  us,  have 
been  anfwered  by  the  general  analogy  of  nature. 
That  God  has  made  fuch  variety  of  creatures,  is  in- 
deed an  anfwer  to  the  former  j  but  that  he  difpenfes 
his  gifts  in  fuch  variety,  both  of  degrees  and  kinds, 
amongft  creatures  of  the  fame  fpecies,  and  even  to  the 
fame  individuals  at  different  times,  is  a  more  obvious 
and  full  anfwer  to  it.  And  it  is  fo  far  from  being  the 
method  of  Providence  in  other  cafes,  to  afford  us  fuch 
overbearing  evidence  as  fome  require  in  proof  of  Chrift- 
ianity,  that  on  the  contrary,  the  evidence  upon  v.'h!ch 
we  are  naturally  appointed  to  ad:  in  comm.on  mat- 
ters^ throughout  a  very  great  part  of  life,  is  doubtful 

■^  Joh.  iii.  1 6.      Heb.  v.  91 


338"  CONCLUSION,       Part  IL 

in  a  high  degree.  And  admitting  the  fad:,  that  God 
has  afforded  to  fome  no  more  than  doubtful  evidence 
of  religion,  the  fame  account  may  be  given  of  it  as  of 
difficulties  and  temptations  with  regard  to  pra6tice. 
But  as  it  is  not  impoffible,*  furely,  that  this  alleged 
doubtfulnefs  may  be  men  s  own  fault,  it  deferves  their 
moft  ferious  confideration  whether  it  be  not  fo.  How- 
ever, it  is  certain  that  doubting  implies  a  degree  of 
evidence  for  that  of  which  we  doubt ;  and  that  this 
degree  of  evidence  as  really  lays  us  under  obligations, 
as  demonflrative  evidence. 

The  whole  then  of  religion  Is  throughout  credible ; 
nor  is  there,  I  think,  any  thing  relating  to  the  revealed 
difpenfation  of  things,  more  different  from  the  expe- 
rienced confhitution  and  courfe  of  nature,  than  fome 
parts  of  the  conflitution  of  nature  are  from  other  parts 
of  it.  And  if  fo,  the  only  queftion  which  remains  is, 
what  pofitive  evidence  can  be  alleged  for  the  truth  of 
Chriflianity.  This  too  in  general  has  been  confidered, 
and  the  objedions  agalnfl  it  eflimated,  Dedudt  there- 
fore what  is  to  be  dedu6ted  from  that  evidence,  upon 
account  of  any  weight  which  may  be  thought  to  re- 
main in  thefe  objedlions,  after  what  the  analogy  of 
nature  has  fuggefled  in  anfwer  to  them,  and  then  con- 
fider  what  are  the  practical  confequences  from  all  this, 
upon  the  moft  fceptical  principles  one  can  argue  upon, 
(for  I  am  writing  to  perfons  who  entertain  thefe  prin- 
ciples) and  upon  fuch  confideration  it  will  be  obvious 
that  immorality,  as  little  excufe  as  it  admits  of  in  it- 
felf,  is  greatly  aggravated  in  perfons  who  have  been 
made  acquainted  with  Chriftianity,  whether  they  be- 
lieve it  or  not ;  becaufe  the  moral  iyftem  of  nature,  or 
natural  rehgion,  which  Chriflianity  lays  before  us,  ap- 
proves itfelf,  almoft  intuitively,  to  a  reafonable  mind 
upon  feeing  it  propofed;  In  the  next  place,  with  re- 
gard to  Chriftianity  it  will  be  obferved,  that  there  is  a 

middle 

*  p.  274,  &c. 


Part  II.        CONCLUSION.  339 

middle  between  a  full  fatisfadlon  of  the  truth  of  it, 
and  a  fatisfadion  of  the  contrary.  The  middle  ftate 
of  mind  between  thefe  two,  confifts  in  a  ferious  appre- 
henfion  that  it  may  be  true,  joined  with  doubt  whether 
it  be  fo.  And  this,  upon  the  beft  judgment  I  am  able 
to  make,  is  as  far  towards  fpeculative  infidehty  as  any 
fceptick  can  at  all  be  fuppofed  to  go,  who  has  had 
true  Chriftianity,  with  the  proper  evidence  of  it,  laid 
before  him,  and  has  in  any  tolerable  meafure  confid- 
ered  them.  For  I  would  not  be  miftaken  to  compre- 
hend all  who  have  ever  heard  of  it ;  becaufe  it  feems 
evident  that  in  many  countries,  called  Chriftian,  nei- 
ther Chriftianity  nor  its  evidence  are  fairly  laid  before 
men.  And  in  places  where  both  are,  there  appear  to 
be  fome  who  have  very  little  attended  to  either,  and 
who  rejeft  Chriftianity  with  a  fcorn  proportionate  to 
their  inattention,  and  yet  are  by  no  means  without 
underftanding  in  other  matters.  Now  it  has  been 
fhewn  that  a  ferious  apprehenfion  that  Chriftianity 
may  be  true,  lays  perfons  under  the  ftrifteft  obliga- 
tions of  a  ferious  regard  to  it  throughout  the  whole  of 
their  life  ;  a  regard  not  the  fame  exaftly,  but  in  many 
refpedts  nearly  the  fame,  with  what  a  full  convi61:ion  of 
its  truth  would  lay  them  under.  Laftly,  it  will  ap- 
pear that  blafphemy  and  profanenefs,  I  mean  with  re- 
gard to  Chriftianity,  are  abfolutely  without  excufe. 
For  there  is  no  temptation  to  it  but  from  the  wan- 
tonnefs  of  vanity  or  mirth  ;  and  thefe,  confidering  the 
infinite  importance  of  the  fubjeft,  are  no  fuch  tempta- 
tions as  to  aiford  any  excufe  for  it.  If  this  be  a  juft 
account  of  things,  and  yet  men  can  go  on  to  vilify  or 
difregard  Chriftianity,  which  is  to  talk  and  aft  as  if 
they  had  a  demonftration  of  its  falfehood,  there  is  no 
reafon  to  think  they  would  alter  their  behaviour  to 
any  purpofe,  though  there  were  a  demonftration  of 
its  truth. 

The  end  of  the  SECOND  PART. 


TWO     BRIEF 

DISSERTATION  S« 


I.     Of  Per'jonal    Identity. 
11.     Of  the    Nature  of  Virtue, 


A  D  V  ERTISEM  E  N  T. 

In  the  fir Ji  copy  of  thefe  papers,  I  had  in- 
fer ted  the  two  following  Dijfertations  into  the  chapters^ 
Of  a  Future  Life,  and.  Of  the  Moral  Government 
of  God,  with  which  they  are  clofely  conneEled,  But 
as  they  do  not  dire£lly  fall  under  the  title  of  the  fore- 
going Treatifey  and  zmuld  have  kept  the  fubjeSl  of  it 
too  long  out  of  fight  y  it  feemed  more  proper  to  place 
them  by  themfelves. 


DISSERTATION    I. 


Of  Perfonal   Identity, 

VV  HETHER  we  are  to  live  In  a  future 
ilate,  as  it  is  the  moft  important  queftion  which  can 
poflibly  be  afked,  fo  it  is  the  moft  intelligible  one 
which  can  be  exprefled  in  language.  Yet  ftrange  per- 
plexities have  been  raifed  about  the  meaning  of  that 
identity  or  famenefs  of  perfon,  which  is  implied  in  the 
notion  of  our  living  now  and  hereafter,  or  in  any  two 
rucceflive  moments.  And  the  folution  of  thefe  diffi- 
culties hath  been  ftronger  than  the  difficulties  them- 
felves.  For,  perfonal  identity  has  been  explained  fo 
by  fome,  as  to  render  the  inquiry  concerning  a  future 
life  of  no  confequence  at  all  to  us,  the  perfons  who  are 
making  it.  And  though  few  men  can  be  milled  by 
fuch  fubtieties,  yet  it  may  be  proper  a  little  to  con- 
fider  them- 

Now,  when  it  is  afked  wherein  perfonal  identity 
coniifts,  the  anfwer  fhould  be  the  fame  as  if  it  were 
a{ked  v/herein  confifts  limilitude  or  equality  ;  that  ail 
attempts  to  define  would  but  perplex  it.  Yet  there 
is  no  difficulty  at  all  in  afcertaining  the  idea.  For  as, 
upon  two  triangles  being  compared  or  viewed  togeth- 
er, there  arifes  \o  the  mind  the  idea  of  fimilitude,  or 
upon  twice  two  and  four,  the  idea  of  equality, — fo 
iikewife,  upon  comparing  the  confciouineHes  oi  one's 

felf 


544  Q/"  P^^fi^^^^  Identity.  Diss,  tr 

felf  or  one's  own  exiftence  in  any  two  moments,  there 
as  immediately  arifes  to  the  mind  the  idea  of  perfonal 
identity.  And  as  the  two  former  comparifons  not 
only  give  us  the  ideas  of  fimiHtude  and  equahty,  but 
aUb  iliew  us  that  two  triangles  are  aUke,  and  twice 
two  and  four  are  equal, — fo  the  latter  comparifon  not 
only  gives  us  the  idea  of  perfonal  identity,  but  alfo 
fliews  us  the  identity  of  ourfelves  in  thofe  two  mo- 
ments ;  the  prefent,  fuppofe,  and  that  immediately 
paft ;  or  the  prefent,  and  that,  a  month,  a  year,  or 
twenty  years  paft.  Or  in  other  words,  by  refle£ling 
upon  that  which  is  my  felf  now,  and  that  which  w^as 
my  felf  twenty  years  ago,  I  difcern  they  are  not  two, 
but  one  and  the  fame  felf- 

But  though  confcioufnefs  of  what  is  pafl  does  thus 
afcertain  our  perfonal  identity  to  ourfelves,  yet  to  fay 
that  it  makes  perfonal  identity,  or  is  necelTary  to  our 
being  the  fame  perfons,  is  to  fay  that  a  perfon  has  not 
exifted  a  fmgle  moment,  nor  done  one  aftion,  biit 
what  he  can  remember ;  Indeed  none  but  what  he  re- 
flects upon.  And  one  fliould  really  think  it  felfevi- 
dent,  that  confcioufnefs  of  perfonal  identity  prefup- 
pofes,  and  therefore  cannot  confbitute,  perfonal  iden- 
tity, any  more  than  knowledge  in  any  other  cafe  can 
conftitute  truth,  which  it  prefuppofes. 

This  wonderful  miftake  may  poffibly  have  arifen 
from  hence,  that  to  be  endued  with  confcioufnefs  is 
infeparable  from  the  idea  of  a  perfon  or  intelligent  be- 
ing. For,  this  might  be  expreffed  inaccurately  thus, 
that  confcioufnefs  makes  perfonality,  and  from  henc^ 
it  might  be  concluded  to  make  perfonal  identity.  But 
though  prefent  confcioufnefs  of  what  we  at  prefent  do 
and  feel  is  neceflary  to  our  being  the  perfons  we  now 
are,  yet  prefent  confcioufnefs  of  paft  actions  or  feelings 
is  not  necelFary  to  our  being  the  fame  perfons,  who 
performed  thofe  adions  or  had  thofe  feelings. 

The 


t)iss.  L  Of  Perfonal  Identity.  34^ 

The  inquiry,  what  makes  vegetables  the  fame  in  the 
common  acceptation  of  the  word,  does  not  appear  to 
have  any  relation  to  this  of  perfonal  identity,  becaufe 
the  word  fame,  when  applied  to  them  and  to  perfon,  is 
not  only  applied  to  different  fubjeds,  but  it  is  alfo 
ufed  in  different  fenfes.  For  when  a  man  fvvears  to 
the  fame  tree  as  having  flood  fifty  years  in  the  fame 
place,  he  means  only  the  fame  as  to  all  the  purpofes  of 
property  and  ufes  of  common  life,  and  not  that  the 
tree  has  been  all  that  time  the  fame  in  the  ffrift  phi- 
iofophical  fenfe  of  the  word.  For  he  does  not  know, 
Vv'hether  any  one  particle  of  the  prefent  tree  be  the 
fame  with  any  one  particle  of  the  tree  which  flood  in 
the  fame  place  fifty  years  ago.  And  if  they  have  not 
one  common  particle  of  matter,  they  cannot  be  the 
fame  tree  in  the  proper  philofophick  fenfe  of  the  word 
fame  ;  it  being  evidently  a  contradidion  in  terms  to 
fay  they  are,  when  no  part  of  their  fubflance  and  no 
one  of  their  properties  is  the  fame  ;  no  part  of  their 
fubflance,  by  the  fuppofition  ;  no  one  of  their  prop- 
erties, becaufe  it  is  allowed  that  the  fame  property  can- 
not be  transferred  from  one  fubflance  to  another.  And 
therefore  when  we  fay  the  identity  or  famenefs  of  g. 
plant  confifls  in  a  continuation  of  the  fame  life,  com- 
municated under  the  fame  organization  to  a  number 
of  particles  of  matter,  whether  the  fame  or  not, — the 
word  famey  when  applied  to  life  and  to  organization, 
cannot  podibly  be  underflood  to  fgnifjr  what  it  iigni- 
fies  in  this  very  fentence  when  applied  to  matter.  In 
a  loofe  and  popular  fenfe  then,  the  life  and  the  organ- 
ization and  the  plant  are  juflly  faid  to  be  the  fame, 
notwithflanding  the  perpetual  change  of  the  parts. 
But  in  a  fcrid  and  philofophical  manner  of  fpeech,  no 
man,  no  being,  no  mode  of  being,  no  anything,  can  be 
the  fame  with  that  with  which  it  hath  indeed  nothing 
the  fame.  Now  famenefs  is  uied  in  this  latter  fenfe 
when  applied  to  perfons.  The  identity  of  thefe,  there- 
fore, cannot  liibfifl  with  dlverfity  of  fubflance. 

Y  •  The 


546  Of  PerJoMl  Identify,  Diss.  \, 

The  thing  here  confidered,  and  demonftratively,  as 
I  think,  determined,  is  propofed  by  Mr.  Locke  in  thefe 
words,  whether  it^  i.  e.  the  fame  felf  or  perlbn, .  be  the 
fame  identical  ftibfiance  f  And  he  has  fuggefted  what  is 
a  much  better  anfwer  to  the  queflion  than  that  which 
he  gives  it  in  form.  For  he  defines  perfon,  a  thinking 
intelligent  beings  &c.  and  perfonal  identity,  the  famrnefs 
of  a  rational  being.*  The  qiieftion  then  is,  whether 
the  fame  rational  being  is  the  fame  fubftance  ;  which 
needs  no  anfwer,  becaufe  being  and  fubftance  in  this 
place  ftand  for  the  fame  idea.  The  ground  of  the 
doubt,  whether  the  fame  perfon  be  the  fame  fubftance, 
is  faid  to  be  this,  that  the  confcioufnefs  of  our  own 
exiftence  in  youth  and  in  old  age,  or  in  any  two  joint 
fucceffive  moments,  is  not  the  fame  individual  action,^ 
i.  e.  not  the  fame  confcioufnefs,  but  different  Ibc- 
cefiive  confciouinelTes.  Now  it  is  ftrange  that  this 
lliould  have  occafioned  fuch  perplexities.  For  it  is 
furely  conceivable  that  a  perfon  may  have  a  capacity 
of  knowing  fome  objeft  ox  other  to  be  the  fame  now, 
which  it  was  when  he  contemplated  it  formerly ;  yet 
in  this  cafe,  where  by  the  fuppofition  the  object  is  per- 
ceived to  be  the  fame,  the  perception  of  it  in  any  two 
moments  cannot  be  one  and  the  fame  perception.  And 
thus,  though  the  fucceffive  confcioufnelfes  which  we 
"  have  of  our  own  exiftence  are  not  the  fame,  yet  are  they 
confcioufnelfes  of  one  and  the  fame  thing  or  objeft  ; 
of  the  fame  perfon,  feif,  or  living  agent.  The  perfon 
of  whofe  exiftence  the  confcioufnefs  is  felt  now,  and 
was  felt  an  hour  or  a  year  ago,  is  difcerned  to  be,  not 
two  perfons,  but  one  and  the  fame  perfon  ;  and  there- 
fore is  one  and  the  fame. 

Mr.  Locke's  obfervations  upon  this  fubje£l:  appear 
hafty  ;  and  he  feems  to  profefs  himfelf  diffatisfied 
with  fuppofitions  which  he  has  made  relating  to  it.j; 

But 

*  Locke's  Works,  vol.  I.  p.  145. 
f  Locke,  p.  146,  147. 
%  Locke,  p.  15a. 


Diss.  L  Of  Perfonal  Identify^  ^47 

But  fome  of  thofe  haity  obfervations  have  been  carried 
to  a  (Irange  length  by  others,  whofe  notion,  wlien  tra- 
ced and  examined  to  the  bottom,  amounts,  I  think, 
to  this ,:  *  "That,  perfonahty  is  not  a  permanent,  but 
a  tranfient  thing ;  that  it  hves  and  dies,  begins  and 
ends  continually  ;  that  no  one  can  any  more  remain 
one  and  tlie  lame  perfon  two  moments  together,  than 
two  fucceiTive  moments  can  be  one  and  the  fame  mo- 
ment ;  that  our  fubftance  is  indeed  continually  chang- 
ing ;  but  whether  this  be  fo  or  not,  is,  it  feems,  noth- 
ing to  the  purpofe,  fmce  it  is  not  fubftance,  but  con- 
fcioufnefs  alone,  which  conftitutes  perfonahty,  which 
confeioufnefs  being  facceffive  cannot  be  the  fame  in 
any  two  momentSj  nor  confequently  the  perfonallty 
conftituted  by  it."  And  from  hence  it  muft  follow, 
that  it  is  a  fallacy  upon  ourfelves  to  charge  our  prefent 
felves  with  any  thing  we. did,  or  to  imagine  our  prefent 
ielves  intereiied  in  any  thing  which  betel  us  yefierday, 
or  that  our  prefent  felf  will  be  interefted  in  what  will 
befal  us  tomorrow  ;  lince  our  prefent  felf  is  not,  in  real- 
ity, the  fame  with  the  felf  of  yefterday,  but  another 
like  felf  or  perfon  coming  in  its  room,  and  miftaken 
for  it  ;  to  which  another  felf  will  fucceed  tomorrow. 
This,  I  fay,  muft  follow  ;  for  if  the  felf  or  perfon  of  to- 
day, and  that  of  tomorrow,  are  not  the  fame,  but  on- 
ly like  perfons,  the  perfon  of  today  is  really  no  more 
interefted  in  what  will  befal  the  perfon  of  tomorrow, 
than  in  what  will  befal  any  other  perfon.  It  may 
be  thought  perhaps,  that  this  is  not  a  juft  reprefenta- 
tion  of  the  opinion  we  are  fpeaking  of  j  becaufe  thofe 
who  maintain  it  allow,  that  a  perfon  is  the  lame  as  far 
back  as  his  remembrance  reaches.  And  indeed  they 
do  ufe  the  words  identity  and  fame  perfon.  Nor  will 
language  permit  thefe  words  to  be  laid  alide ;  fince  if 
they  were,  there  muft  be,  I  know  not  what  ridiculous 

periphrafis 

•'■■  See  an  anfiver  to  Dr.  Clarks'i  third  defence  of  his  letter  to  Mr-  i'si- 
i--'.\  2'.i  «;d!t.  p.  44,  56,  &c. 

Y  2 


34^  Of  Verfond  fckntiiy.  liiss.  fv 

periphrafis  fubftituted  in  the  room  of  them.  But 
they  cannot,  confiftently  with  themfelves,  mean  that 
the  perfon  is  really  the  fame.  For,  it  is  felfevident  that 
the  perfonality  cannot  be  really  the  fame,  if,  as  they 
exprefsly  alTert,  that  in  which  it  confifts  is  not  the 
fame.  And  as,  confiftently  with  themfelves,  they  can- 
not, fo  I  think  it  appears  they  do  not,  mean  that  the 
perfon  is  really  the  fame,  but  only  that  he  is  fo  in  a 
fictitious  fenfe  ;  in  fuch  a  fenfe  only  as  they  aflert,  for 
this  they  do  alfert,  that  any  number  of  perfons  what- 
ever may  be  the  fame  perfon.  The  bare  unfolding 
this  notion,  and  laying  it  thus  naked  and  open,  feems 
the  beft  confutation  of  it.  However,  fmce  great  flrefs- 
is  faid  to  be  put  upon  it,  I  add  the  following  things. 

Firji^  This  notion  is  abfolutely  contradictory  to 
that  certain  conviftion  which  neceffarily  and  every 
moment  rifes  within  us,  when  we  turn  our  thoughts 
upon  ourfelves,  when  we  reileft  upon  what  is  pad,  and 
look  forward  upon  what  is  to  come.  All  imagination 
of  a  daily  change  of  that  living  agent  v/hich  each  man 
calls  himfelf,  for  another,  or  of  any  fuch  change 
throughout  our  v/hole  prefent  life,  is  entirely  borne 
down  by  our  natural  fenfe  of  things.  Nor  is  it  poflible 
for  a  perfon  in  his  wits  to  alter  his  conduft,  with  re- 
gard to  his  health  or  affairs,  from  a  fufpicion  that 
though  he  fhould  live  tomorrow,  he  fhould  not,  how- 
ever, be  the  fame  perfon  he  is  today.  And  yet,  if  it 
be  reafonable  to  aft,  with  refpeO:  to  a  future  life,  up- 
on this  notion  that  perfonality  is  tranfient,  it  is  reafon- 
able to  aft  upon  it  with  refpeft  to  the  prefent.  Here 
then  is  a  notion  equally  applicable  to  religion  and  to 
our  temporal  concerns,  and  every  one  fees  and  feels  the 
inexprefiibie  abfurdity  of  it  in  the  latter  cafe  ;  if  there- 
fore any  can  take  up  with  it  in  the  former,  this  cannot 
proceed  from  the  reafon  of  the  thing,  but  mull  be  ow- 
ing to  an  inward  unfairnefs  and  fecret  corruption  oi 
heart. 

Secondly^ 


Piss.  I.  Of  Pe^fotial  Identity.  349 

Secondly,  It  is  not  an  idea,  or  abftrad  notion,  or 
quality,  but  a  being  only,  which  is  capable  of  life  and 
a<Sion,  of  happinefs  and  mifery.  Now  all  beings  con- 
feflediy  continue  the  fame,  during  the  whole  time  of 
their  exiftence.  Confider  then  a  livino-  beins;  now 
exiftmg,  and  which  has  exifted  for  any*  time  alive  ; 
this  living  being  mufh  have  done  and  fufFered  and 
enjoyed,  what  it  has  done  and  fufFered  and  enjoyed 
formerly,  (this  living  being,  I  fay,  and  not  .another)  as 
really  as  it  does  and  fuffers  and  enjoys,  what  it  does 
and  fuffers  and  enjoys  this  inftant.  All  thefe  fucceffive 
adlions,  enjoyments  and  fufFerings,  are  actions,  enjoy- 
ments and  fufFerings  of  the  fame  living  being.  And 
they  are  fo,  prior  to  all  confideration  of  its  remember- 
ing or  forgetting ;  fmce  remembering  or  forgetting 
can  make  no  alteration  in  the  truth  of  pafl  matter  of 
faft.  And  fuppofe  this  being  endued  with  limited 
powers  of  knowledge  and  memory,  there  is  no  more 
difiiculty  in  conceiving  it  to  h^ve  a  power  of  knowing 
itfelf  to  be  the  fame  living  being  which  it  was  fome 
time  ago,  of  remembering  fome  of  its  adions,  fufier- 
ings  and  enjoyments,  and  forgetting  others,  than  in 
conceiving  it  to  know  or  remember  or  forget  any  thing 
elfe. 

Thirdly y  Every  perfon  is  confcious,  that  he  is  now 
the  fame  perfon  or  felf  he  was  as  far  back  as  his  re- 
membrance reaches ;  lince  when  any  one  reflects  upon 
a  pafl  adion  of  his  own,  he  is  juft  as  certain  of  the  per- 
fon who  did  that  adion,  namely,  himfelf,  the  perlbn 
who  now  reflects  upon  it,  as  he  is  certain  that  the  ac- 
tion was  at  all  done.  Nay,  very  often  a  perfon's  alFur- 
ance  of  an  adlion  having  been  done,  of  which  he  is  ab- 
folutely  afFured,  arifes  wholly  from  the  conicioufnefs 
that  he  himfelf  did  it.  And  this  he,  perfon,  or  felf,  muft 
ei,ther  be  a  fubftance,  or  the  property  of  fome  fubftance. 
If  he,  if  perfon,  be  a  fubftance,  then  confcioufnefs  that 
he  is  the  fame  perfon,  is  conicioufnefs  that  he  is  the 

fame 


5.5^  Cy  Perfonal  Identity.  Diss.  L 

fame  fubftance.  If  the  perfon,  or  he,  be  the  property 
of  a  fubftance,  ftill  confcioufners  that  he' is  the  fame 
property  is  as  certain  a  proof  that  his  fubftance  remains 
the  fame,  as  confcioiifnefs  that  he  remains  the  fame 
fubftance  would  be  •  fince  the  fame  property  canndt 
be  transferred  from  one  fubftance  to  another. 

But  though  we  are  thus  certain  that  we  are  the 
fame  agents,  Hving  beings,  or  fubftanccs  now,  which 
we  were  a;  far  back  as  our  remembrance  reaches,  yet 
it  is  afked  whether  we  may  not  poflibly  be  deceived 
m  it  ?  And  this  qucftion  may  be  alked  at  the  end  of 
any  demonftration  whatever  ;  becaufe  it  is  a  queftion 
concerning  the  truth  of  perception  by  memory.  "  And 
he  who  can  "doubt  whether  perception  by  memory  can 
in  this  cafe  be  depended  upon,  ma]/-  doubt  alfo  whether 
perception  by  dedu^tioh  and  reafoning,  which  alfo  in- 
clude memory,  or  indeed  whether  intuitive  perception 
can.  Here  then  we  can  go  no  farther.  For  it  is  ri- 
diculous to  attempt  to  prove  the  truth  of  thofe  per- 
ceptions, ivhofe  truth  we  can  no  otherwife  prove  than 
by  other  perceptions  of  exactly  the  fame  kind  with 
them,  and  which  there  is  juft'the  fame  ground  to  fuf- 
pe<ft  5  or  to  attempt  to  prove  the  truth  of  our  facul- 
ties, which  can  no  otherwife  be  proved  than  by  the 
ufe  or  means  of  thofe  very  fufpedted  faculties  then:^V 
ielves,  • 


DISSERTATION     11. 


Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue, 


Jl  hat  which  renders  beings  capable  of 
iiioral  government,  is  their  having  a  moral  nature  and 
moral  faculties  of  perception  and  of  action.  Brute 
creatures  are  impreffed  and  actuated  by  various  in-r 
ifincfls  and  propenfions ;  fo  alfo  ar^  we.  But  addi- 
tional to  this,  we  have  a  capacity  of  reflecting  upoi> 
actions  and  characters,  and  making  them  an  object  to 
our  thought ;  arid  on  doing  this,  we  naturally  and 
unavoidably  approve  fome  actions,  under  the  peculiar 
view  of  their  being  virtuous  and  of  good  delert,  and 
difapprove  others,  as  vicious  and  of  ill  defert=  That 
we  have  this  moral  approving  and  difapproving  *  fac- 
ulty, is  certain  from  our  experiencing  it  in  ourfelves, 
and  recognizing  it  in  each  other.  It  appears  from 
our  exercifing  it  unavoidably,  in  the  approbation  and 
dllapprobation  even  of  feigned  characters  ;  from  the 
words,  right  and  wrong,  odious  and  amiable,  bafe 
and  worthy,  with  many  others  of  like  fignification  in. 
all  languages,  applied  to  a£lions  and  characters  j  from 
the  many  written  fyltems  of  morals  which  fuppofe  it, 
fmce  it  cannot  be  imagined  that  all  thefe  authors, 

throughout 

*  This  way  of  fpeaking  is  taken  frcm  Ep/Sfetus,  [a]  and  is  made  vife  of  as 
feeming  the  moft  full,  and  leaft  liable  to  cavil.    And  the  moral  faculty  may  be 

underflood  tohavethefe  two  epithets,  (^oxijUaTTtxr)  and  (X7ro^OKiiJ.iX(TTmY}y 
upon  a  double  account ;  becaufe,  upon  a  furvey  of  adlious,  whether  before 
or  after  they  are  done,  it  di^termines  them  to  be  good  or  evil ;  and  alfo  be- 
caufe it  determines  itfeif  to  be  the  guide  of  a<5lion  and  of  life,  in  contradif- 
tinftion  from  all  other  faculties,  or  natural  principles  of  aftion  ;  in  the  veiy 
fame  manner  as  fpeculative  reafon  diicB.'y  and  naturally  judges  of  fpeculative 
truth  and  falfehood,  and  at  the  fame  time  is  attended  with  a  confcioufnefs 
upon  rrJieSl'wny  that  the  natiiral  right  to  judge  of  them  beionp  tp  it. 

[a]   Arr.  EpiFt.   I.  I.   c.  \, 


35^  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  Diss.  IT, 

throughout  all  thefe  treatifes,  had  abfolutel)''  no  mean- 
ing at  all  to  their  words,  or  a  meaning  merely  chimer- 
ical ;  from  our  natural  fenfe  of  gratitude,  which  im- 
plies a  difl:in6lion  between  merely  being  the  infhrumenfc 
of  good  and  intending  it  ;  from  the  like  diftindion 
every  one  makes  between  injury  and  mere  harm, which, 
Hobbs  fays,  is  peculiar  to  mankind  ;  and  between  in- 
jury and  jufl:  punifliment,  a  diftinction  plainly  natural, 
prior  to  the  confideration  of  human  laws.  It  is  man- 
ifeft  great  part  of  common  language,  and  of  common 
behaviour  over  the  world,  is  formed  upon  fuppofition 
of  fuch  a  moral  faculty,  whether  called  confcience, 
moral  reafon,  moral  fenfe,  or  divine  reafon  j  whether 
confidered  as  a  fentiment  of  the  underflanding,  or  as 
a  perception  of  the  heart,  or,  which  feems  the  truth, 
as  including  both.  Nor  is  it  at  all  doubtful  in  the 
general  what  courfe  of  action  this  faculty  or  practical 
difcerning  power  within  us  approves,  and  what  it  dif- 
approves.  For,  as  much  as  it  has  been  difputed 
wherein  virtue  confifts,  or  whatever  ground  for  doubt 
there  may  be  about  particulars,— yet,  in  general,  there 
is  in  reality  an  univerfally  acknowledged  ilandard  of 
it.  It  is  that  which  all  ages  and  all  countries  have 
made  profeffion  of  in  publick  j  it  is  that  which  every 
man  you  meet  puts  on  the  (hew  of ;  it  is  that  which 
the  primary  and  fundamental  laws  of  all  civil  confti- 
tutions,  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  make  it  their  bufi- 
nefs  and  endeavour  to  enforce  the  practice  of  upon 
mankind  ;  namely,  juftice,  veracity,  and  regard  to 
common  good.  It  being  manifeft  then,  in  general, 
that  we  have  fuch  a  faculty  or  difcernment  as  this,  it 
may  be  of  ufe  to  remark  fome  things  more  diftinctly 
concern! no;  it. 

FirJ}^    It  ought  to  be  obferved  that  the  objedt  of 
this  faculty  is  adions,*  comprehending  under  that 

name 

Anton.  I.   g.  i6.     Virtutii  laus  omnis  in  aftione  confiftiu     Cic.  Off,  1.  r. 
c.  €. 


Diss.  II,  Of  the  Nature  of  Vtrtuc.  353 

name  active  or  pra<5liGal  principles  ;  thofe  principles 
from  which  men  would  ail  if  occafions  and  clrcum- 
llances  gave  them  power,  and  which,  when  fixed  and 
habitual  in  any  perfon,  we  call  his  charader.  It  does 
not  appear  that  brutes  have  the  leaft  refiex  fenfe  of 
actions  as  dlftinguiihed  from  events,  or  that  will  and 
defign,  which  conftitute  the  very  nature  of  a(5tions,  au 
fuch,  are  at  ail  an  objecfl  to  their  perception.  But  to 
ours  they  ^re  ;  and  they  are  the  objedit,  and  the  only 
one,  of  the  approving  and  difapproving  faculty.  A6t- 
ing,  condu<!t,  behaviour,  abftradied  from  all  regard  to 
what  is,  in  fa6l  and  event,  the  confequence  ot  it,  is  it- 
felf  the  natural  obje6l  of  the  moral  difcernment,  as 
fpecuiative  truth  and  falfehood  is  of  Ipeculative  reafon. 
Intention  of  fuch  and  fuch  confequences,  indeed,  is  al- 
ways included,  for  it  is  part  of  the  action  itfelf ;  but 
though  the  intended  good  or  bad  confequences  do  not 
follow,  we  have  exadly  the  fame  fenfe  of  the  aclion  as 
if  they  did.  In  like  manner  we  think  well  or  ill  of 
characters,  abftrafted  from  all  conlideration  of  the 
good  or  the  evil  which  perfons  of  fuch  characlers  have 
it  aftually  in  their  power  to  do.  We  never,  in  tlie 
moral  way,  applaud  or  blame  either  ourfelves  or  others 
for  what  we  enjoy  or  v;hat  we  fufFer,  or  for  having  ira- 
preflions  made  upon  us  which  v.'e  coniider  as  altogether 
out  of  our  power  ;  but  only  for  what  we  do,  or  would 
have  done,  had  it  been  in  our  power,  or  for  what  we 
leave  undone  which  we  might  have  done,  or  would 
have  left  undone  though  we  could  have  done  it. 

Secondly y  Our  fenie  or  difcernment  of  adlions  as 
^morally  good  or  evil,  implies  in  it  a  fenfe  or  difcerrr- 
"ment  of  them  as  of  good  or  ill  defert.  It  may  bedif- 
■jficult  to  explain  this  perception,  fo  as. to  anfwerali  the 
queftions  which  may  be 'aiktd  concerning  it ;  but  ev- 
'ery  one  fpeaks  of  fiich  and  fuch.aftions  as  deferving 
punifhment,  and  it  is  not,  I  fuppofe,  pretended  that 
'they  have  abfolutei^vao^meaning  at  -all  ta  the  expref- 

fion. 


3  54  ^f  ^^^^  Nature  of  Virtue.  Diss.  II, 

fion.  Now  the  meaning  plainly  is  not,  that  we  con- 
ceive it  for  the  good  of  fociety  that  the  doer  of  fuch 
actions  iliould  be  made  to  fuffer.  For  if  unhappily  it 
were  refolved  that  a  man,  who  by  fome  innocent  ac- 
tion was  infeded  with  the  plague,  fliould  be  left  to 
perifn,  left  by  other  people's  coming  near  him  the  in- 
fed:  ion  ftiouid  fpread, — no  one  would  fay  he  deferved 
this  treatment.  Innocence  and  ill  defert  are  inconfift- 
ent  ideas.  Ill  defert  always  fuppofes  guilt ;  and  if  one 
be  not  part  of  the  other,  yet  they  are  evidently  and 
naturally  connefted  in  our  mind.  The  fight  of  a  man 
in  mifery  raifes  our  compaffion  towards  him  ;  and  if 
this  mifery  be  inflifted  on  him  by  another,  our  indig- 
nation againit  the  author  of  it.  But  when  we  are  in- 
form.ed  that  the  fufferer  is  a  villain,  and  is  puniflied 
only  for  his  treachery  or  cruelty,  our  compaffion  ex- 
ceedingly leffens,  and  in  many  inflances  our  indigna- 
tion wholly  fublides.  Now  what  produces  this  effed:, 
is  the  conception  of  that  in  the  fuiferer  which  we  call 
ill  defert.  Upon  confidering  then,  or  viewing  togeth- 
er, our  notion  of  vice  and  that  of  mifery,  there  refults 
a  third,  that  of  ill  defert.  And  thus  there  is  in  hu- 
man creatures  an  affociation  of  the  two  ideas,  natural 
and  moral  evil,  wicked nefs  and  punifhment.  If  this 
affociation  were  merely  artificial  or  accidental,  it  were 
nothing ;  but  being  moil  unqueilionably  natural,  it 
greatly  concerns  us  to  attend  to  it,  inftead  of  endeav- 
ouring to  explain  it  away. 

It  may  be  oblerved  farther,  concerning  our  percep- 
tion of  good  and  of  ill  defert,  that  the  former  is  very 
weak  with  refpecl  to  common  inftances  of  virtue  ; 
or,e  reafon  of  which  may  be,  that  it  does  not  a,ppea,r 
to  a  fpedator  how  far  fuch  inftances  of  virtue  proceed 
from  a  virtuous  principle,  or  in  what  degree  this  prin- 
ciple is  prevalent,  fmce  a  very  weak  regard  to  virtue 
may  be  lufficient  to  make  men  aft  well  in  many  com- 
mon inftances.    And  on.the  other  haiid,  our  perception 

of 


piss.  II,  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  35^ 

of  ill  defert  in  vicious  actions  lefTens,  in  proportion  to 
the  temptations  men  are  thought  to  have  had  to  luch 
vices.  For,  vice  in  human  creatures  confifting  chiefly 
in  the  abfence  or  want  of  the  virtuous  principle,  thougn 
a  iTian  be  overcome,  fuppofe,  by  tortures,  it  does  not 
from  thence  appear  to  what  degree  the  virtuous  prin- 
ciple was  wanting.  All  that  appears  is,  that  he  had  it 
not  in  fiich  a  degree  as  to  prevail  over  the  temptation  ; 
but  poffibly  he  had  it  in  a  degree  which  would  have 
rendered  him  proof  againft  common  temptations. 

Thirdly,  Our  perception  of  vice  and  ill  defert  arifeii 
from,  and  is  the  refult  of,  a  comparifon  of  actions  witii 
the  nature  and  capacities  of  the  agent.  For,  the  mere 
negledl  of  doing  what  we  ought  to  do,  would  in  many 
cafes  be  determined  by  all  men  to  be  in  the  higheft 
degree  vicious.  And  this  determination  mufh  arife 
from  fuch  comparifon,  and  be  the  refult  of  it,  be- 
caufe  luch  neglecft  would  not  be  vicious  in  creatures 
of  other  natures  and  capacities,  as  brutes.  And  it 
is  the  fame  alfo  with  refpedt  to  pofitive  vices,  or 
fuch  as  confift  in  doing  what;  we  ought  not.  For, 
every  one  has  a  different  fenfe  of  harm  done  by  an 
idiot,  madman,  or  child,  and  by  one  of  mature  and 
common  underftanding,  though  the  adion  of  both, 
including  the  intention  which  is  part  of  the  a6lion,  be 
the  fame  j  as  it  "may  be,  fmce  idiots  and  m.admen,  as 
well  as  children,  are  capable  not  only  of  doing  mil- 
chief,  but  alfo  of  intending  it.  "^  Now  this  difference 
muft  arife  from  fomewhat  difcerned  in  the  nature  or 
capacities  of  one,  which  renders  the  aftion  vicious, 
and  the  want  of  which  iii  the  other,  renders  the  fanrie 
action  innocent  or  lefs  vicious  ;  and  this  plainly  fup- 
pofes  a  comparifon,  whether  refle&ed  upon  or  not, 
between  the  action  and  capacities  of  the  agent,  previ- 
ous to  our  determining  an  aftion  to  be  viciou::.  And 
hence  arifes  a  proper  application  of'  the  epitliets, 
incongruous,   unfuitable,  difproportionate,  unfit,  to 

actions 


35^  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  Diss.  II, 

actions  which  our  moral  faculty  determines  to  be 
vicious. 

Fourthly^  It  deferves  to  he  confidered  whether  men 
are  more  at  liberty,  in  point  of  morals,  to  make  them- 
felves  miferable  without  reafon,  than  to  make  other 
people  fo  ;  or  diffolutely  to  neglecl  their  own  greater 
good,  for  the  fake  of  a  prcfent  lelFer  gratification,  than 
they  are  to  negled:  the  good  of  others,  whom  nature 
has  committed  to  their  care.  It  fliould  feem,  that  a 
due  concern  about  our  own  intereft  or  happinefs,  and 
a  reafonable  endeavour  to  fecure  and  promote  it, 
which  is,  I  think,  very  much  the  meaning  of  the 
word  prudence,  in  our  language, — it  fiiould  feem, 
that  this  is  virtue,  and  the  contrary  behaviour  faulty 
and  blameabie ;  fince,  in  the  calmed  way  of  re- 
flection, we  approve  of  the  firft,  and  condem.n  the 
other  conduct,  both  in  ourfelves  and  others.  This 
approbation  and  difapprobation  are  altogether  differ- 
ent from,  mere  defire  of  our  own,  or  of  their  happinefs, 
and  fromforrow  upon  miffing  it.  For  the  objeft  or 
occafion  of  this  laft  kind  of  perception  is  fatisfaclion 
or  uneafinefs ;  whereas  the  obje6t  of  the  firfh  is  adlive 
behaviour.  In  one  cafe,  what  our  thoughts  fix  upon 
is  our  condition ;  in  the  other  our  condud.  It  is 
true  indeed,  that  nature  has  not  given  us  fo  fenfible 
a  difapprobation  of  imprudence  and  folly,  either  in 
ourfelves  or  other s^z.^  of  falfehood,  injuflice  and  cruelty  j 
I  fuppofe,  becaufe  that  conftant  habitual  fenfe  of  pri- 
vate intereft  and  good,  which  we  always  carry  about 
with  us,  renders  fuch  fenfible  difapprobation  lefs 
neceffary,  lefs  wanting,  to  keep  us  from  imprudently 
negleding  our  own  happinefs,  and  foolifhly  injuring 
ourfelves,  than  it  is  necellliry  and  wanting  to  keep  us 
from  injuring  others,  to  whofe  good  we  cannot  have  fo 
ftrong  and  conftant  a  regard  ;  and  alfo  becaufe  im- 
prudence and  folly,  appearing  to  bring  its  own  punifh- 
ment  more  immediately  and  conftantly  than  injurious 

behaviour. 


l)iss.  it.  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  357 

behaviour,  it  lefs  needs  the  additional  punifliment 
which  would  be  inflicted  upon  it  b}""  others,  had  they 
the  fame  feniible  indignation  againft  it  as  againft  in- 
juftice  and  fraud  and  cruelty.  Befides,  unhappinefs 
being  in  itfeif  the  natural  objeft  of  compaffion,  the 
unhappinefs  which  people  bring  upon  themfelves, 
though  it  be  wilfully,  excites  in  us  fome  pity  for  them  ; 
and  this  of  courfe  lefTens  our  difpleafure  againft  them. 
But  ftill  it  is  matter  of  experience,  that  we  are  form- 
ed fo  as  to  refxcct  very  feverely  upon  the  greater  in- 
ftances  of  imprudent  neglects  and  foolifli  rafhnefs, 
both  in  ourfelves  and  others.  In  inftances  of  this 
kind,  men  often  fay  of  themfelves  v/ith  remorie,  and 
of  others  with  fome  indignation,  that  they  deferved 
to  fuffer  fuch  calamities,  becaufe  they  brought  them 
upon  themfelves,  and  would  not  take  warning.  Par- 
ticularly when  perfons  conie  to  poverty  and  diftrefs  by 
a  long  courfe  of  extravagance,  and  after  frequent  ad- 
monitions, though  without  falfehood  or  injuftice  ;  we 
plainly  do  not  regard  fuch  people,  as  alike  objects  of 
compaffion  Vvith  thofe  who  are  brought  into  the  fame 
condition  by  unavoidable  accidents.  From  thefe 
things  it  appears,  that  prudence  is  a  fpecies  of  virtue, 
and  folly  of  vice  ;  meaning  by  folly  fomewhat  quite 
different  from  mere  incapacity  ;  a  thoughtlefs  v/ant 
of  that  regard  and  attention  to  our  own  happinefs 
which  we  had  capacity  for.  And  this  the  word  prop- 
erly includes,  and,  as  it  feems,  in  its  ufual  accep- 
tation ;  for  we  fcarce  apply  it  to  brute  creatures. 

However,  if  any  perfon  be  difpofed  to  difpute  the 
matter,  I  fhall  very  willingly  give  him  up  the  words 
virtue  ^indi  vice,  as  tiot  applicable  to  prudence  and 
folly  ;  but  muft  beg  leave  to  infift,  that  the  faculty 
within  us,  which  is  the  judge  of  a<Stions,  approves  of 
prudent  actions,  and  difapproves  imprudent  ones  ;  I 
fay  prudent  and  imprudent  a5iions^  as  fuch,  and  con- 
fidered  diftinftly  from  the  happinefs  or  mifery  which 

thev 


55^  '  Of  the  Kuiure  of  Vir^uei  l)iss.  IL- 

they  occafion.  And  by  the  way,  this  obfervation 
may  help  to  cietermhie  what  jullnefs  there  is  in  that 
objeftion  againft  rcHgion,  that  it  teaches  us  to  be  in- 
terefted  and  lelfilh. 

Fifthly,  Without  inquiring  \\ow  far  and  in  what 
fenfe  virtue  is  refolvable  into  benevolence,  and  vice 
into  the  v/ant  of  it,  it  may  be  proper  to  obferve,  that 
benevolence  and  the  want  of  it,  fmgly  confidered,  are 
in  no  fort  the  whole  of  virtue  and  vice.  For  if  this 
were  the  cafe,  in  the  review  of  one's  ovv'n  character  or 
that  of  others,  our  m.oral  underftandine;  and  moral 
fenie  would  be  indifferent  to  every  thing  but  the  de- 
grees in  wliich  benevolence  prevailed,  and  the  degrees 
in  whicii  it  was  wanting.  That  is,  we  iliould  neither 
approve  of  benevolence  to  fome  perfons  rather  than  to 
others,  nor  difapprove  injufiice  and  falfehood  upoa 
any  other  account  than  merely  as  an  overbalance  of 
happinefs  was  forefeen  likely  to  be  produced  by  the 
iirfl,  and  of  mifery  by  the  fecond.  But  now  on  the 
contrary,  fuppofe  two  men  competitors  for  any  thing 
whatever  which  would  be  of  equal  advantage  to  each 
of  them,  though  nothing  indeed  would  be  more  ira-- 
pertinent  than  for  a  ftranger  to  bufy  himfelf  to  get  one 
of  them  preferred  to  the  other,  yet  fuch  endeavour 
would  be  virtue  in  behalf  of  a  friend  or  benefactor, 
abilradled  from  ail  confideration  of  diftant  confe- 
quences  ;  as  that  examples  of  gratitude  and  the  cul- 
tivatioxn  of  friendihip  would  be  of  general  good  to  the 
world.  Again,  fuppofe  one  man  ihould,  by  fraud  or 
violence,  take  from  another  the  fruit  of  his  labour, 
with  intent  to  give  it  to  a  third,  who,  he  thought, 
would  have  as  much  pleafure  from  it  as  would  bal- 
ance the.pieafure  which  the  firft  poffeiTor  would  have 
had  in  the  enjoyment  and  his  vexation  in  the  lofs  of 
it ;  fuppofe  aUo  that  no  bad  confequences  would  fol- 
low ;  yet  fuch  an  aftion  would  furely  be  vicious. 
Nay  farther,  were  treachery,  violence  and  injuftice  no 

otherwife 


Di3S.il/:  Of  the  Nature  cf  Virtue:  ^-^g 

otherwife  vicious  than  as  forefeen  likely  to  produce  an 
overbalance  of  miiery  to  fociety,  then,  if  in  any  cafe 
a  man  could  procure  to  himfelf  as  great  advantage  by 
an  ad  of  injuftice  as  the  whole  forefeen  inconvenience 
likely  to  be  brought  upon  others  by  it  would  amount 
to,  fuch  a  piece  of  injuflice  would  not  be  faulty  or 
vicious  at  all,  becaufe  it  would  be  no  more  than,  in 
any  other  cafe,  for  a  man  to  prefer  his  own  fatisfac- 
tion  to  another's  in  equal  degrees.  The  fa6t  then  ap- 
pears to  be,  that  we  are  conftituted  fo  as  to  condemn 
falfehood,  unprovoked  violence,  injuflice,  and  to  ap- 
prove of  benevolence  to  fome  preferably  to  others,  ab- 
ftra£led  from  all  confideration  which  conduft  is  like- 
lieft  to  produce  an  overbalance  of  happinefs  or  miiery. 
And  therefore,  were  the  Author  of  nature  to  propofe 
nothing  to  himfelf  as  an  end  but  the  produi^ion  of 
happinefs,  were  his  moral  charafter  merely  tliat  of  be- 
nevolence, yet  ours  is  not  fo.  Upon  that  fuppofition 
indeed,  the  only  reafon  of  his  giving  us  the  above- 
mentioned  approbation  of  benevolence  to  fome  per- 
fons  rather  than  others,  and  diiapprobation  of  falfe- 
hood, unprovoked  violence,  and  injuftice,  muft  be, 
that  he  forefaw  this  conftitution  of  our  nature  would 
produce  more  happinefs  than  forming  us  with  a  tem- 
per of  more  general  benevolence.  But  ftill,  lince  this 
is  our  conftitution,  falfehood,  violence,  injuftice,  muft 
be  vice  in  us,  and  benevolence  to  fome  preferably  to 
others,  virtue,  abftrafted  ftom  all  confideration  of  the 
overbalance  of  evil  or  good  v/hich  they  may  appear 
likely  to  produce. 

Now  if  human  creatures  are  endued  with  fuch  a 
moral  nature  as  wc  have  been  explaining,  or  with  a 
moral  faculty  the  natural  object  of  which  isadiions, — ■ 
moral  government  muft  confift  in  rendering  them  hap- 
py and  unhappy,  in  rewarding  and  punifhing  them, 
as  they  follow,  neglect,  or  depart  from,  the  moral  rule 
of  adion  interv/oven  in  their  nature,  or  fu^oefted  and 

enrorced 


3  6<9  t)f  the  Nature  of  P^irtiie.  Diss.  IL 

enforced  by  this   moral  faculty;*  in  rewarding  and 
puniOiing  them  upon  account  of  their  fo  doing. 

I  am  not  fenfible  that  I  have,  in  this  fifth  obferva- 
tion,  contradicted  what  any  author  defigned  to  affert. 
But  fome  of  great  and  diftinguilbed  merit  have,  I 
think,  exprelled  themfelves  in  a  manner  which  may 
occafion  Ibme  danger  to  carelefs  readers,  of  imagin- 
ing the  whole  of  virtue  to  confift  in  fmgly  aiming,  ac- 
cording to  the  beft  of  their  judgment,  at  promoting 
the  happinefs  of  mankind  in  the  prefent  ftate  ;  and 
the  whole  of  vice,  in  doing  what  they  forefee,  or 
might  forefee,  is  likely  to  produce  an  overbalance  of 
unhappinefs  in  it  ;  than  which  miilakes,  none  can  be 
conceived  more  terrible.  For  it  is  certain  that  feme 
of  the  moft  Ihocking  inftances  of  injuftice,  adulter}-, 
murder,  perjury,  and  even  of  perfecution,  may,  in 
many  fiippofable  cafes,  not  have  the  appearance  of  be- 
ing likely  to  produce  an  overbalance  of  mifery  in  the 
prefent  ftate  ;  perhaps  fometimes  may  have  the  con- 
trary appearance.     For  this  reflexion  might  eafily  be 

carried  on,  but  I  forbear The  happinefs  of  the 

world  is  the  concern  of  him,  who  is  the  lord  and  the 
proprietor  of  it ;  nor  do  "we  know  what  we  are  about,, 
when  we  endeavour  to  prom.ote  the  good  of  man- 
kind in  any  ways  but  thole  which  he  has  direfted, 
that  is  indeed  in  all  ways  not  contrary  to  veracity  and 
juftice.  I  fpeak  thus  upon  fuppofition  of  perfons  real- 
ly endeavouring,  in  fome  fort,  to  do  good  without  re- 
gard to  thefe.  But  the  truth  feems  to  be,  that  fuch 
iuppofed  endeavours  proceed,  almoft  always,  from  am- 
bition, the  fpirit  of  party,  or  fome  indired  principle, 
concealed  perhaDS  in  great  meafure  from  perfons 
themfelves.  And  though  it  is  our  bufinefs  and  our 
duty  to  endeavour,  within  the  bounds  of  veracity  and 
juftice,  to  contribute  to  the  eafe,  convenience,  and 
even  cheerfulnefs  and  diverlion.  of  our  fellow  crea- 
tures,— • 
*  r.  169. 


Diss.  li.  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  361 

tures, — yet  from  our  fliort  views,  it  is  greatly  uncertain 
whether  this  endeavour  will,  in  particular  inftances, 
produce  an  overbalance  of  happinefs  upon  the  whole, 
ilnce  fo  many  and  diftant  things  muft  come  into  the 
account.  And  that  which  makes  it  our  duty,  is,  that 
there  is  fome  appearance  that  it  will,  and  no  pofi- 
tive  appearance  fufficient  to  balance  this  on  the  con- 
trary fide  ;  and  alfo  that  fuch  benevolent  endeavour 
is  a  cultivation  of  that  moft  excellent  of  all  virtuous 
principles,  the  active  principle  of  benevolence. 

However,  though  veracity  as  well  as  juftice  is  to  be 
our  rule  of  life,  it  muft  be  added,  otherwife  a  fnare 
will  be  laid  in  the  way  of  fome  plain  men,  that  the 
ufe  of  common  forms  of  fpeech  generally  underftood, 
cannot  be  falfehood,  and,  in  general,  that  there  can  be 
no  defigned  falfehood  without  defigning  to  deceive. 
It  muft  likewife  be  obferved,  that  in  numberlefs  cafes 
a  man  may  be  under  the  ftri£teft  obligations  to  what 
he  forefees  will  deceive,  without  his  intending  it. 
For  it  is  impolTible  not  to  forefee  that  the  words  and 
actions  of  men  in  different  ranks  and  employments, 
and  of  different  educations,  will  perpetually  be  mif- 
taken  by  each  other  j  and  it  cannot  but  be  fo  whilft 
they  will  judge  with  the  utmoft  careleffnefs,  as  they 
daily  do,  of  what  they  are  not,  perhaps,  enough  in- 
formed to  be  competent  judges  of,  even  though  they 
confidered  it  with  great  attention. 


A 

CHARGE 

DELIVERED    TO    THE 

CLERGY 

AT     THE 

Primary  Visitation  of  the  Diocese  of  Durham,  in  the  Year 

MDCCLI  ; 

BY    THE    RIGHT    REVEREND    FATHER    IN    COD 

JOSEPH      B  U  T  L  E  R,    LL.  D. 

THEN    LORD    BISHOr    OP    THAT    DIOCESE. 

With      NOTES, 

Containing  a  Defence  of  the  Charge  .igainft  the  Objedlions  of  an  anonymous 

Writer. 

BY    THE    EDITOR. 


A 

H        A        R        G        : 

DELIVERED   TO   THE 

L     E      R     G     Y,      (s?<".* 


It  Is  impoffible  for  me,  my  brethren, 
upon  our  firft  meeting  of  this  kind,  to  forbear  lament- 
ing with  you  the  general  decay  of  religion  in  this  na- 
tion ;  which  is  now  obferved  by  every  one,  and  has 
been  for  forne  time  the  complaint  of  all  ferious  perfons. 
The  influence  of  it  is  more  and  more  wearing  out  of 
the  minds  of  men,  even  of  thofe  who  do  not  pretend  to 
enter  into  fpeculations  upon  the  fubjed: ;  but  the  num- 
ber of  thofe  who  do,  and  who  profefs  themfelves  unbe- 
lievers, incr^afes,  and  with  their  numbers  their  zeal. 
Zeal,  it  is  natural  to  aik — for  what  ?  Why  truly /or 
nothing,  but  agair^  every  thing  that  is  good  and  fa- 
cred  amongft  us. 

Indeed,  whatever  efforts  are  made  agalnft  our  relig- 
ion, no  Chriilian  can  poffibly  defpair  of  it.  For  He, 
who  has  a//  power  i-n  heaven  and  earthy  has  promifed 
that  he  will  he  with  us  to  the  end  of  the  world.  Nor 
can  the  prefent  decline  of  it  be  any  Humbling  block 

to 

*  The  publication  of  Bifhop  Sutler's  Charge,  in  the  year  1751,  was 
followed  by  a  pamphlet,  printed  in  1752,  entitled,  A  Serious  Inquiry  into  the 
Ufe  and  Importance  of  External  Religiony  occafioned  by  fame  Fajfaga  in  the  Right 
Reverend  the  Lord  hiftop  of  Durham'*  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  that  Dioccfe,  Sec. 
humbly  addreffed  to  his  LorJ/Iiip.  This  pamphlet  has  been  reprinted  in  a  mif- 
cellaneous  work  ;  fuch  parts  of  it  as  feemed  moft  worthy  of  obfervation,  the 
reader  will  find  in  the  Notes  fubjoined  to  thofe  palTages  of  the  Charge,  to 
%vhich  the  pamphlet  refers. 


366  Charge  to  the 

to  fuch  as  arc  confiderate ;  fince  he  himfelf  has  (o 
flrongly  expreffed  what  is  as  remarkably  predifted  in 
other  paiTages  of  Scripture,  the  great  defedlion  from 
his  rehgion  which  fhould  be  in  the  latter  days,  by  that 
prophetick  queftion,  When  the  Son  of  Man  cometh^  JJiall 
he  find  faith  upon  the  earth  ?  How  near  this  time  is, 
God  only  knows ;  but  this  kind  of  fcripture  figns  of 
it  is  too  apparent.  For  as  different  ages  have  been 
diftinguifhed  by  different  forts  of  particular  errors 
and  vices,  the  deplorable  diftindtion  of  ours  is  an  avow- 
ed fcorn  of  religion  in  fome,  and  a  growing  difregard 
to  it  in  the  generality. 

As  to  the  profefled  enemies  of  religion,  I  know 
not  how  often  they  may  come  in  your  way  ;  but  often 
enough,  I  fear,  in  the  way  of  fome  at  leail  amongft; 
you,  to  require  confideration  what  is  the  proper  beha- 
viour towards  them.  One  would,  to  be  fure,  avoid 
great  familiarities  with  thefe  perfons ;  efpecially  if  they 
affed  to  be  licentious  and  profane  in  their  common 
talk.  Yet  if  you  fall  into  their  company,  treat  them 
with  the  regards  which  belong  to  their  rank  ;  for  fo 
we  muft  people  who  are  vicious  in  any  other  refpecl. 
We  fhould  ftudy  what  St.  James ^  with  wonderful  ele- 
gance and  exprefTivenefs,  calls  meeknejs  of  wifdorriy  in 
our  behaviour  towards  all  men,  but  more  eipecialiy 
towards  thefe  men  ;  not  lb  much  as  being  what  we 
owe  to  them,  but  to  ourfelves  and  our  religion,  that 
we  may  adorn  the  doSlrine  of  God  our  Saviour^  in  our 
carriage  towards  thofe  who  labour  to  vilify  it. 

For  difcourfe  with  them,  the  caution  commonly 
given,  not  to  attempt  anfwering  objections  which  we 
have  net  confidered,  is  certainly  juli.  Nor  need  any 
one  in  a  particular  cafe  be  afhamed  frankly  to  ac- 
knowledge his  ignorance,  provided  it  be  not  general. 
And  though  it  were,  to  talk  of  what  he  is  not  ac- 
quainted with,  is  a  dangerous  method  of  endeavour- 
ing to  conceal  it.     But  a  conlidcrate  perfbn,  however 

qualified 


Clergy  of  Durham,  1751.  367 

qualified  he  be  to  defend  his  religion,  and  anfwer  the 
objeftions  he  hears  made  againft  it,  may  fometimes 
lee  caufe  to  decline  that  office.  Sceptical  and  profane 
men  are  extremely  apt  to  bring  up  this  fubjed  at 
meetings  of  entertainment,  and  fuch  as  are  of  the  freer 
fort ;  innocent  ones,  I  mean,  otherwife  I  fhould  not 
fuppofe  you  would  be  prefent  at  them.  Now  religion 
is  by  far  too  ferious  a  matter  to  be  the  hackney  iub- 
je(5t  upon  thefe  occafions.  And  by  preventing  its  being 
made  fo,  you  will  better  fecure  the  reverence  which  is 
due  to  it,  than  by  entering  into  its  defence.  Every  one 
obferves,  that  men's  having  examples  of  vice  often  be- 
fore their  eyes,  familiarizes  it  to  the  mind,  and  has 
a  tendency  to  take  off  that  juft  abhorrence  of  it  which 
the  innocent  at  firft  felt,  even  though  it  fhould  not 
alter  their  judgment  of  vice,  or  make  them  really  be- 
lieve it  to  be  lefs  evil  or  dangerous.  In  like  manner, 
the  hearing  religion  often  difputed  about  in  light  fa- 
miliar converfation,  has  a  tendency  to  leflen  that  fa- 
cred  regard  to  it,  which  a  good  man  would  endeavour 
always  to  keep  up,  both  in  himfelf  and  others.  But 
this  is  not  all ;  people  are  too  apt  inconfiderately  to 
take  for  granted  that  things  are  really  queftionable,  be- 
caufe  they  hear  them  often  difputed.  This  indeed 
is  fo  far  from  being  a  confequence,  that  we  know  de- 
monftrated  truths  have  been  difputed,  and  even  mat- 
ters of  fad,  the  objeds  of  our  fenfes.  But  were  it  a 
confequence,  were  the  evidence  of  religion  no  more 
than  doubtful,  then  it  ought  not  to  be  concluded  falfe 
any  more  than  true,  nor  denied  any  more  than  affirm- 
ed ;  for  fufpenfe  would  be  the  reafonable  ftate  of  mind 
with  regard  to  it.  And  then  it  ought  in  all  reafon, 
confidering  its  infinite  importance,  to  have  nearly  the 
fame  influence  upon  pradice,  as  if  it  were  thoroughly 
believed.  For  would  it  not  be  madnefs  for  a  man  to 
forfake  a  fafe  road,  and  prefer  to  it  one  in  which  he 
acknowledges  there  is  an  even  chance  he  fhould  lofe 

his 


36S  Charge  to  the 

his  life,  though  there  were  an  even  chance  llkewife  of 
his  getting  fafe  through  it  ?  Yet  there  are  people  ab- 
furd  enough  to  take  the  fuppofed  doybtfulnefs  of  re- 
ligion for  the  fame  thing  as  a  proof  of  its  falfehood, 
artei^they  have  concluded  it  doubtful  from  hearing 
it  often  called  in  queftion.  This  fhews  how  infinitely 
unreafonable  fceptical  men  are,  with  regard  to  religion, 
and  that  they  really  lay  afide  their  reafon  upon  this 
fubjeft  as  much  as  the  moft  extravagant  enthufiafts. 
But  further,  cavilling  and  objecting  upon  any  fubjecl 
is  much  ealier  than  clearing  up  difficulties ;  and  this 
laft  part  will  always  be  put  upon  the  defenders  of  re- 
ligion. Now  a  man  may  be  fully  convinced  of  the 
truth  of  a  matter,  and  upon  the  ftrongeft  reafons,  and 
ytt  not  be  able  to  anfwer  all  the  difficulties  which  may 
be  raifed  upon  it. 

Then  again,  the  general  evidence  of  religion  is 
complex  and  various.  It  confifts  of  a  long  feries  of 
things,  one  preparatory  to  and  confirming  another, 
from  the  very  beginning  of  the  world  to  the  prefent 
time.  And  it  is  eafy  to  fee  how  impofTible  it  muft 
be,  in  a  curfory  converfatiqn,  to  unite  all  this  intq 
one  argument,  and  reprefent  it  as  it  ought  j  and  could 
it  be  done,  how  utterly  indifpofed  people  would  be  to 
attend  to  it — I  fay  in  a  curfory  converfation  ^  where- 
as unconnected  obje£lions  are  thrown  out  in  a  few 
words,  and  are  eafily  apprehended,  v/ithout  more  atten- 
tion than  is  ufual  in  common  talk.  So  that,  notwith- 
flanding  we  have  the  beft  caufe  in  the  world,  and 
though  a  man  were  very  capable  of  defending  it,  yet 
I  know  not  why  he  fhould  be  forward  to  undertake  it 
upon  {q  great  a  difadvantage,  and  to  fo  little  good  ef- 
fed,  as  it  muft  be  done  amidft  the  gaiety  and  carelefT- 
nefs  of  common  converfation. 

But  then  it  will  be  necelfary  to  be  very  particularly 
upon  your  guard,  that  you  may  not  feem^  by  way  of 
compliance,  to  join  in  with  any  levity  of  difcourfe 

refpedling 


'  Clergy  of  Durham ^  1 7 5 1 -  2>^() 

refpecllng  religion.  Nor  would  one  let  any  pretend- 
ed argument  againft  it  pafs  entirely  without  notice  ; 
nor  any  grofs  ribaldry  upon  it,  without  expreffing  our 
thorough  difapprobation.  T'lis  lafl  may  fometimes 
be  done  by  iilence  j  for  lilence  fometimes  is  very  ex- 
preffive  ;  as  was  that  of  our  blefled  Saviour  before 
the  Sanhedrim,  and  before  Pilate.  Or  it  may  be  done 
by  obferving  mildly,  that  religion  deferves  another  fort 
of  treatment,  or  a  more  thorough  confideration  than 
fuch  a  time,  or  fuch  ciifcumftances  admit.  However, 
as  it  is  abfolutely  necelTary  that  we  take  care,  by  dil- 
igent reading  and  fiudy,  to  be  always  prepared,  to  be 
ready  always  to  give  an  anfwer  to  evei'y  man  that  ajketh 
a  reafon  of  the  hope  that  is  in  us, — fo  there  may  be  oc- 
cafions  when  it  will  highly  become  us  to  do  it.  And 
then  we  muft  take  care  to  do  it  in  the  fpirit  which  the 
apoftle  requires, with  meeknefs  and  fear  :*  Meehjiefs  to- 
wards thofe  who  give  occailons  for  entering  into  the 
defence  of  our  religion  ;  and  with  fear,  not  of  them, 
but  of  God  ;  with  that  reverential  fear  which  the  na- 
ture of  religion  requires,  and  which  is  fo  far  from  be- 
ing inconfiftent  with,  that  it  will  infpire  proper  cour- 
age towards  men.  Now  this  reverential  fear  will 
lead  us  to  infift  ftrongly  upon  the  infinite  great nefs  of 
God's  fcheme  of  government,  both  in  extent  and  du- 
ration, together  with  the  wife  connexion  of  its  parts, 
and  the  impoffibility  of  accounting  fully  for  the  feve- 
ral  parts,  without  feeing  the  whole  plan  of  Providence 
to  which  they  relate  ;  which  is  beyond  the  utmoft 
llretch  of  our  underftanding.  And  to  all  this  muft  be 
added  the  neceffary  deficiency  of  human  language, 
when  things  divine  are  the  fubje(5t  of  it.  Theie  ob- 
fervations  are  a  proper  full  anfwer  to  many  objections, 
and  very  material  with  regard  to  all. 

But  your  Handing  bufmefs,  and  which  requires  con- 
ftant  attention,  is  with  the  body  of  the  people  ;  to  re- 
vive 

*  1  Pet,  iii,  15, 


37*3  Charge  to  the 

vive  in  them  the  fpirit  of  religion  which  is  fo  much 
declining.  And  it  may  feem,  that  whatever  reafon 
there  be  for  caution  as  to  entering  into  any  argu- 
mentative defence  of  religion  in  common  converjation, 
yet  that  it  is  neceffary  to  do  this /row  the  pulpit,  in  or- 
der to  guard  the  people  againft  being  corrupted,  how- 
ever in  fome  places.  But  then  furely  it  fhould  be 
done  in  a  manner  as  little  controverfial  as  poffible. 
For  though  fuch  as  are  capable  of  feeing  the  force  of 
objediions  are  capable  alio  of  feeing  the  force  of  the 
anfwers  which  are  given  to  them,  yet  the  truth  is,  the 
people  will  not  competently  attend  to  either.  But 
it  is  eafy  to  fee  which  they  will  attend  to  moft.  And 
to  hear  religion  treated  of,  as  what  many  deny,  and 
which  has  much  faid  againfl  it  as  well  as  for  it,  this 
cannot  but  have  a  tendency  to  give  them  ill  impref- 
fions  at  any  time  ;  and  feems  particularly  improper 
for  all  perfons  at  a  time  of  devotion,  even  for  fuch  as 
are  arrived  at  the  moft  fettled  ftate  of  piety  ; — I  fay 
at  a  time  of  devotion,  when  we  are  affembled  to  yield 
ourfelves  up  to  the  full  influence  of  the  Divine  Pres- 
ence, and  to  call  forth  into  adual  exercife  every  pi- 
ous alfedion  of  heart.  For  it  is  to  be  repeated,  that 
the  heart  and  courfe  of  afFedions  may  be  difturbed 
when  there  is  no  alteration  of  judgment.  Novv?  the 
evidence  of  religion  may  be  laid  before  men  without 
any  air  of  controverfy.  The  proof  of  the  being  of 
God,  from  final  caufes,or  the  defign  and  wifdom  v^^hich 
appears  in  every  part  of  nature,  together  with  the  law 
of  virtue  Vv^rittcu  upon  our  hearts  j*    the  proof  of 

Chriflianity 

*  f  he  law  or  virtue  written  upon  our  hearts.]  The  author  of  the  Inquiry^ 
nientionpil  ^bove,  informs  us  in  bis  Pou.cript,  tiiat  "  the  certain  confequcnce 
'jf  retci  :ing  mankind  to  a  hiv  (/  nature  ur  'Linui-  •luritten  ufon  th'ir  hearts  iS  their 
tiavin;.';  r(xoui  fe  to  their  own  foife  ofihing!,  (ji)  all  occafions  ;  -.vhich  being,  in  a 
^i;reat  majoDty,  no  better  tnan  t"iimily  Aiperflition,  party  preiutlice.or  lelf  in- 
iereftc<;  ai  tifict,  (perhaps  a  compouml  of  all)  will  be  too  apt  to  overrule  the 
plain  precepts  of  the  Gofpcl."  And  he  declarer,  he  has  "  no  better  opinion 
fjf  the  clciirneji,  certainty,  un-formity,  univcrj\ilily,  &C.  of  this  law,  than"  he 
has  "  of  the  in:portance  of  externat  rel'^ict."  What  then  muft  we  fay  to  St. 
raul,  who  not  only  alferts,  -.a  the  ftiongtll  terra?;  the  reality  of  luch  a  law, 

tut 


Clergy  of  Durham,  1751.  371 

Chriftianlty  from  miracles,  and  the  accomplifhment 
of  prophecies  ;  and  the  confirmation  which  the  nat- 
ural and  civil  hiftory  of  the  world  give  to  the  fcripture 
account  of  things  j — thefe  evidences  of  religion  might 
properly  be  infifted  on  in  a  way  to  affefl:  and  influenee 
the  heart,  though  there  were  no  profeffed  unbelievers 
in  the  world  ;  and  therefore  may  be  infifted  on  with- 
out taking  much  notice  that  there  are  fuch.  And 
even  their  particular  objeftions  may  be  obviated  with- 
out a  formal  mention  of  them.     Befides,  as  to  religion 

in 

but  fpeaks  of  its  obligation  as  extending  to  all  mankind  ;  'blamiiig  foms 
among  the  Gentiles  as  without  e.vcMfe,  for  not  adverting  to  and  obeying  it ;  and 
commending  others  for  doing  by  nature  (in  contradiction  to  revelation)  the 
things  contained  in  the  law,  thai J/ie-w:ng  the  -work  of  thelaiv  luritten  in  their  hearts. 
If,  becaufe  "  natural  religion  is  liable  to  he  miftaken,  it  is  high  Time  to  have 
done  with  it  in  the  puljnt,"  how  comes  it  that  the  lame  apoftle  refers  the 
Philippiansto  the  ftudy  of  this  religion,  to  -whalfoever  things  are  true,  honfji,  juji, 
ifvely  and  of  good  report  ?  And  yet  'W'ithout  fuch  a  fludy  our  knowledge  of  the 
moral  law  muft  always  remain  imperfect ;  for  a  complete  fyftem  of  morality 
is  certainly  no  where  to  be  found  either  in  the  Old  or  Nev/  Tcflame  t.  [al 
When  aChriftian  rainifter  is  enforcing  the  duties  or  doctrines  of  revealed  re» 
ligion,  he  may  perhaps  do  well  to  <'  tell  his  people  he  has  «o  o.'her  proof  of  the 
original,  truth,  obligations,  prefent  benefits  and  future  rewards  of  religion  to 
lay  before  them,  than  what  is  contained  in  the  Scriptures,"  But  what  if  his 
purpofe  be  to  inculcate  fome  moral  virtue  ?  Will  it  not  be  ufeful  here,  befidcs 
obferving  that  the  pra<ftice  of  that  virtue  is  enjoined  by  a  divine  command,  to 
recommend  it  ftill  further  to  his  hearers,  by  fhewing  that  it  approves  itfelf  to 
our  inward  fenie  and  perception,  and  accords  with  the  native  fentiments  and 
fuggeflions  of  our  minds  ?  Metaphyficians  may  fay  what  they  will  of  our  feei- 
ings  of  this  fort  being  all  illufive,  liable  to  be  perverted  hy  education  and 
habit,  and  judged  of  by  men's  ownfcnfe  cf  things ;  they  whofe  underftandings 
are  yet  unlf  oiled hy  pkihfophv  and  ■vain  deceit  will  be  little  difpofed  to  liften  to 
luch  affertions.  Nor  are  there  wantii^g  arguments  which  prove,  and,  as 
lliould  feem,  to  the  fatisfaiflion  of  every  real'onable  inquirer,  that  the  great 
and  leading  principles  of  mora"  duties  have  in  all  ages  been  the  fame  ;  that 
fuch  virtues  as  benevolence,  juftice,  compaffion,  gratitude,  accidental  ohlla- 
cles  removed,  and  when  the  precife  meaning  of  the  words  has  been  once  ex- 
plained, are  inftindtively  known  and  approved  by  all  men  j  and  that  cur  ap- 
probation of  thefe  is  as  much  a  part  of  our  nature  implanted  in  us  by  God,  and 
as  little  liable  to  caprice  and  falliioii,  as  the  fcnfe  of  feeing,  given  us  alfo  hy 
Him,  by  which  all  bodies  appear  to  us  in  an  ere£l.  and  not  an  inverted  pofi. 
tion.  [b]  Mr.  Locke's  authority  has  been  generally  looked  up  to  as  decifive 
on  fdch  Queftions,  and  his  fentiments  have  been  embraced  implicitly  and 
v/ithout  examination.  That  great  and  good  man,  however,  is  not  to  he 
charged  with  the  pernicious  confequences  which  others  havp  diavvn  from  liis 
opinions  ;  confequences  which  have  been  carried  to  fuch  a  length,  as  to  de- 
ftroy  all  moral  difference  of  human  ailions ;  making  virtue  and  vice  altc- 
jether  arbitary  ;  calling  ei'i'l  good,  and  good  evil  ;  putting  darkncfs  Jer  Ji^hty  and 
jigh.  fof  darknefs  ;  putting  bitter  for  fiueet,  and  fiueei  for  liilter^ 

[a]  See  the  Jeeond  cf  Dr.  Balguy's  Charges. 

[I*]  Sa  the  third  if  B  f hep  Hurd't  Sermtni,  FuL  L 


372  Charge  to  the 

in  general,  it  is  a  praftical  thing,  and  no  otherwife 
a  matter  of  fpecuiation,  than  common  prudence  in 
the  management  of  our  worldly  affairs  is  fo.  And 
if  one  were  endeavouring  to  bring  a  plain  man  to  be 
more  careful  with  regard  to  this  laft,  it  would  be 
thought  a  ftrange  method  of  doing  it,  to  perplex  him 
with  ftating  formally  the  feveral  objections  which  men 
of  gaiety  or  fpecuiation  have  made  againft  prudence, 
and  the  advantages  which  they  pleafantly  tell  us  folly 
has  over  it,  though  one  could  anfwer  thofe  objedlions 
ever  lb  fully. 

Nor  does  the  want  of  religion  in  the  generality  of 
the  common  people,  appear  owing  to  a  fpeculative 
difbelief  or  denial  of  it,  but  chiefly  to  thoughtleflfnefs 
and  the  common  temptations  of  life.  Your  chief 
bufinefs,  therefore,  is  to  endeavour  to  beget  a  practi- 
cal fenfe  of  it  upon  their  hearts,  as  what  they  acknowl- 
edge their  belief  of,  and  profefs  they  ought  to  con- 
form themfelves  to.  And  this  is  to  be  done  by  keep- 
ing up,  as  well  as  we  are  able,  the  form  and  face  of  re-; 
ligion  with  decency  and  reverence,  and  in  fuch  a  de- 
gree as  to  bring  the  thoughts  of  religion  often  to  their 
minds ;  *  and  then  endeavouring  to  make  this  form 
more  and  more  fubfervient  to  promote  the  reality  and 

power 

*  By  keeping  up  the  form  and  face  of  religion  \x\fuch  a  degree  as  to  brincj 
the  thoughts  of  religion  often  to  (heir  minds.]  To  this  it  is  faid  by  our  Inquirer^ 
that  "  the  Clergy  of  the  Qhurch  of  England  have  no  way  of  keeping  up  the 
farm  zndfice  of  religion  any  cftener^  or  in  an\  other  degree,  than  is  direcfled  by 
rhe  prefcribed  order  of  the  Church."  As  if  the  whole  duty  of  a  parifh  prieft 
confifted  in  reading  prayers  and  a  fermon  on  Sundays,  and  performing  the 
occafional  ofhces  appointed  in  the  liturgy  !  One  would  think  the  writer  who 
made  this  obie(5lion  had  never  read  more  of  the  Charge  than  the  four  pages' ht 
has  particularly  felefted  for  tlie  fybjeft  of  his  animadverfions.  Had  he  look- 
ed farther,  he  v\ould  have  found  other  methods  recommended  to  the  Clergy 
of  introducing  a  fenfe  of  religion  into  the  minds  of  their  parifhioners,  which 
occur  >i!uc/!  oftener  than  the  times  allotted  for  the  publick  fervices  of  the 
Church  ;  fuch  as  family  prayers  ;  acknowledging  the  divine  bounty  at  oyr 
meals  ;  perfonai  applications  from  minifters  of  pariflies  to  individuals  under 
their  care,  on  particular  occafions  and  circumflances,  as  at  the  time  of  con- 
tirmation,  at  firft  receivmg  the  holy  communion,  on  recovery  from  ficknefs, 
and  the  like  ;  none  of  which  are  prefcribed  in  our  eftablifhed  litual,  any 
more  than  thofe  others  fo  ludicroufly  mentioned  by  this  writer,  "  bowing  to 
the  eaft,  turning  the  face  to  that  quarter  in  repeating  the  creeds,  dipping  tlic 
finger  in  water,  and  therewith  croifing  the  cliild's  Jotehead  in  baptifm." 


Clergy  of  Durham ^  1 7  5 1 .  3  7  3 

power  of  it.  The  form  of  religion  may  indeed  be 
where  there  is  Uttle  of  the  thing  itfelf ;  but  the  thing 
itfelf  cannot  be  preferved  amongft  mankind  without 
the  form.*  And  this  form  frequently  occurring  in 
fome  inftance  or  other  of  it,  will  be  a  frequent  admo- 
nition 4"  to  bad  men  to  repent,  and  to  good  men  to 
grow  better  ;  and  alfo  be  the  means  of  their  doing  fo. 
That  which  men  have  accounted  religion  in  the 
feveral  countries  of  the  world,  generally  fpeaking,  has 
had  a  great  and  confpicuous  part  in  all  publick  appear- 
ances, and  the  face  of  it  been  kept  up  with  great  rev- 
erence throughout  all  ranks  from  the  higneft  to  the 
loweft  i  not  only  upon  occafional  folemnities,  but  al- 
fo in  the  daily  courfe  of  behaviour.     In  the  heathen 

world, 

*  The  thing  itfelf  tannot  be  preferved  nmongft  mankind  without  the 
form.]  The  Quakers  reje<5l  all  forms,  even  the  two  of  Chrift's  own  inftitu- 
tion  ;  will  it  be  faid  that  "  thefe  men  have  no  religion  preferved  among 
them  ?"  It  will  neither  be  faid  nor  infmuateJ.  The  Quakers,  though  they 
have  not  the  form,  ai'e  careful  to  keep  up  Xhtfticc  of  religion  ;  as  appears  not 
only  from  the  cuftom  of  aflembling  themfeives  for  the  purpofes  of  publick 
worftiip  on  the  Lord's  day,  but  from  their  filent  meetings  on  other  days  of 
the  week.  And  that  they  arc  equally  fenfible  of  the  importance  of  main- 
taining the  influence  of  religion  on  their  minds,  is  manifefl  from  the  pradlice  of 
what  they  call  iniuard  -prayer,  in  conformity  to  the  dire<5lion  of  Scripture  to 
fray  continually  :  "  Which,"  faith  Robert  Barclay,  "  cannot  be  underftood  of 
outivard  prayer,  becaufe  it  were  inipoilible  that  men  fhould  be  always  upon 
their  knees,  exprefling  the  ivwds  of  prayer,  which  would  hinder  them  from 
the  exercife  of  thole  duties  no  lefs  pofitively  commanded."  j^fology  for  tht 
(Quakers.     Prop.  xi.      Of  Wotjlii-p. 

\  This  form  frequently  occurring  in  fome  inftance  or  other  of  it,  will  be  a 
■frequent  admonition,  ifec]  Here  it  has  been  objedled,  that  "  the  number,  -va- 
riety, -dwdi  frequent  occurrence  of  forms  in  religion  are  too  apt  to  be  confidered 
by  the  generality  as  commutations  for  their  vices,  as  foniething  fuhftituted  in  lieu 
of  repentance,  and  as  loads  and  incumbrances  upon  true  Chriftian  edifica- 
tion." This  way  of  arguing  againft  the  ufe  of  a  thing  from  the  abufe  of  it, 
inftcad  of  arguing  from  the  nature  of  the  thing  itfelf,  is  the  mafter  fophifm 
that  pervades  the  whole  performance  we  are  here  examining.  What  reafon- 
able  man  ever  denied  that  the  pomp  of  outward  worfhip  has  been  fometimes 
miftaken  for  inward  piety  ?  That  pofitive  inflitutions,  when  refled  in  as 
ends,  inftead  of  being  applied  as  means,  are  hurtful  to  the  interefts  of  true 
religion  ?  Not  Bifhop  Butler  certainly,  who  blames  the  obfervances  of  the 
papifts  on  this  account ;  fome  of  them  as  being  "  in  themfeives  wrong  and 
I'uperftitious  ;"  and  others,  as  being  "made  fubfervient  to  the  purpofes  of 
fuperftition,"  and  for  this  reafon  "  abolifhed  by  our  reformers."  In  the 
meanwhile  it  will  itill  be  true,  that  bodily  worfhip  is  by  no  means  to  be  dif- 
carded.  as  unufeful  in  exciting  fpiritual  devotion  ;  on  the  contrary,  thAt  they 
mutually  affift  and  ftrengthen  each  other  ;  and  that  a  m.ere  mental  inter- 
courfe  wiih  God,  and  a  religious  fervice  purely  intelle(5tual,  is  altogethf  r 
unfuitable  to  fuch  a  creature  as  man,  during  his  prefent  flate  o^.  earth 


;574  Charge  to  the 

world,  their  fuperftition  was  the  chief  fubje^l:  of  ftatu- 
ary,  fculpture,  painting  and  poetry.  It  mixed  itfelf 
with  bufinefs,  civil  forms,  diverfions,  domeftick  enter- 
tainments, and  every  part  of  common  Hfe.  The  Ma- 
hometans are  obliged  to  fhort  devotions  five  times  be- 
tween morning  and  evening.  In  Roman  Cathohck 
countries,  people  cannot  pafs  a  day  without  having 
religion  recalled  to  their  thoughts,  by  fome  or  other 
memorial  of  it,  by  fome  ceremony  or  publick  relig- 
ious form  occurring  in  their  way  ;*  befides  their  fre- 
quent holidays,  the  fhort  prayers  they  are  daily  call- 
ed to,  and  the  occafional  devotions  enjoined  by  con- 
feffors.  By  thefe  means  their  fuperflition  fmks  deep 
into   the   minds  of  the  people,  and   their   religion 

alfo 

*  Tn  Roman  Catholick  countries,  people  cannot  pafs  a  day  without  having 
rdigian  recalled  to  their  thoua;hts,  by  fome  ceremony  or  publick  re/igious  form 
occurring  in  their  way.]  '*  What  in  the  former  period"  (when  fpeaking  of 
the  heathen  world)  was  "  czWed  Juperjiition,  becomes  in  this"  (when  fpeaking 
of  Roman  Catholicks)  "  religion  and  religinui  farms  ;  which  the  papifts  pre- 
tending to  connedft  with  Chriftianity,  and  the  Charge  giving  no  hint  that  this 
is  no  more  than  a  pretence,  a  plain  reader  mufl  needs  take  this  as  fpoken  of 
the  means  and  memorials  of  TRUE  RELIGION,  and  will  accordingly  confider 
thefe  as  recommended  to  his  praftice  and  imitation."  If  a  plain  reader,  at 
firft  view  of  the  pafTage  alluded  to,  fhould  inadvertently  fall  into  fuch  a  mif- 
take,  he  would  find  that  miftake  immediately  corre<5led  by  the  very  next  fen- 
tence  that  follows,  where  the  religion  of  the  Roman  Catholicks  and  their  fu- 
perllition  are  diftinguifhed  from  each  other  in  exprefs  words.  But  the 
terms  in  queftion  are  uftd  with  the  flri(5le{l  propriety.  The  defign  of  the 
Bifhop,  in  tiiis  part  of  his  Charge,  is  to  confider  religion,  not  under  the  no- 
tion of  its  being  true,  but  as  it  aftedls  the  fenfes  and  im<)ginations  of  the  mul- 
titude. For  fo  the  paragraph  begins.  "  That  which  men /mt^^  afcoan/^^  re- 
ligion in  the  feveral  countries  of  the  world,"  (whether  the  religion  be  true 
or  falfe  is  befide  his  prefent  argument)  "  generally  fpeaking,  has  had  a  great 
and  confpicuous  part  in  all  puHlick  appearances."  This  pofjtion  he  illuf- 
trates  by  three  examples,  tlie  Heathen,  the  Mahometan,  and  the  Roman 
Catholick  religions.  The  two  firft  of  thefe,  having  little  or  nothing  of  true 
religion  belonging  to  them,  may  well  enough  be  chara61erized  under  the 
common  name  of  fuperflition;  the  la  ft  contains  a  mixture  of  both,  which 
therefore  the  Bifhop,  like  a  good  writer  as  well  as  a  juft  reafoner,  is  careful 
to  diftinguiili.  In  Roman  Catholick  countries  a  man  can  hardly  travel  a  mile 
without  palFmg  a  crucifix  eredled  on  the  road  fide  ;  he  may  either  ftop  to 
worfhip  the  imcige  reprefented  on  the  crofs,  or  he  may  fimply  be  reminded 
by  it  of  his  own  relation  to  Chrift  crucified  ;  thus  by  one  and  the  fame  out- 
ward fign  "  religion  may  be  recalled  to  his  thoughts,"  or  fuperftition  may 
take  polfeiTion  of  his  mind.  In  the  celebration  of  the  eucharift,  the  elements 
of  bread  and  wine  are  regarded  by  a  papift  as  the  ve.y  body  and  blood  of 
Chriil — tr>  a  proteftant  they  appear  only  a:  fymbols  and  memorials  of  that 
body  and  blood  ;  what  in  one  is  an  aft  of  rational  devotion,  becomes  in  the 
other  an  inftance  of  the  groffeft  fuperftition,  if  not  idolatry. 


Clergy  of  Durham^  ^  7  5  ^  •  375 

alfo  into  the  minds  of  fuch  among  them  as  are  ferious 
and  well  difpofed.  Our  reformers,  confidering  that 
fome  of  thefe  obfervances  were  in  themfelves  wrong 
and  fuperftitious,  and  others  of  them  max:ie  fubfervi- 
ent  to  the  purpofes  of  fuperftition,  abohfhed  them, 
reduced  the  form  of  reHgion  to  great  fimpHcity,and  en- 
joined no  more  particular  rules,  nor  left  any  thing  more 
of  what  was  external  in  religion  than  was,  in  a  man- 
ner, neceflary  to  preferve  a  fenfe  of  religion  itfelf  up- 
on the  minds  of  the  people.  But  a  great  part  cf  this 
is  neglefted  by  the  generality  amongft  us^  for  inilance, 
the  fervice  of  the  Church,  not  only  upon  common 
days,  but  alfo  upon  faints'  days ;  and  feveral  other 
things  might  be  mentioned.  Thus  they  have  no  cuf- 
tomary  admonition,  no  publick  call  to  recollect  the 
thoughts  of  God  and  Religion  from  one  Sunday 
to  another. 

It  was  far  otherwife  under  the  Law.  Thefe  zvords, 
fays  Mofes  to  the  children  of  Israel,  which  I  com- 
mand  thee^  fJiall  be  in  thine  heart  ;  and  thou  flialt  teach 
them  diligently  unto  thv  children^  and  fhalt  talk  of  them 
when  thou  fittefi  in  thine  hoife,  and  when  thou  walk- 
eji  bv  the  way^  and  when  thou  Heft  downy  and  when  thou 
rifefi  up.^     And  as  they  were  cori^manded  this,  fo  it 

is 

*  ^nd  iv/ien  thou  rifejl  up."]  Allowing  that  "  what  Mofes  in  this  paflage 
wanted  to  have  effedled  was  ohedience  to  the  moral  law,"  nothing  fure  could 
be  of  greater  ufe  in  fecuring  that  obedience  than  the  pra<5lice  here  enjoined. 
Our  [n-juirer  however  is  of  a  different  opinion  ;  and  •*  very  much  queftion'j 
whether  his  Lordfliip  could  have  fallen  upon  any  palTage  in  the  Old  Tefta- 
ment,  which  relates  at  all  to  his  fubjedl,  that  would  have  been  lefs  favoura- 

ble  to  his  argunnent."     f^ylio  jhall  decide  ?  &c. The  Bilhop  goes  on,  "  As 

tteey  (the  Jews)  were  commanded  this,  fo  it  is  obvious  how  much  the  confti- 
tution  of  their  law  was  adapted  to  effe<5l  it,  and  keep  religion  ever  in  view." 
Upon  which  the  Inquirer  remarks,  "  It  was  then  very  ill,  or  at  leaft  very 
unwifely  done,  to  abrogate  that  law,  whofe  conftitution  was  adapted  to  fo 
excellent  a  purpofe."  Let  us  firft  fee  what  may  be  offered  in  defence  of  the 
Bifhop,  and  then  confider  what  is  to  be  faid  in  anfwer  to  his  opponent.  The 
purpofe  for  which  the  Mofaick  conftitution  was  eitablilhed  was  this,  to  pre- 
serve, amidfl  a  world  univerfally  addi(5ted  to  polytheifm  and  idchCry,  the 
great  do(5lrine  of  the  Unity  of  the  Divine  Nature,  ////  the  feed  JlMid  come  to 
•whom  the  promife  was  made.  As  a  means  to  this  end,  the  Ifraelites  were  not 
only  to  be  kept  feparate  from  every  other  nation,  but,  the  better  to  enfure 
fuch  feparation,  they  were  to  be  conftantly  employed  in  a  multifarious  ritual, 

which 


376  Charge  to  the 

is  obvious  how  much  the  conftitution  of  that  lav<r  was5 
adapted  to  effedb  it,  and  keep  reHgion  ever  in  view. 
And  without  fomcwhat  of  this  nature,  piety  will  grow 
languid  even  among  the  better  fort  of  men  ;  and  the 
woril  will  go  on  quietly  in  an  abandoned  coiirle,  with 
fewer  interruptions  frorii  within  than  they  would  have, 
were  religious  reflexions  forced  oftener  upon  their 
minds,*  and  confequently  with  lefs  probability  of  their 
amendment.  Indeed  in  moft  ages  of  the  church,  the 
care  of  reafonable  men  has  been,  as  there  has  been  for 
the  moft  part  occafion,  to  draw  the  people  off  fronl; 
laying  too  great  weight  upon  external  things  ;  upon 
formal  afts  of  piety.  But  the  ftate  of  matters  is  quite, 
chariged  now  with  us.  Thefe  things  are  negleded  to 
a  degree  which  is,  and  cannot  but  be,  attended  with  a 

decay 

vs'hich  left  them  neither  time  nor  opportunity  for  deviating  into  the  fupei- 
ftitious  r.bfervances  of  their  pagan  neighbours.  And  this,  I  fuppofe,  ma/ 
fuffice  for  vindicating  the  Bifhop's  alfertion,  that  "  the  conftitution  of  the 
Tevvifh  law  was  adapted  to  keep  religion  ever  in  view."  But  the  Jewifh 
law  was  not  only  adapted  to  this  end  ;  we  arc  next  to  ohferve  that  the  end 
itfelf  was  adlually  gained.  For  though  it  be  too  notorious  to  be  denied,  that 
the  Jews  did  not  always  confine  their  religious  homage  to  the  God  of  Ifrael; 
but  polluted  the  fervice,  due  to  Him  alone,  with  foreign  worfhip, — yet, even 
in  their  worft  defeftions,  it  fhould  be  remembered,  they  never  totally  re- 
ip(5ted  the  true  Jehovah  ;  and  after  their  return  from  captivity,  they  were  fo 
thoroughly  cu  ed  of  all  remaining  propeufity  to  the  idolatrous  rites  of  hea 
thenifm,  as  never  again  to  violate  their  allegiance  to  the  God  of  their  fathers, 
it  appears  then  that,  in  confequence  of  the  Jewi(h  feparation,  the  principle 
of  the  Unity  was  in  faft  preferved  inviolate  among  that  people  till  the  com- 
ing of  Chrifl.  When  the  Mofaick.  conflitution  had  thus  attained  its  end,  and 
mankind  were  now  prepared  for  the  reception  of  a  better  covenant,  the  law 
expired  of  courfe  ;  the  partition  wall  that  had  divided  the  Jew  from  t.he 
Gentile  was  taken  down,  and  all  dillinaion  between  them  lofl  under  the 
common  iiame  of  Chriftians.  And  this  may  fuffice  to  Ihew,  in  oppofition  to 
our  Irf^uirfr,  that  it  was  both  very  well  and  very  nuifely  done  to  abrogate  a 
law,  when  the  purpofe  for  wJiich  the  law  had  been  enadled  was  accompliftied, 

*  Were  religious  refiei5lions/orc/-(/  oftener  upon  their  minds.]  ''  Accord- 
ing to  the  Bifhop's  doftrine,  then,"  fays  tlie  Inquirer,  "  it  fhould  be  not  only 
rood  policy,  but  wholefome  difcipline  ro/orcc  men  in  England  to  come  to 
church,  and  in  France  to  go  to  mafs."  And  again,  "  If  externals  have  this 
virtue  to  enforce  religious  reflexions,  it  muft  be  right  to  compel  thofe  who  are 
indifpofed  to  fuch  refleaions  to  attend  thefe  memorials."  Yes  ;  granting 
that  the  fenfe  of  the  palLige  in  the  Charge  is  not  IhamefuUy  perverted,  and 
4hat  we  are  to  underfland  the  Bifhop  here  to  fpeak  of  external  force  and  com- 
pulfion.  Whereas  by  "  religious  refie^t'ions  forced,"  is  plainly  meant  no  more 
than  religious  refleftions  oftener  throivn  in  men's  luay,  brought  more  frequently 
into  their  thought^,  fo  as  to  produce  an  habitual  recolleftion  that  they  are  al- 
ways in  the  divine  prefence. 


Clergy  of  Durham^  ^  7 5  ^  •  377 

decay  of  all  that  is  good.  It  is  highh^  feafonablc  now 
to  inftruft  the  people  in  the  importance  of  external 
religion.* 

And  doubtlefs  under  this  head  muft  come  into 
confideration  a  proper  regard  to  the  ftrudures  which 
are  confecrated  to  the  {ervice  of  God.  In  the  prefent 
turn  of  the  age,  one  may  obferve  a  wonderful  frugali- 
ty in  every  thing  which  has  refpe(5L  to  religion,  and  ex- 
travagance in  every  thing  elfe.  But  amidft  the  ap- 
pearances of  opulence  and  improvement  in  all  common 
things,  whi&Ji  are  now  fcen  in  mofl  places,  it  would 
be  hard  to  fjnd  a  reafon  why  thefe  monuments  of  an- 
cient piety  rhould  not  be  preferved  in  their  original 
beauty  and  magnificence.  But  in  the  leafh  opulent 
places  they  muft  be  preferved  in  becoming  repair ; 
and  every  thing  relating  to  the  divine  fervice  be,  how- 
ever, decent  and  clean  ;  otherwife  we  (hall  vilify  the 
face  of  religion  whilft  we  keep  it  up.  All  this  is  in- 
deed principally  the  duty  of  others.  Yours  is  to  prefs 
ftrongly  upon  them  what  is  their  duty  in  this  refped, 
and  admonilh  them  of  it  often,  if  they  are  negligent. 

But  then  you  muft  be  fure  to  take  care  and  not 
negledt  that  part  of  the  facred  fabrick  which  belongs 
to  you  to  maintain  in  repair  and  decency.  Such  neg- 
le<5t  would  be  great  impiety  in  you,  and  of  moft  per- 
nicious 

*  To  inftriKft  the  people  in  the  importance  of  external  religion.]  "  The 
importance  of  external  religion,"  the  Inquirer  remarks,  "  is  the  grand  engine 
of  the  papifts,  which  they  play  with  the  greatefl  effcft  upon  our  common 
people,  who  are  always  foonefl  taken  and  enfnared  by /«?■'!  and yS^io  ;  and, 
fo  far  as  we  concur  with  them  in  the  principle,  we  are  doing  their  work  ; 
fmce  if  externals,  as  fuch,  are  important,  the  plain  natural  confequei.ee  is, 
the  more  of  t  him  I  he  letter."  He  had  the  fame  reflection  once  before — "  If  true 
religion  cannot  be  preferved  among  men  w'll'aoMlfiinn^,  the  coniequence  mufl 

be  that  the  R^miJJi  religion,  having mr.re  fre.wnt  occurrences  of  forms,  is 

beUer  than  other  religions  which  have  ft^et  of  theie occurrences."     To 

this  argument  I  reply,  h'ego  confequattiam.  There  may  be  too  much  of  form 
in  religion,  a5  well  as  too  little' ;" the  one  leads  to  enthufiafnv  the  other  de- 
generates into  luperftition  ;  one  is  puritaiiihn,  the  other  popery — wherca? 
the  rational  worihip  of  God  is  equally  removed  from  either  extreme.  Did 
the  Injuirer  never  hear  of  tne  pofiibiUty  of  having  too  much  of  a  good  thing  >" 
Or  does  he  fuppolV,  v-ith  the  late  hiftoVian  of  Great  Britain,  that  all  reliff>on 
is  divided  into  two  foecies,  tlie  fuperilirious  and  the  fanatical  ;  and  tij.it 
whatever  is  noi  one  of  thefe  nmll  of  neceiiity  be  the  other  r 

A  a 


j»7^  ::  y-iO/iai'^e  f&  the 

picioiis  example  to  others.  Nor  could  y6u,  with  any 
i-ucGefs,  or  any  propriety,  urge  upon  them  their  duty 
in  a  regard  in  which  you  yourfeives  fhould  be  openly 
negledtulof  it. 

Bifhop  Fleetwood  has  obferved,*  that  tmlefs  the 
good  piihlick  Jpirit  of  building,  repairing,  and  adorning 
churches  prevails  a  great  deal  more  among  us,  and  he 
more  encouraged,  an  hundred  years  will  bring  to  the 
ground  an  huge  number  of  our  churches.  This  excellent 
prelate  made  this  obfervation  forty  years  ago  ;  and  no 
one,  I  believe,  will  imagine  that  the  good^fpirit  he  has 
recommended  prevails  more  at  prefent  'than  it  did 
then. 

But  if  thefe  appendages  of  the  divine  fervice  are  to 
be  regarded,  doubtlefs  the  divine  fervice  itfelf  is  more 
to  be  regarded  ;  and  the  confcientious  attendance  up- 
on it  Ought  often  to  be  inculcated  upon  the  people, 
as  a  plain  precept  of  the  Gofpel,  as  the  means  of  grace, 
and  what  has  peculiar  promifes  annexed  to  it.  But 
external  a6:s  of  piety  and  devotion,  and  the  frequent 
returns  of  them  are,  moreover,  neceffary  to  keep  up  a 
fenfe  of  religion,  which  the  affairs  of  the  v/orld  will 
otherwife  wear  out  of  mien's  hearts.  And  the  fre- 
quent returns,  whether  of  publick  devotions,  or  of 
any  thing  elfe,  to  introduce  religion  into  men's  feri- 
ous  thoughts,  will  have  an  influence  upon  them  in 
proportion  as  they  are  fufceptible  of  religion,  and  not 
given  over  to  a  reprobate  mind.  For  this  reafon,  be- 
sides others,  the  fervice  of  the  church  ought  to  be 
celebrated  as  often  as  you  can  have  a  congregation  to 
attend  it.  .biuh  : 

But  fince  the  body  of  the  people,  efpecially  in 
country  places,  cannot  be  brought  to  attend  it  often- 
er  than  one  day  in  a  week,  and  lince  this  is  in  no  fort 
enough  to  keep  up  in  them  a  due  fenfe  of  religion,  it 
were  greatly  to  be  wiflied  they  could  be  periuaded  to 

any 

*  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  St.  Afaph,  i  its. 


Clergy  pf  Durham^  1 7  5 1 .  379 

any  thing  which  might,  in  fome  meafxire,  ■  fupply  the 
want  of  more  frequent  pubHck  devotions,  or  ferve  the 
like  purpofes.  Family  prayers,  regularly  kept  up  in 
every  houfe,  would  have  a  great  good  effect. 

Secret  prayer,  as  exprefsly  as  it  is  commanded  by 
pur  Saviour,  and  as  evidently  as  it  is  implied  in  the 
notion  of  piety,  will  yet,  I  fear,  be  grievoufiy  forgot- 
ten by  the  generality,  until  they  can  be  brought  to  fix 
for  theiiifelves  certain  times  of  the  day  for  it  i  lince 
this  is  not  done  to  their  hands,  as  it  was  in  the  Jew- 
ifh  church  by  cuftom  or  authority.  Indeed,  cuftom, 
as  well  as  the  manifeft  propriety  of  the  thing,  and  ex-^ 
amples  of  good  men  in  Scripture,  juftify  us  in  infifting, 
that  none  omit  their  prayers  morning  or  evening,  who 
have  not  thrown  off  all  regards  to  piety.  But  fecret 
prayer  comprehends  not  only  devotions  before  men 
begin  and  after  they  have  ended  the  bufinefs  of  tlae 
day,  but  fuch  alfo  as  may  be  performed  while  they  are 
employed  in  it,  or  even  in  company.  And. truly,  if 
befides  our  more  fet  devotions, -morning  and  evening, 
_all  of  us  would  fix  upon  certain  times  of  .the  day,  lb 
that  the  return  of  the  hour  Ihould  remind  us  to  fay 
Ihort  prayers,  or  exercife  our  thoughts  in  a  way  equiv- 
alent to  this,  perhaps  there  are  few  perfons  in  lo  high 
.and  habitual  a  ftate  of  piety,  as  not  to  find  the  benefit 
of  it.  If  it  took  up  no  more  than  a  minute  or  two, 
.or  even  lefs  time  than  that,  it  would  ferve  the  end  I 
am  propqfing  ;  it  would  be  a  recolledion  that  we  are 
in  tlie  Divine  Prefence,  and  contribute  to  our  ■hingJn 
t^e  fear  of  the  Lqrd  all  the  day  Jong,  "'-'■' 

A  duty  of  the  like  kind,  and  ferving  to  the  fame 
purpofe,  is  the  particular  acknowledgment  of  God 
when  we  are  partaking  of  his  bounty  at  our  meals. 
The  negled  of  this  is  faid  to  have  been  fcandalous  to 
a  proverb  in  the  heathen  world  ;*  but  it  is  without 

iliame 

*  Cudworth  on  the  Lord's  Supper,  p.  ?.     Cafaub.  in  Atheaasum,  L.  i.  c 
xi.  p.  22.     Duport.  Prsel.  in  Theo.phraftum  Ed,  Needham.  C.  ix.  p.  335,  &i;. 


380  -^IX^tyiarge-fo  tJteT^^' 

fhame  laid  afide  at  the  tables  of  the  higlieCt  and  the 
ioweft  rank,  among  us.  s  05  ^^.oi:.::. 

And  as'parents  fhould  be  admonifhbdi'^fld  it" ^6uld 
be  prefled  upon  their  confciences,  to  teach  their  chil- 
'dren  their  pra3!^ers  and  eatechifm,  it  being  what  they 
are  obHged  to  upon  all  accounts,  fo  it  is  proper  to  be 
mentioned  here,  as  a  mearits  by  which  they  will  bring 
the  principles  of  Chriftianity  often  totheir  6wn  minds, 
inftead  of  laying  afide  all  thoughts  of-  it-from  week's 
end  to -week's  end.  . :      'c    ,  :    ;i  lijw  . : 

General  exhortations  to  piety,  abftrafted  from  the 
particular  circumfkances^  of  it^  are  of  great  ule  to  fuch 
as  are  already  got  into- a- religious  courfe  of  life  ;  but 
fuch  as  are  not,  though  they  be  touched  with  them, 
yet  when  they  go -away  from  cl^urch  they  fcarceknow 
whereto  begin,  or  how  to' fet  about  what  they  are 
exhorted  to.  And  it  is  with  refpe£t  to  religion  as 
in  the  common  affairs  of  life,  in  which  many  things  of 
great  confequence  intended  are  yet  never  done  at  all, 
becaufe  they  may  be  done  at  any  time,  and  in  any 
manner  ;  which  would  not  be,  were  fome  determin- 
ate time  and  manner  voluntarily  fixed  upon  for  the 
doing  of  them.  Particular  rules  and  dire<^ions,  then, 
concerning  the  times  and  circumftances  of  perform- 
ing acknowledged  duties,  bring  religion  nearer  to  prac- 
tice ;  and  fuch  as  are  really  proper^  and  cannot  well 
be  miftaken,  and  are  eafily  obferved.  Such  particu- 
lar rules  in  religion,  prudently  recommended,  would 
have  an  influence  upon  the  people.  "-^  —  -  -  ' 

All  this  indeed  may  be  called  form,  as  every -fliiftg 
external  in  religion  may  be  merely  fo.  And  there- 
fore whilft  we  endeavour  in  thefe,  and  other  like  in- 
ftances,  to  keep  up  t\it-'formof  godlinefs*  amongft 
thofe  who  are  our  care,  and  over  whom  we  have  any 
influence,  we  mud  endeavour  alfo  that  this  form  be 
made  more  and  more  fubfervient  to  promote  \\\q  power 
of  it.  *     Admoniib  them  to  take  heed  that  they  mean 

.    what 

*  *  a  Tim.  iii.  5, 


Clergy  of  Durham,  1 7  5  x  •  381 

ivvhat  they  fay  in  their  prayers,  that  their  thoughts  and 

intentions  go  along  with  thdr  words,  that  they  really 

jiin  their  hearts  exert  and  exercife  before  God  the  af- 

-fedions  they  exprefs  with  their  mouth.    Teach  them, 

-  not  that  external  religion  is  nothing,  for  this  is  not 
rtrue  in  any  fenfe ;  it  being  fcarce  poiTible  but  that 

it  will  lay  fome  fort  of  reftraint  upon  a  man's  morals ; 
and  it  is  moreover  of  good  eflfed  with  refpeO:  to  the 
world  about  him.     But  teach  them  that  regard  to 
one  duty  will  in  no  fort  atone  for  the  negle£l  of  any 
•other.     Endeavour  to  raife  in  their  hearts  fuch  a  fenfe 
^  of  God  as  (hall  be  an  habitual,  ready  principle  of 
:  reverence,  love,  gratitude,  hope,  truft,  relignation  and 
obedience.     Exhort  them  to  make  ufe  of  every  cir- 
curaflance  which  brings  the  fubjecl  of  religion  at  ail 
before  them  ;  to  turn  their  hearts  habitually  to  him  -, 
to  recolledt  ferioully  th^  thoughts  of  his  prefence  in 
•  ^'kom  they  live  and  move  cud  have  their  being,  and  by 
a  ihort  aft  of  their  mind  devote  themfelves  to  his  fer- 
•-yice.    :If,  for  inftance,  perions  would  accuftom  them- 
-felves  to  be  thus-adraonilhed  by  the  very  fight  of  a 
-,  -pKiJjR.  c ifi  could  it  be  called  fuperftition  ?   Enforce  up- 
on therQ  the  necefiity  of  making  rehgion  their  principal 

-  concern,  as  what  is  the  exprefs  condition  of  the  gofpel 
, -covenant,  and  what  the  very  nature  of  the  thing  re- 
quires. Explain  to  them  the  terms  of  that  covenant 
ot  mercy,  founded  in  the  incarnation,  lacritice  and  in- 
terceifion  ofCnRiST, together  with  the  promifed  aihil- 
ance  ot  the  FIoly  Ghost,  not  to  fuperfede  our  own 

-  endeavours,  but  to  render  them  efledtual.  The  great- 
er feflivals  of  the  church  being  inftituted  for  com- 
memorating the  feveral  parts  of  the  gofpel  hiilory,  of 
courfe  lead  you  to  explain  thefe  itsieveral  doctrines, 
and  fhew  the  Chriitian  practice  which  arifpsout  of 
them.  And  the  more  occaiional  folemnitics , of  relig- 
ion, as  well  as  thefe  feftivals,  will  often  afford  you  the 
faireft  opportunities  of  enforcing  ail  thefe  things  in 
.     .  familiar 


382  -i'l    charge  to  the 

familiar  conTerfaticm.  Indeed  all  offeBation  of  talk-- 
ing  pioufly  is  quite  naufeous  ;  and  though  there  be 
nothing  of  this,  yet  men  will  eafily  be  difgufted  at 
the  too  great  frequency  or  length  of  thefe  occafional 
admonitions.  But  a  word  of  God  and  Religion 
dropped  fometimes  in  converfation  gently,  and  with- 
out any  thing  fevere  or  forbidding  in  the  manner  of  it, 
this  is  not  unacceptable.  It  leaves  an  imprefTion,  is 
repeated  again  by  the  hearers,  and  often  remembered 
by  plain  well  difpofed  perfons  longer  than  one  would 
think.  Particular  circumftances  too  which  render 
men  more  apt  to  receive  inftruftion,  l}i,ould  be  laid 
hold  of  to  talk  ferioufly  to  their  confciences.  For  in- 
ftance,  after  a  man's  recovery  from  a  dangerous  fick- 
nefs,  how  proper  is  it  to  advife  him  to  recoiiedt  and 
ever  bear  in  mind,  w4iat  were  his,  hopes  or  fears,  kis^ 
wilhes  and  refolutions  when  under  the  apprehenlion  of 
death,  in  order  to  bring  him  to  repentance,  or  confirm 
him  in  a  courfe  of  piety,  according  as  his  life  and  char- 
ader  has  been.  So  likewife  the  terrible  accidents  which 
often  happen  from  riot  and  debauchery,  and  indeed; 
almoft  every  vice,  are  occafions  providentially  thrown- 
in  your  way  to  difcourfe  againft  thefe  vices  in  common 
converfation,  as  well  as  from  the  pulpit,  upon  any  luch 
accidents  happening  in  your  parifh,  or  in  a  neighbour- 
ing one.  Occafions  and  circumftances  of  alike  kind 
to  fome  or  other  of  thefe  occur  often,  and  ought,  if  I 
may  io  fpeak,  to  be  catched  at,  as  opportunities  of  con- ' 
veying  inlfrudion,  both  publick  and  private,  with 
^reat  force  and  advantage. 

-  :Publick  inftru6tion  is  alfo  abfolutely  neceffary,  and 
can  in  no  fort  be  dify;enled  with.  But  as  it  is  com- 
mon to  ail  who  are  prefent,  many  perfons  ftrangeiy" 
negiedtto  appropriate  what  they  hear  to  themfelves, 
to  their  own  heart  and  hfe.  Now  the  only  remedy 
for  this  in  our  power  is  a  particular  perfonal  applica- 
tion. A. ad  a  perfonal  application  makes  a  very  dif- 
ferent 


Clergy  of  Durham^  ^  7  5 1  •  3^3 

ferent  impreffion  from  a  common,  general  one.  It 
were  therefore  greatly  to  be  wifhed,  that  every  man 
fhould  have  the  principles  of  Chriftianity,  and  his  own 
particular  duty  enforced  upon  his  confcience,  in  a 
manner  fuited  to  his  capacity,  in  private.  And  be- 
lides  the  occafional  opportunities  of  doing  this,  fome 
of  which  have  been  intimated,  there  are  fbated  oppor-. 
tunities  of  doing  it.  Such,  for  inftance,  is  confirm^' 
tion ;  and  the  ulual  age  for  confirmation  is  that  tims 
of  life,  from  which  youth  muft  become  more  and 
more  their  own  maflers,  when  they  are  often  leaving 
their  father's  houfe,  going  out  into  the  wide  world  and 
all  its  numerous  temptations  ;  againft  which  they  par- 
ticularly want  to  be  fortified,  by  having  ftrong  and 
lively  imprefiions  of  religion  made  upon  their  minds. 
Now  the  6ift  canon  exprefsly  requires,  that  every 
minifler  that  hath  care  of  fouls  fnall  ufe  his  beft  en- 
deavour to  prepare  and  make  able — as  many  as  he  can 
to  be  confirmed  ;  which  cannot  be  done  as  it  ought 
without  fuch  pcrfonal  application  to  each  candidate  in 
particular  as  I  am  recommending.  Another  opportu- 
nity fordoing  this  is,  when  any  one  of  your  pariihioners 
fignifies  his  name,  as  intending  for  the  firfl  time  to  be 
partaker  of  the  communion.  The  rubrick  requires 
that  all  perfons,  whenever  they  intend  to  receive,  fhali 
fignify  their  names  beforehand  to  the  minifler  ;  which, 
if  it  be  not  infifted  upon  in  all  cafes,  ought  abfolutely 
to  be  infilled  upon  for  the  firft  time.  Now  this  even, 
jays  it  in  your  way  to  difcourfe  with  them  in  private 
upon  the  nature  and  benefits  of  this  facrament,  and  en- 
force upon  them  the  importance  and  neceffity  of  re- 
ligion. However,  I  do  not  mean  to  put  this  upon 
the, fame  foot  with  catechifmg  youth  and  preparing 
them  for  confirmation  ;  thefe  being  indifpenfable  ob- 
ligations, and  exprefsly  commanded  by  our  canons. 
This  private  intercoude  with  your  pariihioners  prepar- 
atory to  their  firfl  communion,  let  it,  if  you  pleafe,  be 

confidered 


5^4  'Charge  to  the 

confidercd  as  a  voluntary  fervice  to  religion  on  your 
part,  and  a  voluntary  inftance  of  docility  on  theirs. 
I  will  only  add  as  to  this  praftice,  that  it  is  regularly 
kept  up  byfome  perfons,and  particularly  by  one,  whoie 
exemplary  behaviour  in  every  part  of  the  paftoral  of- 
iice  is  enforced  upon  you  by  his  ftation  of  authority 
and  influence  in  (this  pait*  efpecially  of)  the  diocefe. 
I  am  very  fenfible,  my  brethren,  that  ftime  of  thefe 
things,  in  places  where  they  are  greatly  wanted,  are  im-. 
pradlicable  from  the  largenefs  of  parilhes,  fuppofci 
And  where  there  is  no  impediment  of  this  fort,  yet  the 
performance  of  them  will  depend  upon  others,  as  well 
as  upon  you.  People  cannot  be  admoniflied  or  in- 
flruded  in  private,  unlefs  they  will  permit  it.  And 
little  will  you  be  able  to  do  in  forming  the  minds  of 
children  to  a  fenfe  of  religion,  if  their  parents  will  not 
affift  you  in  it ;  and  yet  much  lefs,  if  they  will  fruftrate 
your  endeavours,  by  their  bad  example,  and  giving 
encouragement  to  their  children-  to  be  diflbliite.  The 
like  is  to  be  faid  alfo  of  3^our  influence  in  reforming 
the  common  people  in  general,  in  proportion  as  their 
fuperiors  aft  in  like  manner  to  fuch  parents  ;  and 
whilfl  they,  the  lower  people  I  mean,  muft  have  fuch 
numerous  temptations  to  drunkennefs  and  riot  every 
where  placed  in  their  way.  And  it  is  cruel  ufage  we 
often  meet  with,  in  being  cenfured  for  not  doing  what 
we  cannot  do,  without,  what  we  cannot  have,  the  con- 
currence of  our  cenlurers,  Doubtlefs  very  much  re- 
proach which  now  lights  upon  the  clergy  would  be 
tound  to  flill  eUewhere,  if  due  allowances  were  made 
for  things  of  this  kind.  But  then  we,  rny  brethren, 
muft  take  care  and  not  make  more  than  due  allow- 
ances for  them.  If  others  deal  uncharitably  with  u?, 
we  muft  deal  impartially  with  purfelves,  as  in  a  piatter 
of  confcience,  in  determining  what  good  is  in  our 
power  to  (^0  j  and  not  let  indolence  keep  us  from  fct- 

ting 

*  T].f  Archdeaconrr  of  JitrthumlerUnd^ 


Clergy  of  Durham,  1 7  5 1 .  385 

ting  about  what  really  is  in  our  power,  nor  any  heat 
of  temper  create  obllades  in  the  profecution  of  it,  or 
render  infuperabie  luch  as  we  find,  when  perhaps  gen- 
tlenefs  and  patience  would  prevent  or  overcome  them. 

Indeed  all  this  diligence  to  which  I  have  been  ex- 
horting you  and  myfelf,  for  God  forbid  I  fhouid  not 
confider  myfelf  as  included  in  all  the  general  admoni- 
tions you  receive  fi-om  m.e  ;  all  this  diligence  in  thefe 
things  does  indeed  fuppofe  that  we  give  ourfehes  zvhol- 
ly  to  them.  It  fuppofes,  not  only  that  we  ha.ve  a  real 
fenfe  of  religion  upon  our  own  minds,  but  alfo,  that 
to  promote  the  practice  of  it  in  others  is  habitually  up- 
permofl:  in  our  thought  and  intention,  as  the  bufinefs 
of  o.ur  lives.  And  this,  my  brethren,  is  the  bufmefs 
of  otir  lives,  in  every  fenfe,  and  upon  every  account. 
It  is  the  general  bufmefs  of  ail  Chriftians  as  they  have 
opportunity.;  it  is  our  particular  bufinefs.  It  is  fo,  as 
we  have  devoted  ourfelves  to  it  by  the  moft  folemn 
engagements  ;  as  according  to  our  Lord's  appointment 
we  live  of  the  Gofpel  ;*  and  as  the  prefervation  and  ad- 
vancement of  religion,  in  fuch  and  fuch  diftrifts,  are,  in 
fome  refpeds,  our  appropriated  truft. 

By  being  faithful  in  the  difcharge  of  this  our  truft, 
by  thus  taking  heed  to  the  minijiry  we  have  received  in 
the  Lord  that  we  fulfil  it^-f  we  fl:iali  do  cur  part  to- 
vvards  reviving  a  practical  fenfe  of  religion  amongft  the 
people  committed  to  our  care.  And  this  will  be  the 
fecurefk  barrier  againft  the  efforts  of  infidelity  ;  a  great 
fource  of  which  plainly  is,  the  endeavour  to  get  rid  of 
religious  reftraints.  But  whatever  be  our  fuccefs  with 
regard  to  others,  v»^e  fhall  have  the  approbation  of  our 
confciences,  and  may  reft  aflured  that,  as  to  ourfelves 
s.t  leaft,  our  labour  is  not  in  vain  in.  the  Lord."]; 

*  I  Cor.  ix.  14.  f  Col.  iv.  17.  +  r  Cor.  xv.  58. 

F       IN       IS. 


Date  Due 

c^  W€<-Uz 

ii^^i&Mi^MSKKi^ 

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